Miranda vs. Abaya

A candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is not an "official candidate" who may be substituted under Section 77; substitution is only allowed when the original candidate dies, withdraws, or is disqualified, provided he had a valid COC. Moreover, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner when the first placer is disqualified; the law on succession applies instead.

Jose "Pempe" Miranda, the incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, had served three consecutive terms and sought a fourth term in the May 11, 1998 elections. His eligibility was challenged based on the three-term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

• Filed in COMELEC: Antonio Abaya filed Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (SPA No. 98-019) against Jose "Pempe" Miranda on March 27, 1998
• Decision of COMELEC First Division: Granted petition on May 5, 1998, disqualifying Jose Miranda
• Substitution: On May 6, 1998, Joel G. Miranda filed COC as substitute for his father
• Elections: Held May 11, 1998; Joel Miranda won with 22,002 votes vs Abaya's 20,336
• Post-election petition: Abaya filed Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution (SPA No. 98-288) on May 13, 1998
• Decision of COMELEC First Division: Dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio on May 16, 1998
• Motion for Reconsideration: Abaya filed MR
• Decision of COMELEC En Banc: Granted MR on December 8, 1998, annulled Joel Miranda's election and proclamation, and ordered Abaya proclaimed as winner
• Elevated to SC: Joel Miranda filed petition for certiorari on December 9, 1998

• Jose "Pempe" Miranda filed his COC for mayor of Santiago City on March 24, 1998, representing himself eligible for the office despite having served three consecutive terms
• Antonio Abaya filed SPA No. 98-019 on March 27, 1998, seeking denial of due course and cancellation of Jose Miranda's COC under Section 78 of the OEC for false material representation regarding eligibility
• COMELEC First Division granted SPA No. 98-019 on May 5, 1998, disqualifying Jose Miranda; the resolution stated he was "DISQUALIFIED" but also granted the prayer to deny due course/cancel the COC
• On May 6, 1998, beyond the deadline for filing COCs, Joel G. Miranda filed his COC as substitute candidate for his father, accompanied by a certificate of nomination from LAMMP
• During May 11, 1998 elections, Joel Miranda garnered 22,002 votes while Abaya obtained 20,336 votes
• Joel Miranda was proclaimed winner
• Abaya filed SPA No. 98-288 on May 13, 1998, praying that Joel's substitution be declared void ab initio because Jose Miranda's COC had been cancelled, leaving nothing to substitute
• COMELEC En Banc granted Abaya's MR, annulled Joel's proclamation, and ordered Abaya proclaimed as winner

• Joel Miranda validly substituted his father under Section 77 of the OEC, which allows substitution when a candidate is "disqualified for any cause"
• The COMELEC resolution dated May 5, 1998 disqualified Jose Miranda, making him a "disqualified candidate" eligible for substitution
• The COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the substitution and proclamation, and when it directed the proclamation of Abaya as winner
• The COMELEC En Banc acted in excess of jurisdiction when it amended the dispositive portion of the May 5, 1998 resolution in SPA No. 98-019, which had already become final and executory

• Jose Miranda's COC was not merely the subject of disqualification but was cancelled and denied due course under Section 78; since he had no valid COC, he was never an "official candidate" who could be substituted
• Section 77 allows substitution only for death, withdrawal, or disqualification, not for cancellation of COC (expressio unius est exclusio alterius)
• Joel Miranda's COC was void ab initio because there was no valid COC to substitute
• The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in nullifying the substitution and proclaiming Abaya as the sole remaining candidate who obtained the majority of votes

• Procedural Issues: Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it amended the dispositive portion of its May 5, 1998 resolution in SPA No. 98-019 which had become final and executory
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a candidate whose COC has been cancelled and denied due course under Section 78 may be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC
  • Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in annulling Joel Miranda's substitution and proclamation
  • Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the proclamation of Abaya (second placer) as winner

• Procedural: While the COMELEC En Banc acted in excess of jurisdiction when it motu proprio took cognizance of SPA No. 98-019 and amended its final resolution, this did not constitute grave abuse of discretion in its resolution of SPA No. 98-288. The amendment was mere surplusage because the May 5, 1998 resolution already granted the specific prayer to deny due course and cancel the COC.
• Substantive:
  • Substitution: A candidate whose COC has been cancelled and denied due course under Section 78 cannot be substituted under Section 77. Section 77 requires that the substituted candidate be an "official candidate" with a valid COC. A cancelled COC does not give rise to a valid candidacy (Bautista v. Comelec). The grounds for substitution under Section 77 (death, withdrawal, disqualification) do not include cancellation of COC under Section 78.
  • Annulment of Proclamation: The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling Joel Miranda's election and proclamation because his substitution was invalid; he was not a valid candidate.
  • Proclamation of Second Placer: The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the proclamation of Abaya as winner. Under the Labo doctrine, the second placer cannot be proclaimed winner when the first placer is disqualified. Instead, Section 44 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) on succession applies, and the vice mayor should succeed to the office.

• Expressio unius est exclusio alterius — The express mention of one thing excludes others. Since Section 77 of the OEC enumerates only death, withdrawal, and disqualification as grounds for substitution, the cancellation or denial of due course of a COC under Section 78 is excluded.
• Ejusdem generis — Where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is construed to include only things of the same kind. The phrase "disqualified for any cause" in Section 77 must be construed in light of "dies" and "withdraws," requiring a valid COC as a prerequisite for substitution in all instances.
• Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut eviatur inconveniens et absurdum — Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall be adopted. Allowing substitution of a candidate whose COC was cancelled would lead to the absurdity of substituting someone who was never a candidate.
• Nemo dat quod non habet — No one can give what he does not have. A non-candidate cannot pass on the right to be substituted to another.
• Second Placer Rule — A candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner when the first placer is disqualified, because the second placer was repudiated by the electorate and conditions would have substantially changed without the disqualified candidate in the field (Labo v. Comelec, Reyes v. Comelec, Nolasco v. Comelec).
• Valid Certificate of Candidacy as Sine Qua Non — A valid COC seasonably filed is an indispensable requisite for a person to be considered a candidate. A person whose COC is cancelled or denied due course is not a candidate at all, and no amount of votes can validate his candidacy.

• "A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all."
• "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."
• "Nemo dat quod non habet. What right can a non-candidate pass on to his substitute? Clearly, there is none because no one can give what he does not have."
• "The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed." (citing Nolasco v. Comelec)
• "We should always be reminded that ours is a government of laws not of men. If this Court should fold its arms and refuse to apply the law at every 'clamor' of the majority of the supposed constituency, where shall order and justice lie?"

• Bautista v. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) — Established that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy"
• Labo v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) — Originated the doctrine that the second placer cannot be proclaimed winner when the first placer is disqualified
• Reyes v. Comelec (254 SCRA 514 [1996]) — Reaffirmed the Labo doctrine regarding second placers
• Nolasco v. Comelec (275 SCRA 763 [1997]) — Applied the Labo doctrine; held that votes cast for a disqualified candidate are presumed cast in the belief he was qualified and cannot be treated as stray votes to be given to the second placer
• Gador v. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]) — Held that a COC filed beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not a candidate
• Herrera v. Baretto (25 Phil. 245 [1913]) — Distinguished jurisdiction from exercise of jurisdiction

• Section 77, Omnibus Election Code — Governs substitution of candidates in case of death, disqualification, or withdrawal; requires that the substituted candidate be an "official candidate of a registered or accredited political party"
• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy based on false material representations
• Section 73, Omnibus Election Code — Requires filing of sworn certificate of candidacy as mandatory for eligibility for elective office
• Section 44, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Governs permanent vacancies in local government offices and succession thereto (vice mayor succeeds mayor)
• Article II, Section 26, 1987 Constitution — State policy prohibiting political dynasties
• Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution — Term limits for local elective officials (three consecutive terms)
• Section 43(b), Republic Act No. 7160 — Local Government Code provision on three-term limit

• Justice Romero — Argued that the substitution was valid because Jose Miranda was "disqualified" under Section 77, and the cancellation of COC under Section 78 was merely the procedural mechanism to enforce that disqualification; contended that the terms "disqualified" and "cancelled" should not be given a hair-splitting distinction that defeats the will of the party to field a substitute; also argued that technical defects in the certificate of nomination should be considered harmless irregularities after the electorate has spoken.
• Justice Panganiban — Argued for a liberal interpretation of election laws to give effect to the will of the people; criticized the majority for using "hair-splitting logic" to obliterate the popular will and install the vice mayor instead of the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes; cited Frivaldo v. Comelec for the principle that it is better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex legalisms.