Nate vs. Contreras

A clerk of court acting as an ex officio notary public may perform notarial acts only on documents connected to the exercise of official functions and duties; notarizing documents unrelated to those functions constitutes unauthorized notarial practice and abuse of authority. The prohibition is not avoided merely because the document is not private or commercial, since the controlling test also considers the relationship between the document and the notary’s official functions. Court personnel may appear as counsel for an immediate family member only with prior written authority from the Supreme Court and subject to conditions ensuring no conflict with official duties.

At the time of the alleged acts, respondent Lelu P. Contreras was Clerk of Court VI and ex officio provincial sheriff of the Regional Trial Court in Iriga City, Camarines Sur; she later became Judge of Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes. Complainant Atty. Benito B. Nate was the subject of an administrative complaint prepared by respondent’s father. Clerks of court are authorized to act as ex officio notaries public under the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, while the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees prohibits public officials and employees from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The 2004 Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice were not yet in force when the purported offenses were committed.

Atty. Benito B. Nate was the subject of an administrative complaint prepared by Benjamin E. Contreras, the father of respondent Lelu P. Contreras. At the time of the acts complained of, Contreras was Clerk of Court VI and ex officio provincial sheriff of the Regional Trial Court in Iriga City, Camarines Sur; she later became Judge of Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes. Nate filed an administrative complaint alleging that Contreras committed three counts of grave misconduct while serving as clerk of court.

In the first act, sometime in June 2003, Contreras notarized the administrative complaint prepared by her father and filed with the Supreme Court. Nate alleged that she could not legally notarize the document because Section 3, Rule 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice disqualifies notaries related to the principal within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and because she notarized in Iriga City a document signed in the Municipality of Buhi, outside that city. Contreras admitted the notarization but maintained that as an ex officio notary public she was authorized to administer oaths and notarize documents so long as no private document was involved. She argued that the administrative complaint against a lawyer, eventually filed with the Supreme Court, was not a private document; that it was her ministerial duty to sign the jurat regardless of her relationship with the principal; and that Buhi was within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.

In the second act, Nate claimed that Contreras certified a document as a true copy of the original, which her sister-in-law later used in a labor case pending with the National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City. He alleged that as an ex officio notary public, she was empowered to authenticate only documents in her custody, and that the amended labor complaint was not a document pending before the RTC-Iriga City. Contreras admitted the certification but explained that the Manual for Clerks of Court allowed her to authenticate copies, especially since the RTC in Iriga City did not have human resource management officers. She argued that the power to authenticate documents as true copies was not limited to documents in her custody, and that a clerk of court may certify authenticity so long as the copies are shown to be faithful reproductions after presentation and comparison.

In the third act, Nate alleged that Contreras appeared as her father’s counsel before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines without prior written authority from the Supreme Court. He claimed that she admitted during the IBP proceedings that she had not yet obtained written authority. Contreras admitted the appearance but explained that the intended first hearing before the IBP was suspended precisely because she informed the hearing officer that she had not yet received authority to appear as counsel for her father. The proceedings pushed through only when she was able to present her written authority from the Court.

The OCA agreed with Nate on the first and second acts, finding that there was no connection between Contreras’s official functions and her father’s administrative complaint or her sister-in-law’s labor complaint. On the third act, the OCA found no irregularity because she was authorized by the Court to represent her father. The Supreme Court agreed with the OCA’s findings on the first and second acts, and also agreed that the third act did not constitute an irregularity.

• First Notarization: Complainant argued that respondent could not legally notarize the administrative complaint prepared by her father because Section 3, Rule 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice disqualifies notaries related to the principal within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and because she notarized in Iriga City a document signed in the Municipality of Buhi, outside that city.
• Second Notarization: Complainant maintained that as an ex officio notary public, respondent was empowered to authenticate only documents in her custody; since the amended labor complaint was not pending before the RTC-Iriga City, she exceeded her authority in certifying it.
• Unauthorized Appearance: Complainant alleged that respondent appeared as her father’s counsel before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline without the Supreme Court’s prior written authority, and that she admitted during the IBP proceedings that she had not yet obtained such authority.

• First Act: Respondent admitted the notarization but argued that as an ex officio notary public she was authorized to administer oaths and notarize documents so long as no private document was involved; the administrative complaint against a lawyer, filed with the Supreme Court, was not a private document; signing the jurat was her ministerial duty regardless of her relationship with the principal; and Buhi was within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.
• Second Act: Respondent admitted the certification but maintained that the Manual for Clerks of Court allowed her to authenticate copies, especially since the RTC in Iriga City did not have human resource management officers; the power to authenticate true copies was not limited to documents in her custody; and she could certify authenticity after presentation and comparison showing faithful reproduction.
• Third Act: Respondent explained that the intended first hearing before the IBP was suspended because she informed the hearing officer that she had not yet received authority to appear as counsel for her father; the proceedings pushed through only when she presented her written authority from the Supreme Court.

• First Act — Jurat on Father’s Administrative Complaint: Whether Contreras is administratively liable for affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint prepared by her father.
• Second Act — Copy Certification of Labor Complaint: Whether Contreras is administratively liable for authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor complaint.
• Third Act — Appearance as Counsel before the IBP: Whether Contreras is administratively liable for appearing as counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father.

• First Act — Jurat on Father’s Administrative Complaint: Yes. The notarization had no direct relation to her work as clerk of court; under Rule 139-B, disbarment and discipline proceedings are before the IBP, and clerks of court are not among the touch points in complaints against attorneys.
• Second Act — Copy Certification of Labor Complaint: Yes. Copy certification must be connected to official functions and must involve public documents and records in the clerk’s custody; the labor complaint was filed before the NLRC in Naga City, not the RTC-Iriga City.
• Third Act — Appearance as Counsel before the IBP: No. Court personnel may appear as counsel for an immediate family member only with prior written authority and subject to conditions; respondent had authority to represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089 and complied with the conditions.

• First Act — Jurat on Father’s Administrative Complaint: Clerks of court are authorized to act as ex officio notaries public under Sections 41 and 42 of the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Section D(1), Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court. Historically, justices of the peace, municipal judges, and clerks of court could perform any act within the competency of regular notaries public, but since Borre vs. Moya (1980), their power has been limited to notarial acts connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties. Notarizing documents unrelated to official functions is an unauthorized notarial act amounting to unauthorized practice of law and abuse of authority. The exception allowing notarization of unrelated documents requires a certification attesting to the lack of any other lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit and that all notarial fees be for the account of the government and turned over to the municipal treasurer. For clerks of court, the guideline is the functions and duties listed in the 2002 Revised Manual. Respondent’s private-document test was insufficient; the applicable test also considers the relationship between the document and the official functions and duties of the ex officio notary public. The administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct relation to her work as clerk of court. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, disbarment and discipline proceedings are conducted before the IBP; clerks of court are not among the touch points in the regular procedure for complaints against attorneys, and a pleading in a case involving lawyers may not be filed with the RTC. Thus, she was administratively liable for the first act.
• Second Act — Copy Certification of Labor Complaint: The same reasoning applies. Clerks of court are allowed to perform the notarial act of copy certification, but this act must be connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties, meaning it must be done in connection with public documents and records that are, by virtue of their position, in their custody. Respondent admitted that the document was filed before the NLRC in Naga City, not the RTC-Iriga City. In the regular course of her duties, she would not have come across, encountered, or been in custody of the document. Therefore, her certification of the labor complaint was also an unauthorized notarial act.
• Third Act — Appearance as Counsel before the IBP: The primary employment of court personnel must be their full-time position in the judiciary. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Section 7(b) in relation to Rule X, Section 1(c) of its implementing rules, prohibits public officials and employees from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law, or regulation, and provided that the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s administrative supervision over all court personnel under Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution, the Court has granted, on a case-by-case basis, requests of court personnel to appear as counsel on behalf of immediate family members. The grant is conditioned on the representation not conflicting or tending to conflict with official functions, the personnel not using official time in preparing for the case, and filing a leave of absence every time they attend to the case. Respondent satisfactorily proved that she was granted authority by the Court to represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089, provided that she file the corresponding leaves of absence on scheduled hearing dates and not use official time in preparing for the case. Thus, she did not commit any irregularity in representing her father before the IBP.
• Penalty: The Court has sanctioned judges and clerks of court for notarizing documents unconnected with official functions. In Astorga vs. Salas, a clerk of court was fined ₱5,000 for notarizing several documents and administering oaths involving matters unrelated to her official duties. In Cruz vs. Centron, a clerk of court was fined ₱2,000 for notarizing a deed of sale, but the fine was lower because it was her first offense. Both were warned that repetition would be dealt with more severely. Considering that the documents notarized by Contreras did not involve a private or commercial undertaking, and that this was the first time she was charged, the OCA recommended reprimand instead of a fine, which the Court found appropriate.

• Ex Officio Notary Public Authority Limited to Official Functions — Since Borre vs. Moya (1980), ex officio notaries public may perform notarial acts only when connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties. Notarizing documents unrelated to those functions is an unauthorized notarial act amounting to unauthorized practice of law and abuse of authority. The Court applied this to a clerk of court who notarized her father’s administrative complaint and certified her sister-in-law’s labor complaint.
• Test for Coverage of Ex Officio Notarial Authority — The test is not merely whether the document is private; it also considers the relationship between the document and the official functions and duties of the ex officio notary public. For clerks of court, the functions and duties in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court serve as a failsafe guideline.
• Exception for Notarizing Unrelated Documents — An ex officio notary may perform notarial acts on documents unrelated to official functions only if (1) a certification is included in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any other lawyer or notary public in the municipality or circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged are for the account of the government and turned over to the municipal treasurer.
• Copy Certification by Clerk of Court — Clerks of court may perform copy certification, but the act must be connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties, meaning it must be done in connection with public documents and records that are, by virtue of their position, in their custody.
• Private Practice by Court Personnel and Appearance as Counsel for Immediate Family — Public officials and employees are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law, or regulation, and provided the practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions. The Supreme Court may grant, on a case-by-case basis, authority to court personnel to appear as counsel for immediate family members, conditioned on no conflict, no use of official time, and filing leaves of absence for hearings. Respondent’s appearance for her father was not irregular because she had such authority.
• Penalty for Unauthorized Notarization — Reprimand may be appropriate where the notarized documents do not involve a private or commercial undertaking and the respondent is charged for the first time; prior cases imposed fines of ₱5,000 and ₱2,000 with stern warnings.

• "ever since this clarification was made by the Court in the 1980 case Borre v. Moya, the power of ex officio notaries public have been limited to notarial acts connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties." — States the controlling limitation on ex officio notaries public, which the Court applied to both notarizations.
• "the applicable test is not based merely on the nature of the transaction as private, but also on the relationship between the document and the official functions and duties of the ex officio notary public." — Defines the test for determining whether an ex officio notary acted within authority; rejects respondent’s private-document defense.
• "While we agree with her that clerks of court are allowed to perform the notarial act of copy certification, this act must still be connected to the exercise of their official functions and duties – meaning to say, it must be done in connection with public documents and records that are, by virtue of their position, in their custody." — Explains why the certification of the labor complaint was unauthorized.
• "Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she was granted authority by this Court to 'represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089 provided that she files the corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing of the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for the case.'" — Supports the finding that the third act did not constitute an irregularity.

• Borre vs. Moya, 188 Phil. 362 (1980) — Controlling precedent; limited the power of ex officio notaries public to notarial acts connected to the exercise of official functions and duties.
• Lapena vs. Marcos, 200 Phil. 69 (1982) — Cited for the historical rationale behind allowing public officers to act as ex officio notaries public and the eventual diminution of that authority.
• Astorga vs. Salas, 413 Phil. 558 (2001) — Cited as a penalty precedent; a clerk of court was fined ₱5,000 for notarizing several documents and administering oaths unrelated to official duties.
• Cruz vs. Centron, 484 Phil. 671 (2004) — Cited as a penalty precedent; a clerk of court was fined ₱2,000 for notarizing a deed of sale, with a lower fine because it was her first offense.
• Gabon vs. Merka, A.M. No. P-11-3000, 29 November 2011, 661 SCRA 505 — Cited in the line of cases holding that ex officio notaries public may not notarize documents unconnected with their official functions.

• Sections 41 and 42, Administrative Code of 1987 — Authorize clerks of court to administer oaths; cited as the statutory basis for clerks of court acting as ex officio notaries public, subject to the limitation that notarial acts be connected to official functions.
• Section D(1), Chapter VI, 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court — Lists the general functions and duties of a Clerk of Court, including acting as ex-officio notary public; used as the guideline to determine whether a notarial act is connected to official functions.
• Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Provides that disbarment and discipline proceedings are conducted before the IBP; applied to show that the administrative complaint against a lawyer had no relation to respondent’s duties as clerk of court.
• Section 7(b), R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) — Prohibits public officials and employees from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law and provided it does not conflict with official functions; applied to the third act.
• Rule X, Section 1(c), Implementing Rules of R.A. 6713 — Reiterates the prohibition on private practice and makes it a ground for administrative disciplinary action; applied to the third act.
• Article VIII, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Vests the Supreme Court with administrative supervision over all court personnel; basis for the Court’s authority to grant respondent permission to appear as counsel for her father.
• 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice — Invoked by complainant for the disqualification of notaries related to the principal; the Court noted that these rules were not yet in force when the purported offenses were committed.
• 2004 Code of Conduct for Court Personnel — Noted as not yet in force at the time of the purported offenses.

Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Jose Portugal Perez, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.