Morillo vs. People of the Philippines and Natividad

In violations of Batas Pambansa No. 22, the court of the place where the check is deposited or presented for encashment has jurisdiction to try the case, because such offenses are transitory or continuing in nature, and jurisdiction may be exercised in any municipality or territory where any of the essential elements of the crime occurred.

In July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, together with Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, doing business as RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies, for a project inside the Subic Freeport Zone. The parties agreed that payment would be made via postdated checks: twenty percent within seven days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty percent within thirty-five days after the last delivery. Petitioner delivered materials totaling P500,054.00. Respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two postdated Metrobank checks drawn against the Pampanga branch. Upon maturity, petitioner deposited these checks in her Equitable PCI Bank account in Makati City, but they were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Respondent subsequently issued two replacement postdated checks (Nos. 2960203217 for P434,430.00 and 2960203218 for P13,032.00), which were also dishonored upon presentment in Makati for the reason that the account had been closed. Despite personal demands made in Pampanga, respondent failed to pay, prompting petitioner to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office of Makati.

• The Construction Supply Transaction: In July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong, and Bing Nanquil, operating as RB Custodio Construction, entered into an agreement with petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies, for the purchase of construction materials worth P500,054.00 for their Subic Freeport Zone project. The parties agreed that twenty percent of the purchases would be paid within seven days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty percent within thirty-five days after the last delivery, all via postdated checks.

• Issuance and Dishonor of Checks: After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two postdated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner deposited these checks in her savings account at Equitable PCI Bank, San Lorenzo, Makati City, but they were dishonored by the drawee bank. Respondent subsequently issued two replacement postdated checks (Nos. 2960203217 for P434,430.00 and 2960203218 for P13,032.00), assuring petitioner they would be honored. Upon deposit at Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Branch, these checks were dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.

• Demand and Refusal to Pay: Petitioner personally informed respondent and his partners of the dishonor at their office in Pampanga and tendered a demand letter for payment. Despite several demands, respondent failed to pay the face value of the checks or make arrangements for full payment.

• Criminal Charges: On August 12, 2004, two Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong before the MeTC of Makati City for violation of BP 22, alleging that on or about October 20, 2003, they willfully issued the subject checks knowing they had insufficient funds or credit, which checks were dishonored for "Account Closed" upon presentment within ninety days, and despite notice, they failed to pay within five banking days.

• Lower Court Proceedings: On September 3, 2008, the MeTC found Natividad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of BP 22, sentencing him to pay fines totaling P213,032.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and ordering him to pay civil liability of P447,462.00 with interest and penalties; Milo Malong was acquitted for lack of evidence. The RTC affirmed this decision on February 23, 2009, rejecting Natividad's arguments regarding venue and procedural defects.

• Appellate Court Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed on January 18, 2011, holding that all essential elements of the offense (issuance, knowledge of dishonor by the maker, and dishonor by the drawee bank) occurred in Pampanga, not Makati, and that the act of depositing the check is not an essential element of BP 22. The CA dismissed the case without prejudice to refiling in the proper venue.

• Jurisdiction and Venue: Petitioner maintained that the MeTC of Makati City had jurisdiction over the case because the checks were deposited and presented for encashment there. Citing Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, she argued that the court of the place where the check is deposited acquires jurisdiction over BP 22 violations, as these are transitory crimes where any place where an essential element occurred may serve as venue.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that all elements of BP 22 were established beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the checks were issued for value as payment for construction materials; (2) respondent had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds, evidenced by the dishonor for "Account Closed" and his failure to pay within five banking days after receiving notice; and (3) the checks were presented within the ninety-day period required by law.

• Procedural Standing and Double Jeopardy: Petitioner contended that the CA's dismissal was not an acquittal but a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, which does not bar re-prosecution and may be appealed without violating double jeopardy. She further asserted that in the interest of substantial justice, she could maintain the appeal despite the OSG's contrary position and failure to represent her interests.

• Improper Venue: Respondent Natividad argued that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered in Pampanga, and the account was closed at the Metrobank Pampanga branch, the MeTC of Makati had no jurisdiction. He asserted that none of the essential elements of the offense occurred in Makati City.

• Procedural Defect: Respondent claimed that during the retaking of petitioner's testimony on March 14, 2008, the public prosecutor was absent and had not properly delegated authority to the private prosecutor, rendering the proceedings null and void.

• OSG Position: The Office of the Solicitor General supported the dismissal, arguing that the place of deposit and the place of dishonor are distinct, and that only the place where the check was issued, delivered, and dishonored (Pampanga) constitutes the proper venue, citing Rigor v. People. The OSG contended that the act of depositing the check is not an essential element of BP 22.

• Jurisdiction over Transitory Crimes: Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City had jurisdiction over the BP 22 case where the checks were deposited and presented for encashment in Makati but issued and dishonored by the drawee bank in Pampanga.

• Nature of Dismissal: Whether the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the case operated as an acquittal that bars further appeal by the private offended party.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the appeal by the private offended party violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

• Standing of Private Offended Party: Whether the private offended party may file a petition for review on certiorari without the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General.

• Jurisdiction over BP 22 Cases: The MeTC of Makati City properly exercised jurisdiction. Violations of BP 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that acts material and essential to their consummation may occur in different municipalities. Jurisdiction lies in any place where any of the essential elements occurred, including the place where the check is deposited or presented for encashment. The Court followed Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals and Yalong v. People, which recognized the jurisdiction of courts where checks were deposited, and distinguished Rigor v. People, which did not exclude the place of deposit as a valid venue but merely affirmed jurisdiction based on the place of issue and delivery.

• Dismissal Distinguished from Acquittal: The dismissal by the Court of Appeals was not an acquittal. Dismissal based on improper venue or lack of jurisdiction terminates proceedings without deciding the case on the merits, whereas acquittal is based on the failure of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing People v. Salico, the Court held that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar re-prosecution in the proper court and is not a judgment on the merits.

• No Double Jeopardy: The appeal does not violate double jeopardy. The requisites for the exception to the double jeopardy rule were present: (1) the dismissal was upon respondent's motion or with his express consent (having raised the venue issue from the RTC appeal stage); (2) the dismissal was not an acquittal or based on consideration of the evidence or merits; and (3) the question raised was purely legal (the proper interpretation of jurisdictional rules).

• Standing of Private Offended Party: The private offended party may file the appeal in the interest of substantial justice. While the OSG generally represents the People in criminal appeals, exceptions exist where the OSG refuses to act or adopts a position contrary to the offended party's rights, and where strict adherence would result in grave injustice. Citing Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, the Court gave due course to the petition to prevent a miscarriage of justice, given that the OSG supported the erroneous dismissal and the petitioner had already established her right to payment.

• Transitory or Continuing Crime Doctrine — Violations of Batas Pambansa No. 22 are transitory or continuing crimes where acts material and essential to their consummation may occur in different municipalities. The court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the others. A person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed, including the place where the check is deposited or presented for encashment.

• Dismissal versus Acquittal — Dismissal terminates proceedings for reasons such as lack of jurisdiction or defective information, without deciding the case on the merits or the defendant's guilt. Acquittal is based on the merits, specifically the failure of the evidence to show the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not an acquittal and does not bar re-prosecution in the proper court.

• Double Jeopardy Exception — An appeal by the prosecution (or by the private offended party with the Court's permission) from an order of dismissal by the trial court does not constitute double jeopardy if: (1) the dismissal is made upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant; (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal, such that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

• Standing of Private Offended Party in Criminal Appeals — While the Office of the Solicitor General has the exclusive authority to represent the Government and the People in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, the Court may permit a private offended party to file an appeal or petition without the OSG's intervention in the interest of substantial justice, particularly when the OSG refuses to act, adopts a position prejudicial to the offended party's rights, or where strict procedural adherence would result in grave injustice.

• "Violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other." — Establishes the basis for jurisdiction in transitory crimes.

• "Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22." — Affirms the specific holding regarding venue in BP 22 cases.

• "Dismissal is different from acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty." — Distinguishes dismissal from acquittal.

• "Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice." — Statement of the principle justifying liberal construction of procedural rules.

• Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 529 (1997) — Controlling precedent establishing that the court of the place where the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment has jurisdiction over BP 22 violations; followed by the Court.

• Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125 (2004) — Distinguished; held that the place of issue and delivery confers jurisdiction but did not expressly exclude the place of deposit as a valid venue for transitory crimes.

• Yalong v. People, G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013 — Followed; recognized that the MTCC of Batangas City properly acquired jurisdiction over a BP 22 case where the check was presented for deposit and encashment there, even though it was drawn, issued, and delivered elsewhere.

• People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722 (1949) — Cited for the distinction between dismissal and acquittal, and the principle that dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not an acquittal.

• Paulin v. Hon. Gimenez, G.R. No. 103323, January 21, 1993 — Cited for the three requisites of the exception to the double jeopardy rule when the prosecution appeals a dismissal.

• Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208 (2000) — Cited for the exception allowing private offended parties to file appeals in the interest of substantial justice when the OSG fails to act or takes a contrary position.

• _Section 1, Batas Pambansa No. 22 — Defines the offense of making, drawing, or issuing a check knowing at the time of issue that the maker does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank.

• _Section 2, Batas Pambansa No. 22 — Provides that dishonor of a check when presented within ninety days from the date thereof constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, unless the maker pays or makes arrangements for payment within five banking days after receiving notice of dishonor.

• _Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari raising questions of law.

• _Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code — Mandates the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Mariano C. Del Castillo, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Bienvenido L. Reyes