Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte

A municipality's territory is limited to the barangays expressly enumerated in the law creating it, and an ambiguous boundary description must be interpreted in light of legislative intent rather than given literal application that would lead to absurd results.

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created by Executive Order No. 66 dated September 30, 1916, issued by Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, consolidating several rancherias in Ilocos Norte into a single township. The Municipality of Marcos was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to R.A. No. 3753, which separated seven barangays — Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas, and Agunit — from the Municipality of Dingras to constitute the new municipality. The boundary dispute arose from an ambiguity in Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, specifically the phrase describing Marcos' eastern boundary as "the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," which Marcos interpreted as extending its territory through portions of Nueva Era up to the provincial boundary. The term "Mt. Province" as used in R.A. No. 3753 referred to the then-undivided province that was later partitioned by R.A. No. 4695 (1966) into Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao, the last of which was further divided into Kalinga and Apayao by R.A. No. 7878 (1995).

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis in Ilocos Norte, which were previously organized as rancherias, each under the independent control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order No. 66 dated September 30, 1916. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to R.A. No. 3753, which separated seven barangays — Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas, and Agunit — from the Municipality of Dingras to constitute the new municipality. Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 named only Dingras as the mother municipality and enumerated only Dingras barangays as Marcos' source territory. The same section described Marcos' boundaries, including the phrase "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary."

From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been considered aligned and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent municipality of Dingras. Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era until almost 30 years later, on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015 entitled "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Marcos submitted its claim to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte, arguing that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary respectively, its eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary but should extend further east up to the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos further claimed entitlement not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its northern portion, which it argued was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era when Marcos was created, contrary to the requirement that a municipality must have compact and contiguous territory. Based on a re-survey conducted in 1992, Marcos claimed approximately 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era, specifically within Barangay Sto. Niño.

Nueva Era reacted to the claim through its Resolution No. 1, Series of 1993, asserting that its entire land area was an ancestral domain of the tinguians, an indigenous cultural community, and should be preserved as part of Nueva Era. Nueva Era argued that since R.A. No. 3753 specifically named only seven barangays of Dingras to comprise Marcos, the area of Marcos should not go beyond the territory of those barangays. On March 29, 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era, applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius and holding that no part of Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos. The SP also noted that extending Marcos' eastern boundary to Mt. Province would encroach not only upon Nueva Era but also upon Abra, producing an absurd result, as Abra is situated between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province. Marcos appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the SP decision on March 19, 2001, citing the explanatory note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez which mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality and stated that Dingras "will not be adversely affected too much because its finances will still be sound and stable." Marcos then filed a petition for review before the CA, which partly reversed the RTC decision on June 6, 2005, declaring that Marcos' eastern boundary extended to the Ilocos Norte-Kalinga-Apayao boundary line, thereby allocating a portion of Nueva Era to Marcos, while denying Marcos' claim over the isolated northern portion. The CA rejected the SP's geographic reasoning, holding that Abra was situated far to the south of Kalinga-Apayao and was part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur, not Ilocos Norte. Nueva Era then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Jurisdiction of the CA: Nueva Era contended that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the petition for review on appeal, citing Section 119 of the Local Government Code, which provides that appeal of the SP decision is exclusively vested in the RTC without further appeal to the CA.
• Improper Conversion of Remedy: Nueva Era argued that the CA gravely abused its discretion in treating Marcos' petition for review under Rule 45 as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
• Erroneous Appreciation of Facts: Nueva Era maintained that the CA erred in declaring that Marcos' eastern boundary was not coterminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras, and that there was no factual and legal basis to extend Marcos' territory beyond barangays Agunit and Culao, as traversing Barangay Sto. Niño eastward would lead to Abra, not Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.
• Plebiscite Requirement: Nueva Era posited that Marcos' claim over parts of its territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 Constitutions and the Local Government Code of 1991.

• Eastern Boundary Description: Marcos argued that since its northeastern and eastern boundaries under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary respectively, its eastern boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras, but should extend further east up to the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant to the description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753.
• Isolated Northern Portion: Marcos claimed entitlement not only to the middle portion of Nueva Era but also to its northern portion, which it argued was isolated from the major part of Nueva Era when Marcos was created. It posited that such isolation of territory was contrary to law because the law required that a municipality must have a compact and contiguous territory.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from RTC decisions in boundary disputes between municipalities under the Local Government Code.
• Propriety of CA's Treatment of Petition: Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in treating Marcos' petition for review as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Plebiscite Requirement: Whether the plebiscite requirement under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code applies to the creation of Marcos in 1963.
• Eastern Boundary of Marcos: Whether the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era's territory.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: Yes. The CA correctly had appellate jurisdiction over the RTC decision, as B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, vests the CA with appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments of RTCs, and Rule 42 provides the remedy of appeal via petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
• Propriety of CA's Treatment of Petition: No. The CA erred in treating the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, as it should have been entertained directly as a petition for review under Rule 42 pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
• Plebiscite Requirement: No. The plebiscite requirement was not applicable at the time Marcos was created in 1963, as it came into being only with the 1973 Constitution and is prospective in character under the principle lex prospicit, non respicit.
• Eastern Boundary of Marcos: No. No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753, as only barangays of Dingras were enumerated as source territory, and the ambiguous eastern boundary description must be interpreted in light of legislative intent to preclude absurdity.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: While Section 119 of the Local Government Code mentions only the RTC as the appellate court for SP decisions in boundary disputes, the CA's appellate jurisdiction is independently vested by B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, which grants the CA appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, through Rule 42, further supplements this by providing the remedy of appeal via petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The CA therefore need not treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari to take cognizance of the case. The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction and in converting the petition to certiorari, as B.P. Blg. 129 and Rule 42 directly confer authority on the CA to entertain such appeals.

• Propriety of CA's Treatment of Petition: The CA's conversion of the petition for review into a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was unnecessary and erroneous. The CA had direct authority under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, and Rule 42 to entertain the appeal via petition for review, making the conversion to certiorari superfluous. The CA's pronouncement that appeal is a purely statutory right and cannot be exercised unless expressly granted by law was correct in principle but misapplied, as the right of appeal to the CA from RTC decisions rendered in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is expressly granted by B.P. Blg. 129 and Rule 42.

• Plebiscite Requirement: The plebiscite requirement for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of boundaries of local government units was a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and cannot affect the creation of Marcos, which came into existence on June 22, 1963. The principle lex prospicit, non respicit — the law looks forward, not backward — applies. The Court cited Ceniza vs. Commission on Elections, which held that the plebiscite requirement under the 1973 Constitution was prospective and could not affect the creation of the City of Mandaue in 1969. Moreover, the Court was not creating Marcos but merely interpreting the law that created it, its creation being already a fait accompli. While Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim was untenable was correct, the reason was not the lack of a plebiscite but the legislative intent to create Marcos solely from Dingras territory.

• Eastern Boundary of Marcos: Only the barangays of Dingras were enumerated in R.A. No. 3753 as Marcos' source territory. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned; if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. The barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration, and under the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The explanatory note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez, which mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality, further confirmed the legislative intent. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute. The description of Marcos' eastern boundary as "the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary" was ambiguous and must be interpreted in light of legislative intent. A literal interpretation extending Marcos' boundary through Nueva Era would lead to absurd results — it would dismember Nueva Era and potentially encroach upon Abra. Statutes must be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied, and a literal interpretation leading to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeating the clear purpose of the lawmakers must be rejected. The boundary description was descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory, and the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only must be upheld.

• Expressio unius est exclusio alterius — The mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. The Court applied this maxim to hold that since only Dingras barangays were enumerated in R.A. No. 3753 as Marcos' source territory, Nueva Era's territory was excluded. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

• Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The Court used this rule to support the conclusion that Nueva Era's barangays were intentionally excluded from the law creating Marcos, bolstering the finding of legislative intent to create Marcos solely from Dingras territory.

• Lex prospicit, non respicit — The law looks forward, not backward. The Court applied this principle to hold that the plebiscite requirement, which came into being only with the 1973 Constitution, could not retroactively affect the creation of Marcos in 1963. It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for retroactive application is so provided.

• Statutory construction against absurdity — A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would lead to unjust or absurd results. Courts must construe statutes in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied, and may consider the spirit and reason of the statute where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. The Court applied this principle to reject Marcos' literal reading of the eastern boundary description, which would have dismembered Nueva Era and potentially encroached upon Abra, producing an absurd result contrary to legislative intent.

• "As the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them. Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do." — This is the opening statement of the decision, articulating the fundamental principle that boundary disputes must be resolved by carrying into effect the law creating the municipality, and that any alteration not in accordance with that law constitutes an amendment that only Congress may make.

• "Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the territorial issue, applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to exclude Nueva Era from Marcos' source territory.

• "Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application." — This passage articulates the Court's approach to resolving the ambiguous boundary description by resorting to legislative intent and the rule against absurd interpretations.

• "At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived." — This passage clarifies that the plebiscite requirement is prospective and does not apply to municipalities created before the 1973 Constitution.

• Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, 333 Phil. 1 (1996) — Cited as controlling authority for the principle that any alteration of boundaries not in accordance with the law creating a municipality constitutes an amendment that only Congress can make, framing the Court's approach to the boundary dispute.

• Miranda vs. Aguirre, 373 Phil. 386 (1999) — Cited for the purpose of the plebiscite requirement under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging, or altering the boundaries of local government units, serving as an instance of direct democracy.

• Ceniza vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-52304, January 28, 1980 — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that the plebiscite requirement is prospective in character and cannot affect the creation of local government units that came into existence before the 1973 Constitution, directly supporting the holding that Marcos was validly created without a plebiscite in 1963.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 3753 — The law creating the Municipality of Marcos, enumerating seven barangays of Dingras as source territory and describing Marcos' boundaries, including the phrase "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary." The Court interpreted the eastern boundary description in light of legislative intent, holding that it was descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.

• Section 10, Article X, 1987 Constitution — Requires approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units. The Court held this provision was prospective and inapplicable to Marcos, created in 1963, before the plebiscite requirement came into being.

• Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution — Contains a similar plebiscite requirement, noted by the Court as the first constitutional provision of its kind, making it a new requirement prospective in character.

• Section 119, Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) — Provides that appeal of SP decisions in boundary disputes shall be elevated to the proper RTC. The Court held that this provision did not preclude further appeal to the CA, as B.P. Blg. 129 independently vests the CA with appellate jurisdiction over RTC decisions.

• Section 118(b), Local Government Code — Provides that boundary disputes between two or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The Court cited this to confirm the SP of Ilocos Norte's valid cognizance of the dispute.

• Section 7(c), Local Government Code — Requires that the land area of a local government unit must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others. The CA applied this provision to deny Marcos' claim over the isolated northern portion of Barangay Sto. Niño, holding it remains part of Nueva Era.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 — Vests the Court of Appeals with appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. The Court relied on this to uphold the CA's jurisdiction over the appeal from the RTC decision.

• Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides the remedy of appeal via petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Court held that the CA should have entertained Marcos' appeal under Rule 42 rather than converting it to a certiorari petition under Rule 65.

The decision was unanimous. Justices who concurred: Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (on official leave per Special Order No. 485), Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (on leave per Special Order No. 486), Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Ma. Alicia M. Austria-Martinez, Associate Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, and Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro.