Montelibano vs. Ferrer

Under section 22 of the Charter of the City of Bacolod, the City Attorney has exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the city's courts; a criminal complaint filed directly by the offended party, without the City Attorney's intervention and over his opposition, cannot be entertained.

Capitol Subdivision Inc., of which petitioner Alfredo Montelibano was president and general manager, had leased Lot No. 1205-I-1 to respondent Jose F. Benares for five crop years ending in crop-year 1944-1945, with an option for another five crop years. The legal question concerned the authority of the City Attorney of Bacolod under section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326, as against Section 2 of Rule 106, which defines a complaint as a sworn statement subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other employee of the government.

Capitol Subdivision Inc., through its president and general manager Alfredo Montelibano, had leased Lot No. 1205-I-1 to Jose F. Benares for five crop years ending in crop-year 1944-1945, with an option for another five crop years. On June 5, 1951, the Subdivision filed an unlawful detainer case against Benares in the Municipal Court of Bacolod, which ordered his ejectment. Benares appealed to the CFI of Negros Occidental, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1896. On motion of the Subdivision, the CFI issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding Benares to turn over the lot to the Subdivision, which posted a bond undertaking to pay Benares "all damages which he may sustain" by reason of the writ "if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto."

Because Benares continued planting on the lot instead of delivering it, the Subdivision filed a petition to declare him in contempt. The CFI denied the petition in an order dated April 30, 1953, but required Benares to "immediately and promptly obey the order of preliminary mandatory injunction." On June 5, 1953, the provincial sheriff delivered the land to the Subdivision. Acting upon instructions of Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land of the sugarcane planted by Benares.

On June 13, 1953, Benares filed a criminal complaint with the Municipal Court of the City of Bacolod, docketed as Case No. 2864, charging Montelibano as author by inducement and Pastor Mallorca, Gonzalgo de la Torre, and Jose Articulo as authors by direct participation with malicious mischief. The complaint alleged that on or about June 5, 7, and 8, 1953, in Bacolod, the accused conspired and helped one another to willfully, unlawfully, and deliberately cause damage to Benares's sugarcane plantation, intentionally using a bulldozer and completely destroying eighteen hectares of sugarcane, allegedly under the impulse of hatred and a desire for revenge because Montelibano had failed in his attempt to have Benares punished for contempt of court in Civil Case No. 1896, causing damage of more than P13,000.

Upon the filing of the complaint, Municipal Judge Felix S. Ferrer gave it due course and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. It was not disputed that Benares filed the complaint directly with the Municipal Court and that the City Attorney had no intervention whatsoever and expressed his opposition in open court. On June 22, 1953, petitioners filed a motion to quash the warrant and complaint on the grounds that only the City Attorney was authorized by the Charter of the City of Bacolod to initiate criminal cases and that the case involved a prejudicial question. The Municipal Court denied the motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners then filed Civil Case No. 2828 in the CFI of Negros Occidental for certiorari and mandamus, seeking to annul and vacate the proceedings in Case No. 2864, to hold that the Municipal Judge had no jurisdiction, and to dismiss the case, with a preliminary injunction. The CFI issued the writ of preliminary injunction and later dismissed the petition, dissolved the injunction, and taxed costs against petitioners.

• Exclusive Authority of the City Attorney: Petitioners argued that under section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326, the City Attorney of Bacolod is the only officer authorized to initiate criminal cases in the city's courts, and because the City Attorney opposed the complaint, the Municipal Court could not entertain it.
• Prejudicial Question: Petitioners argued that Case No. 2864 involved a prejudicial question.

• City Attorney's Power Merely Declaratory: Respondents argued that section 22 of the Charter of the City of Bacolod merely declared the powers of the City Attorney and did not preclude the application of Section 2 of Rule 106, which allows a complaint subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other employee of the government.

• Authority to File Criminal Complaint: Whether the Municipal Court of Bacolod may entertain a criminal complaint filed directly by the offended party, without the intervention of and over the opposition of the City Attorney, under section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326.

• Authority to File Criminal Complaint: No. Under section 22 of the Charter of the City of Bacolod, the City Attorney has exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the city's courts; a complaint filed directly by the offended party without the City Attorney's intervention and over his opposition cannot be entertained.

• Authority to File Criminal Complaint: Section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326 provides that the City Attorney "shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of the city," and "shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violation of ordinances, and have the necessary informations or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused." The SC found this provision substantially identical to the Manila Charter provisions — Section 39 of the Manila Charter, Section 2437 of the Old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), Section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, and Section 38 of Republic Act No. 409 — which had been consistently construed to mean that criminal complaints in Manila may be filed only with the City Fiscal, who has exclusive authority to institute criminal cases. Because the Bacolod Charter reproduced the Manila provisions after that settled interpretation, the framers were presumed to have adopted the construction; under the rule on reenacted statutes, the SC follows the construction the provisions received when previously in force. Respondents' reliance on Section 2 of Rule 106 did not change the result: Espiritu vs. Dela Rosa had refused mandamus to compel the CFI of Manila to accept a complaint filed directly by the offended party without the City Fiscal, and Hashim vs. Boncan held that the Administrative Code provisions were not repealed by the Rules of Court. Sayo vs. Chief of Police likewise stated that in Manila a complaint charging an offense cognizable by the courts is not filed with the municipal court but with the City Fiscal. Since Benares filed the complaint directly with the Municipal Court and the City Attorney had no intervention and opposed it, the Municipal Court had no authority to entertain Case No. 2864.

• Exclusive Authority of the City Attorney under the Bacolod Charter — Section 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326 gives the City Attorney charge of prosecution and the duty to investigate and prepare complaints; this implies exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in Bacolod courts. A complaint filed directly by the offended party, without the City Attorney and over his opposition, cannot be entertained.
• Reenacted Statutes Adopt Prior Judicial Construction — When a statute is substantially reenacted after courts have construed it, the legislature is presumed to have adopted that construction. The Bacolod Charter copied Manila Charter provisions that had been interpreted to give the City Fiscal exclusive authority, so the same interpretation applies.
• Rules of Court Do Not Repeal City Charter Provisions on Prosecution — Section 2 of Rule 106, defining a complaint as a sworn statement subscribed by the offended party, does not override a city charter that vests the initiation of criminal cases in the City Attorney or City Fiscal. The SC relied on Espiritu vs. Dela Rosa and Hashim vs. Boncan.

• ". . . The City attorney . . . shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals." — This is the Bacolod Charter provision the SC construed as giving the City Attorney exclusive authority to institute criminal cases.
• "The city attorney shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violation of ordinances, and have the necessary informations or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused." — This second sentence of section 22 was part of the basis for holding that the City Attorney controls the preparation and filing of complaints.
• "It is clear, therefore, that, in the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City Fiscal, who is thereby given, by implication, the exclusive authority to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the provisions of its Charter..." — The SC's construction of the Manila Charter, which it applied to the substantially identical Bacolod Charter.
• "In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force." — The rule used to apply the settled Manila construction to the Bacolod Charter.

• Espiritu vs. Dela Rosa, 45 Off. Gaz. 196 — Relied on; the SC had refused mandamus to compel the CFI of Manila to accept a complaint filed directly by the offended party without the City Fiscal.
• Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216 — Followed; held that Administrative Code provisions on the City Fiscal were not repealed by the Rules of Court and that criminal complaints should be filed with that officer.
• Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 45 Off. Gaz. 4875 — Followed; in Manila, a complaint charging an offense cognizable by the courts is not filed with the municipal court but with the City Fiscal.
• In re Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 77 — Cited for the rule that reenacted statutes are construed as adopting the construction they received when previously in force.

• Section 22, Commonwealth Act No. 326 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) — The SC applied this provision to hold that the City Attorney has charge of prosecution and investigation and preparation of complaints, giving exclusive authority to institute criminal cases.
• Section 2, Rule 106, Rules of Court — Defines a complaint as a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other employee of the government; respondents invoked it, but the SC held it did not authorize a direct filing contrary to the city charter.
• Section 39 of the Manila Charter, Section 2437 of the Old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), Section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, and Section 38 of Republic Act No. 409 — Cited as substantially identical Manila Charter provisions whose settled interpretation was adopted for the Bacolod Charter.