Nacario vs. People of the Philippines

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense; once the aggressor is divested of his weapon and no longer poses an imminent threat, the justifying circumstance ceases, and the accused cannot invoke self-defense for a subsequent stabbing.

On March 29, 1997, at about 3:05 o’clock in the afternoon, Medardo M. de Villa was riding a bicycle along a road at Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, when he met petitioner Cosme Nacario, who was also on a bicycle and coming from the opposite direction. After both alighted from their bicycles, Nacario stabbed de Villa with a balisong (fan knife) at the upper left portion of the abdomen. De Villa was operated on at the Bicol Medical Center, and the clinical data sheet showed a final diagnosis of a 3 cm stab wound at the subcostal area, anterior axillary line, left, penetrating the diaphragm and incising the spleen, type I. Not long after the incident, Nacario surrendered to the police.

Nacario admitted having stabbed de Villa but interposed self-defense. According to him, he had earlier seen de Villa drinking with others in front of de Villa’s house. When they met on the road, de Villa blocked his path and, without warning, swung a fan knife toward him but missed. De Villa then thrice attempted to hit him with the knife but missed as Nacario swung his body backward. On the fourth attempt, Nacario wrested the knife from de Villa. Sensing danger when de Villa turned his back to pick up stones and was poised to strike, Nacario stabbed him once with the knife. Nacario added that prior to the incident, de Villa had made several attempts to stab him, and de Villa’s brothers had harassed and threatened him.

Nacario’s account varied. He claimed that de Villa was “in the act of throwing the stones” at him when he stabbed him, and later claimed that de Villa was able to strike him with a stone before he stabbed him; no claim of injury was made. The trial court rejected self-defense, finding that after Nacario wrested the knife from de Villa, there was an interval of time when de Villa turned his back and picked up a stone, during which Nacario could have run away. The trial court also found that Nacario had been patient enough to ward off de Villa’s attempts to stab him and believed that Nacario was in possession of the knife all the time when they met and stabbed de Villa. The Supreme Court found incredible the claim that de Villa was throwing stones of undescribed sizes from a distance near enough for Nacario to reach and stab him.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that the victim provoked the incident by waylaying him, and that after he wrested the knife from the victim, the latter instantaneously picked up stones, making him believe that an attack was still forthcoming and that he was still threatened by some evil or injury, hence his stabbing of the victim.
• Prior Aggression: Petitioner added that prior to the incident, there had been several attempts by the victim to stab him, and the victim’s brothers had harassed and threatened him.

• Self-Defense: Whether petitioner’s plea of self-defense is sustainable, particularly whether unlawful aggression on the part of the victim continued after petitioner wrested the knife from him.
• Penalty: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court in light of petitioner’s voluntary surrender.
• Damages: Whether the awards of actual damages, moral damages, and indemnity are proper.

• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression, a condition sine qua non for self-defense, ceased when petitioner divested the victim of the balisong; no imminent risk to petitioner’s life or personal safety remained.
• Penalty: Yes. Voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance, and the appellate court’s modification of the penalty was well-taken.
• Damages: Partly. Actual damages were reduced to P2,261.55 as proven; moral damages of P30,000 were proper; the P25,000 indemnity was deleted for lack of legal basis, and P30,000 temperate damages was awarded in its stead.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense requires (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Having interposed self-defense, petitioner bore the onus of proving its elements. Even assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression initially came from the victim, the aggression ceased when the victim was divested of his balisong. At that instant, there was no longer any imminent risk to petitioner’s life or personal safety. The Court cited People vs. Ebmerga, where the accused threw a stone causing the victim to drop the knife he was holding, and there was no longer any imminent risk or danger to the accused’s life; the subsequent attack was not self-defense. Further, assuming the victim turned his back and picked up stones, there was an interval of time that afforded petitioner the opportunity to run away, especially since he had warded off four prior attempts to stab him. The claim that the victim was in the act of throwing stones was incredible because the victim could not have been throwing stones of undescribed sizes from a distance near enough for petitioner to reach and stab him. The later claim that the victim struck him with a stone was an afterthought, and the absence of any claim of injury dented its credibility. Since unlawful aggression was absent, discussion of the other elements of self-defense was unnecessary. The plea of self-defense was thus rejected and the conviction for frustrated homicide upheld.
• Penalty: The appellate court’s modification of the penalty was well-taken because petitioner’s voluntary surrender was a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court affirmed the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, which ranged from two years and four months of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as maximum.
• Damages: The reduction of actual damages to P2,261.55 was well-taken because the documentary evidence, Exhibits “C” to “C-13” representing expenses for medicine, totaled only that amount. The award of P30,000 as moral damages was in consonance with law, Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, and prevailing jurisprudence, citing Santos vs. Court of Appeals. The award of P25,000 as indemnity had no legal basis and was deleted. In its stead, the Court ordered the award of P30,000 as temperate damages.

• Self-defense — unlawful aggression as condition sine qua non — Self-defense is a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. Its elements are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non; if absent, self-defense fails and the other elements need not be discussed. Applied: petitioner failed to prove unlawful aggression because it ceased when he wrested the knife from the victim.
• Cessation of unlawful aggression — When the aggressor is divested of his weapon and no longer poses an imminent threat, unlawful aggression ceases. Acts taken after that point are not justified as self-defense. Applied: after petitioner took the balisong, the victim no longer posed an imminent risk; petitioner’s stabbing was not self-defense. The Court relied on People vs. Ebmerga.
• Voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstance — Voluntary surrender may mitigate criminal liability. Applied: the Court of Appeals properly modified the penalty to reflect petitioner’s voluntary surrender.
• Actual damages require proof — Actual damages must be supported by documentary evidence. Applied: only P2,261.55 was proven by Exhibits “C” to “C-13”; the RTC’s P35,000 actual damages award was reduced.
• Moral damages under Article 2219 — Moral damages may be awarded in cases provided by law. Applied: P30,000 moral damages was sustained under Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prevailing jurisprudence.
• Temperate damages in lieu of indemnity lacking legal basis — Where an award of indemnity has no legal basis, it must be deleted; temperate damages may be awarded in its stead. Applied: the P25,000 indemnity was deleted and P30,000 temperate damages was ordered.

• "It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that the presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense to be a justifying circumstance. Such element not being present on the victim’s part, discussion of the rest of the elements of self-defense is rendered unnecessary." — States the ratio decidendi for rejecting self-defense and dispenses with analysis of the other elements.
• "Assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression initially came from the victim, the aggression ceased when the victim was divested of his balisong. At that instant, there was no longer any imminent risk to petitioner’s life or personal safety." — Defines the point at which unlawful aggression ceased, the decisive factual and legal basis for the conviction.
• "As for the award of P25,000 as indemnity, there being no legal basis, it must be deleted." — Explains the deletion of the indemnity award.
• "The award of P25,000 as indemnity is DELETED; in its stead, the award of P30,000 as temperate damages is ORDERED." — Dispositive modification of damages.

• People vs. Ebmerga, G.R. 116616, November 26, 1999, 319 SCRA 304, 320 — Cited for the rule that when the accused threw a stone causing the victim to drop the knife, there was no longer any imminent risk or danger to the accused’s life; the subsequent attack was not self-defense. The Court used it to support the conclusion that unlawful aggression ceased when petitioner wrested the knife.
• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 36, 55 (2003) — Cited as prevailing jurisprudence supporting the award of P30,000 moral damages.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Provides self-defense as a justifying circumstance and requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity, and lack of sufficient provocation. Applied: petitioner failed to prove unlawful aggression, so self-defense was rejected.
• Article 2219, New Civil Code — Authorizes moral damages. Applied: the Court sustained the P30,000 moral damages award as in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Arturo D. Brion concurred.