Mupas vs. People

Intent to kill must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor; where such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries only, and where the wounds are shown to require medical attendance for ten days or more, the offense is less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners Jun Mupas and Gil Mupas (alias "Banjo") were charged with frustrated homicide for an alleged assault on Rogelio Murao on 18 February 1993 in Bangar, La Union. Rogelio and Jun had a prior verbal altercation in January 1993, which the prosecution suggested as motive. The case proceeded through trial and appeal before reaching the Supreme Court on petition for review.

On 18 February 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning, Rogelio Murao was walking to school with his companion Eduardo Murao, Jr. in Bangar, La Union. According to Rogelio, Jun Mupas suddenly stopped and stabbed him with a 29-inch Batangas knife, while Gil Mupas, alias "Banjo," bodily restrained him. Rogelio claimed he avoided the initial blow, after which both assailants hurled stones at him, hitting his leg as he ran eastward. He flagged down a motorized tricycle, but the two pursued him; Banjo held him by the neck and punched him while Jun stabbed him several times inside the vehicle. Rogelio then alighted and ran home, whereupon his parents brought him to the Martinez Clinic. Dr. Arsenio Martinez attended to him and issued a medical certificate noting a cut wound 2–3 cm. in the parietal area, abrasion and contusion in the maxillary area (left), and abrasion in the lumbar area (left), with a healing period of two weeks. Rogelio attributed the attack to a verbal altercation he had with Jun in January of that year.

The defense presented a different account. Jun testified that he was watering plants in front of Gil's house when he accidentally sprayed water on Rogelio, who scolded him. Jun apologized, but Rogelio challenged him to a fistfight, which Jun accepted. Rogelio ran away, picked up stones, and threw them at Gil's house. Jun gave chase, caught up with Rogelio, and the two boarded a tricycle where the fighting continued. A passenger, Josefina Mendoza, pacified them. Banjo arrived only after the fighting ceased. Jun then went home, but Rogelio and his father Flaviano later arrived armed with a bolo and challenged Jun to a fight, though they could not enter because the gate was locked. Gil corroborated this version, testifying that he saw Jun chasing Rogelio, went near them, found them pacified by one Ms. Monis, and sent them home.

Danilo Olpindo, a defense witness who was buying soap from Banjo's store, testified that a fistfight transpired between Rogelio and Jun, after which Rogelio ran, picked up a stone, and threw it at Jun and at Banjo's house. Jun chased Rogelio and fought him again. Banjo came out and asked the two to go home. Teresita Monis, also for the defense, testified that while riding a tricycle, she saw a hand reach inside to hit a co-passenger, causing blood to ooze from his forehead, but she could not identify whose hand it was. Josefina Mendoza testified that she saw Jun box Rogelio and that Banjo dispersed them.

The trial court convicted both petitioners of frustrated homicide based solely on Rogelio's testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Banjo and Gil were the same person based on bail bond records and the amended information, and that Jun performed all acts of execution that would have produced homicide but for timely medical intervention.

• Identity of Gil Mupas: Petitioners maintained that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty that Gil Mupas and "Banjo" Mupas were one and the same person, and that Rogelio had not categorically identified Gil as one of the perpetrators.
• Defense of Denial: Petitioners argued that Gil's defense of denial was duly supported by clear and convincing evidence, including corroborating testimony from defense witnesses.
• Absence of Intent to Kill: Petitioners contended that, assuming Jun committed a crime, the prosecution failed to prove intent to kill, warranting conviction only for physical injuries rather than frustrated homicide.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the complainant is sufficient to sustain a conviction for frustrated homicide beyond reasonable doubt.
• Identity and Participation of Gil Mupas: Whether the prosecution conclusively proved that Gil Mupas alias "Banjo" participated in the alleged assault.
• Intent to Kill: Whether the prosecution established intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt, such as to sustain a conviction for frustrated homicide rather than physical injuries.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: No. The complainant's lone and uncorroborated testimony was insufficient, particularly where available witnesses identified by the complainant himself were not presented and the defense witnesses contradicted material portions of his account.
• Identity and Participation of Gil Mupas: No. The prosecution failed to conclusively prove Gil's identity and participation, his alleged involvement being uncorroborated and bereft of proof; he was acquitted.
• Intent to Kill: No. The prosecution failed to establish intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt; the nature of the wounds, the absence of a deadly weapon conclusively proven, and the circumstances of the encounter negated homicidal intent, warranting conviction only for less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: While the testimony of a single witness can sustain a conviction if it establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Rogelio's testimony did not meet that standard. In his sworn statement, Rogelio admitted having a companion, Eduardo Murao, Jr., and identified other potential witnesses—Josefina Mendoza, Teresita Monis, and Mario Olpindo. On the witness stand, he again referenced these witnesses. Yet none were presented by the prosecution. Notably, Josefina Mendoza and Teresita Monis testified for the defense and contradicted Rogelio's account: Mendoza saw only a fistfight, and Monis saw a hand reach inside the tricycle but could not identify the assailant. The unexplained failure to present available witnesses whose names the complainant himself supplied raised reasonable doubt. The defense, by contrast, presented three witnesses besides the petitioners, including Danilo Olpindo, who was related to both parties—Jun's second cousin and Rogelio's third cousin—and thus not demonstrably biased.

• Identity and Participation of Gil Mupas: Juxtaposing the testimonies, the Court deduced that a fistfight occurred only between Jun and Rogelio, which continued inside a tricycle. Rogelio's allegations of Banjo's participation and that Jun carried a bolo were uncorroborated and unsupported by any other evidence. Absent proof of Gil alias Banjo's involvement, his acquittal was required. The Court of Appeals' conclusion that Banjo and Gil were the same person, while not disturbed, did not cure the absence of evidence linking him to the assault itself.

• Intent to Kill: Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission, and must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt. The evidence fell short. The wounds were superficial—a 2–3 cm. cut wound requiring only suturing, with a two-week healing period. Dr. Martinez testified that the wound could have been caused by a rough or sharp object, not necessarily a knife, and that it was not a penetrating wound. If Jun had carried a bolo with intent to kill, and if Banjo had conspired, the wounds would likely have been more severe. That Rogelio was able to go home shortly after the tricycle incident without being pursued further also negated homicidal intent. The suggested motive—Rogelio's prior verbal altercation with Jun—was too weak and shallow. Where intent to kill is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is physical injuries, not frustrated homicide. Given the two-week healing period, the offense was less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. A finding of guilt for this lesser offense was proper, it being necessarily included in frustrated homicide.

• Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof — The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of overcoming this presumption and must rest on its own merits, not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the presumption of innocence prevails and the accused must be acquitted. Once the presumption is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Single-Witness Testimony — The testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, where the lone testimony is uncorroborated and contradicted by other available evidence, and where witnesses identified by the complainant are inexplicably not presented, the single-witness rule cannot sustain a conviction.

• Intent to Kill as Element of Homicide — Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission. It must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. The nature, location, and severity of wounds, the weapon used, and the conduct of the assailant are relevant circumstances. Where intent to kill is absent but wounds were inflicted, the crime is physical injuries, not frustrated homicide.

• Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265, RPC — Any person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or require medical attendance for the same period, is guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

• Necessarily Included Offense — A finding of guilt for a lesser offense may be made where it is necessarily included in the offense charged, since the essential ingredients of the lesser offense constitute and form part of those constituting the greater offense.

• "Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor." — This passage states the controlling standard for proving intent to kill, the absence of which downgraded the conviction from frustrated homicide to less serious physical injuries.

• "When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries only and in this case, less serious physical injuries considering the attending physician's opinion that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to heal." — This formulation links the absence of homicidal intent to the proper classification of the offense and the applicable healing-period standard under Article 265.

• "It is thus Rogelio's word against the attestations of others. Such omission already raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the petitioners." — This passage articulates the evidentiary principle that the unexplained failure to present available identified witnesses generates reasonable doubt.

• People vs. Uy, 392 Phil. 773 (2000) — Cited for the doctrine on the presumption of innocence, the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the definition of reasonable doubt as doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof.

• United States vs. Sy Quingco and De Jesus, 16 Phil. 418 (1910) — Cited as authority for the proposition that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction if it establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Aradillos vs. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 650 (2004) — Cited for the requirement that intent to kill must be proved clearly and evidently, and for the award of moral damages in cases of physical injuries.

• People vs. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338 (2001) — Cited for the principle that intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and that where such intent is lacking, the crime is physical injuries, not frustrated homicide.

• People vs. Vicente, 423 Phil. 1065 (2001) — Cited for the doctrine that a conviction for a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged is permissible.

• Article 249 in relation to Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide and frustrated homicide. The trial court convicted petitioners under this provision, but the Supreme Court ruled the elements of frustrated homicide, particularly intent to kill, were not established.

• Article 265, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Defines and penalizes less serious physical injuries. Applied to Jun Mupas, whose infliction of wounds requiring medical attendance for ten days or more (two-week healing period) met the elements of this offense, warranting the penalty of arresto mayor.

• Article 2219, Civil Code — Basis for the award of moral damages. The Court awarded ₱5,000.00 as moral damages, Rogelio having suffered actual injuries.

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concurred.