Montecillo and Del Mar vs. Gica, et al.

A lawyer who resorts to veiled threats, abusive language, and accusations of unjust judgment against courts in an attempt to compel reconsideration of an adverse decision commits contempt of court and is subject to disciplinary action, including suspension from the practice of law. The Court held that such conduct challenges the integrity of the courts and tends to erode public faith in the administration of justice.

Atty. Quirico del Mar was a practicing lawyer in Cebu City who served as counsel for Jorge Montecillo in a case involving oral defamation. The underlying dispute arose from an alleged slander committed by Montecillo against Francisco M. Gica, where Montecillo allegedly called Gica "stupid" or "fool." The case involved both criminal and civil proceedings arising from the same incident. The Court noted that the case was decided during the period of martial law, when certain penal violations were placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines.

Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City served as counsel for Jorge Montecillo in a case arising from an alleged slander. As a result of an alleged slander committed by Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica — the former allegedly calling the latter "stupid" or "fool" — Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in the criminal case, and in the civil case, the Cebu City Court found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid." Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages, and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Gica appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, but the Court of First Instance upheld the City Court's decision. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review and docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, in a decision penned by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., promulgated on September 27, 1972, reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and ruled in favor of Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored him "on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence," concluding that "some words must have come from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica." The appellate court awarded Gica five hundred pesos as damages.

As counsel for Montecillo, del Mar moved for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence," and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. The Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972, observing that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification, and that it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Del Mar persisted and filed a second motion for reconsideration without leave of court, making another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will be interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."

The Appellate Court, in its resolution of November 27, 1972, ordered del Mar to explain within 10 days why he should not be punished for contempt. On December 5, 1972, del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow. On the same date, he sent a letter to the Justices of the Fourth Division informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof. On December 8, 1972, del Mar sent another letter to the same Justices wherein he reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked.

The Appellate Court, in its Resolution of March 5, 1973, found del Mar guilty of contempt, condemned him to pay a fine of P200.00, and ordered him suspended from the practice of law, with certified copies of the papers elevated to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to the order of suspension when, in its resolution dated November 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant was directed to circularize all courts about the order of suspension.

Not satisfied, del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R. That case was terminated by compromise agreement after del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint, apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendant-Justices. Del Mar then filed a motion on October 10, 1973, asking that his suspension be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in the civil case.

When the Supreme Court denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari, del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter to the Clerk of Court requesting the names of the Justices who supported the resolution denying his petition. The motion for reconsideration was denied on June 15, 1973. Del Mar then filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, stating brazenly that had the Clerk of Court furnished him with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court, "I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination."

The Supreme Court required del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. In his explanation dated August 1, 1973, del Mar attached the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines and the civil case he instituted against the Justices, stating that he decided "to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies." In an additional explanation dated September 26, 1973, he stated that "graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government." In a memorandum dated December 20, 1973, del Mar stated that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically, asked for forgiveness for any mistakes, but persisted in his view that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision and that the Justices knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code. He also stated that he had decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law.

• Nature of Statements: Del Mar argued that he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow, and that the Appellate Court could not be threatened.
• Justification for Conduct: Del Mar argued that his contemptuous statements were justified by the alleged existence of graft, corruption, and injustice rampant in and outside of the Government, and that his actions were aimed at exposing "the corroding evils extant in our Government."
• Physical and Mental Condition: Del Mar argued that he suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically, that his sight was blurred and his reasoning faulty, and that he asked for forgiveness for any mistakes he might have committed.
• Voluntary Retirement: Del Mar argued that for reasons of sickness and old age, he had decided to retire from the practice of law and hoped that with the approval of the Supreme Court, he could be released from his obligations to his clients regarding all his pending cases.

N/A — The decision does not recount separate arguments from the respondents (the Justices of the Court of Appeals) beyond their resolutions finding del Mar in contempt.

• Contempt by Threats and Abusive Language: Whether Atty. Quirico del Mar's veiled threats and abusive language directed at the Court of Appeals Justices constituted contempt of court warranting suspension from the practice of law.
• Contempt Toward the Supreme Court: Whether del Mar's contemptuous statements and veiled threats against the Supreme Court in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action.
• Voluntary Retirement: Whether del Mar could be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law to evade the disciplinary action of the Court.

• Contempt by Threats and Abusive Language: Yes. The Court of Appeals' resolution of March 5, 1973, finding del Mar guilty of contempt and suspending him from the practice of law was affirmed, the Court having found that his repeated veiled threats and abusive language constituted pure contumely for the tribunal.
• Contempt Toward the Supreme Court: Yes. Del Mar's contemptuous statements in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, constituted misconduct toward the Supreme Court, and he was suspended from the practice of law until further orders of the Court.
• Voluntary Retirement: No. A practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, as this would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor.

• Contempt by Threats and Abusive Language: The Court quoted with approval the Appellate Court's observation that "a just man can never be threatened" is not true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened, and the offense is committed whether the threats do or do not succeed. The Court noted that del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for reconsideration, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices by insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment. The Court observed that del Mar's conduct in suing the three Justices for damages, which was terminated by compromise agreement after he apologized and agreed to pay nominal moral damages, was an undeniable indication that he not only threatened the Justices but actually carried out his threat. The Court held that the intemperate and imprudent act of del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make the Courts reconsider their respective stand "cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals."

• Contempt Toward the Supreme Court: The Court found that del Mar's manifestation of July 1, 1973, contained veiled threats of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at the Supreme Court for their judicial acts. The Court noted that his explanation of August 1, 1973, was "more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements" and revealed a continued veiled threat against the Justices who voted to deny his petition. The Court observed that del Mar's additional explanation was "a toned-down justification of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret." The Court held that del Mar's allegation that the Courts "knowingly rendered unjust judgment" meant that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. The Court stated: "We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice."

• Voluntary Retirement: The Court held that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, "an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor." The Court denied del Mar's prayer to retire without prejudice to his making arrangements directly with his clients.

• Duty of lawyers to maintain respect for the courts — Second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court). The Court applied this doctrine in finding that del Mar's threats and abusive language toward the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court constituted a serious breach of this duty, warranting disciplinary action.

• Criminal contempt — Criminal contempt is conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. The Court applied this definition in holding that del Mar's veiled threats to bludgeon the Justices into reconsidering their decision, and his accusations that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment, constituted criminal contempt.

• Lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court — As an officer of the court, it is the lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard toward the court so essential to the proper administration of justice. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that del Mar's conduct in challenging the integrity of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case was a serious disrespect that tended to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts.

• "A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed." — This passage, quoted with approval from the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, establishes that the offense of contempt is committed regardless of whether the threats succeed, and was central to the Court's finding of contempt.

• "Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." — This passage defines criminal contempt and was applied by the Court in evaluating del Mar's conduct toward both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

• "We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice." — This passage articulates the Court's concern that del Mar's conduct undermined public confidence in the judiciary and was central to the Court's decision to impose disciplinary sanctions.

• People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 — Cited for the proposition that it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude; as an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken.
• In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 — Cited for the proposition that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
• Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441 — Cited for the proposition that lawyers may come up with various methods in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved, and that the language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
• In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562 — Cited in the dispositive portion in connection with the indefinite suspension of del Mar from the practice of law.

• Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court — The provision imposing upon attorneys the duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The Court cited this provision in reminding lawyers of their paramount duty to respect the courts.
• Section 9, Rule 139, Rules of Court — The provision pursuant to which the Court of Appeals elevated certified copies of the contempt proceedings to the Supreme Court for disciplinary action.
• Section 29, Rule 138, Rules of Court — The provision pursuant to which the Court deemed the matter submitted for decision after del Mar manifested that there was no need for further investigation of the facts involved.
• Article 204, Revised Penal Code — The provision on knowingly rendering unjust judgment, which del Mar invoked in his threats against the Court of Appeals Justices and in his persistent justification of his conduct.
• Articles 171 and 205, Revised Penal Code — The provisions referenced by del Mar in his second motion for reconsideration, relating to falsification and judgment rendered through negligence, which the Court viewed as veiled threats against the Appellate Court.

Chief Justice Makalintal, and Justices Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino concurred. Justice Fernando took no part.

N/A — The decision does not mention any dissenting opinions.