Morales y Bronola vs. People

Mere association with the principal perpetrator, presence at meetings, and signing of a Certificate of Candidacy are insufficient to establish conspiracy or the element of deceit in Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, absent proof of a prior agreement to defraud or any affirmative misrepresentation by the accused that induced the offended party to part with money.

Private complainant Catherine M. Factor-Koura sought a congressional seat through the party-list system for the May 2016 National Elections. She was introduced by her consultant Edwin H. Aniñon to petitioner Mark Joel Morales y Bronola, who in turn introduced her to Armando Almo Co, a businessman who claimed strong connections with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Armando represented that Ang Chinoy Association Phils., Inc., a non-stock agricultural corporation seeking party-list accreditation, could guarantee Catherine a congressional nomination in exchange for PHP 15 million, with a money-back guarantee if the party-list failed to win. The transaction was documented in a Memorandum of Agreement between Catherine's company, JPHILS Global Training Corporation, and Ang Chinoy. Petitioner was designated Secretary and second nominee of the intended party-list, while Armando served as President.

Sometime in April 2015, Catherine M. Factor-Koura sought assistance for the importation of goods from Japan through Ernesto "Ka Ernie" Natividad, who eventually introduced her to Edwin H. Aniñon. Edwin became Catherine's consultant at her company, JPHILS Global Training Corporation, in July 2015. Catherine confided to Edwin her intention to pursue a congressional seat through the party-list system, disclosing that she had previously received two offers requiring payments of PHP 150 million and PHP 75 million, respectively, but had declined upon Edwin's advice that no refund was guaranteed if the nomination failed. Edwin relayed Catherine's interest to petitioner Mark Joel Morales y Bronola, who indicated he was acquainted with Armando Almo Co, a businessman with purportedly strong connections with the COMELEC. Petitioner facilitated a meeting between Catherine and Armando.

In August 2015, Edwin formally introduced Catherine and her sister Cheryl-Lyn P. Munoz to petitioner and Armando at the UCC Cafe Burgos Circle in Taguig City. Edwin represented that petitioner and Armando were associated with "Ang Chinoy," a party-list organization seeking COMELEC accreditation for the May 2016 elections. Armando presented the Certificate of Incorporation, Articles of Incorporation, and By-Laws of Ang Chinoy Association Phils., Inc. to support its legitimacy. Edwin described petitioner as a former Bureau of Customs employee with National Bureau of Investigation connections and Armando as a businessman with COMELEC connections, and identified both as his business partners. At a subsequent meeting at a Japanese restaurant in Fisher Mall, Quezon City, Armando offered Catherine a guaranteed nomination under the Ang Chinoy Party-list in exchange for PHP 15 million, with a full reimbursement guarantee should the party-list fail to win. On Edwin's advice, Catherine negotiated a staggered payment arrangement, which Armando accepted.

On September 3, 2015, JPHILS, represented by Catherine, and Ang Chinoy, represented by Armando, executed a Memorandum of Agreement acknowledging Ang Chinoy's pending COMELEC accreditation. JPHILS undertook to fund Ang Chinoy's projects in the amount of PHP 15 million under the guise of a joint venture, with a "repayment of funds" clause assuring full reimbursement if the joint venture failed. Catherine remitted payments to Armando as follows: PHP 1.5 million on September 3, 2015; PHP 1 million on September 14, 2015; PHP 4 million on October 14, 2015; and PHP 8.5 million on October 27, 2015. Beyond the PHP 15 million under the MOA, Catherine paid an additional PHP 2 million in installments on April 6, 2016, May 19, 2016, and July 25, 2016, for a total of PHP 17 million. The COMELEC denied Ang Chinoy's accreditation. Armando then assured Catherine of nomination under AKAP Party-list, and later under Anak Central Party-list (ACP). On December 3, 2015, Armando had Catherine and petitioner sign a Certificate of Candidacy at a restaurant in Mandaluyong City. On December 26, 2015, Catherine personally verified with the COMELEC and discovered that neither Ang Chinoy nor AKAP was accredited, and while ACP was registered, neither her name nor petitioner's appeared among its nominees. She immediately demanded enforcement of the money-back guarantee from Armando through text and email but received no response.

Petitioner denied participating in any agreement to defraud Catherine. He testified that Edwin introduced him to Catherine in August 2015, when he was affiliated with Ang Chinoy as a non-stock agricultural corporation together with Armando, Gilbert Garcia, Andrea C. Garcia, and Edgar H. Villanueva. Petitioner maintained that he merely referred Catherine's inquiries to Armando, who exclusively explained the organization's objectives and handled all financial transactions. His presence at meetings was solely in his capacity as a member of the corporation and as the designated second nominee. Petitioner asserted that he contributed PHP 2 million of his own funds to the endeavor, upon Armando's assurance that the party-list would be financially supported by the Chinese community. He categorically denied receiving any portion of the amounts Catherine paid, all of which were made payable solely to Armando.

The RTC found petitioner and Armando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa, sentencing each to imprisonment and ordering joint and several indemnification of PHP 17 million, while acquitting Edwin. The RTC held that petitioner's inclusion in the Articles of Incorporation, his nomination as second nominee, and his signing of the Certificate of Candidacy induced Catherine to trust Armando and fall for the scheme. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto, rejecting petitioner's invocation of in pari delicto as a doctrine principally applicable in civil cases and declining to consider his theory of inducement of election offenses as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

• Lack of Conspiracy: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, as the evidence did not establish the essential requisites of a common criminal design, unity of intent, or coordinated action toward an unlawful objective. There was no showing of any agreement with Armando to defraud Catherine, nor any overt act indicating a shared intent to commit a felony.
• Lack of Deceit: Petitioner maintained that he did not harbor any intent to deceive or induce Catherine into parting with her money, asserting that he was similarly situated with Catherine in being led to believe in the legitimacy of the party-list endeavor, having contributed PHP 2 million of his own funds for the same objective.
• No Financial Involvement: Petitioner contended that he was not privy to any financial transaction between Catherine and Armando, did not benefit from it, and never received any portion of the funds. He argued that Armando alone negotiated the terms, received the monetary consideration, and made representations regarding the party-list nomination and the money-back guarantee.
• In Pari Delicto: Petitioner asserted before the CA that the RTC failed to appreciate the doctrine of in pari delicto, arguing that Catherine's willingness to pay for a congressional seat constituted inducement to commit election offenses, barring her from recovering or seeking criminal liability against him.

• Conspiracy: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy between petitioner and Armando to defraud Catherine.
• Elements of Estafa: Whether the prosecution established all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as against petitioner, particularly the element of deceit.
• Civil Liability: Whether civil liability may be imputed to petitioner notwithstanding his acquittal.
• In Pari Delicto: Whether the doctrine of in pari delicto bars Catherine from recovering the amounts she paid to Armando.

• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established, the prosecution having failed to show any overt act by petitioner demonstrating a shared criminal design with Armando; mere association, presence at meetings, and signing a Certificate of Candidacy are insufficient.
• Elements of Estafa: No. The element of deceit was not proven against petitioner, as no evidence showed he made any fraudulent representation directly inducing Catherine to part with her money, nor that he received or misappropriated any portion of the funds.
• Civil Liability: No. Civil liability cannot be imputed to petitioner, as the complainant's own testimony and the documentary evidence established that Armando solely received all payments, and no competent evidence linked petitioner to the receipt or misappropriation of the funds.
• In Pari Delicto: Yes. The doctrine of in pari delicto bars Catherine from recovering the amounts paid, as the transaction involved the trafficking of a public office through the party-list system—an illegal contract void for being contrary to public policy, with both parties in equal fault.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy is never presumed and transcends passive presence, requiring affirmative proof of intentional participation in a common design. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to execute it. While direct evidence is not indispensable, conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the crime, provided such conduct clearly indicates a common criminal purpose. Here, the RTC sustained conspiracy based solely on petitioner's inclusion in the Articles of Incorporation, his nomination as second nominee, his signing of the CoC with Catherine, and his gift of a ballpen engraved with "Cong. Cathy Factor." These circumstances, while suggestive of involvement in a common political objective, are insufficient to establish a community of criminal design to defraud. The totality of the evidence—including the complainant's own testimony and email correspondences—points to Armando as the sole transacting party who exclusively curated and orchestrated the scheme and received all payments. Petitioner's role was limited to introducing Catherine to Armando and being present at some meetings. Absent clear proof of a prior agreement and coordinated execution of a deceitful plan, conspiracy cannot be sustained.

• Elements of Estafa: The elements of Estafa by means of deceit are: (1) a false pretense or fraudulent act; (2) executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party relied on it and was induced to part with money or property; and (4) damage resulted. Deceit must be the determining cause that induced the offended party to part with money or property. The accusation against petitioner was premised on his involvement in the incorporation of Ang Chinoy, his designation as second nominee, his signing of the CoC, his inaction to dissuade Catherine from transacting with Armando, and his alleged remarks about her campaign efforts. Taken individually or collectively, these acts do not constitute false pretenses or fraudulent misrepresentations within the contemplation of Article 315, paragraph 2(a). There was no showing that petitioner made any direct representations to Catherine regarding the legitimacy of the party-list, the certainty of her nomination, or the return of her investment. Neither was there evidence that he orchestrated, facilitated, or was privy to the financial arrangements. Absent clear and convincing proof of fraudulent inducement or affirmative misrepresentation attributable to petitioner, the element of deceit is lacking, and his conviction cannot be sustained.

• Civil Liability: The dismissal of a criminal case does not ipso facto result in the extinction of civil liability, as jurisprudence recognizes instances where civil liability subsists notwithstanding acquittal—namely when the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, when the court declares the liability is only civil, or when the civil liability does not arise from the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The quantum of proof for civil liability is preponderance of evidence. However, upon review, the required quantum was not met. Catherine unequivocally testified that Armando solely received the entire PHP 17 million, and none of the acknowledgement receipts indicate that petitioner ever received any amount, directly or indirectly. In the absence of competent and credible evidence linking petitioner to the receipt or misappropriation of the funds, civil liability cannot be imputed based on mere association or passive involvement.

• In Pari Delicto: Contracts that have for their object the trafficking of public office by unlawful means or the manipulation of electoral processes are void for being contrary to public policy, subverting democratic processes and eroding public trust in the electoral system. Under the doctrine of in pari delicto, no action arises from an illegal contract, and where the parties are in equal fault, the courts will leave them where they are found. The doctrine rests on the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur action and is designed to discourage illegal agreements by refusing judicial aid to either party. As both Catherine and Armando stand on equal footing in terms of culpability for the illegal transaction, the doctrine bars Catherine from recovering the amount she paid to Armando. Accordingly, the PHP 17 million civil liability award against Armando was deleted.

• Conspiracy is never presumed — Conspiracy transcends passive presence and requires affirmative proof of intentional participation in a common design. Mere association, companionship, or presence at the scene is insufficient. The prosecution must prove with the same degree of certainty as the crime itself that: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement; (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. While direct evidence is not indispensable, conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the crime, provided such conduct clearly and convincingly indicates a common criminal purpose. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner's limited role—introducing the complainant to Armando and being present at meetings—did not establish conspiracy.

• Elements of Estafa by means of deceit — The four elements are: (1) a false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (2) executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party relied on the false pretense and was induced to part with money or property; and (4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage. Deceit must be the determining cause that induced the offended party to part with money or property. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the first and third elements as against petitioner, as no evidence showed he made any fraudulent representation that induced Catherine to part with her money.

