Montañes vs. Cipriano

A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not absolve a person of criminal liability for bigamy, because the crime is consummated at the moment the second marriage is contracted while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been judicially declared void.

Respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano contracted two marriages: the first to Socrates Flores on April 8, 1976 in Lezo, Aklan, and the second to Silverio V. Cipriano on January 24, 1983 in San Pedro, Laguna, during the subsistence of the first. Both marriages were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez is Silverio's daughter from his first marriage. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Socrates under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity), which was granted in 2003 and became final on October 13, 2003. The legal backdrop involves the interplay between Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (bigamy), Article 40 of the Family Code (requiring a prior judicial declaration of nullity before remarriage), and the question of whether Article 40 applies retroactively to marriages celebrated before the Family Code's effectivity.

On April 8, 1976, respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano married Socrates Flores in Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of that marriage and without any judicial dissolution thereof, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano in San Pedro, Laguna. Both marriages were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. According to an affidavit later executed by Silverio, respondent had failed to reveal to him that she was still married to Socrates.

In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for Annulment of her marriage to Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision declaring the marriage null and void, which became final and executory on October 13, 2003.

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio's daughter from his first marriage, filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna. On November 17, 2004, an Information for bigamy was filed with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, charging respondent with contracting a second marriage with Silverio while her first marriage to Socrates had not yet been judicially dissolved. Before arraignment, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the Information, alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus the element of two valid marriages was wanting, and that the crime had already prescribed.

The RTC initially denied the motion on August 3, 2007, applying Mercado vs. Tan, which held that a subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. The RTC also found that prescription had not set in, reckoning the discovery of the crime from November 17, 2004. Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing that Mercado was inapplicable because her first marriage was contracted before the Family Code, the annulment was final before the bigamy complaint was filed, and Article 40 could not be given retroactive effect. On September 24, 2007, the RTC reversed itself and dismissed the Information, finding that pre-Family Code jurisprudence was ambivalent on the need for a prior judicial declaration of nullity, and that laws should be liberally construed in favor of the accused. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 2, 2008.

• Subsequent Nullity Is Not a Defense: Petitioner maintained that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage does not negate criminal liability for bigamy, because the crime was already consummated when the second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the first, citing Mercado vs. Tan, Abunado vs. People, Tenebro vs. CA, and Jarillo vs. People.
• Article 40 Applies Retroactively: Petitioner argued that Article 40 of the Family Code, being a rule of procedure, applies retroactively pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code, which provides that the Code has retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights, and that no vested right attaches to procedural laws.

• Declaration of Nullity Eliminates the First Marriage: Respondent argued that because her first marriage was declared void ab initio in 2003, before the Information was filed, there was no prior marriage to speak of, and the element of two valid marriages was therefore wanting.
• Prescription: Respondent claimed that the crime of bigamy had already prescribed, since the second marriage took place in 1983, more than the 15-year prescriptive period.
• Non-Retroactivity of Article 40: Respondent contended that since both marriages were contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 cannot be given retroactive effect, as this would impair her right to remarry without securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
• Inapplicability of Tenebro vs. CA: Respondent asserted that Tenebro vs. CA is distinguishable because in that case the declaration of nullity came after the filing of the Information, whereas in her case the declaration was rendered before the Information was filed.

• Validity of Subsequent Nullity as Defense: Whether the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, obtained before the filing of the bigamy Information, constitutes a valid defense against a charge of bigamy when the second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the first.
• Retroactivity of Article 40: Whether Article 40 of the Family Code, requiring a prior judicial declaration of nullity before remarriage, may be applied retroactively to marriages contracted before the Family Code's effectivity.
• Ambivalence of Pre-Family Code Jurisprudence: Whether the trial court erred in declaring that pre-Family Code jurisprudence was ambivalent on the necessity of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage before contracting a second marriage.

• Validity of Subsequent Nullity as Defense: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial; the crime of bigamy was already consummated when respondent contracted the second marriage while the first was still subsisting and undissolved.
• Retroactivity of Article 40: Yes, Article 40 applies retroactively. Being a rule of procedure, it does not impair vested or acquired rights, as no vested right attaches to procedural laws.
• Ambivalence of Pre-Family Code Jurisprudence: Yes, the trial court erred. The requirement that a prior marriage be judicially declared void before a subsequent marriage may be contracted is not rendered ambivalent by the fact that both marriages predated the Family Code.

• Validity of Subsequent Nullity as Defense: The elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (c) the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage. At the time respondent married Silverio in 1983, her first marriage to Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting, as it had not yet been annulled or declared void. All elements of bigamy were therefore present. Consistent with Mercado vs. Tan, Abunado vs. People, Tenebro vs. CA, and Jarillo vs. People, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not change the fact that the second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the first. In Tenebro, the Court recognized that although a declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of celebration insofar as the marital vinculum is concerned, the void marriage still produces legal consequences, including criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy nugatory and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed so as to escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages. Respondent's distinction based on the timing of the declaration relative to the filing of the Information was rejected; what makes a person criminally liable is contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage, and parties may not judge for themselves the nullity of their own marriage.

• Retroactivity of Article 40: Respondent argued that because both marriages were contracted before the Family Code, the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), not Article 40. The Court rejected this, citing Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr., which held as early as 1995 that Article 40 is a rule of procedure and should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code has retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. No vested right attaches to procedural laws, so retroactive application is not violative of any right. The Court further cited Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis to illustrate the danger of not enforcing Article 40: a person could contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first, then invoke the very judgment of nullity to escape a bigamy charge, rendering the provision on bigamy nugatory.

• Ambivalence of Pre-Family Code Jurisprudence: The RTC had reasoned that because both marriages predated the Family Code and jurisprudence before its effectivity was ambivalent on the need for a prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity, the absence of such a declaration should not prejudice the accused. The Court found this reasoning erroneous. The settled rule, affirmed in multiple decisions, is that so long as there is no judicial declaration of nullity, the presumption is that the marriage exists. A person who contracts a second marriage before obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The principle of liberal construction in favor of the accused does not apply where the essential elements of the offense are sufficiently alleged in the Information.

• Consummation of Bigamy at Celebration of Second Marriage — The crime of bigamy is consummated at the moment the second or subsequent marriage is celebrated, provided the first marriage is still subsisting and has not been judicially dissolved. A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not retroactively extinguish the crime, as the elements of bigamy were already complete at the time of the second marriage's celebration. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's 2003 declaration of nullity could not absolve her of bigamy committed in 1983.

• Presumption of Validity of Marriage Absent Judicial Declaration of Nullity — Parties to a marriage may not judge for themselves its nullity; the nullity must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court, and only when so declared can the marriage be held void. So long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. A person who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first assumes the risk of prosecution for bigamy.

• Retroactive Application of Article 40 of the Family Code — Article 40, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage, is a rule of procedure and applies retroactively pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code. No vested right attaches to procedural laws, so retroactive application does not impair any right. This doctrine prevents individuals from contracting multiple marriages without prior judicial declaration of nullity and then invoking the subsequent declaration to escape bigamy liability.

• Legal Effects of Void Marriages — A marriage declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of celebration insofar as the marital vinculum is concerned, but it is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of nullity are considered legitimate. The recognition that a void marriage may still produce legal consequences includes incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

• "To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment." — This passage, quoted from Tenebro vs. CA, articulates the policy rationale for holding that a subsequent declaration of nullity does not extinguish bigamy liability, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on bigamy.

• "Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the presumption of marriage validity and the necessity of judicial declaration of nullity, a cornerstone principle in Philippine family law and bigamy jurisprudence.

• "Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy." — This is the operative rule applied to respondent, crystallizing the legal risk assumed by any person who remarries without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage.

• Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000 — Controlling precedent holding that a subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because the crime of bigamy was already consummated when the second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the first. The RTC initially relied on this case before reversing itself; the Supreme Court reaffirmed its applicability.

• Abunado vs. People, G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004 — Followed. Held that what is required for bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted, and that a subsequent declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio does not negate liability since both marriages were subsisting before the first was annulled.

• Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004 — Followed. Declared that although a judicial declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of celebration insofar as the marital vinculum is concerned, a void marriage still produces legal consequences, including criminal liability for bigamy. Respondent attempted to distinguish this case on the ground that the declaration of nullity preceded the filing of the Information, but the Court rejected the distinction.

• Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009 (June 29, 2010) — Followed. Affirmed bigamy conviction where the accused contracted a second marriage without the first having been judicially declared null and void, and rejected the argument that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages celebrated before its effectivity.

• Atienza vs. Brillantes, Jr. — Cited for the proposition that Article 40 of the Family Code, being a rule of procedure, applies retroactively because Article 256 provides for retroactive effect insofar as vested or acquired rights are not prejudiced.

• Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis — Cited to illustrate the danger of not enforcing Article 40, whereby an individual could contract a subsequent marriage without a prior declaration of nullity and then invoke the subsequent declaration to escape bigamy liability.

• Landicho vs. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 23, 1968 — Cited for the principle that parties may not judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage and that the presumption of marriage validity persists absent a judicial declaration.

• Antone vs. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010 — Cited on the procedural issue of standing, holding that the Court may give due course to a petition filed by a private complainant in a criminal case when the OSG ratifies and adopts the petition as its own.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes bigamy as the act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by judgment. The Court applied this provision to hold that all elements of bigamy were present when respondent married Silverio in 1983 while her marriage to Socrates remained subsisting and undissolved.

• Article 40, Family Code — Provides that the absolute nullity of a prior marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. The Court held this provision to be a rule of procedure that applies retroactively to marriages celebrated before the Family Code's effectivity, pursuant to Article 256.

• Article 256, Family Code — Provides that the Family Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. The Court relied on this provision to justify the retroactive application of Article 40, reasoning that no vested right attaches to procedural laws.

• Article 36, Family Code — Governs the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent's first marriage was declared void under this provision in 2003; the Court held that this subsequent declaration did not retroactively erase the bigamy committed in 1983.

• Section 29, Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law) — The pre-Family Code provision on illegal marriages, which respondent argued should govern instead of Article 40. The Court rejected this argument, affirming the retroactive application of Article 40.

• Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, 1987 Administrative Code — Enumerates the powers and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General, including representing the Government in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court. The Court noted this provision but gave due course to the petition filed by the private complainant after the OSG ratified and adopted it.

• Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson)
• Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1343 dated October 9, 2012)
• Justice Roberto A. Abad
• Justice Jose Catral Mendoza