Morata vs. Go

Barangay conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 is a compulsory pre-condition to filing in court for all disputes within the authority of the Lupon, including actions cognizable by the regional trial courts, not only cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of metropolitan and municipal trial courts.

Petitioners Spouses Julius Morata and Maria Luisa P. Morata and private respondents Spouses Victor Go and Flora C. Go were all residents of Cebu City. Presidential Decree No. 1508, the Katarungang Pambarangay Law promulgated June 11, 1978, required compulsory arbitration/conciliation at the barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court. The dispute turned on whether that requirement embraced actions filed in the courts of first instance, now regional trial courts, or was confined to actions cognizable by city and municipal courts.

On August 5, 1982, Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154. The complaint itself alleged that the parties-litigants were all residents of Cebu City.

On the basis of that allegation of common residence in the same city, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached. The motion was opposed by private respondents.

On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioners sought reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated October 3, 1982 on the ground that, considering the specific reference to city or municipal courts in Sections 11 and 12 as the courts to which a Lupon or Pangkat settlement or award shall be elevated for nullification or execution, and the reference in Section 14 to the pre-condition in Section 6, Section 6 applied only to cases cognizable by said inferior courts.

Thereafter petitioners came to the Supreme Court through the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the proceedings below, the material factual predicates were undisputed: the parties actually resided in the same city, the action was for a sum of money and damages within no stated exception, and no prior confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or Pangkat nor certification of non-settlement was alleged.

• Scope of P.D. No. 1508: Petitioner argued that the legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts, now metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the courts of first instance, now regional trial courts.
• Non-compliance as Ground for Dismissal: Petitioner maintained that the complaint was dismissible for failure to allege prior availment of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508 and for absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached, the parties being all residents of Cebu City.

• Scope Limited to Inferior Courts: Respondent countered that coverage should be limited only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts.
• Forum for Settlement or Award: Respondent judge maintained that, considering the specific reference to city or municipal courts in Sections 11 and 12 as the courts to which a dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or Pangkat shall be elevated for nullification or execution, and the reference in Section 14 to the pre-condition in Section 6, Section 6 applies only to cases cognizable by said inferior courts.

• Coverage of Conciliation Pre-condition: Whether the barangay conciliation pre-condition under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 applies only to cases cognizable by inferior courts or also to actions cognizable by courts of first instance, now regional trial courts.

• Coverage of Conciliation Pre-condition: Yes. The conciliation process at the barangay level under P.D. 1508 is compulsory for actions cognizable by regional trial courts as well as those under the exclusive competence of metropolitan and municipal trial courts, where the dispute falls within Lupon authority.

• Coverage of Conciliation Pre-condition: Except in the instances enumerated in Sections 2 and 6, the Lupon was given authority to amicably settle all types of disputes involving parties actually residing in the same city or municipality, with no distinction as to classes of civil disputes, in contrast to the express limitation for criminal cases in paragraph (3), Section 2. Because Section 2 employed the universal term all, no distinction was to be added by construction. Limiting Lupon authority to cases exclusively cognizable by inferior courts would defeat the stated objectives of avoiding animosity among members of the same political unit, discouraging indiscriminate filing, and decongesting clogged dockets, and would permit evasion by bloating claims to place cases beyond inferior court jurisdiction. The venue rule in Section 3 for real property disputes, traditionally within first instance jurisdiction except forcible entry and detainer, confirmed broader coverage. Sections 11, 12 and 14, which conferred on city and municipal courts jurisdiction over nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards regardless of amount or nature of the original dispute, were held not to limit Lupon authority. Any doubt was dispelled by Circular No. 22 directing all judges of courts of first instance and other courts to desist from receiving complaints in cases within Lupon authority, as noted by the President's Letter of Implementation of November 12, 1979.

• Statutory construction — where law does not distinguish — Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, and neither addition nor subtraction from the statutory language is permitted. Applied to hold that Section 2's grant of authority over all disputes, without distinction among classes of civil disputes, could not be narrowed to cases cognizable only by inferior courts, citing Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Gimenez.
• Katarungang Pambarangay — compulsory conciliation pre-condition — No complaint involving any matter within Lupon authority under Section 2 shall be filed in court or any other government office unless there has been confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or Pangkat and no conciliation was reached as certified, or unless settlement was repudiated, save the four direct-to-court cases in Section 6. Applied to require dismissal of the P49,400.00 collection suit filed in the Court of First Instance without such compliance.
• Scope of Lupon authority vs. forum for award enforcement — Sections 11, 12 and 14 confer on city/municipal courts jurisdiction to resolve petitions for nullification or enforcement of Lupon settlement/arbitration awards regardless of amount or nature of the original dispute, but do not define or limit the Lupon's settlement authority under Section 2. Applied to reject the trial court's inference that reference to inferior courts confined the Section 6 pre-condition thereto.

• "where the law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish." — States the constructional rule used to reject reading an inferior-courts-only limitation into Section 2's grant over all disputes.
• "The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:" — Defines the comprehensive scope of Lupon authority, subject only to enumerated exceptions, as basis for extending the pre-condition to regional trial court actions.
• "to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons." — Quotes the directive in Circular No. 22 addressed to all judges including courts of first instance, relied upon to confirm that the pre-condition was not confined to inferior courts.

• Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Gimenez, I SCRA 267 — Cited as authority for the rudimentary precept in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, supporting the broad reading of all disputes in Section 2.

• Section 6, P.D. No. 1508 — Imposes conciliation as pre-condition to filing, barring filing in court or any government office without prior confrontation and certification of non-settlement or repudiation, except detention, habeas corpus deprivation of liberty, actions with provisional remedies, and prescription-barred actions; applied as the mandatory requirement petitioners invoked.
• Section 2, P.D. No. 1508 — Grants the Lupon authority over all disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality except government parties, public officers acting officially, offenses punishable beyond 30 days or P200.00 fine, offenses without private offended party, and classes determined by the Prime Minister; applied to hold the money claim between same-city residents within Lupon authority.
• Section 3, P.D. No. 1508 — Provides venue requiring real property disputes to be brought in the barangay where the property lies; relied upon to show intended coverage beyond inferior courts since real property jurisdiction traditionally lay in courts of first instance.
• Sections 11, 12 and 14, P.D. No. 1508 — Govern finality upon ten days, nullification before proper city/municipal court, execution within one year and thereafter by action, and transmittal of settlement/award to local city/municipal court; construed as conferring award-enforcement jurisdiction on inferior courts without limiting Lupon authority or the Section 6 pre-condition.
• Circular No. 22, November 9, 1979 — Directed all judges of courts of first instance, circuit criminal, juvenile and domestic relations, agrarian relations, city and municipal courts to desist from receiving cases within Lupon authority; relied upon with the November 12, 1979 Letter of Implementation to confirm applicability to regional trial court actions.

Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Aquino, J., filed a separate concurring opinion agreeing that Civil Case No. R-22154 for P49,400 was covered, emphasizing that disputes among actual residents of the same city or municipality undergo conciliation whatever the amount or nature unless within enumerated exclusions and the four direct-to-court cases, and noting Circular No. 22 and Ministry of Justice opinions treating even P100,000.00 damage suits as within Lupon authority. Makasiar and Teehankee, JJ., reserved their votes. De Castro, J., was on leave.