Navarro and Orozco vs. Commission on Audit Central Office

The right to a speedy disposition of cases under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is violated where the State fails to discharge its burden of proving that a delay of more than seven years in resolving an administrative case was reasonable or not attributable to it; it is not for the party to establish that the delay was capricious or oppressive. The right is not an iron-clad rule but a flexible concept, and the State bears the burden of attesting that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances or that the private party caused the delay.

Petitioners Elaine E. Navarro and Raul L. Orozco served as Regional Accountant and Chief Administrative Officer, respectively, of the Department of Education (DepEd) Caraga Regional Office in Butuan City. Respondent Commission on Audit (COA) is the government audit body whose Central Office and Regional Office No. XIII issued the rulings assailed in the petition. The controversy unfolded against the backdrop of a moratorium imposed by DepEd on the procurement of supplementary and reference materials under DECS Order (D.O.) No. 25 series of 1999 and D.O. Nos. 38 and 52 series of 2007, which the COA later invoked to disallow the procurement at issue.

In 2007, Representative Francisco T. Matugas of the First District of Surigao del Norte wrote then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on October 4, 2007, requesting P8 Million in financial assistance for the purchase of textbooks and other instructional materials for use in the primary and secondary schools in Siargao Island. Representative Guillermo A. Romarate, Jr. of the Second District of Surigao del Norte made a similar request on November 26, 2007, also for P8 Million, for the purchase and procurement of textbooks and instructional materials. Both letters bore the handwritten approval of then Department of Education (DepEd) Secretary Jesli A. Lapus.

In March and July 2008, the corresponding Sub-Allotment Release Orders were issued for the acquisition of supplementary and reference materials. In 2008, the DepEd Caraga Regional Office in Butuan City purchased instructional materials amounting to P18,298,789.50.

On February 17, 2009, the COA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. DepEdRO13-2009-003, noting that the procurement of the supplementary and reference materials was irregular because it was contrary to DECS Order (D.O.) No. 25 series of 1999, and D.O. Nos. 38 and 52 series of 2007, which imposed a moratorium on the procurement of supplementary and reference materials. Isabelita M. Borres, Regional Director of the DepEd Caraga Regional Office, replied that Sec. Lapus himself authorized the purchase of the materials, as evidenced by scribbled notes bearing his initials found on the letters of Rep. Matugas and Rep. Romarate. She also noted that Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita approved the request of Rep. Matugas for the release of additional funds.

On May 18, 2009, the COA issued Notice of Suspension No. 09-003-101-(08), reiterating its findings in AOM No. DepEdRO13-2009-003. The P18,298,789.50 was suspended in audit because the DepEd had ordered a moratorium on the procurement of supplementary and reference materials, and the COA reminded that the practice of procuring such materials should be stopped until the moratorium is lifted. Eventually, the COA issued ND No. 09-005-101-(08) after the Notice of Suspension had not been settled or acted upon, ordering Regional Accountant Elaine E. Navarro and Chief Administrative Officer Raul L. Orozco, among others, to refund the P18,298,789.50 used in procuring the supplementary and reference materials.

Petitioners appealed the ND to the COA Regional Office No. XIII. In its August 23, 2011 Decision, the COA-RO partially granted the appeal, pointing out that P7,259,676.10 worth of reference or instructional materials were included in the list of materials allowed to be procured under D.O. Nos. 52 series of 2007, 112 series of 2009, and 111 series of 2010, and reduced the audit disallowance to P11,039,113.40. The decision was expressly made subject to automatic review by the Commission Proper within the remaining six-month period to appeal under Section 7, Rule V of the 2009 COA Revised Rules on Procedures.

The COA-RO Decision was elevated to the COA for automatic review. In its November 9, 2016 Decision, the COA reversed the COA-RO Decision and reinstated the full amount disallowed in ND No. 09-005-101-(08). It reiterated that existing DepEd issuances clearly prohibit the procurement of books and instructional materials that are not included in the List of Textbooks and Teacher's Manuals attached to D.O. No. 52, series of 2007. The COA observed that the COA-RO erred in reducing the amount disallowed on the basis of D.O. No. 112, series of 2009 because the reference materials were procured prior to the issuance of the said order, and that the individuals who undertook the procurement activities could not have decided what books to purchase based on a list made on a future date. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the COA denied the motion in its October 26, 2017 Resolution.

• Speedy Disposition: Petitioners argued that the COA violated their right to speedy disposition of cases, highlighting that the proceedings before the COA-RO took more than two years and six months from the issuance of AOM No. DepEdRO13-2009-003 on February 17, 2009, and that it took five years and three months before the COA rendered its November 9, 2016 Decision from the time the COA-RO Decision was elevated for automatic review, resulting in an inordinate delay of seven years and nine months.
• Validity of Procurement: Petitioners surmised that the procurement of reference materials was valid considering that Sec. Lapus himself authorized it.
• Limited Participation: Petitioners contended that they should be excused from refunding the disallowed amount because of their limited participation in the transaction, bewailing that they only came into the picture after the procurement had been made and its delivery effected.
• Burden of Proof: In their Reply, petitioners insisted that respondents had the burden of proving that their right to speedy disposition of cases had not been transgressed.
• Authority under D.O. No. 52: Petitioners assailed that D.O. No. 52, Series of 2007, authorized the procurement of supplementary and reference materials.
• Propriety of Certifications: Petitioners highlighted that Navarro's certification as an accountant was in order considering that the transaction was duly supported by pertinent papers and documents and that there were available funds for the disbursement, and that Orozco's certification as Chief Administrative Officer that the charges to the appropriations were necessary and legal was above board as the disbursements were done with the imprimatur of the DepEd Secretary.

• Speedy Disposition: The COA countered that petitioners merely alleged a delay in the disposition of the case without showing that it was vexatious, capricious, or oppressive, and elucidated that the right to speedy disposition of cases is flexible and that due regard must be given to the circumstances.
• Justification for Disallowance: The COA reiterated that the disallowance of the procurement of reference materials was justified in view of the moratorium on the purchase of supplementary and reference materials.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: The COA posited that it did not act with grave abuse of discretion because its decision was based on existing rules and regulations.

• Speedy Disposition: Whether the COA Commission Proper gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered a decision in gross violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases.
• Disregard of Defenses: Whether the COA Commission Proper gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it sustained Notice of Disallowance No. 09-005-101-(08) in total disregard of the defenses raised by petitioners.
• Inclusion as Persons Liable: Whether the COA Commission Proper gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it included petitioners as among those responsible for the disallowance in blatant disregard of the extent of her participation in the transaction.

• Speedy Disposition: Yes. The more than seven-year delay in the resolution of the case, unexplained by the COA, violated petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the State having failed to discharge its burden of proving that the delay was reasonable or not attributable to it.
• Disregard of Defenses: Not reached. The petition was granted on the ground of violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases, rendering it unnecessary for the Court to resolve the remaining issues.
• Inclusion as Persons Liable: Not reached. The disposition of the petition on the speedy disposition ground mooted the resolution of this issue.

• Speedy Disposition: Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies. This right is not afforded only to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases pending before such bodies, and any party may demand expeditious action from all officials tasked with the administration of justice. The right is not an iron-clad rule; it is a flexible concept dependent on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In determining whether the right has been violated, four factors are considered and weighed: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. The length of delay was undisputed: more than seven years elapsed from the issuance of AOM No. DepEdRO13-2009-003 on February 17, 2009 until the COA promulgated its November 9, 2016 Decision, and more than five years passed from the elevation of the case to the COA for automatic review before a decision was rendered. In responding to the claim, the COA merely brushed it aside and asserted that petitioners failed to show that the delay was vexatious or oppressive. It is incumbent upon the State to prove that the delay was reasonable or that the delay was not attributable to it; it is not for the party to establish that the delay was capricious or oppressive, as it is the government's burden to attest that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances or that the private party caused the delay. The COA miserably failed to establish that the delay of more than seven years was reasonable or that petitioners caused the same, and it erroneously shifted the burden to petitioners. The right to speedy disposition of cases serves to ensure that citizens are free from anxiety and unnecessary expenses brought about by protracted litigations, and the ND holding petitioners solidarily liable to refund P18,298,789.50 subjected them to constant distress and worry, such that the COA should have been more circumspect in observing petitioners' rights and should have addressed the allegations of delay more concretely.
• Disregard of Defenses: The Court granted the petition solely on the ground of the violation of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, and thus did not pass upon the substantive defenses raised by petitioners against the disallowance.
• Inclusion as Persons Liable: Consistent with the disposition on the first issue, the Court did not reach the question of the propriety of including petitioners among those solidarily liable under the notice of disallowance.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies. The right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases pending before such bodies, and any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials tasked with the administration of justice. The right is not an iron-clad rule; it is a flexible concept dependent on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
• Four-Factor Test for Speedy Disposition — In determining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors are considered and weighed: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. The Court applied this test and found the length of delay undisputed, the COA having failed to justify the delay, and the substantial amount of the disallowance having subjected petitioners to constant distress and worry.
• Burden of Proof in Speedy Disposition Claims — It is incumbent upon the State to prove that the delay was reasonable or that the delay was not attributable to it. It is not for the party to establish that the delay was capricious or oppressive; the government bears the burden of attesting that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances or that the private party caused the delay. The COA's failure to discharge this burden, and its erroneous shifting of the burden to petitioners, warranted the grant of the petition.

• "Nevertheless, the right to a speedy disposition of cases is not an iron­ clad rule such that it is a flexible concept dependent on the facts and circumstances of a particular case." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the flexible nature of the right to speedy disposition, a principle consistently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.
• "In other words, it is not for the party to establish that the delay was capricious or oppressive as it is the government's burden to attest that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances or that the private party caused the delay." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the burden of proof, the pivotal ground for granting the petition.
• "Surely, the substantial amount involved is a Sword of Damocles hovering over petitioners' heads subjecting them to constant distress and worry." — This passage illustrates the fourth factor of the four-factor test — the prejudice caused by the delay — and explains why the COA should have been more circumspect in observing petitioners' rights.

• Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan, 714 Phil. 55, 61 (2013) — Cited to support the proposition that the right to speedy disposition of cases extends to all parties in all cases pending before judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies, and not only to the accused in criminal proceedings.
• The Ombudsman vs. Jurado, 583 Phil. 132, 149 (2008) — Cited for the doctrine that the right to speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept dependent on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
• Capt. Roquero vs. The Chancellor of UP-Manila, 628 Phil. 628, 640 (2010) — Cited for the four-factor test in determining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated.
• People vs. Sandiganbayan, 723 Phil. 444, 491 (2013) — Cited for the rule that it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the delay was reasonable or that the delay was not attributable to it.
• People vs. Sandiganbayan 5th Division, 791 Phil. 37, 61 (2016) — Cited for the purpose of the right to speedy disposition of cases, which is to ensure that citizens are free from anxiety and unnecessary expenses brought about by protracted litigations.

• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies. The Court applied this provision in finding that the COA's delay of more than seven years in resolving the case violated petitioners' right, the State having failed to prove that the delay was reasonable or not attributable to it.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Carandang, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur. Leonen, J. and Caguioa, J., were on official business; Hernando, J. and Lazaro-Javier, J., were on leave.