Nacario vs. People

Intimidation in rape is subjective and must be viewed from the victim's perception at the time of the commission of the crime; it need not be actual or verbal, and may arise from the accused's moral influence or ascendancy over the victim, even where the victim's fear is rooted in a prior traumatic experience with a different person, so long as the accused's acts triggered that fear and produced the victim's submission.

AAA, born September 30, 1989, was a minor who had run away from home due to maltreatment and sexual abuse by her maternal uncle. She was taken in by Ledelma Nacario, an employee of the Municipal Social Service and Development Office of Claveria, Misamis Oriental, after agencies refused to admit AAA. Ledelma brought AAA to her own home, where AAA lived with Ledelma's husband, petitioner Ricardo Nacario y Mendez, from February 2004 to September 2004, performing household chores in exchange for the petitioner shouldering her school expenses. The charges arose under Article 266-A(1) in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes rape committed through force, threat, or intimidation.

Petitioner Ricardo Nacario y Mendez and his wife Ledelma resided in Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. From February 2004 to September 2004, their household included AAA, a minor born September 30, 1989, who had been taken in by Ledelma after AAA fled her home due to maltreatment and prior sexual abuse by her maternal uncle. AAA performed household chores in exchange for the petitioner shouldering her school expenses. The parties stipulated during pre-trial that AAA had previously been molested by her maternal uncle, though no case had been filed in connection with that incident, and that AAA resided in the petitioner's house during the relevant period.

On September 9, 2004, at around 11:00 p.m., AAA was sleeping alone in her room when she was awakened by someone touching her breasts. She saw the petitioner, who told her that he would be the one to break her vagina and instructed her not to tell his wife. AAA felt helpless and terrified, reminded of the time her uncle, armed with a dagger, had threatened to kill her during his prior assault. The petitioner sucked her breast, kissed her lips, removed her pants and underwear, licked her vagina, and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterward, the petitioner undressed her while AAA lay crying. Two hours later, at around 1:00 a.m. on September 10, 2004, the petitioner again approached AAA, undressed her, and had carnal knowledge of her. When he finished, he told AAA not to go out, and she was left crying and shivering until she fell asleep. At around 4:00 a.m. that same morning, the petitioner again had sexual intercourse with AAA, beginning by touching her breast and chest, sucking her mouth, removing her undergarments, and proceeding with the act. AAA no longer showed any reaction throughout this third ordeal. Thereafter, the petitioner told her that he would again have sexual intercourse with her whenever his wife was not around, and instructed her to get up and cook rice. AAA performed her usual household chores, went to school, and upon returning home asked the petitioner for permission to go out.

AAA went to a friend's house and recounted the incidents to her friend and the latter's mother. They helped her by relating the matter to Belen Razalo, a DSWD social worker in Claveria. On September 11, 2004, AAA was brought to the Claveria Police Station to give her statement and was medically examined at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center by Dr. Sittienor M. Gumaos-Casip. The Living Case Report documented healed hymenal lacerations at the 3 and 9 o'clock positions, with the cervix closed and smooth with mucoid discharge. The defense presented the petitioner's wife Ledelma, their 11-year-old son Renz, and Maria Belen Racines, an NMMC employee. Renz testified that on the night of September 9, 2004, he was in the living room doing a school project from 9:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. and that the petitioner was sleeping in the living room the entire time, with nothing unusual occurring. Ledelma testified that she last saw AAA on the morning of September 9, 2004.

Both the RTC and the CA found AAA's testimony credible, straightforward, and consistent, and found no ill motive on her part. The RTC rejected Renz's testimony as implausible, noting that it taxed credulity that an 11-year-old child could stay awake the entire night working on a school project on a Friday when the following days were a weekend, without even specifying what the project was. The CA agreed, refusing to give credence to Renz's account.

