Misamin vs. San Juan

An administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension must be dismissed where the charges are not established by clear preponderance of evidence, the presumption being that the attorney is innocent and has performed his duty in accordance with his oath; and an incumbent police officer's practice of law is not a ground for suspension or removal under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, but may be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission.

Jose Misamin was an employee of Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, and had accused Tan Hua of violating the Minimum Wage Law. Miguel A. San Juan was a member of the bar and a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force. The administrative complaint against San Juan implicated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs suspension or removal of attorneys, and the Civil Service Law, which governs public officers. The Court also invoked the principle that public office is a public trust.

Jose Misamin was an employee of Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery. Misamin filed charges against Tan Hua for violation of the Minimum Wage Law. Respondent Miguel A. San Juan was a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar. Misamin charged San Juan with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and with coercing Misamin to agree to drop the charges he had filed against Tan Hua.

San Juan denied the charges. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report, and recommendation. Pursuant to the Court's resolution of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. Complainant's counsel failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At that latter date, complainant's counsel was again absent; in both instances, counsel did not file a written motion for postponement but merely sent complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, complainant's counsel failed once more to appear. Complainant, who was present, explained that his lawyer was busy preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila. When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing in the absence of his counsel, complainant declared that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he had brought the present action in an outburst of anger, believing that respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC; after reexamining his case, he believed respondent to be without fault and a truly good person.

In the Report of the Solicitor-General, respondent admitted having appeared as counsel for New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. He contended that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession and that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position was not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. He also denied having conspired with complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, he denied giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila.

The Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, because this was not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court; the matter could appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission. Separate complaints on that ground had been filed and were under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission. As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant into admitting having received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.

• Coercion to Drop Labor Charges: Complainant charged that respondent coerced him to agree to drop the charges he had filed against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for violation of the Minimum Wage Law.
• Representation of Alien-Owned Establishments: Complainant charged that respondent was the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent.
• Conspiracy and Illegal Protection: The complaint also charged respondent with conspiring with complainant's attorney in the NLRC proceeding to trick complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay, and with giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila.

• Isolated Practice of Profession: Respondent admitted appearing as counsel for New Cesar's Bakery before the NLRC while holding office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police, but contended that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession.
• No Ground Under Rules of Court: Respondent contended that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.
• Denial of Conspiracy: Respondent denied having conspired with complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding to trick complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay.
• Denial of Illegal Protection: Respondent denied giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila.

• Malpractice / Disbarment: Whether respondent Miguel A. San Juan should be suspended or removed from the bar for malpractice based on the charges of coercion, conspiracy, and illegal protection.
• Practice of Law While Police Officer: Whether respondent's appearance as counsel while holding office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police is a ground for suspension or removal under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

• Malpractice / Disbarment: No. The complaint was dismissed for not having been duly proved; disbarment or suspension requires a clear preponderance of evidence, and the presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges.
• Practice of Law While Police Officer: No, not under Section 27, Rule 138. The matter may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission.

• Malpractice / Disbarment: The law requires competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. The complainant's counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, and complainant withdrew the complaint, explaining he had acted out of anger and now believed respondent without fault. The Solicitor-General found no evidence on the conspiracy and illegal-protection charges and recommended dismissal. Under the Tionko doctrine, the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against respondent, and the presumption is that the attorney is innocent and has performed his duty in accordance with his oath. Because that standard was not met, respondent could not be found guilty of malpractice.
• Practice of Law While Police Officer: Respondent admitted appearing as counsel for New Cesar's Bakery before the NLRC while an incumbent police captain. However, this conduct is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides the grounds for suspension or removal of an attorney. The Solicitor-General recommended referring the matter to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission, and separate complaints on that ground were already under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission. The Court expressly did not consider any violations of the Civil Service Law, leaving that to the administrative proceeding. Although the charges were dismissed, the Court admonished respondent to avoid all appearances of impropriety, given the suspicion that he may have used the influence inherent in his office to frustrate the labor law and serve alien interests.

• Tionko Doctrine / Clear Preponderance of Evidence in Disbarment and Suspension — In disbarment or suspension proceedings, the serious consequences should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath. The Court applied this standard and dismissed the complaint because the charges were not duly proved; complainant withdrew and the Solicitor-General found no evidence on the key charges.
• Practice of Law by Public Officer Not Within Section 27, Rule 138 — The Court held that an incumbent police officer's appearance as counsel in a labor proceeding is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides the grounds for suspension or removal of attorneys. Such conduct may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission. The Court thus did not use it as a basis for disbarment or suspension in this administrative complaint.
• Public Office as a Public Trust and Avoidance of Impropriety — Although the complaint was dismissed, the Court admonished respondent that a member of the bar should avoid all appearances of impropriety. The suspicion that he used the influence inherent in his public office to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated and to serve what complainant called alien interests should not pass unnoticed. This principle informed the Court's warning but did not alter the dismissal.

• "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." — This is the Tionko doctrine quoted by the Court, establishing the evidentiary standard and presumption governing disbarment and suspension proceedings.
• "The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." — This passage shows the Court's treatment of the practice-of-law-while-in-office issue: it was not a ground under Section 27, Rule 138 but was referred to the proper administrative bodies.
• "WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record." — This is the dispositive portion, ordering dismissal and directing that the resolution be spread on respondent's record.

• In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922) — The Court cited this as the authoritative doctrine, set forth by Justice Malcolm, requiring a clear preponderance of evidence and presuming the attorney innocent in disbarment or suspension proceedings. It supplied the controlling standard for dismissing the complaint; the Court noted the doctrine had been subsequently adhered to in Javier vs. Cornejo, De Guzman vs. Tadeo, In re Attorney C. T. Oliva, Blanza vs. Arcangel, and Magnoy Gellada.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court — Provides the grounds for suspension or removal of attorneys. The Court held that respondent's appearance as counsel while an incumbent police officer was not embraced in this provision, so it could not serve as a basis for disbarment or suspension in this administrative complaint; the matter was referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
• Civil Service Law — The Court noted that it did not consider whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law due to respondent practicing his profession while holding his position as Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That issue was left to the administrative proceeding noted in the Solicitor-General's recommendation.
• Minimum Wage Law — Mentioned as the law that complainant accused his employer Tan Hua of violating, which formed the backdrop of the coercion charge against respondent. It was not the provision applied to resolve the administrative complaint against respondent.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.