Nessia vs. Fermin

A public official who maliciously refuses or neglects to act on a matter pending before him—neither approving nor disapproving it—may be held liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code, even if the claims involved exceed budgetary appropriations and could not be compelled by mandamus; official inaction is not equivalent to disapproval and must be distinguished from it.

Petitioner Jose V. Nessia served as Deputy Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, where respondent Jesus M. Fermin was the Municipal Mayor. Nessia incurred travel and food expenses in the performance of his official duties and sought reimbursement through vouchers that required Fermin's approval. The dispute arose in the context of the 1980 local elections, during which Fermin had reportedly requested all municipal officials to register and vote in Victorias—a request Nessia defied. Article 27 of the Civil Code provides judicial relief to any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty.

Petitioner Jose V. Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, where respondent Jesus M. Fermin served as Municipal Mayor. In the performance of his official duties, Nessia incurred travel and food expenses and submitted vouchers to Fermin for reimbursement. The complaint filed by Nessia theorized that Fermin deliberately ignored and caused the non-payment of these vouchers because Nessia had defied Fermin's request that all municipal officials register and vote in Victorias during the 1980 local elections.

Fermin disputed the allegations, countering that Nessia's claims could not be approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations therefor. The Municipality of Victorias concurred with Fermin's arguments and added that Nessia was himself blamable for his predicament, as he neither gave Fermin justification for drawing funds in excess of appropriations nor amended his vouchers to conform to the budget. Issues were joined and the parties presented evidence, except for Victorias, which was declared in default for non-appearance at the pre-trial conference.

The trial court found that Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers, bolstered by his inaction on Nessia's follow-up letters inquiring on their status. It ruled that the vouchers were received by Fermin's secretary, negating his contention that they were never received. Even if the vouchers had not reached him, the trial court held Fermin answerable because he should have inquired into their whereabouts upon receipt of Nessia's follow-up letters. This finding was supported by Fermin's own admission at trial that he did nothing on the vouchers. The trial court awarded Nessia P1,424.75 for reimbursement, P10,000 as moral damages, P2,000 as exemplary damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees, with costs.

Both Nessia and Fermin appealed to the Court of Appeals—Nessia praying for an increase in moral and exemplary damages, and Fermin seeking exoneration. The Municipality of Victorias did not appeal. The appellate court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, reasoning that the complaint itself and Nessia's testimony admitted Fermin had acted on the vouchers by denying or refusing the claims. The Court of Appeals further held that the vouchers were not shown to have been received by Fermin and, even if received, could not be approved because they were submitted late and were not supported by an appropriation. Nessia then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Procedural — Finality as Against Victorias: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals could not reverse the trial court's decision insofar as it had become final and executory as against the Municipality of Victorias, which failed to appeal.
• Procedural — Affirmative Relief to Non-Appellant: Petitioner contended that the appellate court could not grant affirmative relief to Victorias, which did not appeal the trial court's decision.
• Substantive — Malicious Refusal Under Art. 27: Petitioner maintained that Fermin maliciously refused to act on the vouchers, rendering him liable under Article 27 of the Civil Code, and that the appellate court erred in exonerating him.
• Substantive — Liability of Victorias: Petitioner argued that the dismissal of the complaint by the appellate court erroneously absolved Victorias from liability despite its failure to appeal.

• Lack of Appropriation: Respondent Fermin argued that Nessia's claims could not be approved because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations therefor.
• Inconsistency with Pleading: Respondent contended that Nessia could not claim relief under Article 27 because his theory of unjust inaction was incompatible with the complaint's allegations that Fermin denied or refused the vouchers, citing the rule that a pleader may not contradict his own pleading.
• Non-Receipt of Vouchers: Respondent argued that the vouchers were not shown to have been received by Fermin.
• Victorias's Position: Respondent Municipality of Victorias concurred with Fermin's arguments and added that Nessia was blamable for failing to justify the excess over appropriations or to amend his vouchers accordingly.

• Weight of Trial Court Findings: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's factual findings, particularly on the receipt of the vouchers, given the greater weight accorded to the trial court's appraisal of conflicting testimonies.
• Consistency of Pleading with Theory: Whether Nessia's allegations in the complaint that Fermin "refused" payment were inconsistent with his theory of unjust inaction under Article 27.
• Liability for Malicious Inaction: Whether Fermin could be held liable for damages under Article 27 for malicious inaction on the vouchers, notwithstanding the defense of lack of appropriation.
• Affirmative Relief to Non-Appellant: Whether the Court of Appeals could grant affirmative relief to the Municipality of Victorias, which did not appeal the trial court's decision.

• Weight of Trial Court Findings: No, the appellate court erred. The trial court's appraisal of conflicting testimonies is afforded greater weight and respect than the appellate court's reading of the cold record, and its finding that the vouchers were received should be followed.
• Consistency of Pleading with Theory: No, there was no inconsistency. "Refusal to pay" may be inferred from inaction as well as from disapproval; the complaint's allegations were not contradictory to the theory of unjust inaction.
• Liability for Malicious Inaction: Yes. Fermin could not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers exceeding appropriations, but he could be held liable for damages under Article 27 for malicious inaction, which is distinct from disapproval.
• Affirmative Relief to Non-Appellant: No. A non-appellant cannot obtain affirmative relief from the appellate court beyond what the lower court granted.

• Weight of Trial Court Findings: The trial court's determination that the vouchers were actually received by Fermin's secretary was based on its direct appraisal of conflicting testimonies, which is afforded greater weight and respect than the appellate court's findings drawn merely from reading the records and transcript of stenographic notes. The signature on the transmittal letter, though disputed as not the secretary's customary signature, was not convincingly shown to be not her handwriting. The version favoring receipt carried the presumption of regularity in official acts, especially since the handwritten name closely resembling her signature immediately followed the list of enclosures. Had the enclosures not been received, the secretary should have so indicated; otherwise, it is presumed they were enclosed and properly received. The appellate court's reliance on the cold record could not overcome the trial court's superior vantage point in ascertaining truth and detecting falsehood, as established in Roque vs. Baun.

• Consistency of Pleading with Theory: The allegations in the complaint—that Fermin "refused and continued to refuse the payments thereof" and "refused and continue to refuse to pay"—should not be construed as an admission of disapproval. Refusal to pay is not inferred solely from disapproval of claims but from inaction thereon as well. Accordingly, these allegations were not contradictory to Nessia's theory of unjust inaction. The cases of Sta. Ana vs. Maliwa and Cunanan vs. Amparo, which prohibit a pleader from contradicting his own pleading, were inapplicable because no such contradiction existed.

• Liability for Malicious Inaction: While Fermin could not be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers exceeding budgetary appropriations—consistent with Baldivia vs. Lota, where a politically motivated disapproval was sustained because the mayor was bound to disapprove vouchers not supported by appropriations—he could nevertheless be held liable for damages under Article 27 for malicious inaction. The provision against official inaction is reinforced by Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), which criminalizes neglecting or refusing, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before a public official. Public officials must act expeditiously on matters before them; only by signifying approval or disapproval can a claimant proceed to the next step of the bureaucratic process. Official inaction brings the administrative process to a standstill and cannot be equated with disapproval. Nessia had properly filed a collection case to establish his claim, which he satisfactorily proved.

• Affirmative Relief to Non-Appellant: It is settled that a non-appellant cannot obtain affirmative relief from the appellate court. An appellee who has not appealed cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from, nor assign errors designed to modify it, as held in Medida vs. Court of Appeals. The appellate court's exoneration of Victorias was a consequence of its erroneous dismissal of the entire complaint for lack of cause of action. This matter became irrelevant in light of the Court's conclusion reinstating the trial court's decision.

• Trial Court's Findings of Fact Prevail Over Appellate Court's — The judge who tries a case has vastly superior advantage for ascertaining truth and detecting falsehood over an appellate court sitting as a court of review, which can merely read the cold words of witnesses as transcribed. Where the trial court and the appellate court reach divergent findings, the trial court's appraisal of conflicting testimonies is afforded greater weight and respect, even if both conclusions are supported by evidence. Applied here to sustain the trial court's finding that the vouchers were received by Fermin's secretary.

• Official Inaction Distinguished from Disapproval — Official inaction—neither approving nor disapproving a matter pending before a public official—is not equivalent to disapproval. Public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters before them; inaction brings the administrative process to a standstill and leaves the claimant in uncertainty. A public official may be liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for malicious inaction even where mandamus cannot compel approval of the claim.

• Non-Appellant Cannot Seek Affirmative Relief — An appellee who has not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what the lower court granted. The non-appellant cannot impugn the correctness of the judgment or assign errors designed to modify it, but may only make a counter-assignment of errors or argue issues to sustain the judgment in their favor.

• Presumption of Regularity in Official Acts — Where a transmittal letter bearing the handwritten name of an official's secretary lists enclosures, and the secretary did not indicate that the enclosures were not attached, it is presumed that the enclosures were actually enclosed and properly received by the addressee. This presumption carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of official acts.

• "Refusal to pay is not inferred solely from disapproval of claims but from inaction thereon as well." — This passage resolves the issue of whether Nessia's complaint was inconsistent with his theory of unjust inaction, establishing that refusal encompasses both disapproval and failure to act.

• "Official 'inaction' cannot be equated with 'disapproval.'" — This is the canonical formulation distinguishing the two concepts, central to the holding that Fermin was liable under Article 27 despite the defense of lack of appropriation.

• "[A]n appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below." — This quotation from Medida vs. Court of Appeals, adopted by the Court, articulates the rule that bars a non-appellant from seeking modification of the judgment in its favor on appeal.

• Roque vs. Baun, 21 SCRA 642 (1967) — Followed. Established the doctrine that the trial court's appraisal of conflicting testimonies is afforded greater weight than the appellate court's review of the cold record, due to the trial judge's superior vantage point in ascertaining truth and detecting falsehood.
• Sta. Ana vs. Maliwa, 24 SCRA 1018 (1968) — Cited by respondent but distinguished. Stands for the rule that a pleader may not contradict his own pleading; the Court found no such contradiction existed because refusal to pay encompasses inaction.
• Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 (1948) — Cited by respondent but distinguished. Same rule as Sta. Ana; inapplicable because Nessia's complaint allegations were not inconsistent with his theory of unjust inaction.
• Baldivia vs. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960) — Distinguished. Mandamus could not compel a mayor to approve vouchers not supported by appropriations, even if disapproval was politically motivated. However, the Court noted that the claimant could file a collection case—which is precisely what Nessia did.
• Medida vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 887 (1992) — Followed. Established that a non-appellant cannot obtain affirmative relief from the appellate court beyond what the lower court granted.

• Article 27, Civil Code — Accords judicial relief to any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty. Applied to hold Fermin liable for maliciously refusing to act on Nessia's vouchers.
• Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Criminalizes neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before a public official for the purpose of discriminating against any interested party. Cited as reinforcing Article 27's prohibition against official inaction.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Used by Nessia to elevate the case from the Court of Appeals.
• Circular 1-88, par. 3 — Requires attachment of a certified true copy of the assailed decision. The OSG argued the petition should be dismissed for non-compliance, but the Court found the decision was properly certified by a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Quiason, JJ., concurred.