Monsanto vs. Factoran Jr.

An absolute pardon removes the disqualification from holding public office and restores eligibility for appointment, but it does not ipso facto reinstate the pardoned convict to the public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction; a new appointment is required.

Case involves the scope of executive clemency in relation to the administrative consequences of criminal conviction for public officers. Addresses the distinction between the effects of acquittal (which entitles one to reinstatement and backpay) and absolute pardon (which does not).

• Sandiganbayan: Convicted petitioner and co-accused on March 25, 1983; sentenced to imprisonment and fine.
• Supreme Court: Affirmed conviction on appeal; petitioner filed motion for reconsideration.
• Executive Action: While MR was pending, President Marcos granted absolute pardon on December 17, 1984, which petitioner accepted on December 21, 1984.
• Ministry of Finance: On referral from the City Treasurer, ruled (March 1, 1985) that petitioner could be reinstated without new appointment but not earlier than the date of pardon, and required payment of civil indemnity.
• Office of the President: On reconsideration, Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied automatic reinstatement (April 15, 1986), ruling that pardon does not equate to acquittal and that a new appointment was necessary; upheld civil liability.
• Supreme Court: Petition for review on certiorari given due course on October 13, 1987; decision rendered affirming Factoran's resolution.

• Petitioner was Assistant City Treasurer of Calbayog City.
• Convicted for complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents; sentenced to prision correccional (min) to prision mayor (max).
• Penalty carried accessory penalties under the RPC:
  • Temporary absolute disqualification from public office (Art. 42, RPC).
  • Suspension from public office (Art. 43, RPC).
  • Perpetual special disqualification from suffrage.
  • Preventively suspended from office on August 1, 1982.
  • Absolute pardon granted December 17, 1984, while conviction was pending appeal (under the 1973 Constitution as amended in 1981, which allowed pardon even before final conviction).
  • Petitioner accepted pardon, deemed to have abandoned her appeal; conviction became final.
  • Former position was vacant at time of pardon.

• General rules on pardon inapplicable because pardon was granted before final judgment of conviction; thus, no forfeiture of office occurred and employment was merely suspended.
• Absolute pardon granted before final verdict constitutes an acquittal; the President effectively declared her not guilty and dismissed the case.
• Pardon wiped out the crime, implying government service was never interrupted; thus, entitled to reinstatement from date of preventive suspension (August 1, 1982).
• Entitled to backpay for entire period of suspension.
• Should not be required to pay proportionate share of civil indemnity (P4,892.50) as pardon extinguishes all liabilities.

• Petitioner was convicted; only acquittal, not absolute pardon, is the ground for automatic reinstatement and entitlement to backpay (citing Miranda v. Imperial and People v. Lising).
• A former public official must secure a reappointment before reassuming former position.
• Civil liability is not extinguished by pardon under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the RPC.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether an absolute pardon entitles a convicted public officer to automatic reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
  • Whether a pardoned public officer is entitled to backpay for the period of suspension.
  • Whether absolute pardon exempts the culprit from payment of civil indemnity imposed by the sentence.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • Automatic Reinstatement: NO. Absolute pardon removes the disqualification from holding public office and restores eligibility for appointment, but it does not ipso facto restore the convicted felon to the public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction. The pardonee must apply for reappointment. Acceptance of pardon while appeal is pending renders the conviction final.
  • Backpay: NO. Pardon is not retrospective; it looks to the future and makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered (e.g., loss of earnings) during the period when the conviction was in force.
  • Civil Liability: NO. Pardon does not extinguish civil liability arising from crime (Art. 36, RPC). Civil liability subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty, or commutation. It may only be extinguished by payment, loss of the thing due, remission of debt, merger, compensation, or novation (Civil Code).

• Nature of Absolute Pardon — An act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with execution of laws, exempting the individual from punishment for a crime committed. It is a private official act requiring delivery and acceptance.
• Effect on Guilt: Pardon implies guilt; it does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime or the conviction itself. It involves forgiveness, not forgetfulness.
• Effect on Penalties: Removes all punitive consequences of the criminal act, including disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt.
• Effect on Civil Rights: Restores civil rights (e.g., eligibility for appointment), but unless expressly grounded on innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty and integrity.
• Effect on Public Office: Does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction, although it restores eligibility for appointment.
• Public Office as a Public Trust — Cannot be compromised to favor private interests. The appointing power may refuse appointment to anyone deemed of bad character or unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
• Accessory Penalties — Under RPC Arts. 40-43, accessory penalties (e.g., disqualification from office) remain even if the principal penalty is pardoned, unless expressly remitted by the pardon.
• Civil Liability vs. Criminal Liability — Pardon extinguishes criminal liability but not civil liability, which is governed by the RPC and Civil Code.

• "The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness."
• "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing."
• "Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office."
• "A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction."

• Ex Parte Garland (4 Wall. 333) — Historical American case stating broad view that pardon blots out guilt and makes the offender "a new man"; SC notes this view has been downplayed by modern authorities.
• Pelobello v. Palatino (72 Phil. 441) and Cristobal v. Labrador (71 Phil. 341) — Prior Philippine cases adopting broad Garland view that absolute pardon removes all disabilities; SC distinguishes/modifies these in light of statutory provisions (Art. 36, RPC).
• Miranda v. Imperial (77 Phil. 1966) — Cited for the rule that acquittal, not pardon, is the ground for reinstatement.
• People v. Lising (Sandiganbayan) — Reinstatement requires acquittal, not merely pardon.

• 1973 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 11 (as amended April 7, 1981) — Granted President power to grant pardon except in impeachment cases; amendment deleted requirement of final conviction (unlike 1935 and 1987 Constitutions).
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 36 — Pardon does not restore right to hold public office or suffrage unless expressly restored; does not exempt from civil indemnity.
• Revised Penal Code, Arts. 40-43 — Accessory penalties of death, reclusion perpetua/temporal, prision mayor, and prision correccional; disqualifications remain unless expressly remitted in the pardon.
• Revised Penal Code, Arts. 112-113 — Civil liability subsists despite pardon.
• Civil Code — Modes of extinguishing civil liability (payment, loss, remission, merger, compensation, novation).

• Justice Padilla — Concurs in result but relies strictly on Article 36, RPC. Argues that since the pardon did not expressly restore the right to hold public office, that right is not restored. Public office being a public trust, restoration must be explicit, not inferred. Suggests Cristobal and Pelobello should be modified if they hold otherwise.
• Justice Feliciano — Joins Padilla. Emphasizes that Articles 36 and 40-43 RPC require a high degree of explicitness to restore the right to hold public office. These provisions are not unconstitutional restrictions on the pardoning power; the requirement of explicitness is proper because pardon does not blot out factual guilt.