Primary Holding
An adjudication of ownership over land necessarily includes delivery of possession thereof, but this does not automatically extend to improvements on the land whose ownership was never litigated and is actively disputed by the actual possessor.
Background
Natividad Nazareno and Romeo Nazareno are siblings. The dispute centers on a parcel of land in Naic, Cavite, originally part of the estate of their late father, Maximino Nazareno, Jr., and the Naic Cinema constructed on the property. Natividad claimed to have purchased the lot from their father, while Romeo asserted it was his inheritance share.
History
1985 – 2000-
Mar 15, 1985
RTC-Cavite
Natividad filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza.
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RTC-Cavite
Ruled for the spouses, treating the simulated deed of sale as an adjudication of Romeo's inheritance share.
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Court of Appeals
Reversed the RTC, declared the deed of sale and TCT No. 118276 null and void, and ordered the restoration of TCT No. 51798 to Natividad.
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Jun 13, 1996
Supreme Court
Denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari; the CA decision became final and executory on June 13, 1996.
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4 mos 25 days later
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Nov 7, 1996
RTC-Naic
Natividad moved for the issuance of a writ of execution and a writ of possession.
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3 mos 14 days later
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Feb 21, 1997
RTC-Naic
Granted the writ of execution but denied the writ of possession for not being included in the CA decision.
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6 mos 19 days later
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Sep 9, 1997
Court of Appeals
Denied the petition for the writ of possession, holding that execution must conform to the judgment and the case did not fall under the exceptions for a writ of possession.
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2 yrs 5 mos later
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Feb 23, 2000
Supreme Court
Denied the instant petition, affirming the CA's denial of the writ of possession.
Facts
On 15 March 1985 Natividad Nazareno filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Damages against spouses Romeo and Eliza Nazareno. Natividad claimed sole ownership of a parcel of land in Naic, Cavite, covered by TCT No. 51798. She averred that in April 1981, her brother Romeo and his wife Eliza convinced her to lend them the title as collateral for a loan to complete the construction of the Naic Cinema on the property. She agreed on the condition that the title be returned within one year of the cinema's completion. She executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses, but the sale was simulated as she received no consideration. The cinema was completed in November 1981, but the spouses refused to return the title and had it transferred to their name, resulting in TCT No. T-118276.
The spouses denied Natividad's ownership, claiming the property was Romeo's share in the estate of their late father, Maximino Nazareno, Jr. Romeo explained the deed of sale was merely to implement the transfer of his inheritance share, the distribution of which was entrusted to Natividad. The trial court ruled for the spouses, treating the simulated sale as an adjudication of Romeo's inheritance share. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the parties stipulated the sale was simulated for lack of consideration, shifting the burden to Romeo to prove it was a conveyance of his inheritance share, which he failed to do. Natividad proved she bought the property from their father, and Romeo failed to have that sale nullified. The appellate court declared the deed of sale and TCT No. T-118276 null and void, ordering the restoration of TCT No. 51798 to Natividad. The Supreme Court denied a petition for review, and the CA decision became final on 13 June 1996.
On 7 November 1996 Natividad sought a writ of execution and a writ of possession from the RTC. The spouses opposed, arguing possession was never prayed for or decreed. The RTC granted the writ of execution but denied the writ of possession on 21 February 1997. The Court of Appeals denied Natividad's petition for the writ of possession on 9 September 1997, holding that execution must conform to the judgment and that a writ of possession in an annulment of sale case was improper. Natividad moved for reconsideration, which was denied, leading to the instant petition.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Right to Possession: Petitioner maintained that the adjudication of ownership over the disputed lot in the final decision of the Court of Appeals necessarily included the delivery of possession thereof, as the respondents had no valid right to remain on the property.
- Inclusion in Judgment: Petitioner argued that under Section 49(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment includes not only what appears on its face but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto, which in this case was the writ of possession.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Lack of Prayer for Possession: Respondents countered that petitioner never prayed in her complaint that she be placed in possession of the subject premises, and the Court of Appeals did not order it.
- Improper Remedy: Respondents argued that a writ of possession is improper in an action for annulment of a private sale, as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions (land registration, extrajudicial foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, or execution sales).
Issues
- Scope of Execution: Whether the adjudication of ownership over a parcel of land in a civil case for annulment of sale necessarily includes the issuance of a writ of possession for the land.
- Possession of Improvements: Whether the writ of possession over the land extends to the improvements (Naic Cinema) thereon, the ownership of which was never put in issue.
Ruling
- Scope of Execution: Yes. Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession, especially where the actual possessor has no valid right over the property enforceable against the owner.
- Possession of Improvements: No. Being declared owner of the lot does not automatically entitle the owner to possession of all improvements therein, especially when ownership over the improvement was never put in issue and is disputed.
Ruling Rationale
- Scope of Execution: A writ of execution must conform to the judgment and may not vary or exceed its terms. However, under Section 49(c) of Rule 39, a judgment is not confined to what appears on its face but also includes those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The Court of Appeals' decision resulted from the adjudication of ownership over the disputed lot in favor of Natividad. Applying Perez vs. Evite, adjudication of ownership includes delivery of possession when the actual possessor has no valid right to remain on the property. Since the Court of Appeals categorically declared that the respondents' claim over the lot had no factual basis, they have no reason to remain in possession, and the writ of execution would suffice to place Natividad in possession of the lot.
- Possession of Improvements: The matter of ownership and possession of the Naic Cinema was never put in issue in the annulment of sale case. Petitioner admitted she was not the owner of the cinema, claiming it belonged to her father's estate, while respondents asserted dominion over it. To grant possession of the cinema to petitioner through a mere writ of possession would deprive the actual possessor of property without due process of law. Ownership over the cinema must be threshed out in a proper proceeding.
Doctrines
- Doctrine of Conformity of Execution to Judgment — A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed and may not vary or exceed its terms. Where execution is not in harmony with the judgment and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. However, a judgment includes not only what appears on its face but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto, pursuant to Section 49(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
- Adjudication of Ownership Includes Delivery of Possession — When ownership of property is adjudged to a party, delivery of possession is necessarily included in the judgment, especially when the actual possessor has no valid right to remain on the property enforceable against the owner. An exception exists where the actual possessor has a valid right over the property, such as a tenant or lessee.
Key Excerpts
- "A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed; it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed." — This passage states the fundamental rule on execution of judgments, anchoring the Court's analysis on the scope of a writ of possession.
- "Adjudication of ownership necessarily includes delivery of possession. Indeed, it would be defeating the ends of justice should we require that for the parties to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to be theirs from those who have no right to remain therein, they must submit to court litigations a new." — This articulates the controlling doctrine that possession follows ownership, negating the need for a separate ejectment suit when the possessor has no valid right to remain.
- "Being declared owner of subject lot does not also mean that she is automatically entitled to possession of all the improvements therein. Otherwise, the actual possessor would be deprived of his property without due process of law." — This defines the limitation of the doctrine, protecting improvements whose ownership is disputed from being swept into a judgment over the land.
Precedents Cited
- Perez vs. Evite — Followed. Established that adjudication of ownership of land includes delivery of possession when the actual possessor has no valid right to remain, distinguishing it from cases where the possessor has a recognized right.
- Jabon vs. Alo and Talens vs. Garcia — Distinguished. Cited by respondents to argue adjudication of ownership does not include possession; distinguished as cases where the actual possessor had a valid right enforceable against the owner, which does not apply here.
- Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for the rule that a writ of execution must conform to the judgment and may not vary or exceed its terms.
Provisions
- Section 49(c), Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that in any other litigation between the same parties, only that is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Applied to hold that the writ of possession was necessarily included in the adjudication of ownership over the lot.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Buena, J., was on leave.