Navarra vs. Office of the Ombudsman

A contractual clause permitting extrajudicial rescission or re‑entry does not authorize the use of violence, threats, or intimidation to dispossess a possessor who objects; any taking of possession by force or intimidation constitutes grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code, irrespective of the actor’s belief in a right to repossess. The existence of a defense of good faith or a claimed right under a contract cannot defeat a finding of probable cause where the elements of the crime are prima facie established.

Far East Network of Integrated Circuit Subcontractors Corporation (FENICS) leased premises from Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI), a government‑owned corporation, in Taguig, Metro Manila from 1995 to 2002. FENICS later entered into a Compromise Agreement with FTI under which it undertook to pay the outstanding obligation of a previous lessee; the agreement provided that upon default in certain payments, FTI could rescind the lease contract without need of judicial action. The lease contract also contained a clause allowing the lessor to re‑enter the premises upon default. Before the expiration of the lease, on the night of September 16, 2002, armed elements of FTI forcibly took over the FENICS compound, ejected two building custodians, and welded the gates shut. Petitioner Jorge B. Navarra, president of FENICS, subsequently filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman.

• Parties and Lease: FENICS leased premises from FTI under a lease contract that included Article 21, allowing the lessor to re‑enter the premises upon default in rent payment or breach of covenant. A Compromise Agreement was later forged between FTI and FENICS, wherein FENICS undertook to pay the outstanding arrearages of a previous lessee. The Compromise Agreement contained a clause providing that upon default in at least three consecutive monthly amortization payments on arrearages or one semestral or annual current rental payment, FTI could rescind the lease contract without need of judicial action, and all unpaid rentals would become immediately due.
• The Takeover: On the night of September 16, 2002, before the lease contract expired, approximately thirty armed FTI uniformed police and employees entered the FENICS compound through an open gate while a vehicle was exiting. They ordered the driver out, seized the vehicle’s registration papers, and forced the two custodians, Freddie San Juan and Jun Abalajen, to leave the premises, threatening that something bad would happen to them if they did not comply. FTI personnel welded the gate shut, preventing re‑entry. A gunshot was heard from within the compound. Petitioner’s witness, Freddie San Juan, recorded the names of some FTI personnel, but an officer without a nameplate seized his list.
• Following Day: On the morning of September 17, 2002, FENICS employees arriving for work were prevented from entering the compound. Petitioner Jorge Navarra approached FTI personnel, who stated they were acting on orders from higher‑ups and that the repossession had long been planned because FENICS had unpaid rentals. At Gate 2, FTI guards allowed only FTI personnel to enter, mentioning Felixberto Lazaro as the leader of the group. Later that day, Danilo Medina arrived with a group intending to take inventories; when petitioner objected that FENICS personnel should be present, Medina replied that the barangay was with them. Neither petitioner nor FENICS employees were thereafter permitted to re‑enter the premises.
• Complaint: Petitioner filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for grave coercion, malicious mischief, and/or grave threats against Samuel Namanama (head of FTI’s legal department), Felixberto Lazaro (FTI legal assistant), and Danilo Medina (FTI senior manager). Affidavits of petitioner and two witnesses detailed the use of armed force, threats, the welding of gates, and the prevention of entry.
• Private Respondents’ Position: Private respondents claimed they acted under orders and were merely exercising FTI’s rights under the Compromise Agreement and lease contract. They maintained that FENICS had defaulted on payments, that its check had bounced, and that it subleased premises without approval. They asserted good faith and lack of intent to cause harm, arguing that resorting to court would only prolong the situation.

• Presence of Elements of Grave Coercion: Petitioner argued that all elements of grave coercion under Article 286 were extant: (1) he and his employees were prevented from entering their premises and the custodians were compelled to leave against their will; (2) the prevention and compulsion were effected by armed FTI personnel who outnumbered the caretakers, threatened them, destroyed a padlock, and welded the gates; and (3) private respondents had no authority of law or right to do so, as no court order had been obtained and the possessor objected to the takeover.
• No Lawful Right to Use Force: Petitioner maintained that the contractual right to rescind or re‑enter did not authorize the use of force and intimidation to evict a possessor who objects. The possessor exhibited opposition, and the law requires that possession cannot be acquired through force or intimidation.

• Exercise of Contractual Right: Private respondents contended that they acted on the orders of superiors and were merely exercising FTI’s rights under the Compromise Agreement and lease contract. The Compromise Agreement expressly allowed FTI to rescind the lease contract without judicial action upon default, and Article 21 of the lease contract made it lawful for the lessor to re‑enter the premises upon default.
• Good Faith and Justification: Citing University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, they argued that a contracting party need not wait for a court judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. The Ombudsman adopted this view, concluding that private respondents acted in good faith without intent to harm, that FENICS had long delayed payment and had bounced checks and subleased without approval, and that resort to the courts would have prolonged the harm to FTI.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for grave coercion despite prima facie evidence that private respondents employed force and intimidation to dispossess the lessee.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Ombudsman’s dismissal was set aside because the undisputed facts in the affidavits prima facie established all elements of grave coercion under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner and his witnesses attested that armed FTI personnel, outnumbering the two caretakers, entered the compound at night, forced the custodians to leave under threat of harm, welded the gates, and prevented re‑entry, all without a court order or prior notice. These acts constitute prevention and compulsion effected by violence or intimidation, and the absence of any lawful authority is patent: no contractual stipulation, whether in a compromise agreement or a lease contract, can clothe a party with the right to employ force or intimidation against a possessor who objects. The principle that “no man is authorized to take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights with threats of violence” is deeply rooted; possession cannot be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects, and one who believes he has a right to deprive another of possession must invoke the aid of the competent court. University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles was distinguished because that case did not involve allegations of violence, threats, or intimidation to compel relinquishment of possession. Good faith and lack of intent to do harm are matters of defense to be ventilated during trial, not at the preliminary investigation stage where only probable cause is determined. The Ombudsman’s reliance on these defensive claims to dismiss the complaint amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

• Elements of Grave Coercion under Article 286, Revised Penal Code — The crime is committed when: (1) a person prevents another from doing something not prohibited by law or compels him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; (2) the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and (3) the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no authority of law or right to do so; i.e., the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. The Court applied this test and found that the affidavits established all three elements prima facie.
• Prohibition Against Extrajudicial Repossession by Force — It is a maxim of the law that no man may take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights with threats of violence. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects. He who believes he has an action or a right to deprive another of holding a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court if the holder refuses to deliver the thing. A contractual clause allowing extrajudicial rescission or re‑entry does not constitute authority of law to use force or intimidation; it cannot justify acts that amount to coercion.
• Probable Cause and Defenses at Preliminary Investigation — Probable cause requires only such facts sufficient to engender a well‑founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty. Matters of defense such as good faith, lack of intent, or justification are best ventilated during the trial and do not prevent a finding of probable cause.

• “It is elementary that in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto, and that he who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.” (Citing Civil Code, Article 536)
• “The defendant was not clothed with any judicial or administrative authority, and it is a maxim of the law that no man is authorized to take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights with threats of violence, except in certain well‑defined cases, where one acts in the necessary defense of one’s life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression, and manifestly the defendant can not successfully maintain that his action was taken in defense of life, liberty or property.” (Quoting United States v. Mena, 11 Phil. 543, 545‑546 [1908])

• United States v. Mena, 11 Phil. 543 (1908) — Followed. Reiterated the maxim that no one may take the law into his own hands and enforce rights with threats of violence; force used to recover possession from a possessor who objects constitutes coercion.
• University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, G.R. No. L‑28602, September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102 — Distinguished. That case did not involve allegations of violence, threats, or intimidation to compel relinquishment of possession; thus, its pronouncement that a party need not await judgment before taking extrajudicial steps did not apply to a situation where force was employed.
• Tentangco v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 156427, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 249 — Cited for the rule that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause absent grave abuse of discretion.
• Sy v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 166315, December 14, 2006, 511 SCRA 92 — Cited for the definition of probable cause and for the elements of grave coercion under Article 286.
• Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 132120, February 10, 2003, 397 SCRA 171 — Cited for the principle that good faith is a matter of defense better ventilated during trial than at the preliminary investigation.

• Article 286, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes grave coercion. The Court applied its elements to conclude that the complaint established probable cause.
• Article 536, Civil Code — Provides that possession cannot be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects, and that one claiming a right to possession must resort to the competent court. The provision underpinned the ruling that contractual re‑entry clauses do not authorize violent repossession.
• Rule 112, Section 1, Rules of Court — Defines probable cause. Cited to emphasize the low threshold required to indict an accused, contrasting with the Ombudsman’s premature assessment of defenses.

Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Martin S. Villarama, Jr.