Navales vs. Navales

A marriage may be declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code only upon proof of a serious psychological illness that is grave, permanent, incurable, and existing at the time of the marriage; mere flirtatiousness, infidelity, emotional immaturity, or irresponsibility does not establish psychological incapacity, and the State's active participation under Article 48 is mandatory in nullity proceedings.

Reynaldo Navales and Nilda Navales were married on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu. Their dispute concerns the application of Article 36 of the Family Code, which allows a declaration of absolute nullity where a party was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. The case also implicates Article 48 of the Family Code, which requires the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to participate actively in nullity proceedings to prevent collusion and the fabrication or suppression of evidence. The Constitution and the Family Code establish marriage as inviolable and as the foundation of the family, a backdrop against which the sufficiency of evidence for psychological incapacity is assessed.

Reynaldo Navales and Nilda Navales met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked as a waitress. They became lovers, and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house owned by her uncle, and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This was despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her penpals and asking money from them and that she had an illegitimate son by a man whose identity she did not reveal to him. The two married on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu.

Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well. Problems arose when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no longer take care of him and attend to household chores. Things worsened when she started working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo, and another when Nilda went home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a child with him, as it would destroy her figure. On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her again.

On August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799, claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her behavior indicated her lack of understanding and appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing that Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" instead of "Navales." He also presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called "Appetizer," and that he himself was attracted to Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk with. Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that she knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight-fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with another man, which angered Reynaldo. Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001. In said Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nilda's psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo.

Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage. She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo, with concubinage. Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for ladies, as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her married name, Nilda B. Navales.

The RTC found from the testimonies and evidence that Nilda had no full understanding of the effects of marriage and no appreciation of the consequences of marriage, as shown by her act of concealing her marital status by using her maiden name "Nilda T. Bacon," augmenting her pretense of being still single through the telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany her husband despite the latter's insistence, but rather opting to ride another man's jeep; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to kiss her even in full view of her husband; by preferring to lose her husband rather than losing her job as aerobic instructress; and by refusing to bear a child fathered by her husband because it would destroy her figure. The CA noted that the telephone listings presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995, after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on June 18, 1992.

• No Psychological Incapacity: Petitioner argued that she was not psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations as a wife; that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity; that she never had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo against her; and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for concubinage.
• Nymphomania Finding Unsupported: Petitioner questioned the lower courts' finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations, and there was not a single evidence to show that she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living together.
• Molina Guidelines Not Followed: Petitioner maintained that the guidelines in Republic of the Philippines vs. Molina were not complied with; that the RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation; that the expert opinion was given weight even though it was baseless to establish psychological incapacity; and that, assuming such incapacity existed, it was not shown to have existed at the time of the marriage, to be incurable, and to be grave enough to bring about disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
• Preservation of Marriage: Petitioner asserted that her effort in the case showed that she was consciously and nobly preserving and continued to believe that marriage is inviolable.

• Procedural Defect: Respondent argued that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Factual Findings Binding: Respondent claimed that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters have already been decided and passed upon, and that factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on the Supreme Court; only questions of law may be raised.
• Compliance with Molina: Respondent argued that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Respondent averred that he testified on his behalf, presented corroborating witnesses, one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage and to have become manifest during her marriage; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as shown by the report of Vatanagul.

• Validity of Marriage under Article 36: Whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity.
• State Participation: Whether the State, through the prosecuting attorney or Office of the Solicitor General, actively participated in the nullity proceedings as required by Article 48 of the Family Code.
• Sufficiency of Expert and Lay Evidence: Whether the totality of evidence—including the psychological assessment and testimonies—established Nilda's psychological incapacity as grave, permanent, incurable, and existing at the time of marriage under Molina.
• Use of Maiden Name: Whether Nilda's use of her maiden name in telephone directories established that she concealed her marital status and lacked understanding of the consequences of marriage.
• Refusal to Bear a Child: Whether Nilda's alleged refusal to bear a child supported a finding of psychological incapacity.

• Validity of Marriage under Article 36: No. The totality of evidence was insufficient to prove Nilda was psychologically incapacitated; mere flirtatiousness, infidelity, emotional immaturity, or irresponsibility does not amount to the grave, permanent, and incurable psychological illness required by Article 36.
• State Participation: No. The State's participation was wanting because it consisted only of a no-collusion report, an opposition, and cross-examination, with no other pleadings or controverting evidence, contrary to Article 48's mandate for active participation.
• Sufficiency of Expert and Lay Evidence: No. The psychological report was vague, sweeping, and lacked factual bases; it failed to identify the root cause, show a natal or supervening disabling factor, or prove incapacity existed before marriage.
• Use of Maiden Name: No. The telephone listings were for 1993–1995, after Reynaldo left Nilda on June 18, 1992, and did not prove she represented herself as single while they lived together.
• Refusal to Bear a Child: No. Apart from Reynaldo's testimony, no other proof supported the claim, and mere allegation is insufficient to discharge the burden of proof.

• Validity of Marriage under Article 36: Article 36 requires a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage, a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. Santos vs. Court of Appeals requires gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. Molina further requires that the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; that the root cause be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision; that the incapacity exist at the time of the celebration; that it be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; that it be grave enough to bring about disability to assume essential marital obligations; and that the non-complied marital obligations be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the decision. Here, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage and that her flirtatiousness recurred when she worked as an aerobics instructress. The instances alleged—choosing to ride home with another man, being kissed by another man in a car, and allowing other men to touch her body—if true, would hurt and embarrass Reynaldo, but they are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable, or grave under Article 36. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will is different from incapacity rooted in a debilitating psychological condition or illness. Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity. Reynaldo admitted that the marriage went well in the first year, which weakens the assertion of a psychological defect existing at the time of the celebration. Article 36 must also be read in conjunction with, but distinct from, Articles 35, 37, 38, 41, 45, and 55 of the Family Code; it should not be equated with legal separation, whose grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but may include physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
• State Participation: Article 48 of the Family Code requires courts, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected. While the Molina guideline requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether it agrees or objects to the petition was dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Article 48 still mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through the fiscal or prosecuting attorney. In this case, contrary to the RTC's assertion that the OSG actively participated through the Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation consisted only of the Report dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion exists; the OSG's Opposition dated June 2, 2000; and the cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo and his witness Abales. No other pleadings, motions, or position papers were filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG, and no controverting evidence was presented before judgment. The State's participation was therefore wanting.
• Sufficiency of Expert and Lay Evidence: The Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality, and there is no requirement that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before nullity based on psychological incapacity may be declared. Still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and the incapacity established by the totality of evidence presented during trial. The psychological report in this case concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, emotionally immature, has a borderline personality, strong sexual urges which are incurable, complete denial of her actual role as a wife, a very weak conscience or superego, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, is deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive, irresponsible, and vain. The report failed to specify the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationships with or the circumstances surrounding the same. There was not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claimed she interviewed Reynaldo, Jojo Caballes, Dorothy, Lesley, a certain Marvin, and a certain Susan, but she did not specify the identities of these persons, which information was supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective information. The conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping, and lack sufficient factual bases. The report failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity, failed to demonstrate a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting and complying with essential marital obligations, and failed to show that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. The Court cannot give weight to the assessment. The standards are strict because any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
• Use of Maiden Name: Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" to prove that she represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings were for the years 1993 to 1995, after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abales's testimony, Reynaldo had no proof that Nilda represented herself as single while they were still living together. The Court cannot agree with the RTC that the telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage.
• Refusal to Bear a Child: Reynaldo claimed that Nilda did not want to get pregnant, which allegation was upheld by the trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolved upon Reynaldo to discharge the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 — Psychological incapacity refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. The law confines the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In this case, the alleged flirtatiousness, infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility did not meet this standard.
• Requisites of Psychological Incapacity (Santos vs. Court of Appeals) — Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The Court applied these requisites and found them unsatisfied because the evidence did not show a grave, pre-existing, and incurable psychological illness.
• Molina Guidelines — The Court set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36: (1) the burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage; (2) the root cause must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the decision, and must be a psychological illness with its incapacitating nature fully explained; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) the incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable, and relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations; (5) the illness must be grave enough to bring about disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage, not mere mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts, refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will; (6) the essential marital obligations are those in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220, 221, and 225 as regards parents and children, and non-complied obligations must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the decision; and (7) interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect. The Court found these guidelines not satisfied.
• State Participation in Nullity Proceedings — Article 48 of the Family Code requires the court to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to appear on behalf of the State to prevent collusion and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Only active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General ensures that the State's interest is represented and protected. The Court found the State's participation wanting because it consisted only of a no-collusion report, an opposition, and cross-examination, with no other pleadings or controverting evidence.
• Distinction from Legal Separation and Other Marital Remedies — Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but may be based on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the alleged acts of Nilda, even if true, did not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
• Sufficiency of Psychological Expert Report — While the Court relies heavily on psychological experts and does not require personal examination of the defendant spouse, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, and the incapacity established by the totality of evidence. The report must have sufficient factual bases and must demonstrate a natal or supervening disabling factor or adverse integral element in the person's character. The Court found the Vatanagul report vague, sweeping, and lacking sufficient factual bases.
• Factual Findings of Trial Courts; Exceptions — Factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding on the Supreme Court. The principle is not absolute when the findings go beyond the issues, run contrary to the admissions of the parties, fail to notice relevant facts that would justify a different conclusion, or when there is a misappreciation of facts. The Court applied the exception and reviewed the factual findings.
• Marriage Inviolability and Doubt in Favor of Validity — The Constitution protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family; marriage is legally inviolable and protected from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. The Court applied this principle in requiring strict standards for psychological reports and in reversing the declaration of nullity.
• Burden of Proof in Nullity Cases — The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Mere allegation is insufficient. The Court applied this rule in finding that Reynaldo failed to prove Nilda's alleged refusal to bear a child and failed to establish psychological incapacity.

• "Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." — This passage defines the controlling standard for psychological incapacity under Article 36 and anchors the Court's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient.
• "Mere 'difficulty,' 'refusal' or 'neglect' in the performance of marital obligations or 'ill will' on the part of the spouse is different from 'incapacity' rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness." — This passage distinguishes ordinary marital shortcomings from the grave psychological illness required by Article 36, a distinction central to the Court's rejection of the lower courts' findings.
• "The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity." — This passage states the Court's specific evidentiary holding on the expert report, which it found vague, sweeping, and lacking factual bases.
• "A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage." — This passage encapsulates the Court's policy-driven conclusion that a failed or unhappy marriage does not automatically justify a declaration of nullity under Article 36.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — Controlling precedent holding that psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; cited and applied to require these requisites.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — Set forth the guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code; cited extensively and applied to find the evidence insufficient and the guidelines not complied with.
• Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396 — Cited for the definition of psychological incapacity, the distinction between incapacity and mere difficulty, refusal, neglect, or ill will, the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage, and the rule that a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177 — Cited for the State's active participation in nullity proceedings, the strict standards for psychological incapacity, and the principle that a marriage is not null and void merely because it is unsatisfactory.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508 — Cited for the rule that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume basic marital obligations, and that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.
• Marcos vs. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) — Cited for the rule that there is no requirement that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before nullity based on psychological incapacity may be declared, although the incapacity must still be established by the totality of evidence.
• Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121 — Cited for the distinction between incapacity and mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect, and for the principle that an admission of a good and harmonious relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of a pre-existing psychological defect.
• Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353 — Cited for the rule that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC dispensed with the Molina requirement of an OSG certification, but Article 48 still mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through the fiscal or prosecuting attorney.
• Carating-Siayngco vs. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422 — Cited in connection with A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and the continuing requirement of State participation in nullity proceedings.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Court applied this provision and held that the evidence did not establish the required serious, grave, permanent, incurable, and pre-existing psychological illness.
• Article 48, Family Code — Requires the court, in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to appear on behalf of the State to prevent collusion and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed; no judgment shall be based on a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. The Court applied this provision and found the State's participation wanting.
• Articles 68–71, Family Code — Define the essential marital obligations of husband and wife; under the Molina guidelines, non-complied marital obligations must be stated in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the decision. The Court found the evidence insufficient to establish non-compliance amounting to psychological incapacity.
• Articles 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Define parental obligations; under the Molina guidelines, these are among the essential marital obligations that must be shown to have been breached. The Court found no sufficient proof to support a finding of psychological incapacity based on these obligations.
• Articles 35, 37, 38, 41, 45, and 55, Family Code — Provide other grounds rendering a marriage void ab initio, voidable, or subject to legal separation. The Court cited these provisions to distinguish Article 36 from other marital remedies and to hold that the alleged acts did not amount to psychological incapacity.
• A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) — Dispensed with the Molina guideline requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether it agrees or objects to the petition. The Court held that Article 48 still mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through the fiscal or prosecuting attorney.
• Constitution (family protection policy) — The Decision invokes the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family, and decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protected from dissolution at the whim of the parties. The Court applied this policy in requiring strict standards for psychological reports and in resolving doubts in favor of the validity of the marriage.

• Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson)
• Minita V. Chico-Nazario
• Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
• Ruben T. Reyes