Montes vs. Court of Appeals

A petition for prohibition must be dismissed when the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping, has disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy by filing directly with the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals, and the act sought to be enjoined has already been implemented.

Carlito L. Montes served as Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). An administrative complaint for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service was filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman by Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla, both connected with DOST, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-98-0556. The complaint arose from Montes's recording of private conversations with the DOST Secretary and with Fontanilla without their knowledge or consent, in violation of Republic Act No. 4200, the Anti-Wiretapping Law. A criminal information for violation of R.A. No. 4200 was also filed against Montes before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 168, docketed as Criminal Case No. 116118, which was later dismissed on technicality and lack of jurisdiction on 2 February 2001.

Carlito L. Montes was the Chief of the Legal Division of the Department of Science and Technology. On 15 July 1999, while adducing evidence against Imelda D. Rodriguez and the DOST Secretary in a complaint for misconduct he had filed before the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), Montes produced a tape recording of a private conversation he had with the DOST Secretary. Montes admitted that he had taped the conversation at the DOST Secretary's Office without the Secretary's knowledge and consent a few days after 28 November 1993. He publicly played the recording during the hearing and marked it as Exhibit "VV." During cross-examination, Montes likewise admitted that he had recorded a private conversation he had with Elizabeth Fontanilla at the DOST Office in Taguig sometime in November 1997, also without her knowledge and consent.

In two missives Montes sent to Pedro A. del Rosario, Jr., he mentioned the existence of tape recordings he had made of conversations with other people. Sometime in June 1998, Montes replayed for Eduardo Langara the taped conversations he had with Secretary William G. Padolina and Fontanilla. PCAGC Prosecutor Mariano C. Quintos, Jr. also stated in an affidavit dated 30 April 1998 that Montes submitted to him tape recordings Montes had made of his conversations with Fontanilla.

Rodriguez and Fontanilla filed an administrative complaint against Montes before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-98-0556, charging him with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave misconduct, holding that his taping of conversations with Fontanilla was prohibited by R.A. No. 4200, the Anti-Wiretapping Law, and suspended him for one year without pay. Montes's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in an Order dated 2 March 2000.

Montes then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 58267. The appellate court dismissed the petition outright on 4 May 2000 for procedural infirmities: failure to state the specific date of receipt of the Ombudsman's Decision, failure to attach duplicate originals or certified true copies of the challenged Decision and Order, and failure to provide an explanation for non-personal service upon the DOST Secretary. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution on 22 June 2000 requiring the Ombudsman to file a comment, indicating the motion had not been fully resolved. Meanwhile, on 28 June 2000, the DOST Secretary issued the assailed suspension order directing Montes's suspension for one year without pay effective 16 July 2000. Montes filed the instant petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court on 19 July 2000, while his motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Court of Appeals. The suspension order was implemented on 17 July 2000.

• Premature Implementation: Montes argued that the implementation of the suspension order was premature considering the pendency of his petition before the appellate court. Citing Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, he asserted that there is no law or provision in R.A. No. 6770 or Administrative Order No. 7 mandating the immediate execution of the Ombudsman's decision in an administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one year.
• Jurisdiction of Regular Courts: Montes contended that the administrative complaint, which charged a violation of R.A. No. 4200, is cognizable by the regular courts considering the imposable penalty.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Montes complained that he was convicted of the alleged wiretapping by mere substantial evidence, which is short of the quantum of evidence required for conviction of a criminal offense.
• Prior Criminal Case: In his Memorandum, Montes reiterated that the Ombudsman should not have proceeded to hear the administrative complaint considering that an Information had already been filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 168.

• Forum Shopping: The Ombudsman and DOST, through the Solicitor General, asserted that the filing of the instant petition constituted a violation of the proscription against forum shopping.
• Immediate Execution: They argued that the execution of the suspension order despite the pendency of an appeal is allowed under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 14-A-00.
• Fait Accompli: They contended that a prohibitory injunction is not proper because the act sought to be restrained is already fait accompli, the suspension order having already been implemented.
• No Basis for TRO: Montes failed to raise any valid reason warranting the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of prohibition.

• Forum Shopping: Whether Montes committed forum shopping by filing the petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court while his motion for reconsideration was pending before the Court of Appeals.
• Adequacy of Remedy and Judicial Hierarchy: Whether Montes had no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and whether he properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy.
• Mootness: Whether the petition for prohibition has been rendered moot by the implementation of the suspension order.

• Forum Shopping: Yes. Montes transgressed the proscription against forum shopping by seeking the same relief — restraint of the DOST Secretary from implementing the suspension order — simultaneously from the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court while his motion for reconsideration was still pending.
• Adequacy of Remedy and Judicial Hierarchy: No adequate remedy was lacking; Montes had the remedy of filing a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals as an incident of his pending petition for certiorari. He also disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy by filing directly with the Supreme Court without special or important reasons.
• Mootness: The petition was rendered moot. The suspension order was already implemented on 17 July 2000, making the act sought to be enjoined a fait accompli, and prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that has already taken place.

• Forum Shopping: Forum shopping exists when a party seeks to obtain remedies in one court that had already been solicited in other courts or proceedings in other tribunals, or when a party institutes two or more proceedings grounded on the same cause in the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. When Montes filed the petition for prohibition on 19 July 2000, his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending before the Court of Appeals, as shown by the appellate court's Resolution of 22 June 2000 requiring the Ombudsman to file a comment. The relief sought from the appellate court — that the DOST Secretary be restrained from implementing the Ombudsman's Order — was identical to the relief prayed for in the present petition. By filing the instant petition without awaiting the resolution of his pending motion, Montes sought simultaneous remedies in two different fora, which is censurable and warrants dismissal with prejudice.

• Adequacy of Remedy and Judicial Hierarchy: For a writ of prohibition to issue, the petitioner must establish, among other requisites, that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution. When the DOST issued the suspension order on 28 June 2000, Montes's motion for reconsideration was still pending before the appellate court. Montes thus had the remedy of filing a petition for prohibition before the Court of Appeals as an incident of his pending petition for certiorari, which could have been consolidated therewith. Furthermore, Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, which requires that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist, and that such jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions before the Court of Appeals or tribunals not controllable by that court. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, the specific action must be presented to either of those courts.

• Mootness: Prohibition is a preventive remedy. Montes himself manifested that the suspension order had already been implemented on 17 July 2000. The act sought to be enjoined having already taken place, there was nothing more to restrain. The petition was thus rendered a mere subject of theoretical interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. Montes's own admission that he had to file the instant petition in view of the denial of his motion for reconsideration before the appellate court implicitly confirmed forum shopping, while the same implementation of the suspension order that impelled him to abandon his motion for reconsideration also rendered the instant petition academic.

• Proscription Against Forum Shopping — Forum shopping occurs when a party seeks to obtain remedies in one court that had already been solicited in other courts or proceedings in other tribunals, or when a party institutes two or more proceedings grounded on the same cause in the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. It is an act of malpractice that trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. Willful and deliberate forum shopping constitutes direct contempt and a ground for administrative sanctions, as well as summary dismissal of the case with prejudice. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that Montes sought the identical relief — restraint of the DOST Secretary from implementing the suspension order — from both the Court of Appeals (via his pending motion for reconsideration) and the Supreme Court (via the instant petition), warranting dismissal with prejudice.

• Doctrine of Judicial Hierarchy — The Supreme Court is a court of last resort and should not be burdened with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, the specific action must be presented to either of those courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts does not give parties absolute freedom of choice of forum; there is an ordained sequence of recourse beginning from the lowest court. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that Montes filed the petition directly with the Supreme Court without any special or important reason, when the Court of Appeals was fully competent to act on the matter as an incident of his pending petition for certiorari.

• Requisites for Issuance of a Writ of Prohibition — A writ of prohibition requires: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board, or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. The Court found that Montes failed to satisfy the third requisite because he had an available remedy before the Court of Appeals.

• Prohibition Does Not Lie Against a Fait Accompli — Prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that has already taken place. Because the suspension order was already implemented on 17 July 2000, the petition was rendered moot and of merely theoretical interest.

• "There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals." — This passage defines the doctrine of forum shopping as applied in Philippine jurisprudence, serving as the ratio decidendi for the Court's dismissal of the petition on that ground.

• "The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance." — This quotation from Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, adopted by the Court, articulates the doctrinal basis for the principle of judicial hierarchy and explains why direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs is disfavored.

• "Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli." — This passage states the rule that a preventive remedy cannot undo what has already been done, which rendered the petition moot upon the Court's finding that the suspension order had already been implemented.

• Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738 — Cited by Montes in support of his argument that there is no law mandating the immediate execution of an Ombudsman's decision imposing suspension for one year. The Court did not rule on the merits of this argument, having dismissed the petition on procedural grounds.
• Balite vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140931, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 410 — Cited as the source of the definition of forum shopping and the statement that willful and deliberate forum shopping constitutes direct contempt and a ground for administrative sanctions and summary dismissal.
• Longino vs. General, G.R. No. 147956, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 423 — Cited for the requisites for the issuance of a writ of prohibition and the definition of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto, No. L-74766, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 753 — Cited as controlling authority for the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, establishing that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary and that litigants must observe the ordained sequence of recourse to courts.
• Yared vs. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 53 — Cited in support of the doctrine that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Regional Trial Courts does not grant parties absolute freedom of choice of forum.
• Gonzales vs. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, 337 SCRA 733 — Cited for the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.

• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the petition for prohibition and the petition for certiorari. The Court applied the requisites for prohibition under Rule 65 and found that Montes failed to satisfy the requirement of showing the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Law) — The substantive law underlying the administrative complaint against Montes. The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of grave misconduct for violating this law by recording private conversations without the consent of the parties.
• Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Montes cited this law to argue that there is no provision mandating the immediate execution of the Ombudsman's decision imposing suspension for one year. The Court did not rule on this argument.
• Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) — Cited by Montes in support of his argument against immediate execution. The Court did not rule on this argument.
• Administrative Order No. 14-A-00 — Cited by respondents to support their argument that execution of the suspension order despite the pendency of an appeal is allowed under Section 7 thereof.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification that the conclusions in the Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Associate Justice, Chairperson), Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.