Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan vs. Carino

Procedural laws dispensing with the record on appeal requirement are retrospective only to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and cannot be applied to revive an appeal that has already been dismissed and has become final and executory.

The Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan, represented by its Mayor Ricardo F. Lim, sought to demolish structures built by the private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the municipality's wharf, claiming the area was needed for docking, berthing, and loading/unloading operations. The private respondents countered that their structures were built with permits, that the area was foreshore land, and that demolition had been suspended pending action by the Office of the President. The dispute was litigated before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch IV, and the appeal process was governed by the procedural rules then in effect, including Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court as amended by the Court's en banc resolution dated September 17, 1974, which required the submission of printed copies of the record on appeal within sixty days from notice.

Sometime in 1976, the Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan filed an action before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 35, seeking authority to demolish structures built by the private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the municipality's wharf. The complaint alleged that the defendants' houses were constructed more than three years before the filing of the action, that the defendants had undertaken on August 19, 1974 to remove their structures when needed by the government, that the area was needed for docking and berthing of pumpboats and fishing boats and for loading and unloading of cargoes, and that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had directed the mayor to demolish all constructions along the pier after giving the defendants one month's notice. The complaint further alleged that most of the defendants were affluent squatters and that a surveyed relocation area had been prepared for indigent defendants.

The private respondents, in their answer, counter-alleged that their structures were built with building permits approved by the Bureau of Public Highways, that the area was a foreshore area, and that a meeting presided by Governor Socrates had been convened with representatives of the Philippine Constabulary, the Philippine Coast Guard, the Department of Social Services and Development, and the Sangguniang Bayan, where it was agreed that demolition would be suspended pending action by the Office of the President. They also stated that the Chairman of the National Housing Authority had sent a letter-advice to the mayor to suspend demolition.

After a series of postponements, the trial court reset the hearing for the last time on March 20, 21, and 22, 1979, with a warning that no further postponements would be allowed. On March 20, 1979, despite proper notice, the private respondents and their counsel failed to appear. The petitioner moved that the non-appearance be deemed a waiver of the right to cross-examine and to present evidence, and the lower court granted the motion and considered the case submitted for decision. The private respondents sought certiorari before the appellate court, which dismissed the petition for lack of merit on June 9, 1979. On October 10, 1980, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, dismissing the counterclaim, confirming the municipality's power to demolish the structures, and ordering the defendants to remove their structures within thirty days, with authority for the municipality to demolish them at the defendants' expense upon failure to do so.

On appeal, the appellate court required the private respondents on February 2, 1982 to submit forty printed copies of their record on appeal within fifteen days. A sixty-day extension was granted from April 7, 1982, but the private respondents still failed to comply. The appellate court issued a resolution on July 19, 1982 requiring them to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed. On August 31, 1982, the appeal was dismissed for failure to file the required record on appeal. On December 6, 1982, the Acting Clerk of Court certified that the dismissal had become final and executory on September 27, 1982. A writ of execution was issued on February 1, 1983. Before the Provincial Sheriff could proceed, the private respondents moved on April 12, 1983 to recall the records, arguing that under the present law printed records on appeal were no longer required and that their right to be heard on appeal should prevail over technicalities. The appellate court issued a temporary restraining order on April 29, 1983 and, on July 29, 1983, issued the disputed resolution recalling the records from the court of origin for further proceedings.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Rules: Petitioner maintained that the Interim Rules of Court promulgated on January 11, 1983 to implement Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 cannot apply to the case because to revive or recall appealed cases which had been dismissed or which had become final and executory would cause great injustice to those in whose favor such cases had been decided.
• Finality of Judgments: Petitioner contended that allowing the application of the new rules would put no end to appealed cases otherwise considered closed, as the prevailing party would be deprived of the benefit of a final judgment.

• Liberality in Application of Remedial Laws: Respondents argued that since under the present law printed records on appeal are no longer required, their right to be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the rule on technicalities.
• Oversight by the Appellate Court: Respondents claimed that the appellate court's July 19, 1982 resolution requiring them to show cause must have been the result of oversight because they had actually filed a record on appeal, though what they referred to was the record on appeal from the lower court to the appellate court and not the printed record on appeal required by Section 5, Rule 46.

• Retroactive Application of the Interim Rules of Court: Whether the provisions of the Interim Rules of Court and Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 dispensing with the record on appeal requirement may be applied retroactively to revive an appeal that had already been dismissed and become final and executory.