• Judicial Admission of No Force: Petitioner argued that AAA's open-court testimony expressly narrating that no force or intimidation was employed by the accused during the alleged copulation constituted a judicial admission requiring no further proof, thereby negating an essential element of rape.
• Absence of Force or Intimidation: Petitioner maintained that the crime of rape cannot prosper when the element of force or intimidation is wanting, and that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
• Erroneous Affirmance by the CA: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming in toto the guilty verdict of three counts of rape when the prosecution failed to establish the element of force or intimidation.

• Judicial Admission: Whether AAA's testimony that no force or intimidation was employed constitutes a judicial admission that negates the element of force or intimidation in rape.
• Sufficiency of Intimidation: Whether the crime of rape prospers even if the element of force or intimidation is seemingly absent, where the victim did not physically resist.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction for three counts of rape when the prosecution allegedly failed to prove the element of force or intimidation beyond reasonable doubt.

• Judicial Admission: No. AAA's testimony that she did not resist does not constitute a judicial admission negating intimidation; her lack of resistance was the product of fear, not consent.
• Sufficiency of Intimidation: Yes. Rape prospers even without physical resistance where intimidation, viewed subjectively from the victim's perception, produced fear sufficient to cow the victim into submission.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The CA did not err; the prosecution established all elements of rape beyond reasonable doubt, including intimidation, which was established by the petitioner's acts triggering AAA's fear rooted in prior trauma.

• Judicial Admission: The Court found that AAA's failure to resist was not equivalent to consent or a judicial admission that no intimidation occurred. AAA testified that she did not resist because she was afraid the petitioner would do to her what her uncle had done—namely, threaten her with a dagger and nearly kill her during a prior rape. While the fear was ingrained by an act performed by a person other than the petitioner, it was the petitioner's sexual acts toward AAA that triggered the fear leading to her submission. The Court emphasized that people react differently under emotional stress: some resist violently, others faint or are shocked into insensibility, and a few may openly welcome the intrusion. AAA's crying after the first two incidents and her flight from the house immediately after the third, followed by her disclosure to others, clearly manifested the absence of consent.

• Sufficiency of Intimidation: The Court applied the principle that intimidation is subjective and must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule. Intimidation need not be actual or verbal when the accused wields moral influence or ascendancy over the victim. It is sufficient that the accused, through his acts, causes the victim to feel fear strong enough to compel complete submission. The inherent predisposition of the victim is beside the point, because the workings of the human mind, based on experiences and genetic predisposition, naturally vary from person to person. The Court stressed that emphasis must be placed on the acts of the accused and whether those acts tend to cause the victim to surrender to his will, taking into account the victim's personal circumstances. AAA's personal circumstances—her youth, her dependence on the petitioner's household for shelter and education, and her prior traumatic experience—rendered her defenseless when the petitioner initiated his sexual advances.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Court found that all three elements of rape under Article 266-A(1) were satisfied: the offender is a man; the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and the act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. The fact of sexual intercourse was established by AAA's testimony, corroborated by the medico-legal report documenting healed hymenal lacerations. The testimony of a minor rape victim is given full weight and credit, particularly absent evidence of ill motive. AAA had much to lose by implicating the petitioner, as she stood to lose the shelter and education provided by his household. The petitioner's alibi failed because the defense itself admitted he was in the same house at the time of the crime, merely sleeping in the living room a short distance from AAA's room. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime, which was not the case here. The testimony of the petitioner's son Renz was rejected as biased—inherently improbable and inconsistent with human nature, as it was implausible that an 11-year-old would stay awake from 9:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. on a Friday night doing an unspecified school project. The uniform factual findings of the RTC and CA, which are accorded the highest respect, were not shown to be arbitrary, unfounded, or based on overlooked or misinterpreted facts.

• Subjectivity of Intimidation in Rape — Intimidation is a state of mind discernible only from the simultaneous or subsequent acts of the victim. It is subjective and must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule. It is sufficient that the victim is cowed to submission as a result of the accused's acts. The inherent predisposition of the victim is beside the point; emphasis must be placed on the acts of the accused and whether they tend to cause the victim to surrender to his will, considering the victim's personal circumstances. Applied here: AAA's fear, though rooted in prior trauma from her uncle's assault, was triggered by the petitioner's sexual acts, rendering her defenseless and satisfying the element of intimidation.

