Moreno vs. Bernabe

A judge who solemnizes a marriage without the required marriage license is administratively liable for misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, the absence of a valid marriage license being a formal requisite of marriage under the Family Code that renders the marriage void from the beginning. Good faith and noble intentions do not exonerate a judge from administrative liability, and the withdrawal of the complaint does not divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and discipline erring members of the Judiciary.

The respondent was a judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila, at the time of the incident. The Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227) governs the formal requisites of marriage, including the requirement of a valid marriage license, and declares that the absence of any essential or formal requisite renders the marriage void ab initio. Judges are enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence, and to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with existing laws.

Complainant Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married on October 4, 1993, before respondent Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila. The respondent assured the complainant that the marriage contract would be released ten days after the ceremony. When the complainant visited the respondent's office on October 15, 1993, she discovered that she could not obtain the marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar had failed to issue a marriage license. The complainant alleged that the respondent connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.

In his comment, the respondent denied conspiring with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno. He contended that the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig had actually prepared the marriage license but it was not released due to the subsequent objection of Marcelo Moreno's father. The respondent claimed he did not intend to violate the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, having been moved by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted assurance or security due to her pregnant condition. He stated that Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony with the express assurance that the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete. The respondent admitted that the contracting parties were not known to him, but claimed that both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the effects of a marriage performed without the required marriage license.

At the pre-hearing conference, the respondent admitted that he solemnized the marriage on October 4, 1993, and that at the time of the solemnization, the marriage license had not yet been issued or released by the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig. The complainant failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, and her elder sister executed a sworn statement on her behalf withdrawing the complaint, as the complainant had left for Singapore.

• Conspiracy to Deceive: The complainant alleged that the respondent connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her into the marriage.
• Failure to Release Marriage Contract: The complainant averred that the respondent assured her the marriage contract would be released ten days after the ceremony, but she could not obtain it because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license.

• Denial of Conspiracy: The respondent denied conspiring with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.
• Good Faith and Christian Motives: The respondent contended that he did not violate the law nor had the slightest intention to do so when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted assurance or security due to her pregnant condition.
• Assurance of License: The respondent claimed that Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony with the express assurance that the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete.
• Lack of Knowledge of Parties: The respondent stated that the contracting parties were not known to him.
• Full Disclosure of Effects: The respondent claimed that both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the effects of a marriage performed without the required marriage license.

• Solemnizing Marriage Without License: Whether the respondent judge is administratively liable for solemnizing a marriage without the required marriage license.
• Effect of Withdrawal of Complaint: Whether the complainant's withdrawal of the administrative complaint warrants dismissal of the case.

• Solemnizing Marriage Without License: Yes. The respondent is administratively liable for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. Article 3(2) of the Family Code provides that a valid marriage license is a formal requisite of marriage, and its absence renders the marriage void from the beginning under Article 35(3). The respondent's own admission that he solemnized the marriage without the required license established his liability.
• Effect of Withdrawal of Complaint: No. The withdrawal of the complaint does not divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged. The Court has an interest in the conduct of members of the Judiciary, and its efforts may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance.

• Solemnizing Marriage Without License: The Court found that the respondent, by his own admission, solemnized the marriage between the complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of Article 3(2) of the Family Code, which provides that one of the formal requisites of marriage is a valid marriage license, and that the absence of said requisite makes the marriage void from the beginning under Article 35(3). The respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives, which at most would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law. The Court cited Cosca, et al. vs. Palaypayon, Jr. as a definite precedent where a judge was fined and sternly warned for, among others, solemnizing marriages without licenses. The Court emphasized that judges should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law and should keep abreast of the law, the rulings, and doctrines of the Court.
• Effect of Withdrawal of Complaint: The Court reiterated its ruling in Imbing vs. Tiongson that the fact that a complainant has lost interest in prosecuting an administrative case will not necessarily warrant dismissal. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged. The Court has an interest in the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainant's desistance. To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant would strip the Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary. What is involved is a matter of public interest, as the respondent is an officer of the court whose personal behavior should be beyond reproach.

• Administrative liability of judges for solemnizing marriage without license — A judge who solemnizes a marriage without the required marriage license is administratively liable for misconduct and gross ignorance of the law. The Family Code requires a valid marriage license as a formal requisite of marriage, and its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. Good faith and noble intentions do not exonerate a judge from liability, though they may mitigate the penalty.
• Effect of complainant's desistance on administrative cases — The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant in an administrative case against a member of the Judiciary does not divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and discipline erring officers. The Court's supervisory power over the Judiciary is a matter of public interest that cannot be conditioned upon the will of the complainant.
• Judges as exemplars of the law — Judges are the visible representation of law and justice, and must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. They should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law and should keep abreast of the law, the rulings, and doctrines of the Court.

• "The judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law." — This passage articulates the standard of conduct expected of judges and the basis for holding them to a higher standard than ordinary citizens.
• "Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law." — This states the rule that good faith is not a complete defense to administrative liability for violating the law.
• "The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent judge will not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint." — This establishes the principle that the Court retains jurisdiction over administrative cases despite the complainant's desistance.

• Uy vs. Dizon Capulong, 221 SCRA 87 (1993) — Cited for the principle that the judge is the visible representation of law and justice and must be the first to abide by the law.
• Cosca, et al. vs. Palaypayon, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-92-721, Sept. 30, 1994 — Controlling precedent where a judge was fined and sternly warned for, among others, solemnizing marriages without licenses; applied to determine the respondent's liability.
• Imbing vs. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690 (1994) — Followed for the rule that the complainant's desistance does not warrant dismissal of an administrative case against a judge.
• Garcia vs. De la Peña, 229 SCRA 766 (1994) — Cited among cases reiterating the reminder on judicial conduct.
• OCA vs. Gines, 224 SCRA 261 (1993) — Cited among cases reiterating the reminder on judicial conduct.
• Garganera vs. Jocson, 213 SCRA 149 (1992) — Cited among cases reiterating the reminder on judicial conduct.
• Cuaresma vs. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 (1993) — Cited for the rule that judges should conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

• Article 3(2), Family Code of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227) — Provides that one of the formal requisites of marriage is a valid marriage license; the respondent's failure to secure this before solemnizing the marriage constituted a violation.
• Article 35(3), Family Code of the Philippines — Declares that the absence of a formal requisite renders the marriage void from the beginning; applied to show the legal consequence of the respondent's act.
• Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct — Requires judges to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence; the respondent failed to live up to this commitment.
• Rule 3.01, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct — Requires judges to be faithful to the law; the respondent failed to observe this mandate.
• Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987 — Enjoins judges to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Quiason, JJ., concurred.