Mustapha vs. Commission on Elections

The COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declares a candidate a nuisance candidate without substantial evidence, without considering the evidence submitted by the candidate, and based on sweeping and general statements that fail to specify which findings apply to which candidate. In a Section 69 proceeding, the COMELEC bears the burden, as petitioner, to prove by substantial evidence that the candidate falls within any of the three grounds for nuisance candidacy, and, as tribunal, must comply with the due process requirements in quasi-judicial proceedings, including considering the evidence presented and rendering a decision based on substantial evidence.

Mustapha filed his certificate of candidacy for senator under the Workers and Peasants Party (WPP), a duly accredited and recognized national political party since February 3, 1963. The COMELEC Law Department filed a verified motu proprio petition to declare him a nuisance candidate, and the COMELEC Second Division, later affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, cancelled his certificate of candidacy. The case reached the Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari, with the Court issuing a temporary restraining order on January 14, 2025, enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the assailed resolutions.

Subair Guinthum Mustapha, through an authorized representative, filed his Certificate of Candidacy and Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance under the Workers and Peasants Party (WPP) for the position of senator in the May 12, 2025 National and Local Elections. The WPP is a duly accredited and recognized national political party by the COMELEC since February 3, 1963.

On October 14, 2024, the COMELEC Law Department filed a verified motu proprio Petition seeking to declare Mustapha a nuisance candidate, arguing that his candidacy was a farce that puts the election process in mockery or disrepute and that he had no bona fide intent to run for senator. The Law Department alleged: (1) Mustapha has no propensity to serve the public; (2) he has no track record of advocacies or civic engagements; (3) he did not discuss his advocacies or platforms of government despite the opportunity given him after filing his CoC; (4) he showed no interest in engaging with the public; and (5) he once ran for Member, House of Representatives in Lanao del Sur but gained only 5,387 votes or 2.01% of the total votes cast.

In his Answer, Mustapha denied the allegations, claiming he holds a law degree from Manuel L. Quezon School of Law, a specialization in Shari'ah Law from Mindanao State University, and earned units in the University of the Philippines' masteral program for Islamic studies. He claimed active participation in the labor sector, subscription to the WPP's platforms, and personal platforms including uplifting marginalized sectors, promoting peace and development in Mindanao, and addressing corruption. He explained that his representative's failure to present his platforms at the filing of his CoC was because he was suffering from high blood pressure. He also claimed to be a Sultan and recognized leader of Marawi.

The WPP filed a Motion to Intervene, expressing support for Mustapha and asserting that its candidates are not nuisance candidates. On November 14, 2024, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Omnibus Resolution declaring Mustapha and two others nuisance candidates, finding that they had no serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign, filed their CoCs merely to gain attention, made exaggerated or frivolous promises, failed to articulate defined agendas, and received low turnout of votes in the 2022 NLE. The COMELEC En Banc denied Mustapha's Motion for Reconsideration on November 29, 2024.

Mustapha filed the present Petition, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC. He argued that the findings were based on speculations and conjectures, that his circumstances were similar to those in Marquez vs. Commission on Elections (2022), that he adequately rebutted the allegations, and that the COMELEC's declaration that his minimal votes in the 2022 NLE indicate lack of sincerity was preposterous. The Court issued a TRO on January 14, 2025. In its Comment, the COMELEC argued for the first time that the most obvious badge of Mustapha's lack of bona fide intention was his supposed false representations in his curriculum vitae, citing certifications from the Office of the Ombudsman, the Philippine Military Academy, and the Department of Foreign Affairs stating that Mustapha was not employed in those offices. Mustapha denied making false representations, explaining that he worked pro bono as civilian instructor at the PMA, as assistant to the resident ombudsman for Muslim Affairs, and was locally hired by the DFA.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Mustapha argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion because its findings were based merely on speculations and conjectures made by the COMELEC Law Department, which the COMELEC literally adopted even without proof, effectively shifting the burden of proof to him contrary to Marquez vs. Commission on Elections (2022).

• Similarity to Marquez 2022: Mustapha averred that his circumstances are very similar to those in Marquez 2022, namely: he filed a CoC which is a sworn document; this is not the first time he filed a CoC; he was initially declared a nuisance candidate and is now seeking judicial remedy; he has been vigilant in defending his candidacy; and he crafted his own program of governance.

• Adequate Rebuttal: Mustapha maintained that he adequately rebutted the allegations of the COMELEC Law Department by laying down his full credentials, trainings, activities of serving the Filipino people, and his platform of government.

• Minimal Votes as Ground: Mustapha criticized as preposterous and illogical the COMELEC's declaration that his receipt of minimal votes during the 2022 NLE is indicative of his lack of sincerity in his candidacy.

• False Representations: In his Reply, Mustapha denied making false representations in his curriculum vitae, explaining that he merely included his work experiences and that he worked pro bono or was locally hired in the positions he listed.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: The COMELEC countered that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion, maintaining that Mustapha is a nuisance candidate, and that it was vested by the Constitution with the administration of elections and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods to ensure free, orderly, and honest elections.

• Error in Judgment vs. Jurisdiction: The COMELEC argued that even assuming it committed an error in the appreciation of the facts, the same is, at best, an error in judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.

• False Representations in Curriculum Vitae: The COMELEC argued, for the first time, that the most obvious badge of Mustapha's lack of bona fide intention to run for office and his mockery of the election process is his supposed patent lack of caution in making false representations in his curriculum vitae, citing certifications from the Ombudsman, PMA, and DFA stating that Mustapha was never employed in their respective offices.

• Mootness: Whether the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the conclusion of the 2025 NLE and the proclamation of the 12 senatorial candidates.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared Mustapha a nuisance candidate resulting in the cancellation of his CoC for the position of senator in the 2025 NLE.

• Mootness: Yes, the petition was rendered moot and academic by the conclusion of the 2025 NLE and the proclamation of the 12 senatorial candidates, Mustapha excluded. However, the Court resolved the case on the merits under the fourth exception to the mootness doctrine — the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared Mustapha a nuisance candidate. The assailed resolutions were issued in violation of the due process requirements in quasi-judicial proceedings, were not supported by substantial evidence, were issued without considering the evidence submitted by Mustapha, and were couched in sweeping and general statements.

• Mootness: The Court found that with the conclusion of the 2025 NLE and the proclamation of the 12 senatorial candidates who received the highest number of votes, Mustapha excluded, a declaration on the petition would be of no practical value. However, citing De Alban vs. Commission on Elections, the Court noted that "elections are held at regular intervals and the issues of nuisance candidates will inescapably reach the Court." Thus, the case falls under the fourth exception to the mootness doctrine — capable of repetition yet evading review — and the Court proceeded to resolve the case on its merits to elucidate the meaning, scope, and application of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court ruled that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court explained that in a Section 69 proceeding, the COMELEC serves a dual role — that of a petitioner and a quasi-judicial agency. As petitioner, the COMELEC must prove by substantial evidence that the candidate falls within any of the three grounds provided in Section 69. As a quasi-judicial tribunal, the COMELEC must observe the due process requirements in quasi-judicial proceedings: (1) afford the parties an opportunity to be heard; (2) consider the evidence presented; (3) base its decision on the evidence presented at the hearing or contained in the record; (4) base its decision on substantial evidence; (5) act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts; and (6) render its decision in such manner that the parties can know the various issues involved and reasons for its decision.

The Court found that the COMELEC relied on the unsubstantiated allegations of its Law Department, employing a "cookie-cutter" motion already condemned in Marquez 2022, Marquez 2019, and Ollesca. The COMELEC failed to give due consideration to the evidence and arguments presented by Mustapha. The three circumstances cited by the COMELEC — (1) respondents' supposed behavior during the filing of their CoCs reflecting lack of serious intent; (2) respondents' supposed failure to articulate a defined agenda; and (3) respondents' obtaining minimal votes during the 2022 NLE — were too general and immaterial to a determination of bona fide intent.

With respect to the first circumstance, the COMELEC did not mention or state what the supposed exaggerated or frivolous promises were, nor did it point to the portion of the records where these could be found. Moreover, Mustapha was not even present during the filing of his CoC because it was filed through an authorized representative as he was suffering from high blood pressure.

As regards the second circumstance, the finding that Mustapha failed to articulate a defined political agenda was inconsistent with the records, as Mustapha had submitted his personal platforms and advocacies in his Answer. The Court noted that Section 74 of the OEC provides that the statement of a program of government is merely discretionary, and the legislative deliberations confirm that failure to submit or articulate a program of government cannot result in disqualification.

With respect to the third circumstance, the Court held that there is no logical connection between Mustapha's alleged minimal votes during the previous elections and his seriousness to run for public office in the current elections. The Court stated that if the COMELEC is allowed to declare one a nuisance candidate simply because he obtained minimal votes in previous elections, then the COMELEC will be virtually exercising that which is exclusively reserved to the voters on election day.

As to the fourth circumstance regarding false representations in the curriculum vitae, the Court noted that these certifications were presented for the first time during the proceedings before the Court and were not previously considered by the COMELEC when it rendered its assailed resolutions.

The Court found that Mustapha's bona fide intent to seek and assume public office was apparent from: (1) his being an official candidate of the WPP, a recognized national political party, with the WPP even filing a Motion to Intervene in his support; (2) his submission of programs of government and clear articulation of his individual platforms; (3) his consistent assertion that he is a Sultan in Marawi and his educational background; and (4) his utmost vigilance in protecting his candidacy, having actively participated in the proceedings from the filing of the petition up to the Supreme Court.

• Nuisance Candidacy (Section 69, OEC) — The three grounds for declaring a candidate a nuisance candidate are: (1) the candidate filed his or her CoC to put the election process in mockery or to cause disrepute; (2) the candidate filed his or her CoC to cause confusion among the voters; and (3) there exist circumstances that clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for office to prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. The common thread is that nuisance candidates filed their CoCs not to aspire or seek public office but to prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. The pivotal criterion is the absence of a bona fide intent to run for public office.

• Right to Candidacy — Candidacy is a right, not merely a privilege, enjoyed by every qualified citizen in a democracy. While it is not a fundamental right and may be regulated or restricted by the State to achieve a legitimate and compelling State interest, any such limitation or restriction must be reasonable and non-discriminatory, and must be properly and conscientiously enforced or implemented.

• Burden of Proof in Section 69 Proceedings — The COMELEC, as petitioner in a Section 69 proceeding, must prove by substantial evidence that the candidate falls within any of the three grounds provided in Section 69 of the OEC. When the COMELEC fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which it bases its claims, the respondent-candidate is under no obligation to prove his or her exception or defense.

• Due Process in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings — The COMELEC, acting as a tribunal in Section 69 proceedings, must observe the due process requirements in quasi-judicial proceedings: (1) afford the parties an opportunity to be heard; (2) consider the evidence presented; (3) base its decision on the evidence presented at the hearing or contained in the record; (4) base its decision on substantial evidence; (5) act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts; and (6) render its decision in such manner that the parties can know the various issues involved and reasons for its decision.

• Property Qualifications Prohibited — Using lack of financial capacity to wage a national campaign as a yardstick in determining a candidate's seriousness to run for office is tantamount to imposing property qualifications on the right to run for public office, which is constitutionally impermissible. Circumstances such as lack of ability to make oneself known to the entire country, lack of a nationwide network of supporters, incapability to persuade a substantial number of voters, and lack of political machinery are "shrouded property qualifications" and are proscribed under the Constitution.

• Popularity and Winnability Not Criteria — Non-membership in a political party, being unknown nationwide, low probability of getting elected, or being a first-time candidate do not by themselves equate to the absence of bona fide intention to run for public office. Declaring one a nuisance candidate simply because he or she is not known to the entire country reduces the electoral process to a mere popularity contest. The OEC's provision of a 60 to 90-day campaign period supports the conclusion that popularity and winnability were not intended by Congress to be criteria in determining whether a candidate is a nuisance.

• Mootness Doctrine — Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review — Courts may decide cases otherwise moot and academic if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Nuisance candidate cases fall under the fourth exception because elections are held at regular intervals and the issues of nuisance candidates will inescapably reach the Court.

• "The Court rules that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared Mustapha a nuisance candidate resulting in the cancellation of his CoC for the position of senator in the 2025 NLE. As will be further explained below, the assailed Resolutions were issued in violation of the due process requirements in quasi-judicial proceedings. The assailed Resolutions were not supported by substantial evidence, were issued without considering the evidence submitted by Mustapha, and were couched in sweeping and general statements making it difficult, if not impossible, for Mustapha to know which of the COMELEC's findings apply or pertain to him." — This passage states the core ruling of the Court and identifies the three grounds for finding grave abuse of discretion: violation of due process, lack of substantial evidence, and failure to consider the candidate's evidence.

• "Thus, the COMELEC, as a petitioner in Section 69, must 'prove, by substantial evidence, that the candidacy of [the candidate] falls within any of the three (3) grounds provided in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.' 'When the [COMELEC] fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which [it] bases [its] claims, the [respondent-candidate] is under no obligation to prove [his or her] exception or defense.'" — This passage establishes the burden of proof in Section 69 proceedings, emphasizing that the COMELEC as petitioner must adduce substantial evidence and cannot shift the burden to the candidate.

• "If the COMELEC is allowed to declare one as a nuisance candidate simply because he or she obtained minimal votes in previous elections, and/or simply because such candidate could not possibly obtain sufficient number of votes during the present election, then the COMELEC will be virtually exercising that which is exclusively reserved to the voters on election day." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning on why minimal votes in previous elections cannot be a ground for declaring a candidate a nuisance, as it usurps the exclusive authority of the electorate.

• "The effective implementation of the right to candidacy ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Thus, persons who are eligible to stand for election should not be unceremoniously excluded using unreasonable or discriminatory requirements." — This passage summarizes the constitutional policy underlying the right to candidacy and the protection against unreasonable restrictions.

• Marquez vs. Commission on Elections, 924 Phil. 179 (2022) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that the COMELEC must prove by substantial evidence that a candidate is a nuisance, and that circumstances such as lack of ability to make oneself known, lack of a nationwide network, incapability to persuade voters, and lack of political machinery are "shrouded property qualifications" proscribed under the Constitution. Also cited for the ruling that it is contrary to human experience for a candidate to go through the rigorous process of defending his or her candidacy up to the Supreme Court if such candidate lacks seriousness.

• Marquez vs. Commission on Elections, 861 Phil. 667 (2019) — Followed. Cited for the ruling that bona fide intent to run for office should not be confused with lack of financial capacity to wage a national campaign, and that using lack of financial capacity as a yardstick is tantamount to imposing property qualifications.

• Ollesca vs. Commission on Elections, 956 Phil. 889 (2024) — Followed. Cited for reiterating that financial capacity should not be conflated with bona fide intention to run for public office, and that the imposition of having financial capacity to hit the campaign trail is a property qualification prohibited under the Constitution.

• De Alban vs. Commission on Elections, 921 Phil. 524 (2022) — Followed. Cited for the ruling that non-membership in a political party, being unknown nationwide, low probability of success, or being a first-time candidate do not by themselves equate to the absence of bona fide intention to run for public office. Also cited for the mootness exception that "elections are held at regular intervals and the issues of nuisance candidates will inescapably reach the Court."

• Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections, 470 Phil. 711 (2004) — Followed. Cited for the compelling state interest justifying the prohibition against nuisance candidates, namely, the practical considerations in conducting elections and the need to ensure rational, objective, and orderly electoral exercises.

• Uy vs. Commission on Elections, 945 Phil. 446 (2023) — Followed. Cited for the ruling that membership in a political party weighs heavily against a finding of nuisance candidacy, as the nomination of a candidate by a registered political party means the candidate embodies the party's ideals and principles.

• Amad vs. Commission on Elections, 924 Phil. 861 (2022) — Followed. Cited for the enumeration of the three grounds for declaring a candidate a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the OEC.

• Maquera vs. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 (1965) — Followed. Cited for the principle that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, and that social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike.

• Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) — Followed. Cited for the due process requirements in quasi-judicial proceedings, including the duty to consider the evidence presented and to base decisions on substantial evidence.

• Timbol vs. Commission on Elections, 754 Phil. 578 (2015) — Followed. Cited for the ruling that the COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.

• Section 69, Omnibus Election Code — The provision governing nuisance candidates, which allows the COMELEC to refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that the certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, to cause confusion among voters, or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office. The Court applied this provision by requiring the COMELEC to prove by substantial evidence that the candidate falls within any of the three grounds.

• Section 74, Omnibus Election Code — The provision on the contents of the certificate of candidacy, which provides that the statement of a program of government is merely discretionary ("if he so desires"). The Court applied this provision to hold that a candidate's failure to submit or articulate a program of government at the time of filing the CoC cannot be used as an indicator of lack of bona fide intent to run for public office.

• Article II, Section 1, Constitution — Provides that the Philippines is a democratic and republican State, and that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Cited in the concurring opinion for the principle that the right to vote and be voted for is premised on this constitutional command.

• Article II, Section 10, Constitution — Provides that the State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. Cited in the concurring opinion for the principle that the COMELEC must be careful not to favor only those who are powerful, incumbent, have resources, or are popular in deciding who is a nuisance candidate.

• Article II, Section 26, Constitution — Guarantees equal access to opportunities for public service. Cited for the principle that the right to candidacy is protected, though it may be regulated by reasonable restrictions.

• Article IX(C), Section 2, Constitution — Vests the COMELEC with the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Cited in the concurring opinion for the COMELEC's mandate.

Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva, JJ., concurred. Leonen, SAJ., concurred with a separate opinion. Rosario, J., was on wellness leave, and Singh, J., was on leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided text.