Morada vs. Rias

The writ of amparo will not issue where the petitioner fails to prove by substantial evidence the third and fourth elements of enforced disappearance — the State's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person, and the intention to remove that person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

Fe J. Morada is the mother of Johnson J. Morada, who was arrested by barangay tanods of Barangay 176, Caloocan City for alleged theft of a mobile phone from the house of respondent Randy Rias, also a barangay tanod. The other respondents are barangay officials of the same barangay — Ex-O Rolly Cebu, Desk Officer Romy Donaldo, and Desk Officer Fernando Domingo. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) provides a judicial remedy for extrajudicial killings and enforced or involuntary disappearances, requiring substantial evidence to establish the elements of enforced disappearance as defined under Republic Act No. 9851.

On October 14, 2015 at around 8:00 a.m., Fe J. Morada received a text message from her daughter, Jennilyn J. Morada, that her son Johnson J. Morada had been arrested and detained by the barangay tanods of Barangay 176, Caloocan City for alleged theft of a mobile phone from the house of respondent Randy Rias, also a barangay tanod. Morada went to the barangay hall at about 7:00 p.m. that same day. There, respondent Rolly Cebu informed her that Johnson had already been released from the custody of the barangay by either respondent Fernando Domingo or respondent Romy Donaldo, as evidenced by an entry in the barangay blotter signed by Johnson himself.

In December 2015, Morada went to the Northern Police District to report that her son was missing. An investigation was conducted but was terminated due to the lack of a witness to shed light on Johnson's disappearance and the insistence of the respondent barangay desk officers that Johnson had already been released from their custody. In the meantime, rumors circulated within Barangay 176 that Johnson had been extrajudicially killed and that his body had been mixed in cement to conceal the incident.

Prompted by these rumors, Morada filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 123 on January 25, 2016, docketed as SP. PROC CASE NO. C-5159, to determine whether respondents had violated or threatened to violate Johnson's right to life, liberty, and security, and to compel them to determine his whereabouts and identify the person or persons responsible for his disappearance or possible death. The RTC denied the petition on January 26, 2016, finding that the third and fourth elements of enforced disappearance were absent because there was no showing of any refusal on the part of the respondents to acknowledge or give information on Johnson's whereabouts, and no intention to remove him from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The RTC relied on the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson, evidencing his release from custody, which Morada neither denied nor refuted.

• Substantial Evidence of Enforced Disappearance: Morada argued that, contrary to the RTC's findings, the enforced disappearance of Johnson had been established by substantial evidence.
• Refusal to Acknowledge: Morada insisted that the lack of cooperation on the part of the respondents amounted to a refusal on their part to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of Johnson, showing their intention to remove him from the protection of the law.

• Writ of Amparo — Enforced Disappearance: Whether the RTC gravely erred in not giving due course to the petition for issuance of writ of amparo despite substantial evidence submitted in support of the same.

• Writ of Amparo — Enforced Disappearance: No. The RTC committed no reversible error; no substantial evidence exists to compel the grant of the writ, the third and fourth elements of enforced disappearance being absent.

• Writ of Amparo — Enforced Disappearance: Under Republic Act No. 9851, enforced disappearance requires four elements: (a) an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State's or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person; and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. The first and second elements were present, as Johnson was arrested by barangay tanods. However, the third and fourth elements were absent. The respondents presented the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself, evidencing his release on October 14, 2015 — a document Morada neither denied nor refuted. When Morada inquired at the barangay hall, respondent Rolly immediately informed her of Johnson's arrest and release and showed her the blotter entry. The NPD also conducted an investigation, which was terminated not due to non-cooperation by respondents but due to the lack of a witness and the information that Johnson had already been released. Morada's claim rested entirely on uncorroborated rumors that Johnson had been killed and his body mixed in cement, without any testimonial, documentary, or circumstantial evidence, and without any showing of government participation or acquiescence in any killing or disappearance. The liberal standard of substantial evidence in amparo proceedings still demands adequate evidence; mere rumors and speculations do not suffice.

• Elements of Enforced Disappearance — Under Republic Act No. 9851, enforced disappearance consists of four elements: (a) an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State's or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. All four elements must be established by substantial evidence; the absence of the third and fourth elements is fatal to the petition.

• Substantial Evidence Standard in Amparo Proceedings — While the writ of amparo is accorded liberality, the claimant is not excused from the burden of proving the case by substantial evidence. The liberal standard demands some adequate evidence; unsubstantiated allegations, rumors, and speculations, without corroborating testimonial, documentary, or circumstantial evidence, do not amount to substantial evidence.

• Requirement of Government Participation or Acquiescence — For the issuance of the writ of amparo, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered or that a person has disappeared. It must be shown by the required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing person.

• "For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons." — This passage, quoting Callo vs. Morente, articulates the controlling standard for the issuance of the writ of amparo in enforced disappearance cases, emphasizing that disappearance alone is insufficient without proof of government involvement and refusal to acknowledge.

• "Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence." — This formulation, citing Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, defines the evidentiary threshold in amparo proceedings: liberality does not dispense with the obligation to present adequate proof.

• Navia vs. Pardico, 688 Phil. 266 (2012) — Cited as the source of the four-element definition of enforced disappearance under Republic Act No. 9851; followed as controlling authority on the elements required to establish enforced disappearance in amparo proceedings.
• Callo vs. Morente, 818 Phil. 454 (2017) — Cited for the proposition that mere disappearance is insufficient for the writ; the disappearance must be carried out with government authorization, support, or acquiescence, accompanied by a refusal to acknowledge or give information; followed.
• Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 695 Phil. 781 (2012) — Cited for the principle that the liberal standard of substantial evidence in amparo proceedings still demands adequate evidence; followed.

• Section 19, Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) — Provides that any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, and that the appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. Applied to confirm the Court's authority to review both factual and legal findings of the lower court in amparo proceedings.
• Republic Act No. 9851 — Defines enforced disappearance through its four elements: (a) deprivation of liberty; (b) State authorization, support, or acquiescence; (c) refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person; and (d) intention to remove the person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period. Applied as the controlling statutory framework for evaluating whether enforced disappearance was established.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Inting, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred.