Napoles vs. Morales

A finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman will not be disturbed absent grave abuse of discretion; probable cause requires only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case, may be established by hearsay evidence with substantial basis during preliminary investigation, and may include private individuals who conspire with public officers in plunder or violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

The Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) allocated to members of Congress, the statutory definition of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 form the statutory backdrop of the consolidated petitions. Petitioner Janet Lim Napoles was a private individual associated with JLN Corporation and JLN-controlled non-governmental organizations; petitioner John Raymund De Asis was her driver/messenger/janitor and an incorporator/member of the board of trustees of Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development, Inc.; petitioner Alan A. Javellana was former Director and President of National Agribusiness Corporation. The controversy involves the alleged anomalous utilization of the PDAF of then Masbate 3rd District Representative Rizalina L. Seachon-Lanete for the years 2007-2009, and the Ombudsman's constitutional investigatory and prosecutory powers.

During Representative Rizalina L. Seachon-Lanete's term as legislator for the 3rd District of Masbate from 2004 to 2010, she repeatedly endorsed the implementation of her PDAF-funded projects to JLN-controlled non-governmental organizations. For calendar years 2007-2009, her PDAF allotment was PHP 115,000.000.00, covered by Special Allotment Release Order Nos. ROCS-07-00699, ROCS-07-02116, ROCS-07-02964, ROCS-07-07211, ROCS-07-09368, ROCS-08-00123, ROCS-08-00124, ROCS-08-03727, ROCS-08-07174, ROCS-08-07175, ROCS-09-01695, ROCS-09-04182, and G-09-07620. She requested the release of PHP 112,290,000.00 of her allotted budget to various implementing agencies, particularly the Technology Resource Center, National Agribusiness Corporation, and National Livelihood Development Corporation. Thereafter, PHP 107,341,300.00 of the budget was endorsed by the implementing agencies to several JLN-controlled NGOs as project partners, namely Countrywide Agri and Rural Economic Development, Inc., Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc., Philippine Social Development Foundation, Inc., and Social Development Program for Farmers Foundation, Inc.

According to whistleblowers Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suñas, former employees of Napoles in JLN Corporation, Napoles negotiated for the use of Representative Seachon-Lanete's PDAF allocation in exchange for a commission or kickback amounting to a percentage of the PDAF. Representative Seachon-Lanete's commission was pegged at 60% for 2007-2009. Upon agreement on the conditions, Napoles advanced the lawmaker's kickback using her own money to commence the scheme. Several JLN-controlled dummy NGOs were created and operated to serve as conduits for government funds pursuant to Napoles's directives. To make it appear that projects were implemented, JLN Corporation and the JLN-controlled NGOs, acting on Napoles's orders, used spurious receipts and liquidation documents. Several machinations were employed in securing funds from implementing agencies and liquidating disbursements. Ultimately, PDAF funds directed through the JLN-controlled NGOs to JLN Corporation were misappropriated.

De Asis, Napoles's driver/messenger/janitor, was charged for having assisted in the fraudulent processing and releasing of PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as for his designation as incorporator and member of the board of trustees of CARED, a JLN-controlled NGO. Javellana's involvement was anchored on his work as former Director and President of NABCOR. Along with Representative Seachon-Lanete, he was a signatory to several memorandums of agreement, namely ROCS-08-07174 MOA, ROCS-08-03727 MOA, and ROCS-09-04182 MOA, and likewise approved disbursement vouchers and co-signed the corresponding checks issued to the NGOs in relation to Representative Seachon-Lanete's PDAF.

Investigations conducted by the NBI and the OMB-Field Investigation Office revealed that during Representative Seachon-Lanete's term, she repeatedly endorsed the implementation of her PDAF-funded projects to JLN-controlled NGOs. The NBI and OMB-Field Investigation Office's on-site verification, coupled with reports submitted by the Commission on Audit through its Special Audit Office following the audit of Representative Seachon-Lanete's PDAF allocations and disbursements covering 2007-2009, bolstered findings that the PHP 112,290,000.00 PDAF was never used for the intended projects and that documents submitted by the NGOs/project partners to the implementing agencies were all fabricated. The NGOs/project partners were also selected without public bidding. The OMB found that the diversion of Representative Seachon-Lanete's PDAF was coursed through a complex scheme involving various participants from her office, the Department of Budget and Management, the implementing agencies, and the JLN-controlled NGOs, and that government funds in the aggregate amount of PHP 112,290,000.00 were siphoned, with at least PHP 73,065,000.00 received from 2007 to 2009 by Representative Seachon-Lanete.

The OMB directed Napoles, De Asis, and Javellana, along with several others, to submit their respective counter-affidavits, and they complied. Napoles professed her innocence and avowed that Luy fabricated his testimony to evade possible imprisonment for an ongoing trial for qualified theft. She also claimed the complaints were insufficient in form and substance, consisted of general and sweeping allegations that violated her right to due process, and questioned the credibility of the whistleblowers due to supposed inconsistencies and contradictions in their testimonies. De Asis avowed that there was a dearth of evidence proving his willful participation in any unlawful acts constituting the scheme or pattern in furtherance of amassing ill-gotten wealth; he claimed he was merely running errands and performing his duties in good faith as driver/messenger/janitor without knowledge of the purpose of his tasks or that they constituted an elaborate scheme to commit a criminal offense. Javellana denied preparing any documents relating to NABCOR-implemented projects funded by PDAF; he insisted that NABCOR's PDAF Department was in charge of the transactions and that he merely signed documents in good faith upon recommendation of his subordinates.

The OMB issued a 104-page Joint Resolution finding probable cause to indict Napoles and De Asis for one count of plunder, and Napoles, De Asis, and Javellana for 11, two, and three counts, respectively, of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The OMB found that the diversion of Representative Seachon-Lanete's PDAF was coursed through a complex scheme involving various participants from her office, the Department of Budget and Management, the implementing agencies, and the JLN-controlled NGOs; that government funds in the aggregate amount of PHP 112,290,000.00 were siphoned; and that at least PHP 73,065,000.00 was received from 2007 to 2009 by Representative Seachon-Lanete.

• Napoles — Sufficiency of Complaints and Elements: Napoles contended the OMB committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the complaints were sufficient in form and substance despite their failure to allege and substantiate the elements of plunder under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended, and of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and despite their failure to establish a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme of conspiracy.
• Napoles — Evidence and Credibility: Napoles argued that the OMB found probable cause based on hearsay, self-serving, and totally inadmissible evidence, and she questioned the credibility of the whistleblowers by citing supposed inconsistencies and contradictions in their testimonies.
• Napoles — Private Individual and Due Process: Napoles maintained that as a private individual she could not be subjected to prosecution by the OMB before the Sandiganbayan, and that the complaints lacked particularities such as the time, place, and manner of the commission of the crimes charged, violating her right to due process.
• De Asis — No Charge and Failure to Allege Elements: De Asis asseverated that the NBI complaint did not charge him with any offense and that the OMB-Field Investigation Office complaint clearly failed to allege and substantiate the elements of plunder.
• De Asis — Lack of Knowledge, Intent, and Good Faith: De Asis argued that there was no evidence showing he knowingly took part in any acts constituting the crime charged with knowledge and intent toward a common purpose of amassing ill-gotten wealth; there was no showing of criminal intent for plunder, which is malum in se; and he acted within the bounds of his duties as driver/messenger/bodyguard/janitor and in good faith without knowledge of the acts constituting the crime.
• Javellana — Arias Doctrine and Probable Cause: Javellana maintained that the OMB failed to rule that he was in good faith in accordance with the Arias doctrine and that it erred in ruling there was probable cause to indict him for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; he argued that he merely approved the PDAF releases after his subordinates and other NABCOR officials examined the supporting documents, assured him of the availability of funds, and recommended approval of the disbursements.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Probable Cause: Whether the OMB committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict Napoles, De Asis, and Javellana for plunder and/or violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
• Sufficiency of Complaints: Whether the complaints were sufficient in form and substance and sufficiently alleged the elements of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
• Private Individuals and Conspiracy: Whether private individuals Napoles and De Asis may be held liable or prosecuted for plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 when charged as co-conspirators with public officers.
• Hearsay and Whistleblower Testimony: Whether the OMB gravely abused its discretion in relying on whistleblower testimonies alleged to be hearsay, self-serving, and inadmissible.
• De Asis — Knowledge and Criminal Intent: Whether the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against De Asis despite his claim of lack of knowledge, criminal intent, and good faith as Napoles's driver/messenger/janitor.
• Javellana — Arias Doctrine: Whether the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against Javellana for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 despite his invocation of the Arias doctrine.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Probable Cause: No. The OMB did not gravely abuse its discretion; its probable-cause finding is sustained absent a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
• Sufficiency of Complaints: Yes. The complaints sufficiently alleged the elements and circumstances required by Rule 110, Sections 6 and 9, enabling petitioners to prepare their defense.
• Private Individuals and Conspiracy: Yes. Private individuals may be prosecuted for plunder and Section 3(e) if they conspire with public officers; in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
• Hearsay and Whistleblower Testimony: No. Technical rules of evidence do not bind the OMB during preliminary investigation; hearsay may support probable cause if there is substantial basis, and whistleblower statements are admissible as independently relevant.
• De Asis — Knowledge and Criminal Intent: No. The OMB did not gravely abuse its discretion; probable cause existed based on his participation as CARED incorporator/trustee and his acts of preparing money, receiving and depositing checks, delivering money to Napoles, and assisting in delivering kickbacks; his defenses are for trial.
• Javellana — Arias Doctrine: No. The OMB did not gravely abuse its discretion; the Arias doctrine does not apply because his subordinate disputed recommending approval, and evidence showed Javellana directed the signing and expedited PDAF releases to Napoles-controlled NGOs.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Probable Cause: The Court began from the policy of non-interference with the OMB's determination of probable cause, rooted in respect for its constitutional investigatory and prosecutory powers and in practicality. Review is available only for grave abuse of discretion, which implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary or despotic exercise so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether there is reasonable basis to believe a crime was committed and the person charged should be held responsible. Probable cause does not require absolute certainty or evidence sufficient to convict; facts sufficient to support a prima facie case, more than bare suspicion but less than evidence justifying conviction, suffice. The OMB's findings were supported by the complaints, whistleblower affidavits, on-site verification, and COA reports; no grave abuse attended its action.
• Sufficiency of Complaints: Rule 110, Section 6 requires the complaint or information to state the name of the accused, designation of the offense, acts or omissions constituting the offense, name of the offended party, approximate date, and place. Rule 110, Section 9 requires the acts or omissions and qualifying/aggravating circumstances to be stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient for a person of common understanding to know the offense charged. The complaints alleged that petitioners were responsible for the PDAF scam through concerted illegal actions; that they were accused of plunder and/or Section 3(e); that they employed a scheme detailed by named whistleblowers; that the government was prejudiced in the approximate amount of PHP 112,290,000.00; and that the scam occurred between 2004 and 2010 in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. These allegations were reproduced in the Informations, sufficiently informing petitioners of the accusations and enabling them to prepare an intelligent defense.
• Private Individuals and Conspiracy: While the primary offenders in plunder and Section 3(e) are public officers, private individuals may be held liable if they conspired with public officers. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Napoles played an integral role in the strategic misuse of Seachon-Lanete's PDAF: she negotiated the use of the PDAF for a commission or kickback, advanced the lawmaker's share, controlled the NGOs used as conduits, and caused the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents. De Asis was a member/incorporator of CARED, a JLN-controlled NGO used in the scam, and was tagged by Luy and Suñas as one who prepared money for Seachon-Lanete and/or her chief of staff, received checks issued by implementing agencies to the NGOs, deposited them, brought withdrawn money to Napoles's house, and assisted in delivering kickbacks and commissions. These facts provided a well-grounded basis to believe conspiracy existed.
• Hearsay and Whistleblower Testimony: The invocation of the res inter alios acta rule did not defeat the OMB's finding. Technical rules of evidence are not binding on the prosecutor during preliminary investigation. Hearsay evidence may be considered if there is substantial basis for crediting it, because preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations. Whistleblower testimonies in corruption cases are welcomed, as corruption is often done in secrecy and whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves to expose perpetrators. Even assuming the res inter alios acta rule applied, the whistleblowers' statements were admissible as independently relevant statements: regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that the statements were made is relevant. Luy, Sula, and Suñas were employees of JLN Corporation privy to Napoles's financial transactions concerning Seachon-Lanete's PDAF. Documentary evidence could not be tagged as forgeries at the preliminary investigation stage.
• De Asis — Knowledge and Criminal Intent: De Asis was similarly situated to Napoles as a private individual charged with crimes principally performed by public officers on account of alleged conspiracy with public officers. The reasonable likelihood that conspiracy existed denoted the probable existence of the elements of the crimes as to him. Evidence showed probable cause for his involvement as a co-conspirator in plunder and several counts of Section 3(e): he was a member/incorporator of CARED; Luy and Suñas tagged him as preparing money for Seachon-Lanete and/or her chief of staff, receiving checks issued by implementing agencies to the NGOs and depositing them, and bringing withdrawn money to Napoles's house. His defenses of lack of criminal intent and absence of elements were evidentiary and better ventilated during trial, not preliminary investigation.
• Javellana — Arias Doctrine: The Arias doctrine applies where a head of office, in the performance of official duties, relies to a reasonable extent on subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. It presupposes that the head merely relied in good faith on prior certifications and recommendations of subordinates and that the subordinate's recommendation preceded the superior's approval. Here, Javellana's subordinate disputed having recommended approval; instead, it was professed that the directive to sign disbursement vouchers came from Javellana and that checks and other documents were already signed by Javellana, among others, even before they reached the subordinates. Thus, the head of office influenced, pressured, coerced, or otherwise convinced the subordinate to sign or recommend approval. On the Section 3(e) charge, it sufficed that the offender, a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions, acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits. Javellana processed with indecent haste the SARO and pertinent documents, expedited release of PDAF disbursements to Napoles-controlled NGOs, and consistently pressed for immediate processing, accommodating the NGOs and enabling Napoles to repeatedly receive unwarranted benefits from inexistent or ghost projects. The evidence provided substantial basis to believe the crimes were committed and Javellana was probably guilty.

• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction; the exercise of power must be arbitrary or despotic, so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court used this standard to decline interference with the Ombudsman's probable-cause finding.
• Non-interference with the Ombudsman's probable-cause determination — The Court consistently refrains from interfering with the Ombudsman's discretion to determine probable cause and decide whether an Information should be filed, absent grave abuse of discretion. This policy rests on respect for the Ombudsman's constitutional investigatory and prosecutory powers and on practicality. The Court applied it to sustain the Ombudsman's issuances.
• Probable cause in preliminary investigation — Probable cause for filing a criminal information consists of facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty. It does not mean actual or positive cause and does not import absolute certainty; it is based on opinion and reasonable belief and does not require sufficient evidence to convict. Only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case are required. The Court applied this standard to find no grave abuse.
• Elements of plunder under Section 2, Republic Act No. 7080, as amended — The elements are: (a) the offender is a public officer who acts by oneself or in connivance with family members, relatives, business associates, subordinates, or other persons; (b) the offender amasses, accumulates, or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d); and (c) the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth is at least PHP 50,000,000.00. The Court found probable cause based on the alleged kickbacks and diverted PDAF.
• Elements of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — The elements are: (a) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions, or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers; (b) the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) the action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official functions. The Court applied these elements to Javellana, Napoles, and De Asis.
• Private individuals as co-conspirators — Although plunder and violation of Section 3(e) are principally committed by public officers, private individuals may be held liable if they conspire with public officers. The Court applied this to Napoles and De Asis.
• Conspiracy: the act of one is the act of all — In cases of conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. This principle supported the inclusion of private individuals as co-conspirators in the charges.
• Technical rules of evidence not binding in preliminary investigation — Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether there is reasonable basis to believe a crime was committed and the person charged should be held responsible. Technical rules of evidence should not be rigidly applied. The Court applied this to reject the objection based on hearsay and res inter alios acta.
• Hearsay with substantial basis — Probable cause may be established with hearsay evidence as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. The Court found substantial basis in the whistleblowers' testimonies.
• Independently relevant statements — Under this doctrine, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that statements were made is relevant; the hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. The Court applied this to the whistleblowers' statements.
• Whistleblower testimony in corruption cases — Whistleblower testimonies, especially in corruption cases, should not be condemned but welcomed, as whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves to expose perpetrators and bring them to justice; corruption is often done in secrecy, making their testimonies almost inevitable. The Court relied on this to uphold the Ombudsman's consideration of the whistleblowers' statements.
• Arias doctrine — All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. The doctrine presupposes that the head merely relied in good faith on prior certifications and recommendations of subordinates and that the recommendation preceded the superior's approval. The Court held it inapplicable because Javellana's subordinate disputed recommending approval and the evidence showed Javellana directed the signing and expedited the releases.
• Sufficiency of complaint or information — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense was committed. The acts need not be in the exact language of the law but must be in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged. The Court applied this to uphold the complaints.

• "Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." — Defines the standard for reviewing the Ombudsman's probable-cause determination and grounds the Court's refusal to interfere absent capricious or whimsical judgment.
• "Simply put, in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty. A finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice." — States the probable-cause standard applied to the Ombudsman's finding: a prima facie case, not absolute certainty.
• "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation" — Supports the admissibility of hearsay and whistleblower testimony during preliminary investigation and the rejection of the res inter alios acta objection.
• "in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." — Explains why private individuals may be held liable with public officers in plunder and Section 3(e) charges.

• Ciron vs. Ombudsman Gutierrez, 758 Phil. 354 (2015) — Cited for the Court's consistent policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse of discretion.
• Reyes vs. Hon. Ombudsman, 783 Phil. 304 (2016) — Cited for the rule that the Court may review the Ombudsman's action upon a charge of grave abuse of discretion; it defined grave abuse, discussed probable cause, upheld whistleblower testimony, and held that the res inter alios acta rule should not be rigidly applied in preliminary investigation.
• Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 802 Phil. 190 (2016) — Cited for the elements of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the standard for probable cause, the rule that hearsay may support probable cause with substantial basis, and the doctrine of independently relevant statements.
• Jalandoni vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 211751 et al., May 10, 2021 — Cited for the sufficiency of an information: the acts or omissions must enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged, prepare a defense, and allow the court to render proper judgment.
• Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 259 Phil. 794 (1989) — Cited as the source of the Arias doctrine, which allows heads of offices to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates; distinguished because the subordinate here disputed recommending approval and the head allegedly directed the signing.
• Sombero vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 878 Phil. 460 (2020) — Cited for the burden on petitioners to demonstrate facts essential to a writ of certiorari and for the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's probable-cause determination.
• Relampagos vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 234868-69, July 27, 2022 — Cited for the rule that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary and a matter of defense that may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial.
• Catacutan vs. People, 672 Phil. 178 (2014) — Cited for the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
• Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et al. vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.), 590 Phil. 8 (2008) — Cited for recognition and appreciation of whistleblowers in corruption cases, considering that corruption is often done in secrecy and their testimonies are almost inevitable to pin down crooked public officers.

• Section 2, Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes plunder; requires a public officer who, alone or in connivance with others, amasses ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in Section 1(d), in the aggregate amount of at least PHP 50,000,000.00. Applied to support probable cause against Napoles and De Asis as co-conspirators.
• Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080 — Defines ill-gotten wealth as assets acquired directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, or business associates by a combination or series of means, including misappropriation of public funds and receipt of commissions, kickbacks, or pecuniary benefits in connection with a government contract or project. Applied to the alleged kickbacks and diverted PDAF.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Penalizes causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; applies to public officers and private individuals in conspiracy. Applied to Javellana, Napoles, and De Asis.
• Rule 110, Section 6, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires a complaint or information to state the name of the accused, designation of the offense, acts or omissions constituting the offense, name of the offended party, approximate date, and place. Applied to hold the complaints sufficient.
• Rule 110, Section 9, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires the acts or omissions and qualifying/aggravating circumstances to be stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient for a person of common understanding to know the offense charged. Applied to the sufficiency of the complaints.
• Section 28, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence — States the res inter alios acta rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under Section 30. Cited but held not rigidly applicable in preliminary investigation.
• Section 30, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence — Provides the exception for admissions by a conspirator. Referenced in connection with the res inter alios acta objection.
• 1987 Constitution — Cited as the source of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutory powers, grounding the policy of non-interference absent grave abuse of discretion.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ.