Moslares vs. Court of Appeals

An accused's constitutional right to be heard and to present evidence in defense is inviolate and cannot be deemed waived by postponements that are justified and not vexatious; a conviction rendered in absentia on the premise of such waiver violates due process, and the accused retains the right to appeal provided notice is filed within the reglementary period.

Petitioner Honor P. Moslares purchased three Toyota Corolla 1600 units from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc., issuing a check that was subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds, which led to criminal charges for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa. The case concerns the scope of an accused's procedural and constitutional rights during trial — specifically the right to present evidence, the right to appeal after promulgation in absentia, and the right to bail — as well as the potential criminal liability of a corporate officer who signs a dishonored check on behalf of a corporation.

On February 19, 1991, petitioner Honor P. Moslares purchased three units of Toyota Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. The vehicles were registered under his name, under the name of Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, and under the name of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment, petitioner issued Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. 841644 dated May 24, 1991 in the amount of ₱1,425,780.00. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Petitioner was thereafter charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa.

The hearings of the case were postponed several times, either at the instance of petitioner or the prosecution, or motu proprio by the court. The trial court's decision later noted that it had set the presentation of evidence for the defense nineteen times, four of which were cancelled due to a typhoon and the public prosecutor being "indisposed." The case was submitted for decision four times for failure of the accused to present evidence, but was lifted each time in the interest of justice upon motion of the accused. Petitioner changed his lawyer four times, each time the court ordered the case submitted for decision for failure to present evidence. Petitioner did not testify and presented only one witness, a certain Sixto Avila.

On September 13, 1995, the scheduled date for the presentation of petitioner's evidence, he failed to appear but was represented by a newly retained lawyer, Atty. Dionisio Landero, who claimed he was not ready to proceed as he was not yet familiar with the case. The trial court thereupon set the promulgation of the decision on October 30, 1995. On October 9, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Re-Trial. Nevertheless, on October 26, 1995, the trial court issued its decision convicting petitioner in Criminal Case No. 92-0099 and Criminal Case No. 92-0100 of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, sentencing him to one year imprisonment for each count. The decision was promulgated in absentia on October 30, 1995.

On November 14, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, which was denied due course by the lower court on February 1, 1996, relying on People vs. Mapalao, on the ground that petitioner had waived his right to appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for relief from judgment, likewise denied. On March 14, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which treated the petition as one for certiorari. On October 3, 1996, petitioner filed a petition to post bail. On November 29, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition for review and denying the petition to post bail. Motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied.

• Waiver of Right to Present Evidence: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's declaration that he had waived his right to present evidence by reason of numerous postponements, thereby depriving him of due process.
• Promulgation in Absentia: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming a decision promulgated in absentia without giving him an opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense.
• Validity of Defense: Petitioner asserted that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that he had no valid defense, which he characterized as tantamount to prejudging the nature of his testimony and that of his witnesses.
• Denial of Appeal: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the lower court's dismissal of his appeal, thereby denying him due process.
• Denial of Bail: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in denying his application for bail.

• Waiver of Right to Present Evidence: Respondent Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that petitioner should be considered to have waived his right to present further evidence because of his repeated failure to attend scheduled hearings.
• Insufficiency of Defense: Respondent Court of Appeals held that the defense sought to be established by petitioner would not, even if considered by the court, exonerate him from criminal liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
• Waiver of Right to Appeal: Respondent lower court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, considered petitioner to have waived his right to appeal because of his failure to be present during promulgation despite due notice, relying on the ruling in People vs. Mapalao.
• Denial of Bail: Respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion to post bail on the ground that the decision of the lower court had become final and executory, inasmuch as petitioner's appeal had been denied.

• Waiver of Right to Present Evidence: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's declaration that petitioner had waived his right to present evidence due to numerous postponements, thereby depriving him of due process.
• Promulgation in Absentia: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming a decision promulgated in absentia without giving petitioner an opportunity to present evidence.
• Validity of Defense: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner had no valid defense.
• Right to Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the lower court's dismissal of petitioner's appeal.
• Right to Bail: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner's application for bail.

• Waiver of Right to Present Evidence: No. Petitioner did not waive his right to present evidence; the postponements were justified and not vexatious, and the constitutional right to be heard is inviolate.
• Promulgation in Absentia: No. The trial court erred in proceeding with promulgation on the premise that petitioner had waived his right to appear and present evidence, violating his right to due process.
• Validity of Defense: No. The Court of Appeals' declaration that petitioner's defense would not exonerate him was tantamount to prejudging his testimony, and the issue of corporate officer liability under B.P. Blg. 22 required reception of evidence.
• Right to Appeal: No. Petitioner's right to appeal was not waived; he was not a fugitive from justice, and his notice of appeal was filed within the 15-day reglementary period under Section 6, Rule 120.
• Right to Bail: No. Petitioner was entitled to bail as a matter of right, having been convicted of offenses punishable by only one year imprisonment each, which does not fall under the exceptions where bail is denied or discretionary.

• Waiver of Right to Present Evidence: While the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, petitioner had not waived that right in this case. The postponements sought by petitioner and counsel were justified and not vexatious or oppressive, as borne by the record. The intention and willingness of petitioner to present evidence was evident from the fact that he had already presented one witness and had other witnesses ready, delayed only for meritorious reasons such as illness of petitioner and counsel, petitioner's hospital confinement, ongoing negotiations between the parties, and substitution of counsel. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate, and no court of justice has the power to deprive him of that right, as recognized in People vs. Lumague, Jr. The requirements of substantial justice mandate that petitioner should have been given his day in court; a reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial discretion than a speedy disposition at the expense of a fundamental right. The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard, as enunciated in Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma.

• Promulgation in Absentia: It was error for the trial court to have proceeded with promulgation on the premise that petitioner had waived his right to appear and present evidence. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming a decision rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process. The proper course would have been to order the trial court to reopen the case for reception of petitioner's evidence.

• Validity of Defense: The Court of Appeals' declaration that petitioner's defense would not exonerate him was tantamount to prejudging the nature of the testimony of petitioner and his witnesses. The alleged criminal liability of petitioner stems from his being the signatory of the questioned check and his being an officer of the corporation, the actual purchaser of the cars. Citing Lina Lim Lao vs. Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General acknowledged that an officer of a corporation is not to be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for signing a bum check, and accordingly recommended that petitioner be given his opportunity to present evidence.

• Right to Appeal: The last sentence of Section 6, Rule 120 provides that whether or not the absence of the accused during promulgation is justified, the right to appeal is not lost, the only requirement being that the notice of appeal must be filed within fifteen days from notice of the decision. The Mapalao ruling, upon which the lower court and the Court of Appeals relied, does not apply because the facts differ: in Mapalao, the accused escaped from detention and remained at large, whereas petitioner is not a fugitive from justice and has been seeking redress through various pleadings and motions. Petitioner's appeal was perfected within the 15-day reglementary period and must be given due course. Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, it is an essential part of the judicial system, and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this prerogative, as held in Santos vs. Court of Appeals.

• Right to Bail: Under Section 4, Rule 114, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, bail is a matter of right before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under Section 5, bail becomes discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by those penalties, and may be denied if the penalty exceeds six years and certain circumstances are present. Petitioner was convicted of offenses punishable by only one year imprisonment each, which does not fall under the category where bail is discretionary and potentially deniable. Petitioner does not fall under any of the disqualifying circumstances. The right to bail is a constitutional guaranty which every person under legal custody may invoke, except those disqualified under the law. The denial of bail was patent error, more so given petitioner's deteriorating health.

• Right to be heard and to present evidence — The constitutional right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel is inviolate; no court of justice has the power to deprive an accused of that right. While the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, waiver cannot be found where postponements are justified and not vexatious, and where the accused has demonstrated intention and willingness to present evidence. The requirements of substantial justice mandate that an accused be given his day in court; a reasonable continuance is sounder judicial discretion than a speedy disposition at the expense of a fundamental right.

• Right to appeal after promulgation in absentia — Under Section 6, Rule 120, whether or not the absence of the accused during promulgation is justified, the right to appeal is not lost, provided the notice of appeal is filed within fifteen days from notice of the decision. The doctrine in People vs. Mapalao — that an accused who escapes from detention and remains at large waives the right to appeal — does not apply where the accused is not a fugitive from justice but has been actively seeking judicial redress through pleadings and motions.

• Right to bail as a matter of right — Under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 114, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94, bail is a matter of right before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Upon conviction, bail becomes discretionary if the penalty does not exceed twenty years, and may be denied if the penalty exceeds six years and certain circumstances (recidivism, escape, flight risk, etc.) are present. Where the penalty imposed is only one year imprisonment, bail is a matter of right and cannot be denied.

• Corporate officer liability under B.P. Blg. 22 — An officer of a corporation is not to be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for signing a bum check issued on behalf of the corporation, as cited from Lina Lim Lao vs. Court of Appeals. This principle bears on the sufficiency of the defense and underscores the necessity of allowing the accused to present evidence.

• "The constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right" — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the inviolability of the right to be heard, grounding the reversal of the conviction in the constitutional guarantee of due process.

• "The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case, but at the expense of a fundamental right." — This passage establishes the principle that substantial justice and the right to present evidence must prevail over the speedy disposition of cases, even where postponements have occurred.

• "This means that whether or not the absence of the accused during promulgation is justified, the right to appeal is not lost, the only requirement being that the notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment." — This passage interprets Section 6, Rule 120, clarifying that the right to appeal survives promulgation in absentia provided the reglementary period is observed, and distinguishes the fugitive-from-justice scenario in Mapalao.

• People vs. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79 (1991) — Distinguished. The lower court and the Court of Appeals relied on Mapalao to deny petitioner's appeal, but the Supreme Court held it inapplicable because the accused in Mapalao was a fugitive who had escaped from detention, whereas petitioner was not a fugitive and had been actively seeking judicial redress.

• People vs. Lumague, Jr., 111 SCRA 515 (1982) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense is inviolate and that no court has the power to deprive him of that right.

• Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization vs. Laguesma, 254 SCRA 565 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the principle that the most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard.

• Lina Lim Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572 (1997) — Followed. Cited by the Solicitor General for the proposition that a corporate officer is not to be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for signing a bum check, supporting the conclusion that petitioner should be allowed to present evidence.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 632 (1996) — Followed. Cited for the principle that although the right to appeal is a statutory right, courts should afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Governs promulgation of judgment and provides that whether or not the accused's absence during promulgation is justified, the right to appeal is not lost if the notice of appeal is filed within fifteen days from notice of the decision. Applied to hold that petitioner's appeal was properly perfected and should have been given due course.

• Sections 4 and 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 — Govern the right to bail. Section 4 provides that bail is a matter of right before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Section 5 provides that bail is discretionary upon conviction by the RTC and may be denied if the penalty exceeds six years and certain circumstances are present. Applied to hold that petitioner, convicted of offenses punishable by only one year imprisonment each, was entitled to bail as a matter of right.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — The Bouncing Checks Law, under which petitioner was charged and convicted. The decision addresses the potential defense that a corporate officer who signs a dishonored check on behalf of a corporation may not be held criminally liable, citing Lina Lim Lao vs. Court of Appeals.

• 1987 Constitution — The constitutional right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, was held to have been violated by the trial court's premature promulgation and the Court of Appeals' affirmance thereof.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concurred.