• Acquittal of a co-accused does not ipso facto absolve the remaining accused — The acquittal of one accused does not automatically extend to others, especially when their respective participation in the crime is distinct and supported by separate and independent evidence. The acquittal of one accused is not a bar to the conviction of a co-accused if the evidence warrants such conviction. The Court applied this principle to affirm Armando's conviction notwithstanding petitioner's acquittal, as Armando's independent and overt acts satisfied all elements of Estafa.

• In pari delicto — Where the contract is illegal and constitutes a criminal offense, and both parties are in equal fault, the courts will leave them where they are found. No action arises from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for specific performance, recovery of property or money, or damages. The doctrine rests on the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur action and is designed to discourage illegal agreements by refusing judicial aid to either party. The Court applied this doctrine to bar Catherine from recovering the PHP 17 million paid to Armando for a guaranteed congressional seat, as the transaction constituted trafficking of a public office contrary to public policy.

• Civil liability notwithstanding acquittal — The dismissal of a criminal case does not ipso facto result in the extinction of civil liability. Civil liability may subsist when: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) the court declares the liability is only civil; or (c) the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The quantum of proof is preponderance of evidence. The Court found that even this lower quantum was not met as against petitioner, as no evidence linked him to the receipt or misappropriation of the funds.

• "Conspiracy transcends passive presence and requires affirmative proof of intentional participation in a common design." — This passage articulates the threshold for establishing conspiracy, distinguishing mere association or presence from active participation in a criminal enterprise, and forms the ratio decidendi for petitioner's acquittal on the conspiracy charge.

• "Deceit or fraud, as an element of Estafa, must be the determining cause that induced the offended party to part with his or her money or property." — This formulation defines the causal requirement for deceit in Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), anchoring the Court's conclusion that petitioner's passive involvement did not satisfy the element of fraudulent inducement.

• "As both Catherine and Armando stand on equal footing in terms of culpability for the illegal transaction, the doctrine of in pari delicto bars Catherine from recovering the amount she paid to Armando." — This passage applies the in pari delicto doctrine to the context of electoral trafficking, establishing that a party who pays for a congressional seat cannot recover the payment, as the transaction is void for being contrary to public policy.

• "The exoneration of a co-accused does not ipso facto absolve the remaining accused from criminal liability." — This principle clarifies that acquittal on conspiracy grounds for one accused does not preclude conviction of another whose independent acts independently satisfy the elements of the offense, supporting the Court's affirmance of Armando's conviction.

• People vs. Lababo, 832 Phil. 1056 (2018) — Cited for the doctrine that conspiracy is never presumed. Followed.
• People vs. De Guzman, 905 Phil. 378 (2021) — Cited for the principle that mere association, companionship, or presence at the scene is insufficient to establish conspiracy, and that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval without active participation does not constitute conspiracy. Followed.
• People of the Philippines vs. Abarratigue, 933 Phil. 296 (2023) — Cited for the elements of conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code. Followed.
• Spouses Dulay vs. People of the Philippines, 910 Phil. 1 (2021) — Cited for the definition of deceit as false representation of a matter of fact that deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Followed.
• Arriola vs. People, 871 Phil. 585 (2020) — Cited for the established elements of Estafa by means of deceit. Followed.
• Gonzalo vs. Tarnate, Jr., 724 Phil. 198 (2014) — Cited for the doctrine of in pari delicto and the principle that no action arises from an illegal contract where the parties are in equal fault. Followed.
• People vs. Dulay, 561 Phil. 764 (2007) — Cited for the principle that the acquittal of one accused does not automatically absolve the remaining accused, and that civil liability may subsist notwithstanding acquittal. Followed.
• Ditiangkin vs. Lazada E-Services Philippines, Inc., 930 Phil. 250 (2022) — Cited for the exceptions allowing the Supreme Court to delve into factual issues in a Rule 45 petition. Followed.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Estafa by means of deceit, specifically by using a fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or by other similar deceits. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of this provision as against petitioner, but established all elements as against Armando.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The Court applied this provision to hold that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy between petitioner and Armando.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, limited to questions of law, with recognized exceptions allowing review of factual issues. The Court invoked the exception where the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. Singh, J., was on leave.