Molo vs. Molo

A subsequent will that is denied probate due to defective execution cannot revoke a prior valid will, and any physical destruction of the prior will based on the mistaken belief that the subsequent will is valid does not result in revocation under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.

The dispute arose from the death of a wealthy testator without forced heirs, leaving behind a widow and collateral relatives (nieces and a nephew) who fought over his estate, prompting the widow to rely on an older will after the newer will was invalidated upon the relatives' opposition.

• Filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal for the probate of the 1939 will (Special Proceeding No. 8022), which was eventually denied probate.
• Filed in the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the 1918 will (Special Proceeding No. 56), which was interrupted by World War II and subsequently refiled in 1946.
• Decided by the CFI of Rizal on May 28, 1948, admitting the 1918 will to probate.
• Appealed directly to the Supreme Court by the oppositors due to the value of the estate exceeding P50,000.

• Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, without descending or ascending forced heirs, survived only by his wife (Juana Juan Vda. de Molo) and his nieces/nephew (Luz, Gliceria, and Cornelio Molo).
• The deceased executed two wills during his lifetime, one on August 17, 1918, and another on June 20, 1939, both instituting his wife as his universal heir.
• The widow initially filed for the probate of the 1939 will, which was initially granted but later set aside and denied after the nieces and nephew successfully opposed it on the ground of defective execution.
• Following the disallowance of the 1939 will, the widow filed a petition to probate the earlier 1918 will.
• The original copy of the 1918 will could not be found, so the widow presented a duplicate copy found among the testator's files.
• The nieces and nephew opposed the probate of the 1918 will, arguing it was revoked by the 1939 will and deliberately destroyed by the testator.
• The trial court admitted the 1918 will to probate based on the testimony of the surviving instrumental witness and the notary public who prepared it.

• The widow argued that she is not estopped from probating the 1918 will because the disallowance of the 1939 will was caused by the oppositors' objections, not by her own bad faith or deliberate frustration.
• The widow contended that the revocatory clause in the 1939 will is void and ineffective because the 1939 will itself was denied probate for defective execution.
• The widow maintained that the 1918 will was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, as proven by the credible testimonies of the surviving witness and the notary public.

• The oppositors argued that the widow deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939 will because she knew it contained an invalid disposition ("disposicion captatoria"), thus coming to court with unclean hands and being estopped from probating the 1918 will.
• The oppositors claimed that the revocatory clause in the 1939 will remained valid and effectively nullified the 1918 will despite the 1939 will's disallowance.
• The oppositors asserted that the testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will with the intention to revoke it, as evidenced by the widow's failure to produce the original document.

• Procedural Issue: Is the petitioner estopped from seeking the probate of the 1918 will after failing to secure the probate of the 1939 will?
• Substantive Issue 1: Does a revocatory clause in a subsequent will that is denied probate effectively revoke a prior will?
• Substantive Issue 2: Does the presumed physical destruction of the original 1918 will by the testator constitute a valid revocation?

• Procedural Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is not estopped and did not act in bad faith, reasoning that she fulfilled her duty by presenting the 1939 will for probate and vigorously fought for its allowance, which was only thwarted by the oppositors' own objections; she was merely being zealous in protecting her interest to prevent intestacy.
• Substantive Ruling 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the 1939 will did not revoke the 1918 will, reasoning that a revocatory clause in a will that is disallowed for defective execution is entirely void and produces no legal effect.
• Substantive Ruling 2: The Supreme Court ruled that any presumed destruction of the 1918 will did not result in revocation, reasoning under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation that the destruction was conditionally based on the testator's mistaken belief that the 1939 will was valid, and since the 1939 will failed, the revocation of the 1918 will also failed.

• Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation — This doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will, or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will, with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute, but the new disposition fails to take effect for some reason. In this specific case, the Court used the doctrine to rule that even if the testator destroyed the original 1918 will, he did so under the mistaken belief that his 1939 will was valid; because the 1939 will failed, the revocation of the 1918 will failed, leaving the 1918 will in full force.

• "A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void."
• "The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will."

• Samson vs. Naval — Cited as the controlling precedent establishing that a revocatory clause in a subsequent will that is disallowed due to defective execution cannot annul a previous will.

• Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure — Mentioned in the quoted jurisprudence regarding the required formalities for the execution of wills, the non-compliance of which renders a will and its revocatory clause void.
• Section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure — Cited regarding the rule that a will may be revoked by some will, codicil, or "other writing executed as provided in case of wills," which the Court interpreted to mean that an unprobated or defectively executed document cannot serve as a valid revoking writing.