• Retroactive Application of the Interim Rules of Court: No. Procedural laws are retrospective only to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and cannot be applied to revive a case that has already become final and executory.

• Retroactive Application of the Interim Rules of Court: The Court relied on the established rule, as articulated in Alday vs. Camilon (120 SCRA 521), that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent, citing People vs. Sumilang (77 Phil. 764 [1946]). The appellate court should have followed this rule instead of issuing its July 29, 1983 resolution seeking to revive a case already long final, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment made by its Acting Clerk of Court on December 6, 1982. The records showed that despite a sixty-day extension, the private respondents still failed to file the required printed record on appeal under Section 5, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court as amended by the Court's en banc resolution dated September 17, 1974. While the Court acknowledged the policy of liberality toward the right to appeal, citing Castro vs. Court of Appeals (123 SCRA 782) and Siguenza vs. Court of Appeals (137 SCRA 570), it equally recognized that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege exercisable only in the manner prescribed by law, citing United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Clave (137 SCRA 346). The private respondents' failure to submit the required printed copies constituted clear non-compliance with the applicable rule, and they could not rectify this by invoking liberality in the application of remedial laws. Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to execution, and it becomes the court's ministerial duty to order execution, citing Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987) and related cases.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws — Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage; procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. They do not apply to cases that have already become final and executory. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Interim Rules of Court dispensing with the record on appeal could not revive the private respondents' appeal, which had already been dismissed and become final.
• Right to Appeal as a Statutory Privilege — While the policy toward invocation of the right to appeal has been one of liberality because appeal is an essential part of the judicial system, the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Failure to comply with procedural requirements, such as filing the printed record on appeal within the prescribed period, justifies dismissal of the appeal.
• Finality of Judgments and Ministerial Duty of Execution — Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the judgment in his favor, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of said judgment.

• "Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent." — This passage states the controlling rule on the retroactive application of procedural laws, limiting such retroactivity to pending and undetermined actions and excluding cases that have already attained finality.
• "However, it is an equally established doctrine that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law." — This passage defines the doctrinal balance between liberality toward the right to appeal and the requirement of strict compliance with procedural rules, anchoring the Court's refusal to excuse the private respondents' non-compliance.
• "Once a judgment becomes final the prevailing party, the petitioner in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the judgment in his favor. For the court, it becomes its ministerial duty to order the execution of said judgment." — This passage articulates the principle that finality of judgment entitles the prevailing party to execution as a matter of right, reinforcing the Court's order to remand for enforcement of the writ.

• Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 — Controlling precedent on the retroactive application of procedural rules, cited for the rule that statutes regulating court procedure apply only to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
• People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946) — Followed as supporting authority for the proposition that procedural laws are retrospective only to pending and undetermined actions.
• Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 782 — Cited for the policy of liberality toward the right to appeal, which the Court acknowledged but ultimately found inapplicable given the finality of the dismissal.
• United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Clave, 137 SCRA 346 — Cited for the doctrine that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege exercisable only as prescribed by law.
• Santos, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987 — Cited for the principle that once a judgment becomes final, execution is a matter of right for the prevailing party and a ministerial duty for the court.
• Pfleider vs. Victoriano, 98 SCRA 491 — Cited for the proposition that Section 5, Rule 46 implicitly grants the Court of Appeals the power to dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with its requirements.

• Section 39, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 — Provides that no record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal; in lieu thereof, the entire original record shall be transmitted with all pages consecutively numbered together with an index. The Court held this provision could not be applied retroactively to revive an already-final dismissal.
• Sections 18 and 19(b), Interim Rules of Court (promulgated January 11, 1983) — Section 18 dispenses with the filing of a record on appeal except in cases involving multiple appeals; Section 19(b) provides a thirty-day period for appeals in special proceedings where a record on appeal is required. The Court ruled these provisions do not extend to cases that had already become final and executory.
• Section 5, Rule 46, Rules of Court (as amended by the en banc resolution dated September 17, 1974) — Requires the appellant to pay the docketing fee within fifteen days and to submit twelve printed copies of the record on appeal within sixty days from notice. The private respondents' failure to comply with this provision justified the dismissal of their appeal.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, and Cortes, JJ., concurred. Bidin, J., took no part as he was one of the respondents in the case.