Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals

A common carrier whose fault is established remains liable for damages to the passengers of its sunken vessel notwithstanding the total loss of the ship and the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law; and findings of fact on the cause of a maritime disaster rendered in a prior case arising from the same event bind the carrier in a subsequent suit under the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, even though the parties are different.

Ramon Miranda purchased four special cabin tickets from the Makati office of Negros Navigation Co., Inc. for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, an interisland passenger vessel plying the Manila–Bacolod route, for his wife Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, his daughter Rosario V. Miranda, his son Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., and his niece Elfreda de la Victoria, who were traveling to Bacolod City for a family reunion. The vessel was owned and operated by petitioner Negros Navigation, while the M/T Tacloban City, the oil tanker with which it collided, was owned by the Philippine National Oil Company and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation. The same collision had earlier been the subject of Mecenas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a separate action brought by other passengers, in which the Supreme Court found both vessels negligent and held Negros Navigation liable for gross negligence.

In April 1980, Ramon Miranda purchased from the Makati office of Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets — Nos. 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 — at P131.30 each, for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was scheduled to leave Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The tickets were for his wife, Ardita de la Victoria Miranda, 48; his daughter, Rosario V. Miranda, 19; his son, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16; and his niece, Elfreda de la Victoria, 26, all of whom were traveling to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion.

The vessel sailed from the port of Manila on schedule. Miranda personally brought his family and his niece to the ship on the day of the voyage and stayed with them on board until it was time for the vessel to leave. At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation. The Don Juan sank, and several of her passengers perished in the tragedy. The bodies of some victims were recovered and brought to shore, but the four members of the Miranda and de la Victoria families were never found.

Edgardo Ramirez, a seminarian and one of the survivors of the collision, testified that he saw Mrs. Miranda and Elfreda de la Victoria on the ship and spoke with them. He knew Mrs. Miranda, who had been his teacher in grade school, and Elfreda, who was his childhood friend and townmate. He was with Mrs. Miranda, her children, and her niece from 7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m., when the collision occurred, and had dinner with them. After dinner he and Elfreda stayed on the deck, where they were jolted by the collision; Elfreda ran to fetch Mrs. Miranda, and after he escorted her to the room and tried to return to the deck, the lights went out and a stampede of passengers coming from the deck prevented him from reaching the cabin.

On July 16, 1980, private respondents filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, against Negros Navigation, PNOC, and PNOC/STC, seeking damages for the deaths of the four victims. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents had purchased the four tickets, that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger manifest, and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after being rammed by the M/T Tacloban City, causing the death of some of its passengers. Petitioner denied, however, that the four relatives actually boarded the vessel, pointing to the fact that their bodies were never recovered, and averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.

On January 20, 1986, PNOC and Negros Navigation entered into a compromise agreement under which petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and released PNOC and PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The trial court subsequently held the agreement binding upon petitioner, PNOC, and PNOC/STC, although private respondents did not join in it.

After trial, the trial court found that the victims were passengers of the Don Juan and that petitioner was negligent and failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier, and rendered judgment on February 21, 1991 awarding damages to both sets of private respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, reducing the actual damages awarded to Ramon Miranda to P23,075.00 and increasing the compensatory damages for the death of his wife and two children to P150,000.00 and for the death of Elfreda de la Victoria to P50,000.00. The appellate court's award of actual damages was based on the receipts submitted by private respondents, covering the expenses incurred by Miranda in organizing three search teams, transportation to Batangas City and Iloilo, long-distance calls, the erection of a monument in honor of the four victims, and obituaries, food, masses, and novenas.

• Passenger Status of the Victims: Petitioner contended that the purchase of the tickets did not necessarily mean that the alleged victims actually took the trip, since it is common knowledge that passengers purchase tickets in advance but do not actually use them, and that private respondent should therefore also prove the presence of the victims on the ship; the witnesses who affirmed that the victims were on board were, in petitioner's view, biased and unreliable.
• Non-Applicability of Mecenas: Petitioner argued that although the case arose out of the same incident as Mecenas, the parties were different and trial was conducted separately, so the decision should be based on the allegations and defenses pleaded and the evidence adduced in the case at bar, or on the record of this case alone.
• Effect of Total Loss of the Vessel: Petitioner maintained that the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished its liability to pay damages.
• Excessiveness of Damages: Petitioner asserted that the damages awarded by the appellate court were excessive, unreasonable, and unwarranted; that under the Mecenas formula private respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages; that 60%, not 30%, should be deducted from the gross earnings of the deceased as necessary living expenses; and that the expenses for the erection of a monument and other memorial services should be considered included in the indemnity for death.

• Passenger Status of the Victims: Whether the members of private respondents' families were actually passengers of the Don Juan.
• Binding Effect of Mecenas: Whether the ruling in Mecenas vs. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case.
• Effect of Total Loss of the Vessel: Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner's liability.
• Damages: Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable, and unwarranted.

• Passenger Status of the Victims: Yes. The purchase of the four tickets, their entry in the passenger manifest, and the corroborated testimony of Ramon Miranda and survivor Edgardo Ramirez sufficiently established that the victims boarded the vessel; the non-recovery of their bodies did not negate this, since the bodies of other missing passengers were likewise never recovered.
• Binding Effect of Mecenas: Yes. The findings in Mecenas on the cause of the sinking and petitioner's negligence bind this case under stare decisis et non quieta movere, the same questions relating to the same event having been raised by parties similarly situated.
• Effect of Total Loss of the Vessel: No. A shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner, and petitioner was found negligent.
• Damages: Modified. The awards of actual damages, moral damages, civil indemnity, and attorney's fees were sustained, but the compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity were recomputed with a 50% deduction for living expenses, and exemplary damages were increased to P300,000.00 for Ramon Miranda and P100,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses.

• Passenger Status of the Victims: The trial court found the victims' status as passengers sufficiently proven by Ramon Miranda's testimony that he purchased tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from petitioner's Makati office for Voyage No. 47-A of the Don Juan, corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) bearing the ticket numbers and the names of Ardita Miranda, her children, and Elfreda de la Victoria. Petitioner's argument that ticket purchase does not prove actual boarding was rejected. Miranda testified that he personally took his family and niece to the vessel on the day of the voyage and stayed with them until departure, and the Court observed that there was no reason for him to claim that members of his family perished merely to maintain an action, since people do not normally lie about so grave a matter as the loss of dear ones, and it would be more difficult for private respondents to conceal living relatives than for petitioner to prove the contrary. Petitioner's only proof was the non-recovery of the bodies, but the bodies of other passengers reported missing were likewise not recovered, as the Court had noted in Mecenas. Miranda's testimony was corroborated by Edgardo Ramirez, a seminarian and survivor who testified that he saw Mrs. Miranda and Elfreda de la Victoria on the ship, talked with them, and was with them from 7:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. when the collision occurred, having had dinner with them; he knew Mrs. Miranda as his grade school teacher and Elfreda as his childhood friend and townmate. The Court dismissed petitioner's attacks on Ramirez's credibility — that he could not have conversed with the victims for three hours without running out of stories, and that he took three days to contact Miranda — as unpersuasive, noting that acquaintances thrown together on a long journey may converse for hours and that the confusion following the collision explained the delay. Given these facts, the Court held it improper for petitioner to suggest that the victims did not board the ill-fated vessel simply because their bodies were not recovered.

• Binding Effect of Mecenas: Both the trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings in Mecenas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, which arose from the same incident and was brought for the death of other passengers. In that case the Court found that although the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent: its master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at the time of the collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the master's attention to the imminent danger. The Court further found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew failed to take steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking and supervise the abandoning of the ship, and that Negros Navigation was equally negligent in tolerating the playing of mahjong by the captain and crew while on board and in failing to keep the Don Juan seaworthy, so much so that it sank within 10 to 15 minutes of impact. The Don Juan was also overloaded: the Certificate of Inspection dated August 27, 1979 issued by the Philippine Coast Guard Commander at Iloilo City allowed a total of 864 persons, of whom 810 were passengers, but 1,004 persons were on board when it sank, 140 more than the maximum number it could safely carry. Taking these circumstances together, and considering that the Don Juan, as the faster and better-equipped vessel, could have avoided the collision, the Court held in Mecenas that even if the Tacloban City was at fault for failing to observe an internationally recognized rule of navigation, the Don Juan was guilty of contributory negligence. Petitioner's contention that Mecenas could not bind it because the parties were different and trial was separately conducted was rejected. The Court held that while this may be true as to the merits of individual claims, it is not true as to the cause of the sinking of the ship on April 22, 1980 and petitioner's liability for the accident, of which there can only be one truth. Adherence to Mecenas was dictated by the policy of maintaining stability in jurisprudence under the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, which bars any attempt to relitigate the same issue where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. The Court cited Woulfe vs. Associated Realties Corporation and State ex rel. Tollinger vs. Gill for the proposition that stare decisis renders a ruling final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine, and noted that in J.M. Tuason vs. Mariano it had relied on rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title. The Court also observed that the evidence presented in this case was the same as that presented in Mecenas — the Decision of the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, in BMI Case No. 415-80 dated March 26, 1981; the Decision of the Minister of National Defense dated March 12, 1982; the Resolution on the motion for reconsideration dated July 27, 1984; the Certificate of Inspection dated August 27, 1979; and the Certificate of Stability dated December 16, 1976 — and that the trial court did not merely rely on Mecenas but made its own independent findings based on the testimonies of witnesses such as Senior Third Mate Rogelio de Vera, who gave substantially the same testimony before the Board of Marine Inquiry, with the trial court agreeing with the conclusions of the then Minister of National Defense that both vessels were negligent.

• Effect of Total Loss of the Vessel: The rule is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. Since Mecenas found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage, (2) failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy, and (3) allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry, petitioner was clearly liable for damages to the full extent.

• Damages: On moral damages, the Court held that the principle of stare decisis did not apply because of differences in the personal circumstances of the victims, and that differentiation would be justified even if private respondents had joined the Mecenas case; the doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case, and where the issue was not raised, presented, or passed upon in the previous case, the prior decision is not stare decisis of the question presently presented. The award of P300,000.00 for moral damages to Ramon Miranda was reasonable considering the grief he suffered from the loss of his entire family, and the fact that three months after the collision he developed a heart condition undoubtedly caused by the strain of the loss; the P100,000.00 awarded to Mr. and Mrs. de la Victoria was likewise reasonable. As for civil indemnity, the appellate court's award of P50,000.00 per victim was sustained, the amount of P30,000.00 formerly set in De Lima vs. Laguna Tayabas Co., Heirs of Amparo delos Santos vs. Court of Appeals, and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court having been subsequently increased to P50,000.00 in Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals. On loss of earning capacity, the trial court computed the life expectancy of Ardita V. Miranda, who was 48 at the time of the accident, at 21.33 years, or up to age 69, using the accepted formula of 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased); her gross earnings for 21.33 years based on P10,224.00 per annum would be P218,077.92, from which 30% was deducted as living expenses, leaving P152,654.55. The Court affirmed the life expectancy computation under Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, rejecting petitioner's argument that the loss should be reckoned only up to age 65 because Mrs. Miranda would have retired as a public school teacher at that age; in calculating life expectancy for purposes of loss of earning capacity under Art. 2206(1) of the Civil Code, it is assumed that the deceased would have earned income even after retirement from a particular job, and the trial court had taken into account that Mrs. Miranda had a master's degree and a good prospect of becoming principal of her school, so that her income would have increased through the years and she could still have earned more after retirement, for instance as a consultant. The Court, however, agreed with petitioner that 60% should be deducted as necessary living expenses rather than the 30% allowed by the trial court. Noting that in Villa-Rey Transit the Court allowed a deduction of roughly 54.2% for living expenses, in People vs. Quilation about 51.3%, and in People vs. Teehankee about 42.4%, the Court held that a deduction of 50% from Mrs. Miranda's gross earnings of P218,077.92 would be reasonable, so that her net earning capacity should be P109,038.96; there was no basis for supposing that her living expenses constituted a smaller percentage of her gross income than in the decided cases, and to hold that she would have used only a small part of her income for herself and a larger part for the support of her children would be conjectural and unreasonable. As for Elfreda de la Victoria, the trial court found that she was 26 years old at the time of her death, a teacher in a private school in Malolos, Bulacan earning P6,192.00 per annum; although a probationary employee, she had been working in the school for two years and had a general efficiency rating of 92.85%, so it could be presumed that she would have become a regular teacher, and her loss of earning capacity was computed at P111,456.00 using the same formula with a 50% deduction for living expenses. The award of actual damages of P23,075.00, as determined by the Court of Appeals on the basis of receipts, was reasonable considering the expenses incurred by Miranda in organizing three search teams, transportation to Batangas City and Iloilo, long-distance calls, the erection of a monument in honor of the four victims, and obituaries, food, masses, and novenas. Petitioner's contention that the expenses for the monument and memorial services should be deemed included in the death indemnity was rejected: indemnity for death compensates for the violation of the deceased's right to life and physical integrity, while damages incidental to or arising out of the death are for the pecuniary losses of the beneficiaries. On attorney's fees, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that P40,000.00 for Ramon Miranda and P15,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses were justified; the Mecenas case could not be the basis for determining attorney's fees since the award would naturally vary in each case, and considering the amount of work and effort indicated by the voluminous transcripts, there was no reason to disturb the award. Finally, the award of exemplary damages was increased to P300,000.00 for Ramon Miranda and P100,000.00 for the de la Victoria spouses in accordance with the ruling in Mecenas, where the Court explained that exemplary damages are designed to permit courts to reshape socially deleterious behavior by creating negative incentives or deterrents, and that in requiring compliance with the standard of extraordinary diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, tame their reckless instincts, and force them to take adequate care of human beings and their property.

• Stare decisis et non quieta movere — The doctrine provides that a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different, and that a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The rule operates as a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. In this case, the Court applied the doctrine to hold that the findings in Mecenas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court on the cause of the sinking of the Don Juan and on petitioner's negligence bound the present case despite the difference in parties and the separate conduct of trial, there being only one truth as to the cause of the April 22, 1980 collision.

• Limits of stare decisis — The doctrine works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presently presented. The Court applied this limitation in refusing to adopt the Mecenas moral damage awards as a fixed formula, holding that differences in the personal circumstances of the victims justified differentiation, and that the prior decision related only to the damages for which petitioner was liable to the claimants in that case.

• Liability of a shipowner notwithstanding the real and hypothecary nature of maritime law — A shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner. Because petitioner was found negligent in tolerating the playing of mahjong by the captain and crew during the voyage, in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy, and in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than permitted, the total loss of the M/V Don Juan did not extinguish its liability for damages to the full extent.

• Extraordinary diligence of common carriers and exemplary damages — In requiring compliance with the standard of extraordinary diligence — in fact the highest possible degree of diligence — from common carriers, and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, tame their reckless instincts, and force them to take adequate care of human beings and their property. Exemplary damages are designed to permit courts to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior, a consideration of special importance in an archipelagic state like the Philippines where safe and reliable carriage of people and goods by sea is a matter of public policy.

• Life expectancy formula for loss of earning capacity — The accepted formula for determining life expectancy for purposes of computing loss of earning capacity is 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). Although the age of retirement in the Philippines is generally 65, it is assumed in the calculation that the deceased would have earned income even after retirement from a particular job. The Court applied the formula to fix the life expectancy of Ardita V. Miranda at 21.33 years and of Elfreda de la Victoria at 36 years, and held that a deduction of 50% from gross earnings for reasonable and necessary living expenses was reasonable in light of the deductions allowed in prior cases.

• Civil indemnity for death distinguished from damages incidental to death — Indemnity for death is given to compensate for the violation of the rights of the deceased, namely the right to life and physical integrity, while damages incidental to or arising out of such death are for the pecuniary losses of the beneficiaries of the deceased. The Court thus rejected petitioner's contention that the expenses for the erection of a monument and other memorial services should be deemed included in the death indemnity.

• "The rule is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the shipowner." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the third issue, disposing of petitioner's claim that the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished its liability; it is the canonical formulation of the exception to the limited liability of shipowners in Philippine maritime law.

• "Where, as in this case, the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue." — This passage articulates the controlling test for the application of stare decisis to a subsequent suit arising from the same incident but involving different parties, and supplies the basis for holding petitioner bound by the negligence findings in Mecenas.

• "The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Where the issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presently presented." — This passage defines the outer limit of the doctrine and explains why the moral damages awarded in Mecenas could not be adopted as a fixed formula for the private respondents in this case.

• "The accepted formula for determining life expectancy is 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased)." — This passage states the formula the Court used to compute the loss of earning capacity of the two deceased victims, and is the formulation commonly cited in actions for damages for death or injury.

• Mecenas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 180 SCRA 83 (1989) — The controlling precedent. Its findings that the crew of the Don Juan was grossly negligent, that Negros Navigation tolerated the playing of mahjong and failed to keep the vessel seaworthy, and that the vessel was overloaded were held binding on the present case under stare decisis; its ruling on exemplary damages was also adopted in increasing the awards.
• J.M. Tuason & Corp. vs. Mariano, 85 SCRA 644 (1978) — Cited as an instance in which the Court relied on its rulings in other cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title, illustrating the operation of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
• Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511 (1970) — Followed on the computation of life expectancy and loss of earning capacity; the Court cited it for the deduction of living expenses from the victim's annual salary and for the rule that the deceased is assumed to have earned income even after retirement.
• Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 376 (1995) — Followed as the case that increased the benchmark civil indemnity for death from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, which the Court applied to the victims in this case.
• De Lima vs. Laguna Tayabas Co., 160 SCRA 70 (1988); _Heirs of Amparo delos Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 649 (1990); Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 189 SCRA 158 (1990) — Cited as the cases that previously set the P30,000.00 benchmark for civil indemnity for death, which was later increased.
• People vs. Quilation, 265 SCRA 279 (1992); People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995) — Cited to show the range of deductions for living expenses allowed in prior jurisprudence (51.3% and 42.4%, respectively), supporting the Court's adoption of a 50% deduction in this case.
• Manila Steamship Co. vs. Insa Abdulhanan, 100 Phil. 32 (1956); Chua Yek Heng vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 183 (1988) — Cited, together with Heirs of Amparo delos Santos vs. Court of Appeals, as authority for the rule that a shipowner may be held liable notwithstanding the real and hypothecary nature of maritime law where fault is attributable to it.
• Geluz vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 801 (1961) — Cited for the distinction between indemnity for death, which compensates the violation of the deceased's right to life and physical integrity, and damages incidental to the death, which compensate the pecuniary losses of the beneficiaries.
• Woulfe vs. Associated Realties Corporation, 130 N.J. Eq. 519, 23 A.2d 399 (1942); State ex rel. Tollinger vs. Gill, 75 Ohio App. 62 N.E.2d 760 (1944) — Foreign decisions cited to support the proposition that stare decisis applies even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine.

• Article 2206(1), Civil Code — Provides the basis for the award of damages for loss of earning capacity. The Court applied it in computing the net earning capacity of the two deceased victims, holding that in calculating life expectancy for purposes of this provision it is assumed that the deceased would have earned income even after retirement from a particular job, and that a 50% deduction for reasonable and necessary living expenses should be made from gross earnings.
• Rule 18, International Rules of the Road — Requires two power-driven vessels meeting end on or nearly end on each to alter course to starboard so that each may pass on the port side of the other. The Court noted that the M/T Tacloban City failed to follow this rule, but held that route observance of the International Rules of the Road will not relieve a vessel from responsibility if the collision could have been avoided by proper care and skill on its part or even by a departure from the rules, as the Don Juan could have done.

Regalado and Puno, JJ.