National Power Corporation vs. Santa Loro Vda. De Capin et al.

The acquisition of a right-of-way easement over land traversed by transmission lines, resulting in a restriction or limitation on the owner's property rights, falls within the ambit of "expropriation" and entitles the landowner to full just compensation; a charter provision limiting compensation to an easement fee not exceeding 10% of the market value cannot prevail over the constitutional guarantee of just compensation. Corollarily, summary judgment is proper where the only remaining matter for determination is the amount of damages and the opposing party, despite ample opportunity, fails to raise or substantiate any genuine issue of material fact.

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) is a government-owned and controlled corporation vested with the power of eminent domain by its charter, Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938. Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, NAPOCOR expropriated several parcels of land in the Municipality of Carmen and the City of Danao, Province of Cebu, that would be traversed by its transmission towers and lines. Among the affected lots were those owned by respondents Santa Loro Vda. de Capin, covered by Tax Declaration No. 15-22196 (1994) with an area of 16,193 square meters, and by respondent-spouses Julito and Gloria Quimco, covered by Tax Declaration No. 31376 (1996) with an area of 3,298 square meters. Section 3-A of NAPOCOR's charter, as amended, governs the acquisition of private property traversed by transmission lines and prescribes the compensation payable for acquired land and for acquired right-of-way easements.

Respondents Santa Loro Vda. de Capin and the spouses Julito and Gloria Quimco owned adjoining parcels of land in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu. Capin's lot had an area of 16,193 square meters and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 15-22196 (1994), while the Quimco spouses' lot had an area of 3,298 square meters and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 31376 (1996). Both properties lay in the path of the 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project of petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation vested with the power of eminent domain under its charter.

To secure entry into the properties, NAPOCOR obtained from Capin and from the Quimco spouses "Permission to Enter for Construction of Transmission Line Project" permits dated 14 June 1994 and 11 December 1996, respectively. The permits were signed by the respondents upon NAPOCOR's representation that it would pay them just compensation for the intrusion into their properties. NAPOCOR thereafter constructed its power lines and transmission towers on the properties, completing the works in 1996. The project affected portions of the respondents' lots with a combined area of 3,199 square meters.

Upon completion of the construction, NAPOCOR imposed several restrictions on the respondents' use of their lands, including a prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by the transmission lines, on the ground that the high-tension electric current passing through the lines posed a danger to life and limb. The Quimco spouses, who held a Small Scale Quarry Permit, Series of 1995, were likewise prohibited from continuing their quarry business near the transmission towers because of the great possibility that quarrying might weaken the towers' foundation. The respondents thus lost a substantial amount of income by reason of the restrictions imposed on their properties.

NAPOCOR paid Capin the amount of ₱8,015.90 and the Quimco spouses the amount of ₱5,350.49 for the portions of their lots affected by the project. Only later did the respondents discover that, in comparison with these sums, other landowners within their area who had resisted the expropriation of their properties in court, or who had entered into compromise agreements with NAPOCOR, were paid ₱448.30 to ₱450.00 per square meter as just compensation for portions of their properties similarly affected by the same project.

Respondents accordingly filed a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs against NAPOCOR before the Regional Trial Court. In its Answer, NAPOCOR countered that the claim for compensation based on the full value of the properties traversed by its transmission lines was repugnant to Section 3-A of its charter, under which it was obligated to pay only an easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements. During the pre-trial conference, the parties conceded that there was no dispute as to the material fact that NAPOCOR had taken portions of the respondents' lots with a combined area of 3,199 square meters for use in the Interconnection Project, and they agreed that the only issue for resolution was the amount of just compensation due. The respondents assented that they would file a Motion for Summary Judgment.

The trial court found that NAPOCOR had admitted the taking during pre-trial but had failed to controvert the respondents' evidence on the area taken and on the amount of compensation, despite being granted extensions of time to do so. It further found that the respondents' lots and the lot of the heirs of Tomas Gingco in Civil Case No. DNA-379 were all located within the same area in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu, separated only by a lot owned jointly by Epifanio, Edilberto and Josefa, all surnamed Loro; that the respondents' lots were even more advantageously situated, being traversed by a barangay road and near the quarry areas of Llyons Richfield Industrial Corporation; and that both sets of lots were affected by the Interconnection Project and taken at about the same time, the respondents' lots in June 1996 and the Gingco lot in July 1996.

• Impropriety of Summary Judgment: Petitioner argued that although the Complaint was one for rescission of agreement and/or damages, it was subsequently transformed into one for "reversed eminent domain" in which the determination of just compensation was the issue; that the Rules on Summary Judgment apply only to ordinary takings of property; and that the RTC should instead have appointed commissioners under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court to ascertain just compensation, such that the determination of compensation based only on the pleadings was palpably void.
• Insufficiency of the Basis for the Valuation: Petitioner contended that the RTC's fixing of the fair market value at ₱448.33 per square meter was based on the Decision dated 25 May 1998 in Civil Case No. DNA-379, which in turn rested on the Decision dated 5 May 1998 in Civil Case No. DNA-373; that the latter Decision did not contain a description of the properties involved or their land classification at the time of the filing of the complaint or of taking; and that DNA-379 therefore furnished no sufficient basis for pegging the value of the respondents' properties.
• Absence of Factual and Legal Basis in the Assailed Resolution: Petitioner maintained that the RTC did not discuss in its Resolution dated 16 April 2001 its factual and legal bases for fixing the damages payable, and that the respondents failed to demonstrate that their properties, at the time of taking, were of the same classification as those of the other landowners who were paid more.
• Liability Limited to Easement Fees: Petitioner insisted that it acquired only an easement of right of way over the respondents' properties for the construction of its transmission lines; that the respondents retained ownership notwithstanding the imposition of the easement; and that it was therefore liable only to pay an easement fee not exceeding 10% of the fair market value of the portions actually affected, in accordance with Section 3-A(b) of its charter, as amended.
• Disputed Area: Petitioner raised as an issue the correctness of the total area of 3,199 square meters alleged to have been traversed by its transmission lines, which it claimed its Right of Way Officers were still verifying.

• Full Market Value of the Portions Taken: Respondents insisted that they be paid the full market value of the portions of their lots taken by petitioner, rather than the easement fees petitioner claimed it was bound to pay under Section 3-A of its charter.

• Propriety of Summary Judgment: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the propriety of the trial court's resort to summary judgment in determining the amount of just compensation for the properties of respondents affected by petitioner's transmission line project.
• Area Affected: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the finding of the trial court that the total area of respondents' lands affected by petitioner's transmission line project is 3,199 square meters.
• Basis for the Fair Market Value: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. DNA-379 provides sufficient basis for fixing the fair market value of the affected properties of respondents at ₱448.33 per square meter.
• Entitlement to Easement Fees Only: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not ruling that under petitioner's Charter, R.A. No. 6395, as amended, respondents are only entitled to simple easement fees.

• Propriety of Summary Judgment: No. Summary judgment was proper because, except as to the amount of damages, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact — NAPOCOR having admitted the taking at pre-trial and having failed to file any opposition to the motion despite repeated extensions — and the respondents were entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Area Affected: No. The issue of the area actually taken was not timely or validly raised before the RTC, NAPOCOR having failed to submit the results of its supposed verification or any evidence to controvert the respondents' evidence, so that the trial court correctly relied on the latter.
• Basis for the Fair Market Value: No. The final and executory Decision dated 25 May 1998 in Civil Case No. DNA-379, involving a lot similarly situated and taken at about the same time, furnished a logical and reasonable basis for fixing just compensation at ₱448.33 per square meter, and the RTC could take cognizance of that decision when it was presented for its consideration.
• Entitlement to Easement Fees Only: No. The acquisition of a right-of-way easement over the portions of the respondents' lots was a taking under the power of eminent domain, for which full just compensation is due; Section 3-A of NAPOCOR's charter cannot prevail over the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

• Propriety of Summary Judgment: Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Even if the pleadings appear on their face to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine. The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines the propriety of summary judgment. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, two requisites must concur: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of the moving party, including the documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party; if the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, there is no real or genuine issue as to the facts and summary judgment is called for. The movant bears the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial; trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact, and when the facts pleaded are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. Applying these standards, NAPOCOR admitted during the pre-trial conference that it had taken portions of the respondents' lands for the construction of its power lines and transmission towers, and the parties could not agree only on the amount of just compensation — the respondents insisting on the full market value of the portions taken and NAPOCOR claiming liability only for easement fees equivalent to 10% of the market value as indicated in the tax declarations under Section 3-A of its charter. What remained for the RTC's determination was thus the proper amount of damages due. The respondents filed their Motion for Summary Judgment specifically alleging that portions of their parcels with a total area of 3,199 square meters were affected by the Interconnection Project and taken in 1996, as shown by a Sketch Plan attached as Annex C. NAPOCOR filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment, which the RTC granted, stating that it was not inclined to oppose the motion except that its officers were still verifying whether the area traversed was indeed 3,199 square meters, and that once the area was confirmed correct it would join the motion. Despite ample opportunities, however, NAPOCOR never filed any Opposition or Comment and never submitted the results of its supposed verification; it raised the issue of the area only after the RTC had rendered summary judgment. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that NAPOCOR did not present the alleged communication of its Project Manager or the sketch plans despite the extension given, and that the sketch plans were not even signed by the geodetic engineer who supposedly conducted the survey, rendering them of doubtful credibility; without any comment or contrary evidence, the trial court correctly relied on the respondents' evidence. NAPOCOR could not raise an issue as to any material fact when, through its own fault and inaction, it chose to remain silent when the motion for summary judgment was filed, such actuation speaking of a dilatory tactic in the payment of just compensation due. The issue on the area was therefore not timely or validly raised before the RTC, and except for the amount of damages to which the respondents were entitled as a matter of law, there was no other genuine issue as to any material fact; hence the RTC was justified in resorting to summary judgment.
• Area Affected: The respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment expressly alleged, and supported with an attached Sketch Plan, that portions of their parcels with a total area of 3,199 square meters were affected by the Interconnection Project and taken in 1996. NAPOCOR's own Motion for Extension conceded that it was not inclined to oppose the motion except as to the correctness of the area, which its Right of Way Officers were still verifying, and undertook to join the motion once the area was confirmed. The RTC granted the extension, yet NAPOCOR never filed the promised Comment, never submitted the results of its verification, and never presented the sketch plans or the alleged communication of its Project Manager. The sketch plans it later relied upon were unsigned by the geodetic engineer who supposedly prepared them, making them of doubtful credibility. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the trial court correctly relied on the evidence submitted by the respondents, and the issue of the area was not timely or validly raised.
• Basis for the Fair Market Value: In its Decision dated 25 May 1998 in Civil Case No. DNA-379, the RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay just compensation of ₱448.33 per square meter for the lot owned by the heirs of Tomas Gingco, which was similarly traversed by NAPOCOR's transmission lines; that Decision became final and executory on 3 December 1998. Although rendered in another case, the RTC in Civil Case No. DNA-547 could take cognizance of it when the respondents presented it for consideration. The lot of the heirs of Tomas Gingco and those of the respondents are all located within the same area in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu and are in fact separated only by a lot owned jointly by Epifanio, Edilberto and Josefa, all surnamed Loro. The respondents' lots are even more advantageously situated than the Gingco lot, being traversed by a barangay road and near the quarry areas of Llyons Richfield Industrial Corporation. Both sets of lots were affected by the Interconnection Project and taken at about the same time — the respondents' lots effectively in June 1996 and the Gingco lot only a month later, in July 1996. Since the personalities and properties in both cases were essentially in similar situations, the just compensation awarded in the former case was a logical and reasonable basis for fixing the compensation due in the latter. Moreover, NAPOCOR attached several documents to its Motion for Summary Judgment and furnished copies to petitioner, which was given ample time to study, challenge and controvert the respondents' evidence but failed to do so; the RTC thus rightfully proceeded, based on its evaluation of the evidence on record, to award just compensation equivalent to the fair market value at ₱448.33 per square meter.
• Entitlement to Easement Fees Only: Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession; the right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." After NAPOCOR's transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of the respondents' lots, NAPOCOR imposed restrictions thereon, such as the prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by the lines, and the Quimco spouses, holders of a Small Scale Quarry Permit, were prohibited from continuing their quarry business near the transmission towers because of the great possibility that it could weaken their foundation, causing them substantial loss of income. NAPOCOR's acquisition of an easement of right of way thus amounted to an expropriation of the portions of the respondents' properties and perpetually deprived them of their proprietary rights thereon, for which they are entitled to reasonable and just compensation. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator; the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss, and the word "just" intensifies the meaning of "compensation" to convey that the equivalent rendered shall be real, substantial, full and ample. As explained in National Power Corporation vs. Gutierrez, the acquisition of a right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain where the limitation imposed against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives the private respondents of its ordinary use, and the owner continually pays taxes on the affected portion while receiving only a one-time fee. The acquisition of the right-of-way easement being a taking, NAPOCOR is liable to pay just compensation and not merely an easement fee. To uphold the contention that its charter obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower, would not only interfere with a judicial function but would render useless the protection guaranteed by Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. The valuation of a property in the tax declaration cannot be an absolute substitute for just compensation; the market value stated in the tax declaration of the condemned property is no longer conclusive, and it is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. It is likewise repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judicially evaluated. Ten percent of the market value of the expropriated property cannot in any way be considered the fair and full equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner, as such would be 90% less than what is due him. Section 3-A of NAPOCOR's charter cannot therefore prevail over the constitutional mandate on the payment of just compensation, and the trial court committed no error in holding that the charter encroached on the function of the court in determining just compensation.

• Right-of-way easement as expropriation — Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." The Court applied this doctrine to hold that NAPOCOR's acquisition of an easement of right of way over the respondents' lots, coupled with the prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the transmission lines and the prohibition on the Quimco spouses' quarrying near the towers, amounted to a taking that perpetually deprived the respondents of their proprietary rights.
• Just compensation defined — Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss, and the word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of "compensation" and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The Court applied this measure in sustaining the award of ₱448.33 per square meter as the fair market value of the affected portions.
• Requisites of summary judgment — Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper only upon concurrence of two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where the moving party's pleadings and appended documents show no genuine issue as to a material fact, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party, and failure to do so entitles the movant to summary judgment. The Court applied these requisites in holding that only the amount of damages remained in issue after NAPOCOR admitted the taking at pre-trial.
• Genuine issue defined — A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, there is no real or genuine issue as to the facts and summary judgment is called for; when the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. The Court found no genuine issue on the area taken because NAPOCOR failed to controvert the respondents' evidence despite extensions of time.
• Tax declaration valuation is not conclusive — The market value stated in the tax declaration of condemned property is not an absolute substitute for, and is not conclusive of, just compensation. It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong, and it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to prevail over the judgment of a court rendered after expert commissioners have viewed the property and after evidence and arguments have been judicially evaluated.
• Charter cannot prevail over the Constitution — A statutory or charter provision limiting the compensation payable for property taken to a fixed percentage of the market value declared by the owner or determined by the assessor cannot prevail over the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The Court held that Section 3-A of NAPOCOR's charter, insofar as it would confine compensation to a 10% easement fee, encroached on the judicial function of determining just compensation.

• "Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term 'expropriation.'" — This is the ratio decidendi on the fourth issue; it supplies the canonical formulation of the rule that a transmission-line right-of-way easement is itself a taking, and it is the passage most frequently invoked for that proposition.
• "Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to intensify the meaning of the word 'compensation' and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample." — This defines the controlling measure of compensation applied in sustaining the award and is the standard formulation of the just compensation doctrine in Philippine expropriation jurisprudence.
• "10% of the market value of the expropriated property cannot in any way be considered as the fair and full equivalent to the loss sustained by the owner of the property, such would be 90% less than what is due him. Thus, we are of the conclusion that Section 3A of [petitioner's] Charter cannot prevail over the mandate of our Constitution on the payment of just compensation." — This states the constitutional supremacy holding that disposes of NAPOCOR's charter-based defense and explains why the easement-fee ceiling cannot be applied.
• "Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right-of-way." — Quoted with approval from Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT, this passage supplies the doctrinal foundation for treating an easement of right-of-way as a compensable taking notwithstanding the owner's retention of title.

• National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106804, 12 August 2004, 436 SCRA 195 — Cited as the controlling precedent for the rule that once NAPOCOR dismissed its expropriation complaint, the case was reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, so that the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation — including trial before commissioners — were no longer applicable. The Court relied on it to reject petitioner's argument that commissioners had to be appointed under Rule 67.
• National Power Corporation vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, 18 January 1991, 193 SCRA 1 — Quoted at length as the principal authority holding that the acquisition of a right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain where the limitation imposed on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives the owner of its ordinary use, and that the owner's continued payment of taxes on the affected portion supports the award of just compensation.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. PLDT — Quoted for the proposition that the power of eminent domain may be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession, and that real property may through expropriation be subjected to an easement of right-of-way.
• National Power Corporation vs. Aguirre-Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 481 — Cited as authority for the proposition that a right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over land traversed by transmission lines falls within the ambit of "expropriation."
• National Power Corporation vs. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, G.R. No. 150936, 18 August 2004, 437 SCRA 60 — Cited as authority for the definition of just compensation as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken, measured by the owner's loss rather than the taker's gain.
• Sumulong vs. Guerrero, G.R. No. L-48685, 30 September 1987, 154 SCRA 461 — Cited in support of the ruling that the market value stated in the tax declaration of the condemned property is no longer conclusive.
• Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 305 — Cited for the ruling that it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to prevail over the judgment of a court rendered after expert commissioners have viewed the property and after evidence and arguments have been judicially evaluated.
• Yuchengco vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149802, 20 January 2006, 479 SCRA 1 — Cited for the rule that the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines the propriety of summary judgment.
• Rivera vs. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 163269, 19 April 2006, 487 SCRA 512 — Cited for the rule that where the moving party's pleadings and appended documents show no genuine issue as to a material fact, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party, and failure to do so entitles the movant to summary judgment.
• Tan vs. De la Vega, G.R. No. 168809, 10 March 2006, 484 SCRA 538 — Cited for the definition of a genuine issue and for the rule that summary judgment cannot take the place of trial where the facts pleaded are disputed or contested.
• National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665 (1984) and Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 597 (1981) — Cited as similar cases involving easements of right-of-way in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.

• Section 1, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, or to obtain a declaratory relief, may at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. This provision supplied the procedural basis for the respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and for the trial court's resolution of the case without trial.
• Section 3, Rule 35, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires that the motion be served at least ten days before the time specified for the hearing, that the adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three days before the hearing, and that after the hearing judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The Court applied this provision in holding that summary judgment was proper because only the amount of damages remained in issue and NAPOCOR failed to controvert the respondents' evidence.
• Section 5, Rule 67, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that upon rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The Court held this provision irrelevant because the proceedings before the RTC were not for expropriation but for damages, the case having been reduced to a simple action for recovery of damages.
• Section 3-A, Republic Act No. 6395, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938 — Provides that in acquiring private property or private property rights through expropriation proceedings where the land or portion thereof will be traversed by transmission lines, only a right-of-way easement shall be acquired when the principal purpose for which the land is actually devoted will not be impaired, and that the compensation shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having a legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower, with respect to acquired land, and not exceed ten percent (10%) of such market value with respect to an acquired right-of-way easement. The Court held that this provision cannot prevail over the constitutional guarantee of just compensation and that it encroached on the judicial function of determining just compensation.
• Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no private property shall be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. The Court held that to uphold NAPOCOR's contention that it was obliged to pay only a maximum of 10% of the market value would render useless the protection guaranteed by this provision.

• Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson)
• Justice Antonio T. Carpio (designated as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 22 September 2008)
• Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez
• Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna (designated per Special Order No. 521 dated 29 September 2008 to replace Justice Ruben T. Reyes, who was on official leave)