Monge vs. Angeles

Under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the five-year period for a homesteader to repurchase conveyed land is counted from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature, even if the sale is with an option to repurchase; it is not counted from the date ownership is consolidated in the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to repurchase.

Plaintiffs acquired a parcel of land under a homestead patent, while defendants are the persons to whom the land was conveyed. The statutory backdrop is Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Law), which subjects every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within five years from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature.

On July 30, 1948, Leoncio Monge, Severa Polvorosa, and Maria Monge executed in favor of Lino Angeles and Socorro Molina a deed of sale over a parcel of land that the Monges had acquired under a homestead patent. The deed gave the Monges the right to repurchase the land within one year from the date of sale.

Because the Monges failed to repurchase the land as stipulated, the sale became absolute on July 30, 1949. Defendants actually consolidated their ownership over the land on January 17, 1953 in accordance with an order of consolidation issued in Special Proceeding No. 548 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.

The Monges nevertheless claimed that they could still exercise the right to repurchase within the period of five years from July 30, 1949 under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. They tendered to defendants the repurchase price of P1,200, and when defendants refused, they consigned the money with the clerk of court and instituted the present action.

• Repurchase Period: Plaintiffs-appellants argued that they could still exercise the right to repurchase the land within the period of five years from July 30, 1949 under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

• Failure to State a Cause of Action: Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action.
• Prescription: Defendants-appellees moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was not commenced within the period prescribed by law.

• Repurchase Period: Whether the five-year period under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 should be counted from the date of the sale even if the sale is with an option to repurchase, or from the date ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to repurchase.

• Repurchase Period: From the date of the sale. Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 expressly fixes the five-year period from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature, so the period is not counted from the date ownership is consolidated in the purchaser.

• Repurchase Period: Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides that every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within five years from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature. The SC reasoned that the word "conveyance" is of American origin and may refer not only to an absolute sale but also to a mortgage or any other transaction; it signifies every instrument by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned. Because the law is clear, it admits of no interpretation, so the claim that the five-year period should be counted from the date ownership was consolidated in defendants is untenable. The SC found support in Blanco vs. Bailon, where the five-year period was held to run from the date of execution of the contract, not from registration, because the conveyance mentioned in Section 119 is the actual date thereof and not the date of registration of the deed of sale, citing Galasinao vs. Austria. It also relied on Galanza vs. Nuesa, where the SC held that the period to repurchase is counted from the execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, not from the issuance of transfer certificate of title, and that the owner is neither prohibited nor precluded from binding himself to an agreement whereby his right of repurchase is for a certain period starting from the date of the deed of sale; the date of the sale is of paramount consideration.

• Homestead repurchase period under Section 119 — The five-year period for repurchase of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions runs from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature. The SC applied this by counting from the deed of sale, not from the consolidation of ownership in defendants.
• Conveyance under Section 119 — The term includes not only an absolute sale but also a mortgage or any other transaction; it signifies every instrument by which any estate or interest in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned. The SC used this definition to reject the claim that the period should run from consolidation.
• Date of sale is paramount — The date of the deed of sale controls the start of the repurchase period, not the date of registration or issuance of title. The SC relied on Blanco vs. Bailon and Galanza vs. Nuesa for this point.
• Plain meaning rule — When the law is clear, it admits of no interpretation. The SC applied Section 119 as written because its text expressly fixes the start of the five-year period.

• "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within the period of five years from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature." — The SC quotes Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and relies on its plain text to fix the start of the five-year repurchase period.
• "When the law is clear, it admits of no interpretation." — The SC uses this rule to reject the argument that the period should be counted from the consolidation of ownership.
• "It follows therefore that the pretense of appellants to the effect that the 5-year period should be counted from the date the ownership of appellees over the land had become consolidated is untenable." — The SC applies the plain meaning of "conveyance" and concludes that the repurchase period does not start from consolidation.
• "In other words, the date of the sale is of paramount consideration." — The SC summarizes Galanza vs. Nuesa and holds that the date of the deed of sale controls the repurchase period.

• Blanco vs. Bailon, G.R. No. L-7342, April 28, 1956 — Followed; the SC cited it for the rule that the five-year period runs from the date of execution of the contract, not from registration, because the conveyance under Section 119 is the actual date thereof.
• Galasinao vs. Austria, 97 Phil., 82, 51 Off Gaz., 2874 — Cited in Blanco vs. Bailon as support for counting the period from the actual date of the conveyance, not the date of registration.
• Galanza vs. Nuesa, 95 Phil., 713, 50 Off. Gaz., 4213 — Followed; the SC relied on it for the rule that the period to repurchase is counted from the execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, not from the issuance of transfer certificate of title, and that the date of the sale is paramount.

• Section 119, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Law) — Provides that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within five years from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature. The SC applied it by holding that the five-year period is counted from the date of the deed of sale, not from the date ownership was consolidated in defendants.