Moncayo vs. Republic of the Philippines

The trial court has the discretion to deny a prayer to dismiss a petition to declare a marriage void if the petitioner served a copy of the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City Prosecutor, despite the lapse of the required period under Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. While the word "shall" makes the service of copies mandatory, the word "may" in the same provision renders the dismissal of the petition for failure to comply merely permissive or discretionary, not mandatory.

Edwin P. Moncayo and Ma. Aileen D. Moncayo were married in a civil wedding on December 11, 1997, before Rev. Franco G.C. Espiritu, who attested that the couple showed him their supposed Marriage License No. 2889833 issued on the same date at Imus, Cavite. The couple had a church wedding a year later, on October 17, 1998, and the same Marriage License No. 2889833 was reflected in their marriage contract. The case involves a petition to declare the marriage void under Article 35(3) of the Family Code, which provides that marriages solemnized without a license are void from the beginning, except those covered by the preceding chapter. The procedural framework governing such petitions is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

Edwin P. Moncayo and Ma. Aileen D. Moncayo had a civil wedding on December 11, 1997, before Rev. Franco G.C. Espiritu, who attested that the couple showed him their supposed Marriage License No. 2889833 issued on the same date at Imus, Cavite. The couple had a church wedding a year after, on October 17, 1998, and Marriage License No. 2889833 was reflected in their marriage contract.

On June 4, 2018, Edwin filed a petition to declare their marriage null before the Regional Trial Court, claiming that his marriage with Aileen is void for having been solemnized without a marriage license, a requirement under Article 35(3) of the Family Code. He alleged that Marriage License No. 2889833 does not exist and was not presented before the solemnizing officers of their marriage rites. To prove his claim, Edwin attached a Certification from the City Civil Registrar Office of Imus, Cavite, stating that the couple neither applied for a marriage license nor were their names reflected in the records of application. Edwin added that their marriage was not among those exempted from the requirement of marriage license under Chapter 2, Title 1 of the Family Code.

On August 24, 2018, Aileen filed her Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses, praying for the outright dismissal of Edwin's petition. She asserted that Edwin failed to serve a copy of his petition to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City Prosecutor within five days from filing, as required under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Aileen further argued that Edwin's petition failed to state a cause of action because the attached Certification from the City Civil Registrar merely stated that the parties have "no record of application for marriage license" from August to December 1997, which does not imply that their marriage license was nonexistent. She also insisted that Edwin is estopped from assailing the validity of their marriage since he was the one who wanted to marry her, and that the only reason Edwin filed the petition was because of his illicit affair.

Later, Edwin filed a Manifestation with Apology before the trial court, stating that he already served copies of the petition to the OSG and OCP on September 10, 2018. On September 18, 2018, the OSG entered its appearance on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf. Two days after, Edwin filed his Reply to Aileen's Answer.

On November 21, 2018, the Regional Trial Court denied Aileen's prayer for dismissal. It explained that the word "may" in the Rules showed that furnishing copies of the Petition to the OSG and OCP is merely directory. Besides, despite the delay, Edwin substantially complied with the Rules when he served copies of the petition to the OSG and OCP before the court could rule upon it. The trial court also found the allegations in Edwin's Petition sufficient to support his cause of action. On March 12, 2019, the Regional Trial Court denied Aileen's motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals denied Aileen's Petition on July 17, 2020, noting that under Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Edwin is required to furnish the OSG and OCP copies of the petition within five days from the date of filing and failure to do so may be a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. While the service of the copies to the OSG and OCP is mandatory because of the word "shall," the Court of Appeals explained that the immediate dismissal is nevertheless directory because of the term "may" in the second paragraph. Accordingly, there was no grave abuse of discretion when the trial court denied Aileen's prayer for dismissal. The Court of Appeals also found the allegations in Edwin's petition adequate to make out a cause of action for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 35(3) of the Family Code, explaining that in determining whether the petition failed to state a cause of action, the court only needs to focus on the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. On February 8, 2021, the Court of Appeals denied Aileen's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

• Failure to State a Cause of Action: Petitioner argued that respondent Edwin's Petition failed to state a cause of action and should have been dismissed by the trial court "for being insufficient in substance." She maintained that the Petition, including the attached supporting documents, should be considered in its totality in determining if it sufficiently states a cause of action, and that its totality proves that their marriage license exists. She pointed out that the solemnizing officers attested that the relevant marriage license was exhibited before them in their two marriage certificates, and insisted that their names not appearing in the book of application for licenses does not mean the marriage license does not exist.

• Mandatory Nature of Service Requirement: Petitioner argued that respondent's petition should have been dismissed outright for violating A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Pursuant to the mandatory nature of service of copies to the OSG and OCP, coupled with the Constitutional mandate to preserve marriage, petitioner maintained that the "sound judicial discretion is to dismiss the case for non-compliance thereof," despite the use of the word "may" in the provision. She further argued that the three months delay in the service aggravates the violation.

• Procedural Non-Compliance: Respondent Edwin pointed out that petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements under Section 4(b) of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as the Petition did not indicate the date when petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration or attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed Decision and Resolution. He maintained that failing to comply with these two requirements is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.

• Lack of Substantive Issues: Respondent argued that the Petition failed to raise issues of substance and value warranting this Court's consideration. He insisted that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the issues raised when it stated that his allegations sufficiently state a cause of action to declare the nullity of their marriage under Article 35(3) of the Family Code, and that he has sufficiently complied with the requirement under A.M. 02-11-10-SC. He also pointed out that the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court are already at the trial stage and have progressed from these issues, and that petitioner's active participation in the trial is an implied admission of the existence of a cause of action.

• Sufficiency of Cause of Action: The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, argued that an initiatory pleading need not prove the facts constituting the cause of action because proof is meant for the trial. A sufficiently-alleged cause of action is reliant only on the statements in the petition, and the veracity of the allegations need not yet be proven. The test is whether a valid judgment may be rendered on the allegations, assuming them to be true. Here, respondent's petition clearly stated that their marriage license does not exist, which is sufficient to state a cause of action for declaring their marriage null under Article 35(3) of the Family Code. Whether the parties had a marriage license is evidentiary in nature and is better threshed out during trial.

• Discretionary Nature of Dismissal: As to Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the Republic argued that the word "may" connotes that the trial court's dismissal is merely discretionary, not mandatory, regardless of the lapse of time between the filing of the Petition and the service of its copy to the OSG and OCP. While the service of the copy is mandatory, the dismissal of the petition in case of failure to comply is merely permissive. The trial court acted within its discretion when it considered the belated compliance acceptable, especially since it was served before the trial court could act on the Petition.

• Belated Compliance with Service Requirement: Whether belated compliance with Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC warrants an outright dismissal of respondent's Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
• Sufficiency of Cause of Action: Whether respondent's Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage should have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

• Belated Compliance with Service Requirement: No. The trial court acted within its discretion when it did not dismiss respondent's Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. While the word "shall" in Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC makes the service of copies to the OSG and OCP mandatory, the word "may" in the same provision renders the dismissal of the petition for failure to comply merely permissive or discretionary.

• Sufficiency of Cause of Action: No. Respondent's Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage sufficiently states a cause of action. The petition clearly states the ultimate facts on which the claim is based, citing the legal requirement to get married under a valid license and discussing how the marriage failed to comply with that requirement. The test for determining whether a cause of action was sufficiently stated is whether the court may render a valid judgment on the alleged facts, assuming them to be true.

• Belated Compliance with Service Requirement: The Court examined Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides that the petitioner "shall" serve a copy of the petition on the OSG and the OCP within five days from the date of its filing, and that failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements "may" be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition. The Court noted that the use of the word "shall" in the provision indicates that serving a copy of the petition to the OSG and the OCP within five days from the filing of the petition is mandatory, and the word "shall" in the requirement means it is imperative. However, the use of the word "may" in relation to the petition's dismissal in case of failure to comply means that the "shall" is meant to be interpreted to be consistent with the use of discretion. Citing Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp. , the Court explained that while "shall" is generally imperative, it may be construed as "may" when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute. The Court also cited the settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect. Here, it is uncontested that respondent served copies of the petition to the OSG and OCP, albeit belatedly. Even assuming the mandate was not complied with because the copies were not timely served within five days from the filing of the petition, the immediate dismissal of the petition is still only optional because the provision uses the word "may" when referring to it as a ground for dismissal. Thus, the trial court has the discretion on whether it shall outrightly dismiss the petition based on the failure to comply with the requirements, and it cannot be said that the Regional Trial Court acted beyond its discretion in denying petitioner's prayer to dismiss respondent's Petition.

• Sufficiency of Cause of Action: The Court explained that a cause of action arises when by an act or omission, a party violates the right of another. The pleading must contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts, including the evidence on which the party pleading relies for his or her claim. "Ultimate facts" refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests, and do not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements. Citing Roa vs. Spouses Sy, the Court enumerated the elements of a sufficiently stated cause of action: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. Citing Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. vs. Catalan, the Court stated the test in determining whether a cause of action was sufficiently stated: whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded, or whether the court may render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. At this stage, the trial court is not yet deciding whether the petition will prevail or whether the arguments are meritorious, but whether the complainant may offer evidence to support their allegations. Here, respondent's petition clearly states the ultimate facts on which he bases his claim, citing the legal requirement to get married under a valid license and discussing how their marriage failed to comply with that requirement. In filing his petition, respondent need not yet prove the facts he is alleging; the evidence is meant to be presented during trial on the merits. His petition need only show that a cause of action exists so that trial can ensue. Thus, the evidentiary weight of their Marriage Certificates and the Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, stating that the parties did not apply for a marriage license need not yet be considered by the trial court for purposes of determining whether the petition to declare the marriage null sufficiently states a cause of action.

• Discretionary Dismissal for Non-Compliance with Procedural Requirements — Under Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, while the service of copies of the petition to the OSG and OCP within five days from filing is mandatory (as indicated by the word "shall"), the dismissal of the petition for failure to comply is merely permissive or discretionary (as indicated by the word "may"). The trial court has the discretion to deny a prayer to dismiss a petition if the petitioner served copies of the petition to the OSG and OCP, despite the lapse of the required period. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the Regional Trial Court acted within its discretion in denying Aileen's prayer to dismiss Edwin's petition, since Edwin served copies of the petition to the OSG and OCP on September 10, 2018, before the trial court could rule on the petition.

• Test for Sufficiency of Cause of Action — A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of three essential elements: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded — the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that Edwin's petition sufficiently stated a cause of action under Article 35(3) of the Family Code, as the petition clearly stated the ultimate facts on which his claim is based, and the evidentiary weight of the Marriage Certificates and the Certification from the City Civil Registrar need not yet be considered at the pleading stage.

• "The use of the word 'shall' in the provision indicates that serving a copy of the petition to the OSG and the OCP within five days from the filing of the petition is mandatory. The word 'shall' in the requirement means it is imperative. However, the use of the word 'may' in relation to the petition's dismissal in case of failure to comply, means that the 'shall' is meant to be interpreted to be consistent with the use of discretion." — This passage articulates the Court's interpretation of Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, distinguishing between the mandatory nature of the service requirement and the discretionary nature of the dismissal sanction, which is the core ruling on the first issue.

• "The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations." — This passage, quoted from Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Catalan, states the controlling test for determining whether a pleading sufficiently states a cause of action, which the Court applied to Edwin's petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

• "Respondent's petition clearly states the ultimate facts on which he bases his claim. It cites the legal requirement to get married under a valid license and discusses how their marriage failed to comply with that requirement. In filing his petition, respondent need not yet prove the facts he is alleging. The evidence is meant to be presented during trial on the merits." — This passage explains the Court's application of the sufficiency-of-cause-of-action test to the facts of the case, emphasizing that proof of the allegations is not required at the pleading stage.

• Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., G.R. No. L-4712, July 11, 1952, 91 Phil. 608 (1952) — Cited as controlling authority on statutory construction regarding the interpretation of the word "shall." The Court relied on this case to explain that while "shall" is generally imperative, it may be construed as "may" when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute, supporting the ruling that the dismissal for non-compliance with Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is discretionary.

• Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246, 289 (2011) — Cited for the settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having mandatory effect, supporting the Court's interpretation of the permissive nature of the dismissal sanction.

• Roa vs. Spouses Sy, G.R. No. 221586, September 14, 2021 — Cited as authority enumerating the three essential elements of a sufficiently stated cause of action, which the Court applied in determining that Edwin's petition sufficiently stated a cause of action.

• Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. vs. Catalan, 483 Phil. 525 (2004) — Cited as authority for the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action, which focuses on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.

• Magellan Aerospace Corp. vs. Philippine Air Force, 781 Phil. 788 (2016) — Cited as authority explaining that in a challenge to the sufficiency of a cause of action, the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims, and that the inquiry is limited to the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.

• Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626, 635 (2003) — Cited as authority defining "ultimate facts" as the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests, as distinguished from details of probative matter or particulars of evidence.

• Section 5(4), A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC — The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. The provision requires the petitioner to file the petition in six copies and to serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor within five days from the date of its filing, and to submit to the court proof of such service within the same period. It further provides that failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition. The Court interpreted this provision to mean that while service is mandatory, dismissal is discretionary.

• Article 35(3), Family Code — Provides that marriages solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding chapter, shall be void from the beginning. The Court applied this provision in determining that Edwin's petition, which alleged that his marriage with Aileen was solemnized without a marriage license, sufficiently stated a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

• Section 1, A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC — The Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The provision requires every pleading to contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts, including the evidence on which the party pleading relies for his or her claim or defense. The Court cited this provision in explaining the requirements for a sufficiently stated cause of action.

• Section 12, Rule VIII, A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC — The provision on affirmative defenses, which includes as a ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. The Court cited this provision in explaining that failing to sufficiently state a cause of action is an affirmative defense that may be raised in the other party's answer.

• Section 4(b), Rule 45, Rules of Court — The provision on the requirements for petitions for review on certiorari. Respondent Edwin cited this provision in arguing that petitioner failed to comply with procedural requirements, as the Petition did not indicate the date when petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration or attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed Decision and Resolution.

Justices Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva concurred with the decision.