• Credibility of Minor Rape Victim's Testimony — The testimony of a minor who is a victim of rape is given full weight and credit, particularly in the absence of evidence showing ill motive to falsely testify against the accused. When a female minor alleges rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean she has been raped. No young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow examination of her private parts, and undergo the trouble and trauma of a public trial unless she was in fact raped. Applied here: AAA's testimony was found credible, straightforward, and consistent, with no ill motive attributable to her.

• Requirements for Alibi — For alibi to prosper, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, rendering it impossible for him to have been at the scene. Applied here: The defense admitted the petitioner was in the same house, sleeping in the living room a short distance from AAA's room, so the alibi could not be considered exculpatory.

• Bias of Related Witnesses — A witness is biased when his relation to the party is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or pervert the truth. The relationship between a witness and the accused does not per se impair credibility, but when the testimony is evaluated on its intrinsic merits and found inherently improbable or defective, it must be excluded. Applied here: Renz's testimony in favor of his father was rejected as biased and inconsistent with human nature.

• "Intimidation is subjective. As such, it should be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. In the prosecution of rape cases, it is sufficient that the victim is cowed to submission as a result thereof." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the subjectivity of intimidation, the ratio decidendi for the Court's finding that the element of intimidation was satisfied despite AAA's lack of physical resistance.

• "No young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped." — Quoted from People vs. Menaling, this passage states the canonical formulation of the doctrine on the credibility of young rape complainants, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Intimidation need not be actual or verbal when the accused wields moral influence or ascendancy over the victim." — This passage defines the scope of intimidation in rape cases, establishing that moral ascendancy can substitute for physical force, a principle particularly relevant where the accused holds a position of authority or dependence over the victim.

• "People react differently when placed under emotional stress – some may resist violently, others may faint or be shocked into insensibility, and there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion." — This passage explains why a victim's apparent passivity during rape does not equate to consent, supporting the Court's conclusion that AAA's stoic reaction during the third incident did not negate the absence of consent.

• People vs. Menaling, 784 Phil. 592 (2016) — Followed for the proposition that no young girl would fabricate a rape allegation and submit to public trial unless she was in fact raped, supporting the credibility of AAA's testimony.
• People vs. Bayani, 331 Phil. 169 (1996) — Followed for the definition of force and intimidation in rape: force need not be irresistible but must be sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose, and intimidation need only produce fear strong enough to compel submission.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Followed for the modification of damages in rape cases, increasing civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to ₱75,000 each per count.
• Tarapen vs. People, 585 Phil. 568 (2008) — Followed for the doctrine on biased witnesses, providing the framework for evaluating and rejecting testimony of a witness related to the accused when the testimony is inherently improbable.
• People vs. Amoc, 810 Phil. 257 (2017) — Followed for the elements required for a successful alibi defense, specifically the requirement of physical impossibility of being at the crime scene.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Followed for the imposition of 6% per annum interest on monetary awards from the date of finality until fully paid.

• Article 266-A(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines rape committed by a man who has carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The Court found all three elements satisfied: petitioner is a man; he had carnal knowledge of AAA on three occasions; and the acts were accomplished through intimidation that rendered AAA defenseless.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua when rape is committed through force, threat, or intimidation, to be imposed for each count. The Court confirmed the correctness of the penalty imposed by the RTC and CA.
• Rule 124, Section 3(c), Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure — Provides that appeals from CA rulings imposing reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or a lesser penalty shall be made through a notice of appeal before the CA, not through a petition for review on certiorari. The Court noted the petitioner availed of the wrong mode of appeal but resolved the substantive issue in the interest of substantial justice.

Leonen (Chairperson), Gesmundo, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred.