Montebon vs. Director of Prisons

All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid, and remain so after the liberation or re-occupation of the territory by the legitimate government under the doctrine of jus postliminii. The recommitment of a prisoner by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine Executive Commission, made pursuant to Administrative Order No. 21 which transferred the powers of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, was a valid exercise of authority that bound the restored Commonwealth Government.

The case arose in the context of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II. The Philippine Executive Commission was established as a de facto government under the Japanese occupation, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces proclaimed on January 2, 1942, that all laws then in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, would continue to be effective "so far as the military administration permits." Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21, 1942, abolished the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and the Board of Pardons, transferring their powers, duties, and functions to the Commissioner of Justice. The Indeterminate Sentence Act was part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system, directly related to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order.

Alfonso Montebon filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Elpidio S. Cruz, a prisoner at the Iwahig Penal Colony. A similar petition had previously been filed by Felicisima Santiago in the name of the same prisoner (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil., 927), which was denied by the Court on January 30, 1947, on the ground of the alleged illegality of one of the prisoner's three convictions for estafa. The present application contested the validity of the prisoner's recommitment decreed by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine Executive Commission on June 3, 1943, for the unexpired portion of his maximum aggregate sentences in three cases in which he had been paroled by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June 26, 1941, when he still had over five years to serve.

The Commissioner of Justice's recommitment order was made by virtue of Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21, 1942, and approved by the Chairman of the Executive Commission, which read: "The Board of Indeterminate Sentence and the Board of Pardons having been abolished, the powers, duties and functions thereof shall henceforth be assumed and exercised by the Commissioner of Justice." The petitioner did not reveal the nature of his interest in the prisoner's incarceration, or what relation, if any, he had with him.

The Court noted that while res judicata as an inflexible doctrine has been held not to apply in habeas corpus proceedings, the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion may give controlling weight to the prior refusal, as was done in Wong Doo vs. United States. No reason was shown why the petitioner did not question in the first petition the legality of the recommitment order of the Commissioner of Justice. Nevertheless, the Court chose not to dispose of the application on a point of procedural technicality, but decided it on the merits.

• Validity of Recommitment Order: Petitioner took the position that the recommitment of which he complained was not such an act of the belligerent occupant as should be accorded respect and recognition by the Commonwealth Government, now Republic of the Philippines, after the cessation of the enemy occupation.

• Authority of the Commissioner of Justice: Respondents maintained that the authority of the Commissioner of Justice under the then existing government, laws, and military, executive and administrative orders, to take over the powers, functions and duties of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, was beyond dispute.

• Validity of Recommitment Order: Whether the recommitment order issued by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine Executive Commission on June 3, 1943, was a valid act of the belligerent occupant that should be accorded respect and recognition by the Commonwealth Government after the cessation of enemy occupation.

• Validity of Recommitment Order: Yes. The recommitment order was valid and binding. The authority of the Commissioner of Justice to take over the powers, functions, and duties of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence was beyond dispute, and all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid, remaining so after liberation under the doctrine of jus postliminii.

• Validity of Recommitment Order: The Court reasoned that the authority of the Commissioner of Justice under the then existing government, laws, and military, executive and administrative orders to take over the powers, functions, and duties of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence was beyond dispute. In an international sense, it mattered not how the Commissioner of Justice was vested with that authority, for the government of the occupant was likely to exercise lawmaking functions through decrees or regulations emanating from a military source, which become as effective in operation as though they were expressed in statutory enactments. The Court cited Co Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) for the proposition that the Philippine Executive Commission was a de facto government.

The Court further held that the Indeterminate Sentence Act was in force during the occupation. A proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces of January 2, 1942, directed that "so far as the military administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past." This confirmed the well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a political law; it does not affect political relations. It is part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order, which Article 43 of Section III of the Hague Regulations of 1907 compels the belligerent occupant to take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure as far as possible.

