Molo vs. Molo

A subsequent will that is disallowed for lack of due execution cannot revoke a prior will, and if the testator destroyed the prior will based on the mistaken belief that the subsequent will was valid, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies to preserve the prior will.

Mariano Molo died without forced heirs in the direct line, survived by his wife and his nieces/nephew (children of his deceased brother). He executed two wills during his lifetime. The legal dispute centers on which will, if any, should be admitted to probate after the subsequent will was declared invalid, and whether the prior will survives despite a revocatory clause in the invalid will and the unexplained loss of the prior will's original copy.

• Original Filing: CFI Rizal, Sp. Proc. No. 8022 (Petition for probate of 1939 will)
• Lower Court Decision: 1939 will initially probated without opposition; order set aside upon oppositors' motion; case reopened; 1939 will denied probate on November 29, 1943, for lack of due execution.
• Appeal: N/A (Widow filed a new petition for the 1918 will)
• SC Action: Oppositors appealed directly to the SC from the CFI order admitting the 1918 will to probate, as the value of the estate exceeded P50,000.

• The Heirs: Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941. He had no forced heirs in the ascending or descending line. He was survived by his wife, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and his nieces and nephew (Luz, Gliceria, Cornelio Molo).
• The Two Wills: The decedent left two wills: one executed on August 17, 1918 (Exhibit A), and another on June 20, 1939 (Exhibit I). The 1939 will contained an express clause revoking the 1918 will. Both wills instituted the wife as the universal heir.
• Probate of the 1939 Will: The widow filed for probate of the 1939 will on February 7, 1941. Unopposed, it was probated. The oppositors later successfully moved to reopen the case. After trial, the CFI disallowed the 1939 will for failing to comply with statutory formalities.
• Probate of the 1918 Will: On February 24, 1944, the widow filed a new petition to probate the 1918 will (Sp. Proc. No. 56). The oppositors objected on grounds of estoppel, improper execution, and revocation. The case records were destroyed during the liberation of Manila. After failed reconstitution attempts, the widow filed a new petition on September 14, 1946.
• Status of the 1918 Original: The original of the 1918 will could not be found. The notary who prepared it gave the original and copies to the testator in 1918. The widow only found a duplicate copy among the testator's papers after the 1939 will was disallowed. Oppositors claimed the testator deliberately destroyed the original because of the revocatory clause in the 1939 will.
• Due Execution Evidence: Two of the three attesting witnesses to the 1918 will were dead. The widow presented the surviving witness, Angel Cuenca, and the notary public, Juan Salcedo, who both testified that the will was executed according to law.

• The imputations of fraud and bad faith regarding the 1939 will probate are improper in the current independent proceeding and are unsupported by evidence.
• Petitioner is not estopped from seeking the probate of the 1918 will; she was instituted as universal heir in both wills and merely sought to prevent intestacy.
• Under Samson v. Naval, a disallowed subsequent will cannot revoke a prior will; the revocatory clause is void.
• Even if the testator destroyed the 1918 original, it was based on the mistaken belief that the 1939 will was valid, invoking the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
• The due execution of the 1918 will was sufficiently proven by the surviving attesting witness and the notary public.

• The widow voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939 will (unclean hands) to secure the probate of the 1918 will.
• The widow is estopped from seeking the probate of the 1918 will.
• The revocatory clause in the 1939 will is immediately effective upon execution and does not require probate to be operative (citing American jurisprudence).
• The 1939 will should be considered "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills" under Sec. 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, capable of revoking the 1918 will.
• The testator deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will after executing the 1939 will, proving his intent to revoke.
• The 1918 will was not executed in the manner required by law.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petitioner is estopped from seeking the probate of the 1918 will and came to court with unclean hands due to her actions in the 1939 will probate proceedings.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a revocatory clause in a subsequent will that is denied probate can effectively revoke a prior will.
  • Whether the prior will is revoked if the testator destroyed it based on the mistaken belief that the subsequent will was valid.
  • Whether the due execution of the 1918 will was sufficiently proven.

• Procedural: The SC held that the petitioner is not guilty of estoppel or bad faith. She initially filed the 1939 will for probate in good faith; it was the oppositors who moved to reopen the case, leading to its disallowance. She cannot be blamed for being zealous in protecting her interest and preventing intestacy. There was no direct evidence that she frustrated the 1939 probate.
• Substantive:
  • The SC held that a disallowed subsequent will cannot revoke a prior will. A will denied probate for lack of due execution is void and cannot produce the effect of annulling a previous will. The SC refused to abandon the ruling in Samson v. Naval, finding that the prevailing American jurisprudence still supports the view that a defectively executed will does not revoke a prior will because there is no valid revoking instrument. Even if the 1939 will were considered "other writing" under Sec. 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it still must be admitted to probate to have any effect.
  • The SC applied the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Even assuming the testator destroyed the 1918 original, he did so relying on the mistaken belief that the 1939 will was validly executed and would be given effect. The revocation was conditional upon the efficacy of the new disposition. Since the 1939 will failed, the revocation fails, and the original will remains in force. Furthermore, there was no direct evidence the testator destroyed the 1918 will; loss or misplacement over 21 years is plausible, and he never recalled the duplicate copy from his wife.
  • The SC held that the due execution of the 1918 will was sufficiently proven. Under the law, the testimony of the sole surviving attesting witness (Angel Cuenca) is sufficient. The corroborating testimony of the notary public (Juan Salcedo) further cemented the finding of due execution.

• Dependent Relative Revocation — The doctrine applied where a testator cancels or destroys a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason. The revocation is conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition. If the new will is inoperative, the revocation fails, and the original will remains in full force. Applied: If the testator destroyed the 1918 will, it was because he believed the 1939 will was valid. Because the 1939 will was disallowed, the revocation of the 1918 was conditional and thus fails.
• Revocation by a Disallowed Subsequent Will — A subsequent will containing a revocatory clause that is disallowed for lack of due execution cannot annul a prior will. The revocatory clause in the invalid will is void.

• Section 623, Code of Civil Procedure — Governed the revocation of wills, stating a will may be revoked "by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills." The SC interpreted this to mean that a disallowed will cannot act as a valid revoking instrument, and even if classified as "other writing," it must first be admitted to probate to have any revocatory effect.
• Section 618, Code of Civil Procedure — Prescribed the formalities required for the execution of wills. The 1939 will failed to comply with these formalities, leading to its disallowance.