Munez and Lalucan vs. People

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs in violations of RA 3019, even where the accused are low-ranking public officers below Salary Grade 27 and the RTC exercised original jurisdiction; an appeal erroneously taken to the CA is void for lack of jurisdiction and must be remanded for transmission to the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners Narzal R. Munez and Rogelio Lalucan were employees of DENR-Cagayan de Oro, with Munez serving as OIC-CENRO and Lalucan as forest guard. Demetrio Velasco owned Velasco Nursery Plants. The statutory backdrop is RA 3019, which penalizes corrupt practices of public officers, and PD 1606, as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over RA 3019 cases.

In Criminal Case No. 2013-169 before the RTC-Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, petitioners Narzal R. Munez and Rogelio Lalucan, together with Alfredo Quililan, were charged with violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. The information alleged that on or about March 2002 and subsequent thereto in Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, they, as low-ranking public officers of PENR/DENR-Cagayan de Oro, while in the performance of official functions and conspiring, proposed and inveigled Demetrio Velasco to enter into a Contract for Seedling Production with DENR dated April 1, 2002 in consideration of P1,235,000.00 and, in return, demanded and received part of the contract price totaling P1,165,000.00 as share, percentage, or benefit for themselves in connection with the contract, where they had the right to intervene in their official capacities. At the time, Munez was OIC-CENRO and Lalucan was a forest guard; their positions corresponded to Salary Grades below 27.

On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty, and trial ensued. According to the prosecution, the Ombudsman received an anonymous letter-complaint on March 12, 2007 reporting anomalies in the procurement of seedlings by DENR-Cagayan de Oro; the investigation led the Ombudsman to Velasco, owner of Velasco Nursery Plants. Velasco testified that he entered into a contract with DENR for the production of 247,000 clonal seedlings upon the favorable recommendation of Munez, then OIC-CENRO. The contract price was Php5.00 per seedling, for a total of Php1,235,000.00.

Despite the terms of the contract, Velasco and petitioners entered into a side agreement. Under that agreement, Velasco produced only 50,000 clonal seedlings and was paid Php1.50 for each, or Php75,000.00 in total. The difference between the contract price and the amount actually paid to Velasco was pocketed by petitioners. Petitioners themselves produced, and were paid for, the remaining 197,000 clonal seedlings. The prosecution therefore maintained that petitioners had undue interest in the seedling production contract and benefited therefrom in violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

For their part, petitioners presented progressive billings, disbursement vouchers, checks, and receipts to establish the regularity of the questioned transaction. They asserted that the parties fulfilled their respective obligations: Velasco produced 247,000 clonal seedlings for DENR, which in turn paid him the contract price as evidenced by disbursement vouchers and checks. They also pointed out that the COA had already audited the project and found it to be above board. Finally, they argued that the prosecution failed to prove any conspiracy between them and Velasco; if there was conspiracy at all, Velasco should have also been charged with violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

The RTC found that petitioners took advantage of their positions in the DENR to intervene in the seedling production contract and gain pecuniary benefit therefrom.

• Evidence on Record: Petitioners argued that the RTC's ruling was not supported by evidence on record because the billings, disbursement vouchers, checks, and receipts proved the regularity of the transactions.
• Velasco's Discharge as State Witness: Petitioners argued that the prosecution did not come to court with clean hands because Velasco was not discharged as a state witness.
• Conspiracy: Petitioners argued that no evidence other than Velasco's testimony showed conspiracy among petitioners and Velasco.
• Authority and Influence: Petitioners argued that Lalucan was merely a forest guard who could not have influenced the negotiation, execution, and implementation of the seedlings contract, while Munez was not the approving authority thereof.
• COA Audit and Damage: Petitioners argued that the COA did not find the seedling production contract irregular, proving that the Government did not suffer damage.
• Velasco's Qualification and Affidavit: On appeal, petitioners objected for the first time to Velasco's qualification as a witness and the admissibility of his sworn statement, claiming that he was not in the right frame of mind or was coerced when he signed his affidavit out of fear that he might get jailed; they invoked Rule 130, Section 21(a) of the Rules of Court and argued that the affidavit was inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
• Wrong Charge: Petitioners faulted the CA for affirming the conviction despite the fact that they were wrongly charged under RA 3019.

• Elements of Section 3(b): Respondent argued that the trial court did not err in convicting petitioners because all the elements of the offense are present: petitioners were public officers; they benefited from the contract by taking advantage of their positions; and they participated in the actual production of the clonal seedlings and shared in the proceeds.
• Velasco's Credibility: Respondent argued that Velasco's credibility is entitled to great weight, even finality, because the trial judge observed his demeanor and manner of testifying; his testimony is replete with details showing that petitioners acted with a common design, proving conspiracy.

• Appellate Jurisdiction over RA 3019 Convictions: Whether the CA had jurisdiction to review the RTC's verdict of conviction for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.

• Appellate Jurisdiction over RA 3019 Convictions: No. Section 4 of PD 1606 vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs in RA 3019 cases in the Sandiganbayan, even where the RTC exercised original jurisdiction because none of the accused occupied Salary Grade 27 or higher. The CA's decision and resolution were void.

• Appellate Jurisdiction over RA 3019 Convictions: Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended, provides that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 where one or more accused occupy positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher; where none occupy such positions, exclusive original jurisdiction is vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, or MCTC. The same provision states that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs, whether in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. Here, Munez and Lalucan were OIC-CENRO and forest guard, respectively, positions corresponding to Salary Grades below 27. They were charged with violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 for acts committed in relation to their offices; the offense carries a penalty of more than six years, placing it within the RTC's original jurisdiction. The RTC convicted them. Under Section 4 of PD 1606, the appeal should have been taken to the Sandiganbayan, not the CA. The CA decision and resolution were therefore rendered without jurisdiction and are void. The SC also held that petitioners were not responsible for the erroneous transmission; Rule 122, Section 8 imposes on the clerk of court the duty to transmit the complete record to the appellate court. Following Dizon vs. People, the SC set aside the CA dispositions and remanded the case to the RTC for transmission of the records to the Sandiganbayan, because the accused should not be prejudiced by the clerk's fault and because life and liberty are at stake.

• Exclusive Appellate Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over RA 3019 Cases — Under Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended, the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs in RA 3019 cases, whether the RTC exercised original or appellate jurisdiction. The SC applied this even though petitioners were low-ranking public officers below Salary Grade 27 and the RTC had original jurisdiction; the appeal should have gone to the Sandiganbayan, not the CA.
• Void Judgment for Lack of Jurisdiction — A decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void. The CA decision and resolution were vacated because the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the RTC's RA 3019 conviction.
• Clerk of Court's Duty to Transmit the Appeal to the Proper Appellate Court — Rule 122, Section 8 requires the clerk of court to transmit the complete record to the appellate court. The accused should not be prejudiced by the clerk's error in transmitting the case to the wrong appellate court; the SC remanded the case to the RTC for transmission to the Sandiganbayan.

• "The Court of Appeals does not have appellate jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts pertaining to violations of RA 3019." — The SC's threshold ruling: the CA had no authority to review the RTC conviction.
• "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided." — The statutory basis in Section 4 of PD 1606 for the Sandiganbayan's exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
• "Petitioners are not responsible for the error in transmitting the case. For such duty rests on the shoulders of the clerk of court." — The SC refused to penalize petitioners for the erroneous transmission of the appeal.
• "Indeed, the accused here should not be prejudiced by the shortcoming or fault caused by the clerk of court concerned. For what is at stake is no less than the life and liberty of the accused." — The substantial-justice reason for remanding the case instead of dismissing the appeal.

• Dizon vs. People, G.R. No. 227577, January 24, 2018 — Followed; the SC relied on it to set aside the CA's dispositions and remand the case to the RTC for transmission to the Sandiganbayan where the appeal from an RTC conviction was erroneously taken to the CA instead of the Sandiganbayan.

• Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 — Defines the corrupt practice of directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit in connection with a government contract where the public officer has to intervene in his official capacity. Petitioners were charged under this provision.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 10660 — Fixes the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction: exclusive original jurisdiction over RA 3019 cases where one or more accused occupy Salary Grade 27 or higher; where none do, original jurisdiction is vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, or MCTC; and exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs. Applied to hold that the CA lacked jurisdiction.
• Section 8, Rule 122, Rules of Court — Requires the clerk of court to transmit the complete record of the case to the appellate court within five days from filing of the notice of appeal. Applied to excuse petitioners from the erroneous transmission.
• Sections 20 and 32, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Cited as the basis for the RTC's original jurisdiction because the offense carries a penalty of more than six years.
• Section 9, Republic Act No. 3019 — Fixes the penalty at six years and one month to fifteen years; cited to determine that the offense fell within the RTC's original jurisdiction.