Regarding the petitioner's contention that the recommitment was not such an act of the belligerent occupant as should be accorded respect and recognition after the cessation of enemy occupation, the Court referred to the Co Kim Cham case, which stated: "It is legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid." In consonance with the theory of jus postliminii in international law, such acts and proceedings remained good and valid after the liberation or re-occupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. The Court cited Hall's work on International Law, 7th ed., p. 518, according to which the fact that the territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by the invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do.

Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of occupation is not only valid and binding; it is imposed on them as a high obligation by the Hague Convention. The Court quoted William vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176, 192), cited in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon: "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace."

• Jus Postliminii — Under this doctrine in international law, acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government remain good and valid after the liberation or re-occupation of the territory by the legitimate government. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the validity of the recommitment order issued by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine Executive Commission during the Japanese occupation.

• Validity of Acts of a De Facto Government — All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The Court applied this principle, established in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon, to hold that the recommitment order issued by the Commissioner of Justice during the occupation remained valid after liberation.

• Continuity of Municipal Laws During Occupation — Municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, being part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system rather than a political law, continued in force during the occupation.

• "It is legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid." — This passage, quoted from the Co Kim Cham case, states the controlling doctrine that the Court applied to uphold the validity of the recommitment order issued by the Commissioner of Justice during the Japanese occupation.

• "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace." — This quotation from William vs. Bruffy, cited in Co Kim Cham, articulates the rationale for recognizing the validity of acts done by the forces of occupation in enforcing the criminal law and maintaining public order.

• "The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a political law. It does not affect political relations. In fact, it is a part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order." — This passage establishes why the Indeterminate Sentence Act continued in force during the occupation, as municipal laws are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty.

• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil., 113 — Controlling precedent establishing that the Philippine Executive Commission was a de facto government and that all acts and proceedings of its legislative, executive, and judicial departments are good and valid, remaining so after liberation under the doctrine of jus postliminii.

• Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil., 927 — Prior related litigation involving the same prisoner, denied on January 30, 1947, on the ground of the alleged illegality of one of the prisoner's three convictions for estafa.

• Wong Doo vs. United States, 68 Law. ed., 241 — Cited for the principle that while res judicata does not inflexibly apply in habeas corpus proceedings, the court may give controlling weight to a prior refusal where the petitioner had full opportunity to offer proof on the point raised in the second petition.

• William vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176, 192 — Cited for the proposition that the existence of a state of insurrection and war does not loosen the bonds of society or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws, supporting the validity of acts done by the forces of occupation in enforcing the criminal law.

• Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil., 856 — Referenced in the dissenting opinion of Justice Perfecto for the proposition that no governmental act shall be recognized as valid unless made under the authority of the people, on whom sovereignty resides exclusively.

• Article 43, Section III, Hague Regulations of 1907 — Compels the belligerent occupant to take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure public order and safety, which the Court cited as the basis for the validity and binding nature of the enforcement of criminal law by the forces of occupation.

• Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21, 1942 — Abolished the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and the Board of Pardons, transferring their powers, duties, and functions to the Commissioner of Justice. The Court upheld the validity of this order as an act of the de facto government.

• Indeterminate Sentence Act — The Court held that this law continued in force during the occupation, as it is not a political law but part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order.

Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concurred.

• Justice Perfecto — Dissented on the ground that both Administrative Order No. 21 and the order of the Commissioner of Justice on June 3, 1943, were null and void under a proclamation of General MacArthur and under the provisions of the Constitution. Citing his concurring opinion in Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil., 856), Justice Perfecto maintained that no governmental act shall be recognized as valid unless made under the authority of the people, on whom, according to the fundamental law, sovereignty resides exclusively. The acts of the Philippine Executive Commission and of the Commissioner of Justice during enemy occupation, having been made under the exclusive authority of the Japanese Imperial Government, should not be given any validity. He voted for the immediate release of prisoner Elpidio S. Cruz.