Moreno vs. Commission on Elections

A candidate who has been granted probation is not disqualified from running for a local elective office under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code because the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence, meaning the sentence is not "served" and the two-year disqualification period does not commence.

Urbano M. Moreno was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno applied for and was granted probation, which he subsequently completed. On December 18, 2000, the trial court issued an order terminating his probation and restoring all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction. Moreno then filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar for the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

• The Conviction: Urbano M. Moreno was convicted by final judgment of Arbitrary Detention and sentenced to imprisonment ranging from Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar.
• The Grant of Probation: Moreno applied for and was granted probation. He did not serve a day of his prison sentence, as the grant of probation suspended the execution thereof.
• Termination of Probation: On December 18, 2000, the trial court issued an order finally discharging Moreno from probation, finding that he had fulfilled all the terms and conditions thereof. The order restored all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction.
• The Disqualification Petition: Norma L. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay in the July 15, 2002 elections, invoking Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Mejes argued that Moreno was convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, and that the two-year disqualification period should be counted from his release from probation on December 20, 2000.
• Comelec Ruling: The Comelec First Division and subsequently the Comelec En Banc disqualified Moreno, ruling that the grant of probation merely suspended the execution of the sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. The Comelec En Banc held that the Local Government Code takes precedence over the Probation Law as a later enactment and a special law.

• Service of Sentence: Petitioner argued that the disqualification under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code applies only to those who have actually served their sentence. Because he was granted probation, he did not serve the adjudged sentence; thus, the two-year disqualification period does not apply to him.
• Probation Law as an Exception: Petitioner maintained that the Probation Law should be read as an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law applying only to probationers.
• Implied Pardon: Petitioner argued that even assuming he was disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay constituted an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
• Distinction from Precedent: Petitioner distinguished his case from Dela Torre v. Comelec, noting that Dela Torre involved a conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude and that Dela Torre was ineligible for probation because he appealed his conviction, whereas petitioner applied for and was granted probation within the prescribed period.

• Effect of Probation on Disqualification: Respondent Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that Dela Torre v. Comelec definitively settled that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation, and the disqualification under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
• Precedence of the Local Government Code: Respondent argued that the Local Government Code takes precedence over the Probation Law and Baclayon v. Mutia because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.

• Service of Sentence: Whether the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" in Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code applies to a candidate who was granted probation and did not physically serve his sentence.
• Statutory Construction: Whether the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the disqualification provision of the Local Government Code.

• Service of Sentence: The phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" does not apply to probationers. The grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence; thus, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed but merely complies with the conditions prescribed in the probation order. The period of probation cannot be equated with service of sentence. Because the sentence is not served, the two-year period of ineligibility under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run. Furthermore, the final discharge of the probationer operates to restore all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of conviction, including the right to run for public office.
• Statutory Construction: The Probation Law is construed as an exception to the Local Government Code. Although the Local Government Code is a later law setting forth disqualifications for local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation applying only to probationers. Under the canon of statutory construction, a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. Moreover, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia regarding the effect of probation on disqualification, and its omission of probationers from the enumerated disqualifications in Section 40(a) indicates a legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class not covered by the disqualification.

• Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi — To interpret and harmonize laws is the best method of interpretation. Applied to reconcile the Probation Law and the Local Government Code, construing the Probation Law as an exception to the Local Government Code's disqualification provisions.
• Later general statute vs. earlier special statute — A later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. Applied to hold that the Local Government Code (later, general terms regarding disqualifications) does not affect the special provisions of the Probation Law (earlier, special legislation for probationers).
• Effect of probation on service of sentence — The grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence; the period of probation cannot be equated with the service of the sentence adjudged. Applied to rule that the two-year disqualification period under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not commence for a probationer.

• "Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order."
• "It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute."

• Baclayon v. Mutia, No. L-59298, April 30, 1984 — Followed. Established that an order placing a defendant on probation is not a sentence but a suspension of the imposition of sentence, thereby suspending the principal penalty of imprisonment and accessory penalties.
• Dela Torre v. Comelec, 327 Phil. 1144 (1996) — Distinguished and limited. Held that the grant of probation does not affect disqualification under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Distinguished because Dela Torre was primarily based on the finding that the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude, and the pronouncement on probation was obiter, as Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation having perfected an appeal.
• Frivaldo v. Comelec, 327 Phil. 521 (1996) — Cited favorably. Quoted for the principle that it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.

• Section 40(a), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Disqualifies those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, from running for any elective local position. Applied strictly: because the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" modifies both categories of offenses, and a probationer does not "serve" a sentence, the disqualification does not apply.
• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) — Provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. Applied to establish that a probationer does not serve the penalty imposed.
• Section 16, Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) — Provides that the final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction. Applied to fortify the conclusion that Moreno's right to run for public office was restored upon his final discharge from probation.

Panganibo (C.J.), Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr.