Navaja vs. De Castro

Where separate acts constituting violations of different provisions of the same penal law are motivated by a single criminal impulse or resolution directed at a single objective, they constitute one continuing crime (delito continuado) and may not be prosecuted as separate offenses. The principle of delito continuado, though originating from the Spanish Penal Code, applies to crimes penalized under special laws such as PD 1829, pursuant to Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner Noel Navaja is the husband of Ana Lou B. Navaja, who was then the Regional Sales Manager for Visayas of DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) and had been charged with falsification of a private document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. During the preliminary investigation of that case, DKT's counsel, respondent Atty. Edgar Borje, subpoenaed a material witness, Marilyn Magsigay, to testify regarding the allegedly falsified official receipt. The obstruction of justice charges against petitioner arose from his alleged interference with Ms. Magsigay's participation in that preliminary investigation. PD 1829, entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders," penalizes various acts that obstruct, impede, frustrate, or delay the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.

Petitioner Noel Navaja is the husband of Ana Lou B. Navaja, who served as Regional Sales Manager for Visayas of DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT). Ana Navaja was charged with falsification of a private document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol), docketed as I.S. Case No. 04-1238. In the course of that preliminary investigation, DKT subpoenaed one of its material witnesses, Marilyn Magsigay, to appear at a hearing on March 15, 2004, to shed light on the official receipt allegedly falsified by Ana Navaja.

On March 9, 2004, petitioner allegedly went to Ms. Magsigay's workplace at Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, and told her that, per instruction from Ana Navaja's lawyer, Atty. Orwen Bonghanoy, her attendance at the scheduled hearing was no longer needed. As a result, Ms. Magsigay did not attend the March 15, 2004 hearing. Instead, petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and notarized by a certain Atty. Rolando Grapa in Cebu City, which supported Ana Navaja's counter-affidavit. I.S. Case No. 04-1238 was eventually dismissed.

Respondent Atty. Edgar Borje, DKT's counsel, subsequently learned from Ms. Magsigay herself that she would have attended the March 15, 2004 hearing were it not for petitioner's misrepresentation that her presence was no longer required; that she was merely told by her superior at Garden Cafe to sign the affidavit and did not personally prepare it; and that she could not have gone to Cebu to have it notarized before Atty. Grapa because she was at work on that day. This prompted Atty. Borje to file two criminal complaints: the first charging petitioner with violation of Section 1(a) of PD 1829 in connection with the March 9, 2004 incident, and the second charging both petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy with violation of Section 1(f) of the same law in connection with the March 15, 2004 incident.

After due proceedings, separate Informations were filed. The case relating to the March 9, 2004 incident was filed before the MCTC-Jagna (Criminal Case No. 2878), while that relating to the March 15, 2004 incident was filed before the MTCC-Tagbilaran (Criminal Case No. 15942). Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash Information before the MCTC-Jagna, arguing that the charge under Section 1(a) should be absorbed by the charge under Section 1(f) pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran, since both cases arose from a single preliminary investigation proceeding, involved the same set of facts, flowed from a single alleged criminal intent, and that allowing separate prosecutions would violate his right against double jeopardy. The MCTC-Jagna denied the motion, a ruling affirmed by the RTC and subsequently by the CA. Meanwhile, petitioner was convicted in the MTCC-Tagbilaran on July 3, 2007.

• Single Criminal Intent: Petitioner argued that the criminal cases filed before the MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-Tagbilaran arose from a single preliminary investigation proceeding, involving the same set of facts and circumstances, and flowed from a single alleged criminal intent to obstruct the investigation of I.S. Case No. 04-1238.
• Absorption of Charges: Petitioner maintained that the charge of violation of Section 1(a) of PD 1829 pending before the MCTC-Jagna should have been absorbed by the charge of violation of Section 1(f) of the same law pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran, considering that the latter case was filed first.
• Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that to allow separate prosecutions of the two cases would be tantamount to a violation of his right to double jeopardy.

• Delito Continuado: Whether petitioner may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations of different provisions of PD 1829 (Sections 1(a) and 1(f)) allegedly committed during the pendency of a single preliminary investigation proceeding.

• Delito Continuado: No. Petitioner should only be charged with a single violation of PD 1829, as the separate acts — though committed on different dates and in different locations — were motivated by a single criminal impulse to obstruct the preliminary investigation in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Applying the principle of delito continuado, the acts constitute one continuing crime. Since petitioner had already been convicted in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case before the MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed to avoid double jeopardy.

• Delito Continuado: The elements of obstruction of justice under PD 1829 are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of the law; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. Two separate Informations were filed against petitioner — one for violation of Section 1(a) (preventing a witness from testifying by means of misrepresentation) before the MCTC-Jagna, and another for violation of Section 1(f) (presenting a false affidavit) before the MTCC-Tagbilaran. While the Informations pertained to acts done days apart and in different locations, the Court held that petitioner should only be charged with a single violation because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse — to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was in fact eventually dismissed. This conclusion rests on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution. The requisites of delito continuado, as derived from Cuello Calon and adopted in Santiago vs. Garchitorena, are: (a) plurality of acts performed during a period of time; (b) unity of penal provision violated; and (c) unity of criminal intent or purpose. The Court found all three requisites present: petitioner performed multiple acts on different dates, all constituting violations of the same penal law (PD 1829), and all directed at a single criminal objective. The Court distinguished Regis vs. People, where the accused signed falsified payrolls on two different dates with discernibly distinct criminal objectives; in contrast, petitioner's acts were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse to obstruct one specific proceeding. The principle of delito continuado, though originating from the Spanish Penal Code, applies to crimes penalized under special laws pursuant to Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, which makes the Code supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide otherwise. Since petitioner had already been charged and convicted in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the events in Jagna, Bohol should be deemed merely a partial execution of his single criminal design, and the case before the MCTC-Jagna had to be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner would be unduly exposed to double jeopardy.

• Delito Continuado (Continuous Crime) — A single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution, not susceptible of division. The requisites are: (a) plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; (b) unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and (c) unity of criminal intent and purpose, meaning two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. When these requisites concur, the separate acts constitute a single crime and may not be prosecuted as separate offenses. The doctrine applies not only to crimes under the Revised Penal Code but also to crimes penalized under special laws, pursuant to Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, which makes the Code supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide otherwise. In this case, the Court applied delito continuado to violations of PD 1829, holding that petitioner's acts of preventing a witness from testifying and presenting a false affidavit, though constituting violations of different subsections of Section 1, were united in a single criminal intent to obstruct one preliminary investigation and thus constituted one continuing crime. Where the accused has already been convicted in one venue, the case in the other venue must be dismissed to avoid double jeopardy.

• "While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the decisive factual finding that unifies the separate acts into a single offense under the doctrine of delito continuado.

• "The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws." — This formulation, quoted from Santiago vs. Garchitorena, establishes the applicability of delito continuado to special laws via Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, a point critical to the Court's ruling on PD 1829.

• "In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238." — This passage distinguishes the instant case from Regis vs. People and articulates the factual basis for applying delito continuado rather than treating the acts as separate offenses.

• Santiago vs. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, December 2, 1993, 228 SCRA 214 — Controlling authority on the elements of delito continuado. The Court relied on this case's formulation — drawn from Cuello Calon, Guevarra, and Padilla — to establish the three requisites: plurality of acts, unity of penal provision, and unity of criminal intent. The Court also cited Santiago for the proposition that delito continuado applies to crimes penalized under special laws.

• Regis vs. People, 67 Phil. 43 (1938) — Distinguished. The CA had cited this case for the proposition that malversation through falsification committed on different dates constitutes independent offenses punishable separately. The Court distinguished Regis on the ground that the accused there was working towards discernibly distinct criminal objectives when he falsified payrolls on two separate dates, whereas petitioner's acts were motivated by a single criminal impulse directed at one proceeding.

• Gamboa vs. CA, 160-A Phil. 962 (1975) — Followed. The Court cited Gamboa for the canonical formulation of delito continuado as a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution, where each act, though of delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict. This supported the conclusion that the events in Jagna were merely a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design.

• Padiernos vs. People, G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015, 766 SCRA 614 — Cited for the elements of the crime of obstruction of justice under PD 1829: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.

• Paera vs. People, 664 Phil. 630 (2011) — Cited as authority for the definition of delito continuado as a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.

• Section 1(a), Presidential Decree No. 1829 — Penalizes preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force, or threats. Petitioner was charged under this provision before the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in the preliminary investigation of I.S. Case No. 04-1238 by means of misrepresentation on March 9, 2004.

• Section 1(f), Presidential Decree No. 1829 — Penalizes making, presenting, or using any record, document, paper, or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases. Petitioner was charged under this provision before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit of Ms. Magsigay at the March 15, 2004 hearing.

• Article 10, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the Revised Penal Code shall be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide otherwise. The Court relied on this provision to apply the principle of delito continuado — a concept developed from the Penal Code — to crimes penalized under the special law PD 1829.

• Section 15, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Referenced in connection with the proper venue for the single charge, which could be filed either in Jagna, Bohol, where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from testifying, or in Tagbilaran City, where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit.

Cario, Acting C.J. (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred.