Muhlach vs. Acompañado-Arroyo

A judge's order of voluntary inhibition must state just or valid reasons as required by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; an executive judge who declares such a defective order "ineffective" and directs the presiding judge to continue hearing the case acts within her administrative functions and cannot be held liable for gross ignorance of the law or abuse of discretion absent a showing of bad faith or malice.

The case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Jose City, Camarines Sur. The underlying dispute involved Spec. Pro. No. 80, a petition for exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters of Precinct No. 10A, Barangay San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur, filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur. The petition was governed by Republic Act No. 8189, which requires that such cases be decided within ten days from filing. The administrative jurisdiction of the executive judge over first-level courts within her administrative area is established under Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998, which prescribes the procedure for handling cases when a judge inhibits.

On 5 October 2012, Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial, and Ferdinand Fernando Felix Monasterio filed a petition before the MCTC of San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur, praying for the exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach (Spouses Muhlach) from the list of voters of Precinct No. 10A, Barangay San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur. The case was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 80. On the same date, Judge Angel A. Tadeo of the MCTC voluntarily recused himself from hearing the case on the ground that petitioner Edgar Malate is a cousin of his late mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dizon is the son-in-law of his former clerk of court, Florecito V. Patrocinio.

Acting on such inhibition, EJ Arroyo scheduled the raffle of the case among judges of the first-level courts within her administrative jurisdiction. The case was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C. Begino, who, in an Order dated 12 October 2012, set the case for hearing on 16 October 2012. On 15 October 2012, Spouses Muhlach filed a motion to dismiss Spec. Pro. No. 80.

In the morning of 16 October 2012, the Office of the Clerk of Court received a copy of Judge Begino's Order of Inhibition, which stated: "An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the respondents, undersigned judge hereby inhibit (sic) himself from further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt as to the impartiality of this court." Also in the morning of the same date, counsel for Spouses Muhlach filed with the MCTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to inhibit Judge Begino; and (2) to re-raffle and assign the case to another judge.

In the afternoon of the same date, EJ Arroyo issued the assailed order which rendered ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino and directed him to continue to hear and decide the case. EJ Arroyo noted that the counsel for Spouses Muhlach's oral motion failed to state the grounds to justify the inhibition of the judge and did not explain why doubts as to the impartiality of the court could exist. Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing and, on 19 October 2012, resolved the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, denying it and stating that the movants failed to show judicial actuations that might be perceived as prejudgment, and that the belief that the judge and his sibling are political allies of Mr. Fuentebella was "unfounded, untrue and baseless."

Spouses Muhlach filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on 23 October 2012. In a Decision dated 25 October 2012, Judge Begino granted the petition for exclusion, ordering the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters for lack of residency requirement. Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against EJ Arroyo, accusing her of issuing the Order dated 16 October 2012 with abuse of authority and gross ignorance of law and procedure, contending that she had no authority to reverse Judge Begino's order of inhibition as such power is vested solely in the Supreme Court.

In her comment, EJ Arroyo explained that she noticed that the order of inhibition was improper or defective on its face, and that the procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a judge must be substantially followed, citing the resolution of the Supreme Court dated 31 August 1978 in A.M. No. 2128-JC. She averred that she was not ignorant of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998, and that considering the inhibition order was "patently defective," she saw no point in referring the matter to the Court through the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation. She further explained that the case should be decided within ten days from filing under R.A. No. 8189, and that no judge would want to handle the case given the status of the Spouses Muhlach. She reasoned that if she were to approve the defective inhibition order, nothing would stop other judges from recusing themselves on flimsy grounds, resulting in an endless cycle leaving the case unresolved. She surmised that the complaint was filed for the sole purpose of delaying the resolution of Spec. Pro. No. 80, noting that after Judge Begino decided the case, Spouses Muhlach appealed to the RTC, where it was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by Judge Noel Paulite, who affirmed the decision; Spouses Muhlach thereafter filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite on 13 November 2012, after the instant complaint was filed on 7 November 2012.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority: Complainant contended that EJ Arroyo had no authority to reverse Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself, as such power is vested solely in the Supreme Court, and that the issuance of the Order dated 16 October 2012 constituted abuse of authority and gross ignorance of law and procedure.

• Defective Order of Inhibition: EJ Arroyo argued that the order of inhibition issued by Judge Begino was improper or defective on its face, and that the procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a judge must be substantially followed, citing the resolution of the Supreme Court dated 31 August 1978 in A.M. No. 2128-JC.
• Administrative Duty to Ensure Speedy Resolution: EJ Arroyo argued that the subject case should be decided within ten days from filing under R.A. No. 8189, and that as executive judge, it was her duty to ensure that the case is decided within the period prescribed by law; she used the word "ineffective" because she was aware she had no authority to revoke or disapprove the order of inhibition, such power being vested only in the Supreme Court.
• Good Faith and Lack of Malice: EJ Arroyo averred that she had been a judge for 11 years, that this was the first time an administrative case had been filed against her, and that the complaint was filed for the sole purpose of delaying the resolution of Spec. Pro. No. 80.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether EJ Arroyo committed gross ignorance of the law when she issued the Order dated 16 October 2012 declaring ineffective Judge Begino's order of inhibition and directing him to continue hearing the case.
• Abuse of Discretion: Whether EJ Arroyo committed abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: No. The charges of ignorance of the law were found bereft of merit. EJ Arroyo did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino; she correctly asked that the Order be completed to comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges, and the assailed order was issued in the proper exercise of her administrative functions.
• Abuse of Discretion: No. There was no showing that EJ Arroyo was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court issuances; her only intention was to ensure that the case is decided expeditiously and within the period provided under the law.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: The Court examined Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may disqualify himself from sitting in a case "for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." The Court agreed with EJ Arroyo that Judge Begino's inhibition was lacking in some elements, as he simply ruled that he was inhibiting from the case "to avoid any doubts as to the impartiality of the court" without stating the reason for the inhibition, and the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel was done orally, in violation of Section 2 of the same rule. When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective, she was, in a way, returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the motion. The Court noted that EJ Arroyo was aware that she had no authority to revoke or disapprove the order of inhibition, as such is vested only in the Supreme Court, and it was for that reason that she used the word "ineffective." When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it was a manifestation and admission on his part that he can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality expected from an impartial magistrate, and his subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus Motion affirmed EJ Arroyo's position that the earlier order issued on the basis of the oral motion was defective. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious; here, it was clearly established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the case is decided expeditiously and within the period provided under the law.
• Abuse of Discretion: The Court found that there was no showing that EJ Arroyo was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court issuances. In fact, the Court observed that bad faith may be attributed to the complainant for filing successive motions for inhibition. The Court pronounced that, as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith, for to hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, since no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

• Voluntary Inhibition of Judges — Under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, a judge may disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other than those enumerated in the rule. The inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. Although voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge, it should still comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, that is, it should be based on just or valid reasons. In this case, Judge Begino's order of inhibition was defective because it failed to state the reason for the inhibition, and the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel was done orally, in violation of Section 2 of the same rule.
• Liability of Judges for Official Acts — As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. In this case, EJ Arroyo acted in good faith, with the only intention of ensuring that the case is decided expeditiously and within the period provided under the law.

• "When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective, she was in a way, returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the motion." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning that EJ Arroyo's assailed order was a proper exercise of her administrative functions rather than an unauthorized reversal of Judge Begino's inhibition order.
• "Tersely put, EJ Arroyo did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly asked that the Order be completed to comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the executive judge's action was not a reversal but a directive to complete a defective order to comply with the Rules of Court.
• "While it was pronounced in relation to the performance by judges of their judicial functions, we find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it can likewise be said that as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith." — This passage extends the doctrine of judicial immunity from liability to administrative functions, provided the judge acts in good faith.

• Constante Pimentel, petitioner, Request for the designation of another judge to hear the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Petition for Relief from the decision rendered in Criminal Case No. 310-C, People vs. Ruben de la Cruz, 174 Phil. 295 (1978) — Cited by EJ Arroyo in her comment to support the proposition that the procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a judge must be substantially followed.
• People vs. Ong, 523 Phil. 347, 356 (2006) — Cited for the proposition that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
• Zarate vs. Balderian, 386 Phil. 1, 8 (2000) citing In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 311 Phil. 441 (1995) — Cited for the rule that to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious.
• Crisologo vs. Daray, 584 Phil. 366, 374 (2008) — Cited for the doctrine that a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.

• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Provides for the disqualification of judges, enumerating the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified from participating in a trial, and allowing a judge to disqualify himself for just or valid reasons other than those enumerated. The Court applied this provision in determining that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was defective for failing to state just or valid reasons.
• Section 2, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Provides that if it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting, the party objecting must file with the official his objection in writing, stating the grounds therefor. The Court noted that the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel was done orally, in violation of this section.
• Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution — Cited as the constitutional basis for the requirement that a hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, as every litigant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
• Republic Act No. 8189 — Provides for a general registration of voters, adopting a system of continuing registration, prescribing the procedures thereof, and authorizing the appropriation of funds therefor. The Court noted that the subject case should be decided within ten days from filing under this law, which was a consideration in EJ Arroyo's actions.
• Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998 — Prescribes the duty of the executive judge to appoint another trial judge under his/her supervision to handle an inhibited case or to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. EJ Arroyo averred that she was not ignorant of this circular when she issued the questioned order.

Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred.