Moreno vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division)

A person convicted by final judgment must serve the penalty in the form and places prescribed by law; courts have no discretion to allow home care/house arrest, and a motion for such relief unsupported by relevant documents such as medical records is unmeritorious and may be denied outright without hearing. The Community Service Act applies only to arresto menor and arresto mayor, not to prision mayor, and recognizance is unavailable to one whose conviction has attained finality.

Petitioner Cynthia G. Moreno served as mayor of Aloguinsan, Cebu for twelve years and was the incumbent mayor when she and seven other municipal officials were indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in Criminal Case No. SB-10-CRM-0236 before the Sandiganbayan, First Division. The governing framework for her later request includes Articles 78 and 86 of the Revised Penal Code on the execution of penalties, Article 88a as amended by RA 11362 (the Community Service Act), Section 3 of RA 10389 (the Recognizance Act of 2012), and the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC). Her conviction in that criminal case had long attained finality when she filed the motion assailed in this petition.

Petitioner Cynthia G. Moreno served as mayor of Aloguinsan, Cebu for twelve years and was the incumbent mayor when she was indicted together with Pepito A. Manguilimotan, Nonela N. Villegas, Marilyn P. Flordeliza, Gertrudes D. Ababon, John D. Lim, Emilia Luz B. Celis, and Orven M. Nengasca for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in Criminal Case No. SB-10-CRM-0236. On June 5, 2014, all the accused, including petitioner, were found guilty and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six years and one month, as minimum, to ten years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Petitioner and her co-accused filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied on August 28, 2014 for lack of merit.

Petitioner and her co-accused then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC, docketed as G.R. No. 214117 and entitled Cynthia G. Moreno, et al. vs. People of the Philippines; the SC denied it in a Resolution dated December 1, 2014, and denied their motion for reconsideration with finality in the Resolution dated November 9, 2015. Thereafter, they filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment in Criminal Case No. SB-10-CRM-0236, which the Sandiganbayan denied in its Resolution dated January 9, 2017, and a joint Motion for Reconsideration, denied on March 24, 2017 for lack of merit. Petitioner assailed those two Resolutions via a Petition for Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 230823, but the SC affirmed the Sandiganbayan on June 5, 2017. On June 25, 2019, petitioner's conviction attained finality.

On December 2, 2020, petitioner filed a Motion to Serve Sentence Under Home Care/House Arrest, praying that she be allowed to serve her sentence under home care or house arrest at Lunhaw Farm Resort, Barangay Bojo, Municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, under the direct and close monitoring and supervision of the local Bureau of Jail Management and Penology officers or probation officers of the Department of Justice, together with her counsel by way of recognizance. She invoked her poor health condition, claiming health conditions that thwarted her movement and "usual way of living," and her apprehension of being susceptible to pathogens such as COVID-19 in a penal facility.

In its Resolution dated December 17, 2020, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for failure to provide evidence — medical records or a physician's report — showing that she suffered from health conditions thwarting her movement and usual way of living; it found her COVID-19 apprehension to rest on conjectures and speculations devoid of proof. It likewise noted that "home care/house arrest" does not appear in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and that no law provides an alternative mode of confinement based on health considerations for prisoners convicted by final judgment, so petitioner should serve her sentence only in the places provided by law under Articles 78 and 86 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated March 9, 2021 for being filed out of time, beyond the non-extendible five-day period prescribed by the Continuous Trial Guidelines. The Sandiganbayan further ruled that its previous grants of house/hospital arrest to former Presidents Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Joseph Estrada were not judicial precedents set by the SC and that petitioner's circumstances were entirely different from those of the former Presidents; it also held that her reliance on Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals was misplaced because the phrase "in the custody of the law" there was in the context of a bail application and had nothing to do with the place of incarceration after conviction.

• Non-coverage of the Continuous Trial Guidelines: Petitioner contended that the Motion cannot be considered a prohibited motion or a meritorious motion under the Continuous Trial Guidelines, and that the Guidelines do not cover post-conviction motions such as hers; thus, the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (2019 Rules of Court) should govern.
• Litigious motion entitled to hearing: Petitioner argued that the Motion is a litigious motion under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 2019 Rules of Court and should have been set for hearing and resolved based on the evidence adduced.
• Purpose of the RPC and constitutional right to health: Petitioner averred that the framers of the RPC never intended to utilize Articles 78 and 86 as "a death trap for the convicts in case of emergency" in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, and that Article 78 of the RPC cannot defy and rise higher than the constitutional edict in Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution in this time of major health crisis.

• Finality of conviction: Respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, argued that the penalty imposed on petitioner cannot be modified or amended due to the finality of her conviction.
• No grave abuse of discretion: Respondent countered that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion even without a hearing, as the Motion utterly lacks merit.
• Absence of legal basis: Respondent argued that there are no constitutional and legal bases for the allowance of the relief sought by petitioner.
• Equal protection: Respondent argued that the relief sought would violate the equal protection clause insofar as other similarly situated prisoners are concerned.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's Motion to Serve Sentence Under Home Care/House Arrest.
• Applicable Procedural Rules: Whether the Continuous Trial Guidelines governs post-conviction motions such as petitioner's Motion, or whether the 2019 Rules of Court apply instead.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
• Alternative Modes of Service of Sentence: Whether petitioner may be allowed to serve her sentence under home care/house arrest, community service, or recognizance.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. There was nothing capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary in the Sandiganbayan's denial of the Motion; the petition is bereft of merit and was dismissed.
• Applicable Procedural Rules: The Continuous Trial Guidelines governs. Post-conviction motions fall within its coverage, and petitioner's Motion was an unmeritorious motion correctly denied outright under the last paragraph of Section 2(c), Part III.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Yes, it was correctly denied. The December 17, 2020 Resolution is an interlocutory order, not a judgment or final resolution, so Section 1, Rule 52 of the 2019 Rules of Court does not apply and the five-day non-extendible period under the Continuous Trial Guidelines controls.
• Alternative Modes of Service of Sentence: No. Petitioner's penalty falls within the duration of prision mayor, which must be served in the places and penal establishments provided by law; Article 88a allows community service only for arresto menor and arresto mayor, and recognizance under RA 10389 applies only to persons in custody who are unable to post bail due to abject poverty.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The SC tested the Sandiganbayan's denial against the standard of capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary action amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Applying the Continuous Trial Guidelines and the RPC provisions on execution of penalties, the SC found that the Sandiganbayan's grounds — the absence of medical evidence, the absence of any law authorizing home care/house arrest for a convict sentenced to prision mayor, and the inapplicability of Paderanga and recognizance — were all legally sound. In People vs. Napoles, the SC similarly denied therein petitioner's prayer for provisional release on humanitarian grounds due to the risk of contracting COVID-19. Accordingly, there was nothing capricious, whimsical, or even arbitrary in the denial, and the petition was dismissed with the assailed Resolutions affirmed.
• Applicable Procedural Rules: Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Continuous Trial Guidelines likewise governs post-conviction motions such as the Motion in question. Under the last paragraph of Section 2(c), Part III, motions that allege plausible grounds supported by relevant documents and/or competent evidence are meritorious motions, while motions that do not conform to those requirements are considered unmeritorious and denied outright. As aptly found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's Motion was not supported by relevant documents — no medical record or physician's report; the documents she attached, such as the various awards she received, were irrelevant to her cited ground of poor health condition. The Sandiganbayan therefore correctly denied the Motion outright without setting it for hearing, and the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration was likewise in order.
• Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration: Assuming arguendo that the Motion were a meritorious motion, the Motion for Reconsideration should have been filed within a non-extendible period of five calendar days from receipt of the Resolution, in accordance with Section 2(c), Part III of the Continuous Trial Guidelines. Petitioner's reliance on Section 1, Rule 52 of the 2019 Rules of Court, which allows a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen days from notice, was misplaced: the assailed December 17, 2020 Resolution is not a judgment or final resolution but an interlocutory order, so that provision finds no application. The Sandiganbayan therefore correctly denied the Motion for Reconsideration for being filed beyond five days from receipt.
• Alternative Modes of Service of Sentence: Under Article 86 of the RPC, the penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional, and arresto mayor shall be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code or by future law, and Article 78 requires that a penalty be executed in no other form than that prescribed by law. Petitioner's penalty of six years and one month to ten years falls within the duration of prision mayor under Article 27. Article 88a of the RPC, as amended by RA 11362 (the Community Service Act), does not state that sentence may be served under "home care/house arrest"; it merely provides that the penalties of arresto menor and arresto mayor may be served by rendering community service at the court's discretion, so the Sandiganbayan has no discretion to allow petitioner to serve her sentence by community service, much less under home care/house arrest. Petitioner cannot take refuge in Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, because the issue there was whether the accused was denied the right to bail; the concept of "constructive custody of the law" in Paderanga is limited to allowing courts to proceed with the bail application hearing even without the accused's physical presence if the absence is due to a health condition, and by no stretch of the imagination could it be a judicial precedent allowing a convicted criminal to serve sentence outside a penal institution due to poor health. Petitioner likewise cannot be released under recognizance: Section 3 of RA 10389 defines recognizance as a mode of securing the release of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due to abject poverty, and since petitioner's conviction had long attained finality on June 25, 2019, she can no longer be released on bail. Finally, while petitioner's fear of contracting COVID-19 is understandable, she may not be given different treatment, for the law is clear and the SC cannot carve an exception in Articles 78 and 86 of the RPC without violating the proscription against judicial legislation and the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution.

• Coverage of the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases over post-conviction motions — The Continuous Trial Guidelines governs not only pre-judgment proceedings but also post-conviction motions. Under Section 2(c), Part III, only motions alleging plausible grounds supported by relevant documents and/or competent evidence are meritorious; motions that do not conform are unmeritorious and shall be denied outright without a hearing. Petitioner's motion, unsupported by any medical record or physician's report, was correctly dismissed outright.
• Period for filing a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order — The fifteen-day period under Section 1, Rule 52 of the 2019 Rules of Court applies only to a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution. A motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order in a criminal case covered by the Continuous Trial Guidelines must be filed within a non-extendible period of five calendar days from receipt; a filing beyond that period is out of time.
• Strict execution of penalties under Articles 78 and 86 of the Revised Penal Code — No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment, and a penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law. Penalties of prision mayor and similar duration must be served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code or by future law; "home care/house arrest" appears nowhere in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and no law provides an alternative mode of confinement based on health considerations for prisoners convicted by final judgment.
• Community service under Article 88a (RA 11362, Community Service Act) is available only for arresto menor and arresto mayor — The court may, in lieu of service in jail, require community service only for these short-term arresto penalties, under the supervision of a probation officer. A convict sentenced to prision mayor cannot invoke community service, much less home care/house arrest.
• Recognizance under Section 3 of RA 10389 is unavailable after final conviction — Recognizance is a mode of securing the release of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due to abject poverty. Since petitioner's conviction had attained finality, she could no longer be released on bail, and recognizance is therefore not available to her.
• Proscription against judicial legislation and the equal protection clause — Courts cannot carve an exception into clear statutory provisions (here, Articles 78 and 86 of the RPC) to accommodate individual circumstances such as fear of contracting COVID-19, without violating the prohibition against judicial legislation and the constitutional equal protection clause.
• Paderanga's "constructive custody of the law" is confined to bail applications — The doctrine permits courts to proceed with a bail application hearing without the accused's physical presence when absence is due to a health condition; it has nothing to do with the place of incarceration after conviction and is not a precedent for serving sentence outside a penal institution.

• "Motions that do not conform to the above requirements shall be considered unmeritorious and shall be denied outright." — Quoted from the last paragraph of Section 2(c), Part III of the Continuous Trial Guidelines; this is the rule the SC applied to hold that petitioner's motion, unsupported by medical records or a physician's report, was correctly denied without a hearing.
• "Petitioner's fear of contracting COVID-19 is understandable; however, petitioner may not be given a different treatment for the law is clear and the Court cannot carve an exception in Articles 78 and 86 of the RPC without violating the proscription against judicial legislation and the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution." — This passage states the decisive ground for denying humanitarian-based exceptions to the statutory mode of serving sentence, anchoring the ruling on judicial legislation and equal protection.
• "The concept of 'constructive custody of the law' in Paderanga is limited to allowing the courts to proceed with the bail application hearing even without the physical presence of the accused if his or her absence is due to his or her health condition. By no stretch of the imagination could this case be taken as a judicial precedent allowing a convicted criminal, such as petitioner, to serve his or her sentence outside a penal institution due to poor health conditions." — The SC here confines Paderanga to bail proceedings and forecloses its use as authority for post-conviction home confinement.
• "Recognizance [is] 'a mode of securing the release of any person in custody or detention for the commission of an offense who is unable to post bail due to abject poverty.'" — Quoting Section 3 of RA 10389, the SC explains why recognizance cannot benefit a convict whose conviction has attained finality and who can no longer be released on bail.

• Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 317 Phil. 862 (1995) — Distinguished; its "constructive custody of the law" doctrine applies only to bail application hearings for a health-impaired accused, not to the place of incarceration after conviction.
• People vs. Napoles, G.R. No. 247611 (Resolution), January 13, 2021 — Followed as analogous authority; the SC likewise denied therein petitioner's prayer for provisional release on humanitarian grounds due to the risk of contracting COVID-19.
• People vs. Follantes, 63 Phil. 474 (1936) — Cited for the proposition that a convict whose conviction has attained finality can no longer be released on bail.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The provision petitioner was charged with and convicted of violating: causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
• Article 78, Revised Penal Code — Provides that no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment and that a penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law; the SC applied it to hold that petitioner must serve her sentence only as the law prescribes, with no alternative mode based on health considerations.
• Article 86, Revised Penal Code — Requires that reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional, and arresto mayor be executed and served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code or future law; applied to require petitioner, whose penalty is within prision mayor, to serve in penal institutions.
• Article 88a, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 11362 (Community Service Act) — Allows the court, in its discretion and in lieu of service in jail, to require community service only for arresto menor and arresto mayor; the SC applied it to show that petitioner's prision mayor sentence cannot be converted to community service or home care/house arrest.
• Article 27, Revised Penal Code — Fixes the duration of prision mayor at six years and one day to twelve years; the SC used it to classify petitioner's penalty of six years and one month to ten years as within prision mayor.
• Section 2(c), Part III, Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC) — Defines meritorious motions as those alleging plausible grounds supported by relevant documents and/or competent evidence, requires denial outright of non-conforming motions, and sets a non-extendible five-calendar-day period for a motion for reconsideration of a resolution on a meritorious motion; applied to sustain the outright denial of the Motion and the dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideration as out of time.
• Section 1, Rule 52, Rules of Court (2019 amendments, A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC) — Allows a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen days from notice; the SC held it inapplicable because the assailed December 17, 2020 Resolution is an interlocutory order.
• Section 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court (2019 amendments) — Enumerates litigious motions; invoked by petitioner to argue her Motion should have been set for hearing, an argument the SC rejected under the Continuous Trial Guidelines.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 10389 (Recognizance Act of 2012) — Defines recognizance as a mode of securing the release of a person in custody or detention who is unable to post bail due to abject poverty; applied to deny petitioner release under recognizance after final conviction.
• Section 15, Article II, 1987 Constitution — Directs the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people; invoked by petitioner but held insufficient to override Articles 78 and 86 of the RPC, the SC ruling that no exception may be carved without violating the proscription against judicial legislation and the equal protection clause.