Narzoles vs. NLRC

A curative amendment to procedural rules that restores a fresh 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari from notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration applies retroactively to pending cases, validating filings that would otherwise be late under the prior amendment, because curative statutes are by their essence retroactive and intended to give validity to acts that would have been invalid under existing laws.

Fifteen employees (petitioners) had filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against their employer, Eastern Mindoro Institute of Technology and Sciences (EMITS), and its officer, Marcial S. Semilla, before the Labor Arbiter. The dispute concerned the employees' dismissal and their entitlement to reinstatement and backwages. The procedural question before the Supreme Court arose from the intersection of two successive amendments to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on September 1, 1998 and introduced the rule that filing a motion for reconsideration interrupts (but does not reset) the 60-day period for certiorari, and A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on September 1, 2000 and reverted to the earlier rule granting a fresh 60-day period from notice of denial of the motion.

Fifteen employees of Eastern Mindoro Institute of Technology and Sciences (EMITS) — Juanita Narzoles, Perlita Gutierrez, Mylene Geronaga, Leticia M. Fornal, Arnel Dimalibot, Marites Saguid, Irene Marcene, Abram Geronaga, Rolando Lu, Maribeth Hernandez, Corazon Agarap, Patricia Rosario, Bernadette Lu, Angeles Mangul, and Josefina Marte — filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against EMITS and its officer, Marcial S. Semilla, before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The employees appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which modified the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered respondents to reinstate the petitioners, but without backwages.

Petitioners received the NLRC decision on July 23, 1998, and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 3, 1998 — the last day for filing having been August 2, a Sunday. On September 1, 1998, while the motion for reconsideration was pending, Circular No. 39-98 took effect, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The amendment added a paragraph providing that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari is interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, and that upon denial, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but not less than five days in any event.

On October 19, 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. They filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on December 17, 1998. The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC. The Court of Appeals applied Circular No. 39-98 in computing the period: it deducted the 16 days it took for petitioners to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60-day reglementary period, yielding a remaining period of 44 days from October 19, 1998 — or until December 8, 1998. Because the petition was filed on December 17, 1998, the CA dismissed it as nine days late. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the CA's dismissal was denied, prompting the present petition for review.

• Retroactive Application Works Injustice: Petitioners claimed exception to the retroactive application of Circular No. 39-98 on the ground that it would work injustice to them.

• Defective Verification: Respondents contended that the case ought to be dismissed because only three of the fifteen petitioners verified the petition for certiorari originally filed in the Supreme Court.

• Retroactivity of Procedural Amendments: Whether the amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 brought about by Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on September 1, 1998, applies to a case where the motion for reconsideration was filed before the amendment took effect but the petition for certiorari was filed after.
• Curative Effect of Further Amendment: Whether the further amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 via A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, restoring a fresh 60-day period from notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration, applies retroactively to validate the petitioners' filing.

• Retroactivity of Procedural Amendments: Yes. Procedural laws are retroactive in that they apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and no vested rights attach to procedural laws. The CA correctly applied Circular No. 39-98.
• Curative Effect of Further Amendment: Yes. The further amendment is curative in nature, and curative statutes are by their essence retroactive. The filing of the petition for certiorari on December 17, 1998 is deemed timely, having been made within the 60-day period provided under the curative Resolution.

• Retroactivity of Procedural Amendments: Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage; procedural laws are retroactive in that sense, and no vested rights attach to them. Circular No. 39-98 was already in force when petitioners filed their petition on December 17, 1998. Under the amendment, the 60-day period is interrupted by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, leaving only the remaining period. The CA correctly deducted the 16 days it took petitioners to file their motion for reconsideration from the 60-day period, yielding 44 days from October 19, 1998 — or until December 8, 1998. The filing on December 17, 1998 was thus nine days late under Circular No. 39-98. Petitioners' claim that retroactive application would work injustice was noted but deemed unnecessary to resolve, given the subsequent curative amendment.

• Curative Effect of Further Amendment: The Court observed that Circular No. 39-98 had generated tremendous confusion, resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. Historically — even before the 1997 revision — a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. The Court therefore enacted A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, further amending Section 4, Rule 65 to provide that where a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. This amendment took effect on September 1, 2000. The Court characterized it as curative in nature: curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements; they make valid that which was invalid under existing laws, as if the laws had been complied with. Curative statutes are by their very essence retroactive. Accordingly, the filing of the petition on December 17, 1998 is deemed timely, having been made within the 60-day period under the curative Resolution. The Court emphasized that the substantive aspects of the case involve the rights, benefits, and livelihood of the petitioner-employees.

• Retroactivity of Procedural Laws — Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense, and no vested rights attach to them. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Circular No. 39-98, which took effect on September 1, 1998, properly governed the petitioners' filing on December 17, 1998, even though their motion for reconsideration had been filed before the amendment took effect.

• Curative Statutes — Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities, and curb certain evils; they make valid that which, before enactment, was invalid. Curative statutes are by their very essence retroactive. The Court held that A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which restored a fresh 60-day period from notice of denial of a motion for reconsideration, is curative in nature and therefore retroactive, validating the petitioners' filing.

• "Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements." — This passage defines the nature and purpose of curative statutes, which the Court relied upon to hold that the further amendment to Section 4, Rule 65 applies retroactively.

• "Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive." — This is the decisive statement of the ratio decidendi: because the further amendment is curative, its retroactive application cannot be denied, and the petitioners' filing is deemed timely.

• "In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion." — This is the text of the amended Section 4, Rule 65 as enacted in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, restoring the fresh-period rule and superseding the interrupting-period rule of Circular No. 39-98.

• St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998) — Controlling precedent followed; the Supreme Court referred the petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals pursuant to this ruling, which held that petitions for certiorari against NLRC decisions should be filed with the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court.

• Diu vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 472 (1995) — Cited as authority for the proposition that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and that procedural laws are retroactive in that sense.

• Alindao vs. Joson, 264 SCRA 211 (1996) — Cited for the principle that no vested rights attach to procedural laws.

• Erectors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 256 SCRA 629 (1996) — Cited for the definition of curative statutes as enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void.

• Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. vs. Dela Serna, 312 SCRA 22 (1999) — Cited for the principle that curative statutes are intended to give validity to acts that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws had been complied with.

• Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11 (1994) — Cited for the proposition that curative statutes are by their very essence retroactive.

• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure (as originally worded) — Provided that the petition for certiorari may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. This was the baseline rule before any amendment.

• Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 (effective September 1, 1998) — Added a paragraph providing that the 60-day period is interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration; upon denial, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but not less than five days in any event. The CA applied this provision to compute the petitioners' deadline as December 8, 1998, and dismissed the petition as late.

• Section 4, Rule 65, as further amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (effective September 1, 2000) — Restored the fresh-period rule: where a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, the 60-day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. The Court held this amendment to be curative and retroactive, thereby validating the petitioners' December 17, 1998 filing.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.