National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

A defendant cannot invoke the act of God or force majeure defense when its own negligence concurred with the natural event in producing the loss or damage. To exempt an obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. When negligence concurs with an act of God, the whole occurrence is "humanized" and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

The National Power Corporation (NPC) operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident. The private respondents were residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan, whose family members drowned and whose properties were washed away by the flooding. The NPC's charter allowed it to sue and be sued, but the petitioners initially argued that this did not contemplate actions based on tort, a defense that was rejected by the Supreme Court in an earlier proceeding.

The National Power Corporation (NPC) operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, with Benjamin Chavez as plant supervisor. Four separate complaints for damages were filed against the NPC and Chavez by residents of Norzagaray who suffered loss of lives and destruction of property when the town was inundated on 26-27 October 1978. The plaintiffs alleged that despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam. When the water level exceeded the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently, and recklessly opened three of the dam's spillways, releasing a large amount of water that inundated the banks of the Angat River, causing the deaths of household members and the destruction of properties.

The defendants, in their Answers, alleged that the NPC exercised due care, diligence, and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; that written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning residents about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading"; that the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage; and that the damages were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure, constituting damnum absque injuria. The defendants also averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.

The Court of Appeals found that as early as October 21, 1978, the defendants knew of the impending onslaught of typhoon "Kading," which was bannered by Bulletin Today on October 25, 1978, as "Super Howler to hit R.P." The appellate court found that the Angat Dam could safely hold a normal maximum headwater elevation of 217 meters, yet the defendants maintained a reservoir water elevation beyond its maximum and safe level, giving no sufficient allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain water that would inevitably be brought by the coming typhoon. On October 26, 1978, the water elevation remained at its maximum level of 217.00 to 218.00 with very little opening of the spillways ranging from 1/2 to 2 meters, until at or about midnight, the spillways were suddenly opened at 5 meters, then increasing swiftly to 8, 10, 12, 12.5, 13, 13.5, 14, 14.5 in the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, releasing water at the rate of 4,500 cubic meters per second, more or less.

The appellate court rejected the petitioners' defense that they had sent "early warning written notices" to the towns of Norzagaray, Angat, Bustos, Plaridel, Baliwag, and Calumpit dated 24 October 1978. The court found the notice ineffectual, insufficient, and inadequate because it was delivered to a policeman for the municipality of Norzagaray rather than to proper and responsible officials who could have disseminated the warning to the residents directly affected, and it did not appear to have been served on the municipality of Sta. Maria where some plaintiffs resided. The Court of Appeals concluded that the flash flood was caused not by rain waters but by stored waters suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam, and that the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam."

• Misapplication of Nakpil Doctrine: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the ruling in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals and in holding that the petitioners were guilty of negligence.
• Sufficiency of Warning Notices: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the written notices of warning issued by the petitioners were insufficient.
• Damnum Absque Injuria: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the damage suffered by the private respondents was not damnum absque injuria, maintaining that the flooding was a fortuitous event or force majeure.
• Counterclaim: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not awarding their counterclaim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

The decision does not separately recount the private respondents' arguments in detail. The private respondents filed a Comment to the petition and subsequently complied with the submission of Memoranda, but the specific arguments they raised are not individually summarized in the text.

• Negligence and Application of Nakpil Doctrine: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the ruling in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals and in holding that the petitioners were guilty of negligence.
• Sufficiency of Warning Notices: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the written notices of warning issued by the petitioners were insufficient.
• Damnum Absque Injuria: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the damage suffered by the private respondents was not damnum absque injuria.
• Counterclaim: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not awarding the petitioners' counterclaim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

• Negligence and Application of Nakpil Doctrine: No. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the Nakpil doctrine, and the petitioners were properly found guilty of negligence. The Court's prior decision in G.R. No. 96410, involving the very same incident, had already declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage was the petitioners' negligence.
• Sufficiency of Warning Notices: No. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" was insufficient, a finding already established in the related case of G.R. No. 96410.
• Damnum Absque Injuria: No. The damage suffered by the private respondents was not damnum absque injuria because the petitioners' negligence concurred with the typhoon, thereby removing the occurrence from the protection of the act of God doctrine.
• Counterclaim: No. The Court of Appeals did not err in not awarding the petitioners' counterclaim for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, as the petitioners were the losing parties.

• Negligence and Application of Nakpil Doctrine: The Court noted that the same errors raised by the petitioners were already raised and decided in G.R. No. 96410, National Power Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., which this Court decided on 3 July 1992. That case involved the very same incident subject of the instant petition. The Court declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs — who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein — was the negligence of the petitioners. The Court stated that it could not rule otherwise not only because such a decision binds the Court with respect to the cause of the inundation, but also because the Court of Appeals' findings and conclusions are binding upon the Court, there being no showing of the existence of any of the exceptions to the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

• Sufficiency of Warning Notices: The Court reiterated its pronouncement in G.R. No. 96410 that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities was insufficient. The Court of Appeals had found that the notice was ineffectual, insufficient, and inadequate for purposes of the opening of the spillway gates at midnight of October 26, 1978, and on October 27, 1978. It did not prepare or warn the persons served for the volume of water to be released, which turned out to be of such magnitude that residents near or along the Angat River, even those one kilometer away, should have been advised to evacuate. The notice was delivered to a policeman rather than to proper and responsible officials who could have disseminated the warning to the residents directly affected.

• Damnum Absque Injuria: The Court held that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. Under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, to exempt an obligor from liability for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature, and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. Because the petitioners were guilty of negligence, the event was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The petitioners could not, therefore, invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability.

• Counterclaim: The Court did not separately discuss this issue in detail, but the dismissal of the petition with costs against the petitioners necessarily implies that the counterclaim for attorney's fees and litigation expenses was properly denied.

• Act of God or Force Majeure Doctrine — To exempt an obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature, and all human agencies must be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby "humanized" and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. In this case, the petitioners' negligence in maintaining the reservoir water elevation beyond its maximum safe level and in suddenly opening the spillways at midnight concurred with the typhoon, thereby precluding the defense of force majeure.

• Conclusiveness of Findings of Fact of the Court of Appeals — Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court unless any of the recognized exceptions applies. In this case, the Court found no showing of the existence of any of the exceptions, and thus the appellate court's findings that the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam" were binding upon the Court.

• "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God,' the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor." — This passage from the Nakpil case, quoted by the Court, states the canonical four-part test for the force majeure defense under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.

• "The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God." — This passage articulates the "humanization" principle that removes an occurrence from the protection of the act of God doctrine when human negligence concurs with a natural event.

• "Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned." — This passage establishes the rule that a negligent party cannot escape liability by pointing to an act of God as the immediate cause when its own negligence contributed to the loss.

• Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 [1986] — Controlling precedent on the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure. The Court quoted extensively from this case to establish the four-part test for the act of God defense and the principle that negligence concurring with a fortuitous event removes the occurrence from the protection of the doctrine.

• National Power Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 211 SCRA 162 [1992] (G.R. No. 96410) — Prior decision of the Supreme Court involving the very same incident of the inundation of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court relied on this decision as binding with respect to the cause of the inundation, having already declared that the proximate cause of the loss and damage was the petitioners' negligence and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" was insufficient.

• Vasquez vs. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 — Cited within the Nakpil quotation as authority for the requisites of the force majeure defense under Article 1174.

• Estrada vs. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423 — Cited within the Nakpil quotation as authority for the requisites of the force majeure defense.

• Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527 — Cited within the Nakpil quotation as authority for the requisites of the force majeure defense.

• Republic of the Phil. vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279 — Cited within the Nakpil quotation as authority for the requisites of the force majeure defense.

• Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 — Cited within the Nakpil quotation as authority for the requisites of the force majeure defense and for the proposition that a person is not exempt from liability when negligence concurs with an act of God.

• Fish & Elective Co. vs. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129 — Cited within the Nakpil quotation for the proposition that when negligence concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, the negligent person is not exempt from liability.

• Limpangco & Sons vs. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594 — Cited within the Nakpil quotation for the proposition that a person must be free from previous negligence or misconduct to be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God.

• Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988] — Cited as authority for the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

• Median vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 [1990] — Cited as authority for the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

• Article 1174, Civil Code — The provision governing exemption from liability for fortuitous events. The Court applied this provision in determining whether the petitioners could invoke the act of God defense, holding that the requisites for exemption were not met because the petitioners' negligence concurred with the typhoon.

• Article 1170, Civil Code — The provision on liability for damages arising from fraud, negligence, delay, or violation of the tenor of the obligation. The Court cited this provision through the Nakpil quotation, noting that if upon the happening of a fortuitous event there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay, or violation of the tenor of the obligation, the obligor cannot escape liability.

• Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court — The procedural rule governing petitions for review on certiorari, under which the instant petition was filed.

• Justice Feliciano
• Justice Bidin
• Justice Romero
• Justice Melo

N/A — The decision does not mention any dissenting opinion.