Mora Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee

A marriage solemnized in the Philippines according to Mohammedan religious rites by a Mohammedan priest (Iman) is valid under Section IX of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68), which curatively validates any prior marriage solemnized before a person professing authority therefor, if celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they were lawfully married. The provision is not restricted to Christian marriages but applies to all marriages regardless of religion, in accordance with the governmental policy of religious toleration toward the Mohammedan population.

Cheong Boo was a Chinese national who migrated to the Philippine Islands sometime before 1896 and settled in Basilan, where he married Mora Adong according to Mohammedan rites. He also claimed a prior marriage in Amoy, China, to Tan Dit, from which union Cheong Seng Gee was allegedly born. The dispute arose upon Cheong Boo's intestate death in 1919, when competing claims to his estate were asserted by the descendants of the alleged Chinese marriage and the widow and daughters of the Philippine Mohammedan marriage. The governing statute was the Marriage Law, General Order No. 68, enacted during the American colonial period, which contained provisions on the recognition of foreign marriages, the authority of officiating persons, and a curative clause validating prior marriages solemnized by persons professing authority. The case also implicated longstanding governmental policy, articulated through the Treaty of Paris, the Instructions to the Philippine Commission, the Philippine Bill, the Jones Law, and various statutes, guaranteeing religious freedom and non-interference with the customs of the Moro population.

Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919, leaving property worth nearly ₱100,000. His estate was claimed by two competing parties. Cheong Seng Gee alleged that he was the legitimate child of Cheong Boo by a marriage contracted in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the Emperor Quang Su, or February 16, 1895, to a woman named Tan Dit. Mora Adong, for her part, alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, according to Mohammedan rites, and she claimed the estate together with her daughters Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.

The claimant Cheong Seng Gee presented witnesses who testified to having attended the Chinese marriage ceremony and introduced a document in Chinese described as a matrimonial letter, in which Tan Chao, nephew of the bride, accepted the offer of marriage from Chiong Ing, father of the bridegroom, for the marriage of Cheong Boo to Tan Dit. Cheong Boo was said to have remained in China for one year and four months after the marriage, during which time Cheong Seng Gee was born. Cheong Boo then departed for the Philippine Islands and never returned to China. He apparently never corresponded with his Chinese wife and had no further relations with her except for sending her ₱10 on one occasion. In 1910, Cheong Seng Gee followed to the Philippines and was permitted to land as the son of Cheong Boo, as shown by immigration documents. The trial judge, however, found the proof of the Chinese marriage insufficient, noting a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially Cheong Boo's brother, to overstep the limits of truthfulness in protecting Cheong Seng Gee's interests, and crediting reliable witnesses who placed Cheong Boo in Jolo in 1895, when he was supposed to have been in China.

As to the Mohammedan marriage, the evidence showed that in 1896, Cheong Boo was in Basilan, where he married Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, solemnized by the Mohammedan Iman Habubakar. The ceremony was attested by the bride herself, the Iman, the bride's father Marahadja Sahibil, and the chief of the rancheria. The groom gave a dowry of ₱250 in money and ₱250 in goods. The rites began with the bride and groom seated in the bride's father's house, the Iman reading from the Koran and asking the parents if they had any objection, and the marriage being consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net. From that day until Cheong Boo's death twenty-three years later, the couple cohabited as husband and wife and had five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, survived. Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife in relations with third persons and in several private and public documents, including decrees of registration, and as late as 1918 gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter Payang.

The conflicting claims were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. Judge Quirico Abeto found that the Chinese marriage was not sufficiently established but that Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child, and that the Mohammedan marriage was factually proved but could not be held lawful under Philippine law, so that Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The trial court ordered partition of the estate among the three natural children. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed in substance with the trial court's factual findings but diverged on the legal question of the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.

• Sufficiency of Proof of Chinese Marriage: Cheong Seng Gee maintained that the Chinese marriage was validly contracted in Amoy in 1895 and that he was the legitimate son of Cheong Boo and Tan Dit, entitling him to the estate as a legitimate child.
• Invalidity of Mohammedan Marriage: Counsel for Cheong Seng Gee argued that marriages performed according to Mohammedan rites were not valid under the Marriage Law, insinuating further that Moro witnesses were predisposed to favor relatives or friends in their testimony, especially when not sworn on the Koran.

• Validity of Mohammedan Marriage: Mora Adong contended that her marriage to Cheong Boo was lawfully solemnized according to Mohammedan religious ceremonies by a duly authorized Iman, and that the marriage was validated by the curative provisions of Section IX of the Marriage Law, entitling her and her daughters to the rights of a lawful widow and legitimate children.
• Insufficiency of Chinese Marriage Proof: Mora Adong argued that the alleged Chinese marriage was not proved by clear, strong, and unequivocal evidence, and that no competent testimony had been presented on the marriage laws of China in the Province of Amoy as of 1895.

• Validity of the Chinese Marriage: Whether the alleged marriage contracted in China in 1895 between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit was validly proved and recognized in the Philippines.
• Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage: Whether a marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion is valid under the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68).

• Validity of the Chinese Marriage: No. The alleged Chinese marriage was not adequately proved, there being no competent testimony as to the marriage laws of China in the Province of Amoy in 1895 and no proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the marriage.
• Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage: Yes. The Mohammedan marriage was valid under Section IX of the Marriage Law, a curative provision that validates prior marriages solemnized by any person professing authority therefor, if celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they were lawfully married.

• Validity of the Chinese Marriage: Under Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68), marriages contracted outside the Philippines are valid in the Philippines if they would be valid by the laws of the country where contracted. To establish a valid foreign marriage under this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and then to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar, no competent testimony was presented as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. The documentary evidence, described as a matrimonial letter, was insufficient to establish the marriage, and the trial court found the Chinese witnesses inclined to overstep the limits of truthfulness. The immigration documents merely established the parent-child relationship between Cheong Boo and Cheong Seng Gee, not the marriage. Applying the standard from Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, the proof must be so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior marriage; such proof was lacking. The lower court's allowance of Cheong Seng Gee's rights as an acknowledged natural child was not challenged by the oppositor-appellant and was thus left undisturbed.

• Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage: Three sections of the Marriage Law were examined. Section V authorizes solemnization by a judge, justice of the peace, or "priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination." The word "priest" was held to include a Mohammedan Iman—one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and serving as a medium of worship—and "minister of the Gospel" was held to encompass clergymen of every denomination and faith, including Mohammedanism. Section VI provides that no particular form for the ceremony is required, provided the parties declare in the presence of the solemnizing person that they take each other as husband and wife; the two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent, the latter inferable from the ceremony, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this case, consent was established by the fact that the couple took each other as husband and wife and cohabited as such for twenty-three years. The controlling provision, however, was Section IX, a curative statute validating any marriage heretofore solemnized before a person professing authority therefor, if celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they were lawfully married. The language of Section IX was held to be all-embracing, retrospective, and unrestricted by religion. The trial judge's construction limiting the provision to marriages under Spanish law before revolutionary authorities was rejected as unsupported by the text. The provision was further reinforced by the longstanding governmental policy of religious toleration toward the Moro population, as expressed in the Treaty of Paris, the Instructions to the Philippine Commission, the Philippine Bill, the Jones Law, and various statutes and treaties guaranteeing the free exercise of Mohammedan religion and respect for Moro customs. The presumption in favor of marriage—semper praesumitur pro matrimonio—and the public policy favoring the legitimization of marital unions supported the conclusion. The consequences of holding otherwise would have been far-reaching, as the census showed at least 150,000 Moros married according to local custom, whose unions and children would be rendered illegitimate. The decisions in United States vs. Tubban and United States vs. Verzola, which had reached contrary conclusions on tribal and Spanish-regime marriages, were distinguished as criminal cases that did not consider Section IX and were not controlling, with the Court expressing willingness to revoke their doctrine if necessary.

• Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio (Presumption in Favor of Marriage) — The presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married, because such is the common order of society. The Court applied this presumption to uphold the Mohammedan marriage of Mora Adong and Cheong Boo, who had cohabited as husband and wife for twenty-three years and held themselves out as married in public and private documents.

• Curative Validity of Marriages (Section IX, General Order No. 68) — A curative statutory provision validating prior marriages solemnized before any person professing authority therefor, regardless of informality, irregularity, or omission, if celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they were lawfully married. The Court held this provision to be all-embracing, retrospective, and not restricted to Christian marriages, applying it to validate Mohammedan marriages solemnized in the Philippines.

• Proof of Foreign Marriage — To establish a valid foreign marriage under the comity provision of Section IV of the Marriage Law, it is necessary to prove before the courts the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and then to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence—proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the marriage. The Court applied this standard and found the alleged Chinese marriage unproved for lack of both proof of Chinese marriage law and convincing evidence of the marriage.

• Essentials of a Valid Marriage — The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. No particular form for the ceremony is required; consent may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. The Court applied this principle to find that the Mohammedan ceremony, though addressed more to the elders than to the participants, nonetheless manifested the parties' consent, as they took each other as husband and wife and cohabited as such for twenty-three years.

• "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married." — This is the text of Section IX of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68), the curative provision that the Court held to be controlling and all-embracing, validating Mohammedan marriages solemnized in the Philippines regardless of the officiant's formal authority.

• "We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is as obvious as the law is plain." — This passage articulates the Court's recognition of the far-reaching social consequences of its ruling, given that at least 150,000 Moros had been married according to local custom, and frames the validation of Mohammedan marriages as a matter of both legal duty and public policy.

• "A Mohammedan Iman is a 'priest or minister of the Gospel,' and Mohammedanism is a 'denomination,' within the meaning of the Marriage Law." — This statement defines the Court's interpretation of Section V of the Marriage Law, holding that the statutory language authorizing solemnization by a "priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination" encompasses non-Christian religious officiants and sects.

• Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. 137 (1910); 228 U.S. 335 (1913) — Leading controlling precedent on the standard of proof required to establish an alleged prior foreign marriage against an existing Philippine marriage. Both the Philippine and United States Supreme Courts held that a Philippine marriage followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital life should not be impugned by an alleged prior Chinese marriage save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. The Court applied the same standard and found the Chinese marriage unproved.

• Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216 (1912) — Followed as a case in the same category as Sy Joc Lieng, involving conflicting claims to an estate between descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and an alleged Philippine marriage, where the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved.

• United States vs. Tubban, 29 Phil. 434 (1915) — Distinguished and potentially overruled. A criminal case involving a tribal marriage of the Kalingas, in which Section IX of General Order No. 68 was not considered. The Court stated it would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine announced therein if necessary.

• United States vs. Verzola, 33 Phil. 285 (1916) — Distinguished and potentially overruled. A criminal case involving a marriage performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the Guardia Civil, in which Section IX of General Order No. 68 was not considered. The Court stated it would unhesitatingly revoke the doctrine announced therein if necessary.

• United States vs. Villafuerte and Rabano, 4 Phil. 476 (1905) — Cited in support of the presumption in favor of marriage (semper praesumitur pro matrimonio).

• United States vs. Memoracion and Uri, 34 Phil. 633 (1916) — Cited in support of the presumption in favor of marriage.

• Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616 (1914) — Cited as an example of statutory policy permitting modification of the application of Philippine law in cases involving Mohammedans or pagans, taking into account local laws and customs.

• Section IV, Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) — Provides that all marriages contracted outside the Philippines, which would be valid by the laws of the country where contracted, are valid in the Philippines. The Court applied this comity provision to the alleged Chinese marriage and found it unproved for lack of evidence of Chinese marriage law and convincing proof of the marriage itself.

• Section V, Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) — Provides that marriage may be solemnized by a judge, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination. The Court construed "priest" and "minister of the Gospel of any denomination" to include a Mohammedan Iman and Mohammedanism as a denomination, respectively.

• Section VI, Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) — Provides that no particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage that they take each other as husband and wife. The Court found that consent was established by the ceremony, the acts of the parties, and twenty-three years of cohabitation.

• Section IX, Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) — Curative provision validating any marriage heretofore solemnized before a person professing authority therefor, if celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they were lawfully married. The Court held this provision to be the controlling and all-embracing basis for validating the Mohammedan marriage.

• Section 334, No. 28, Code of Civil Procedure — Establishes the presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. The Court relied on this presumption in upholding the Mohammedan marriage.

• Article X, Treaty of Paris — Guaranteed that the inhabitants of the territories over which Spain ceded sovereignty would be secured in the free exercise of religion. The Court cited this as part of the governmental policy of religious toleration supporting the validity of Mohammedan marriages.

• Instructions to the Philippine Commission — Imposed the inviolable rule that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute. The Court cited this as part of the policy framework supporting religious freedom for the Mohammedan population.

• Act No. 2520, Section 3, Philippine Commission — Authorized judges and justices of the peace deciding civil cases involving Mohammedans or pagans to modify the application of Philippine law, taking into account local laws and customs. The Court cited this as an example of legislative policy accommodating Moro customs.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.