National Press Club of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections

Mandamus against the Commission on Elections will lie only where election law specifically imposes a ministerial duty, not where the law grants discretionary implementation or prohibits access. Under Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC must allow designated watchers to witness ballot printing; under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, it must allow examination and testing of automated election system equipment or devices, including secure digital cards, but not access to configuration and preparation; and under the right to information, it may be compelled to disclose the complete transmission diagram or network architecture, but not "all details" of transmission, nor physical access to technical hubs, servers, and data centers. The petition was nonetheless dismissed as moot and academic after the 2022 elections.

Petitioners National Press Club of the Philippines, Automated Election System Watch, and Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. are organizations whose members include registered Filipino voters, journalists, media personnel, and concerned citizens. Respondent Commission on Elections is the constitutional body responsible for administering and enforcing election laws, including the automated election system under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, and the Omnibus Election Code. The controversy concerned the transparency obligations imposed on the COMELEC during preparation for the 2022 National and Local Elections, particularly with respect to digital signatures, ballot printing, secure digital cards, vote counting machines, technical hubs, and data transmission architecture.

Petitioners National Press Club of the Philippines, Automated Election System Watch, and Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. are organizations whose members include registered Filipino voters, journalists, media personnel, and concerned citizens. They sought to participate as observers in election transparency activities for the 2022 National and Local Elections under the automated election system administered by respondent COMELEC. As of the filing of the petition, the 2022 NLE was barely 48 days away, and overseas Filipino workers were set to vote in 18 days.

Concerning digital signatures, COMELEC Commissioner Marlon Casquejo informed the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Automated Election System hearing on September 15, 2021 that COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 210021 dated January 20, 2021 had approved the use of digital signatures for the 2022 NLE. During the March 9, 2022 JCOC hearing, it was discussed that all teachers and Board of Election Inspectors members were enrolled to use digital signatures, but implementation would be limited to the National Capital Region, Cebu City, and Davao City. In a letter dated March 7, 2022, Commissioner Casquejo informed Senator Imee Marcos that equipment such as cable assemblies was needed, that no provider could supply and deliver the needed number of cable assemblies for approximately 300,000 to 350,000 teachers, and that the COMELEC En Banc had decided to limit digital signatures to highly urbanized cities. Petitioners asserted that a cable assembly or download cable was unnecessary because digital signatures could be directly loaded into the VCMs without using iButton.

As to ballot printing, representatives of various political parties went to the National Printing Office to observe but were denied entry. The COMELEC denied requests to observe, citing possible delay and the need to limit the number of persons in the premises due to COVID-19. During the March 9, 2022 JCOC hearing, it was confirmed that 66.4% of the ballots had already been printed without witnesses from political parties and other organizations, and that approximately 5.2 million printed ballots were defective. Petitioners argued that, without observers, there was no way to verify whether those ballots were truly defective and that unaccounted ballots could allegedly be used to cheat. Commissioner Casquejo later apologized and acknowledged that the high number of COVID cases was not an excuse to bar observers.

With respect to SD cards and VCMs, letters from Partido Federal ng Pilipinas and Lakas-CMD dated January 11 and 12, 2022 requested a walk-through and visit to the COMELEC Sta. Rosa warehouse to observe the uploading of contents to the SD cards, conduct stress testing of the VCMs, and randomly open and view the inside of a VCM. During the March 9, 2022 JCOC hearing, Director Jeannie Flororita announced a scheduled walkthrough on March 14, 2022, but the records did not disclose what transpired. Attorneys Alexander Ramos and Hubert Guevara stated that they had gone to the gates weekly and were refused entry because they had no coordination or authority, although there was no formal written denial from the Sta. Rosa facility. The COMELEC later opened the Sta. Rosa warehouse for public viewing and invited the public and political parties to witness the final testing and sealing of VCMs nationwide from May 2 to 7, 2022.

As for transmission documents and technical infrastructure, petitioners sought the complete transmission diagram or data/communications network architecture, including the transmission router server and "Meet-Me Room." The COMELEC had disclosed on its website the List of Local Hubs, Order of Dispatch, and Schedule of Dispatch of Accountable Forms/Supplies as early as March 16, 2022. It conducted an end-to-end demonstration of the automated election system on March 22, 2022 and a walkthrough of the Transparency Media Server on April 30, 2022, during which the actual transmission of results from the VCMs to the Consolidation Canvassing System and the data centers was explained. The locations of the different servers and data centers, including the Central Data Center of which the "Meet-Me Room" was a necessary part, were also divulged. Petitioners nevertheless maintained that no one had been allowed to observe the regional and provincial hubs and data centers.

• Standing and Direct Resort: Petitioners alleged that they had a clear legal right and requisite standing as interested political parties or groups pursuant to Capalla vs. COMELEC, and that the time element justified direct resort to the Supreme Court because the 2022 NLE was barely 48 days away and overseas Filipino workers would vote in 18 days.
• Digital Signatures: Petitioners contended that Section 22 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, imposed a mandatory duty to implement digital signatures, and that the COMELEC refused despite the feasibility of directly loading signatures into VCMs without a cable assembly or iButton.
• Observation of Ballot Printing: Petitioners argued that the COMELEC violated Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 15 of the AES Law by denying observers access to the printing of ballots, leaving 66.4% of ballots printed without witnesses and approximately 5.2 million defective ballots unaccounted.
• SD Cards, VCMs, Technical Hubs, and Transmission Diagrams: Citing Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. COMELEC, petitioners claimed a clear legal right to compel the COMELEC to allow access and inspection of the SD cards, VCMs, technical hubs, and transmission or data/communications network diagram, asserting that the COMELEC had not been transparent and had almost completed configuration without observers.

• Mootness: Respondent argued that the petition was rendered moot by the successful conduct of the 2022 NLE.
• No Neglect of Duty: Respondent maintained that mandamus did not lie because the COMELEC neither neglected the performance of its duties nor excluded another from enjoyment of a right, having consistently complied with its duty to use digital signatures in transmitting election returns.
• No Continuing Refusal to Allow Observers: Respondent countered that it had been transparent in the printing of official ballots and did not continuously refuse to allow observers during the printing.
• No Duty over SD Cards, VCMs, and Critical Information: Respondent argued that the law did not enjoin it to allow access to and inspection of the configuration of SD cards and preparation of VCMs, nor to disclose critical information regarding its hubs, servers, data centers, and transmission details.
• Political Question: Respondent asserted that the petition involved political questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.

• Mootness and Justiciability: Whether the petition was rendered moot and academic by the conclusion of the 2022 NLE, and whether any exception to the mootness doctrine justified a decision on the merits.
• Locus Standi: Whether petitioners possess standing to institute the special civil action for mandamus.
• Digital Signatures: Whether the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to implement the use of digital signatures under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
• Observation of Ballot Printing: Whether the COMELEC may be compelled by mandamus to allow designated watchers to witness the printing of official ballots.
• Examination and Testing of SD Cards and VCMs: Whether the COMELEC may be compelled to allow witnessing of the configuration and preparation of SD cards and VCMs, or to allow examination and testing of those AES equipment or devices.
• Disclosure of Transmission Information: Whether the COMELEC may be compelled to disclose the complete transmission diagram or data/communications network architecture and all details of the transmission router server or "Meet-Me Room."
• Access to Technical Hubs and Data Centers: Whether the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to allow physical access to its technical hubs, servers, and data centers.

• Mootness and Justiciability: Yes. The petition was rendered moot and academic by the conclusion of the 2022 NLE, but the Court ruled on the underlying duties because the last three exceptions to mootness were present.
• Locus Standi: Yes. Petitioners possess locus standi because the mandamus was anchored on the people's right to information on matters of public concern, and the representatives of NPCP and GBI were properly authorized.
• Digital Signatures: No. Mandamus will not lie to compel nationwide implementation of digital signatures because that is not a ministerial duty of the COMELEC; VCM-generated digital signatures sufficiently comply with the AES Law.
• Observation of Ballot Printing: Yes, but the issue is moot. Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a ministerial duty on the COMELEC to allow designated watchers to witness ballot printing, but subsequent transparency measures rendered the issue moot.
• Examination and Testing of SD Cards and VCMs: No as to witnessing configuration and preparation; yes as to allowing examination and testing of AES equipment or devices under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, but the issue became moot. Petitioners failed to establish denial of access to watchers at the Sta. Rosa warehouse.
• Disclosure of Transmission Information: Yes as to the complete transmission diagram or network architecture, absent the mootness; no as to "all details," which was too vague and broad. The COMELEC failed to prove that the transmission diagram was exempt from the right to information.
• Access to Technical Hubs and Data Centers: No. No law imposes a ministerial duty to allow physical access to technical hubs, servers, and data centers; Section 35(c) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, penalizes causing access to such facilities.

• Mootness and Justiciability: A case becomes moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by supervening events, so that a declaration would be of no practical use or value. Because the petition sought to compel transparency measures for the 2022 NLE, the conclusion of the election meant the Court could no longer accord the reliefs prayed for. Nonetheless, the Court may decide otherwise moot cases where there is a grave constitutional violation, the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest are involved, the constitutional issue requires formulation of controlling principles, or the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The last three exceptions were present, particularly because the case presented novel issues on whether the law enjoins the COMELEC to allow access to and inspection of SD card and VCM configuration and to disclose critical election information.

• Locus Standi: Under Guingona vs. COMELEC, a petition for mandamus anchored on the people's right to information on matters of public concern may be brought by any citizen as the real party-in-interest. The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen and part of the general public that possesses the right. Petitioners' members included registered Filipino voters, journalists, media personnel, and concerned citizens, thus clothing them with personality. While Dr. Nelson Celis lacked proof of authority to act for AES Watch, the representatives of NPCP and GBI were properly authorized, so standing was established.

• Digital Signatures: Petitioners relied on the first paragraph of Section 22 of the AES Law, which requires printed election returns to be signed and thumbmarked by all members of the board of election inspectors and the watchers present. That paragraph, however, speaks of printed election returns, not of digital signatures made only on electronic returns. The penultimate paragraph of Section 22 and the last paragraph of Section 25 treat electronically transmitted and digitally signed election returns and certificates of canvass as official election results. Since automated elections began in 2010, the digital signature on election returns has come from the VCMs, and precedent recognizes that a machine signature may be the functional equivalent of a digital signature. The method of digitally signing election results is subject to the COMELEC's sound judgment and must be accorded the presumption of regularity. Accordingly, limiting the teachers' use of digital signatures to highly urbanized cities while retaining VCM-generated signatures elsewhere did not violate a ministerial duty.

• Observation of Ballot Printing: Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code uses the word "shall," leaving the COMELEC no discretion to disallow a designated watcher from witnessing the printing of ballots once a request has been made by a candidate, political party, or covered organization. Security concerns, possible delays, and health protocols did not justify the refusal because watchers are even entitled to guard the printer's premises, requests were sent as early as January 2022, and the COMELEC could have allowed a limited number of watchers or alternative means such as livestreaming. Commissioner Casquejo later confirmed that the COMELEC would allow observers, and the Court took judicial notice that the COMELEC began livestreaming ballot printing on March 17, 2022, offered CCTV footage, and conducted random ballot checking with party and stakeholder representatives. The law does not limit the means by which the COMELEC may allow watching, though on-site viewing may not be entirely dispensed with. These developments rendered the issue moot.

• Examination and Testing of SD Cards and VCMs: No provision specifically requires the witnessing of the configuration and preparation of SD cards and VCMs. The closest provision is Section 14 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which requires the COMELEC to allow political parties, candidates, citizens' arms, or their representatives to examine and test the equipment or device of the AES before voting starts. The amendment from "counting machines" to "equipment or device of the AES" expanded coverage beyond VCMs to include devices such as SD cards. The requirement to provide test ballots and test forms shows that examination and testing occur after configuration, not during or before it. While the COMELEC has no discretion to disallow examination and testing, it may first verify that an individual or entity is a bona fide political party, candidate, authorized representative, or accredited citizens' arm to protect the integrity of the process. Petitioners failed to show that the requesting parties' watchers were denied access, and the COMELEC later opened the Sta. Rosa warehouse and invited public observation of final testing and sealing, rendering the issue moot.

• Disclosure of Transmission Information: The constitutional right to information and the policy of full public disclosure require that two requisites concur before mandamus may compel disclosure: the information must relate to matters of public concern or interest, and it must not be exempt by law from the constitutional guarantee. The complete transmission diagram or data/communications network architecture is a matter of public concern because unauthorized transmissions and communications to and from network nodes may call election integrity into question. The COMELEC failed to discharge its burden of showing that such information was exempt. Thus, absent the mootness, disclosure of the complete transmission diagram and network architecture could be compelled. The prayer for "all details" of the transmission router server and "Meet-Me Room" was, however, too vague and broad because some details could contain confidential information posing security risks. The Court would decide on a case-by-case basis which election, consolidation, or transmission documents are covered by the right to information.

• Access to Technical Hubs and Data Centers: The law does not mandate the COMELEC to allow physical access to its hubs, servers, and data centers, and the right to information does not include or extend to physical access to those facilities. Paragraph (c), Section 29 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended and renumbered as Section 35, penalizes the act of causing access to facilities, whether classified or declassified, and whether or not the act affects the electoral process or results. Unlike access to the premises of the printer for witnessing or guarding under Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code, there is no clear legal right to physical access to the technical hubs or data centers of the automated election system. At most, the COMELEC may be compelled to provide information about those facilities, as it had already done.

• Mandamus and ministerial duty — Mandamus lies only to compel an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty when the respondent unlawfully neglects its performance, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and the duty is ministerial, not discretionary. The Court applied the five requisites to each requested relief and denied the writ where the act involved discretion or was prohibited by law.
• Mootness and its exceptions — A case is moot when supervening events eliminate the justiciable controversy and a declaration would have no practical use or value. The Court may nevertheless decide a moot case where there is a grave constitutional violation, exceptional character and paramount public interest, a need to formulate controlling principles, or an issue capable of repetition yet evading review. The last three exceptions were present here.
• Citizen standing in right-to-information mandamus — Where a mandamus petition is anchored on the people's right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen is a real party-in-interest. No special interest is required; citizenship and interest in the faithful execution of the laws suffice.
• Digital signature equivalence and COMELEC discretion — A machine signature of a PCOS or VCM may be the functional equivalent of a digital signature. The method of digitally signing election results is a matter subject to the COMELEC's sound judgment and is not a ministerial duty subject to judicial compulsion.
• Mandatory observation of ballot printing under Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code — The word "shall" imposes on the COMELEC a ministerial duty to allow any properly designated watcher to witness the printing and distribution of ballots and guard the printer's premises. Security, delay, and health protocol concerns do not authorize disregard of the law; alternative means such as livestreaming may be used, but on-site viewing may not be entirely dispensed with.
• Examination and testing of AES equipment or devices under Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended — The law expanded the phrase "counting machines" to "equipment or device of the AES," thereby including devices such as SD cards. The COMELEC must allow examination and testing after configuration, but has no ministerial duty to allow witnessing of configuration or preparation. It may verify the bona fide status of those seeking access to protect the electoral process.
• Right to information and public concern — The right to information requires that the information sought be of public concern and not exempt by law. Exemptions are strictly construed, and the government agency bears the burden of showing non-disclosure is justified. The complete transmission diagram or network architecture of the automated election system is a matter of public concern, but a request for "all details" may be too vague and broad where it implicates confidential security information.
• No physical access to AES technical hubs and data centers — The right to information does not include physical access to election technical hubs, servers, and data centers. Section 35(c) of R.A. No. 8436, as amended, penalizes causing access to facilities whether classified or declassified, thereby limiting any claimed right of physical inspection.

• "By the use of the word "shall," the COMELEC is not given discretion to allow a designated watcher to witness the printing of the ballots. As long as a request has been made by any candidate, political party, or civic, religious, professional, business, service, youth or any similar organizations collectively designated by the Commission, and that said individual or group has designated its watcher/s, it is the COMELEC's ministerial duty to allow the designated watcher/s to observe the printing of the ballots." — This states the ratio decidendi on the mandatory nature of ballot-printing observation under Section 187 of the Omnibus Election Code.
• "The fact that the law commands the COMELEC to provide test ballots and test forms is a clear indication that the examination and testing take place after the configuration of the devices and not during or before said configuration." — This passage distinguishes the statutory right to examine and test AES equipment from any claimed right to observe configuration and preparation.
• "Mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioner's legal right to the performance of the particular act, which is sought to be compelled, is clear and complete." — This is the controlling standard for evaluating whether each requested relief could be compelled by mandamus.
• "The credibility of the system is directly proportional to the transparency of the entire process, from the preparation of the ballots to the canvassing of votes." — This explains the heightened importance of transparency in an automated election system and supports disclosure of matters of public concern.

• Capalla vs. COMELEC, 687 Phil. 617 (2012) — Followed; clarified that a PCOS machine signature may be treated as the equivalent of a digital signature.
• Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. COMELEC, 851 Phil. 685 (2019) — Followed in principle but distinguished; recognized the right to review the source code and the functional equivalence of a machine signature, but did not support the broader access sought by petitioners.
• AES Watch vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246332 (Resolution), December 9, 2020 — Followed; the method of digitally signing election results is subject to the COMELEC's sound judgment and presumed regular.
• Sumulong vs. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941) — Followed; the COMELEC must be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods to ensure free, orderly, and honest elections.
• Guingona vs. COMELEC, 634 Phil. 516 (2010) — Applied; any citizen may be a real party-in-interest in a mandamus petition anchored on the right to information.
• Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521 (1987) — Applied; "public concern" is determined case-by-case and embraces matters that directly affect the public or naturally arouse the interest of ordinary citizens.
• Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters (CTRM) of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), 780 Phil. 1 (2016) — Applied; stated the two requisites for compelling disclosure under the right to information and required strict construction of exemptions.
• David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) — Cited; enumerated the exceptions allowing courts to decide otherwise moot cases.

• Article II, Section 28, 1987 Constitution — Full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest, subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law; applied to the transparency policy governing the AES.
• Article III, Section 7, 1987 Constitution — Right of the people to information on matters of public concern; applied to the transmission diagram and network architecture, subject to statutory limitations, with exemptions strictly construed.
• Rule 65, Section 3, Rules of Court — Defines mandamus as an extraordinary writ to compel performance of a ministerial act; used as the threshold standard for evaluating each prayer.
• Section 187, Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Mandates the COMELEC to allow designated watchers to witness the printing and distribution of ballots and guard the printer's premises; interpreted as a ministerial duty.
• Section 22, Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369 — Governs electronic returns and digital signatures; the first paragraph applies to printed election returns, while later paragraphs recognize electronically transmitted and digitally signed returns as official, supporting VCM-generated signatures.
• Section 14, Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 9369 — Requires the COMELEC to allow examination and testing of AES equipment or devices before voting starts; interpreted to include SD cards but not access to configuration or preparation.
• Section 35(c), Republic Act No. 8436, as amended and renumbered — Penalizes gaining or causing access to computer facilities, hardware, or equipment whether classified or declassified; applied to bar physical access to technical hubs, servers, and data centers.
• Sections 2 and 28, Republic Act No. 9369 — Define the automated election system and list electronic devices used in the AES; relied upon to include SD cards within the coverage of examination and testing.

Associate Justices Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Singh concurred. Acting Chief Justice Leonen concurred and wrote a separate opinion. Associate Justice Caguioa wrote a separate concurring opinion. Associate Justice Lazaro-Javier wrote a concurrence. Chief Justice Gesmundo and Associate Justice Hernando were on official leave; Associate Justice J. Lopez was on leave; Associate Justices Inting and Kho, Jr. took no part.