Miller vs. California

The SC established the Miller Test for obscenity: Material is obscene (and thus unprotected by the First Amendment) if: (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, finds that the work as a whole appeals to prurient interest; (2) the work depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way as defined by applicable state law; and (3) the work, as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The "utterly without redeeming social value" test from Memoirs is rejected.

Prior to Miller, obscenity jurisprudence was unsettled. The Roth test (1957) held obscenity unprotected if "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Memoirs plurality (1966) required proof that material was "utterly without redeeming social value," a burden deemed nearly impossible to meet. This led to inconsistent rulings and the Redrup practice of summary reversals. The SC sought to provide clearer, more workable guidelines.

• Convicted in California Superior Court (Orange County) for misdemeanor distribution of obscene matter under Cal. Penal Code § 311.2(a).
• Conviction affirmed by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California, Orange County, without opinion.
• Appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

• Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign advertising sexually explicit books and a film ("Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," "An Illustrated History of Pornography," "Marital Intercourse").
• Brochures contained explicit pictures/drawings of sexual activities and genitalia.
• Unsolicited brochures were mailed to a Newport Beach restaurant; opened by the manager and his mother, who complained to police.
• Miller convicted under Cal. Penal Code § 311.2(a) for knowingly distributing obscene matter.

• The California statute incorporated the unconstitutionally vague Memoirs test.
• Application of California "community standards" instead of a "national standard" violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
• The materials were not obscene under constitutional standards.

• The state has a legitimate interest in regulating obscene material, especially when thrust upon unwilling recipients.
• The California statute, as applied, was sufficiently limited and did not infringe First Amendment rights.
• The jury instruction using California community standards was proper.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  1. Whether the Memoirs "utterly without redeeming social value" test is a constitutional standard.
  2. Whether the First Amendment requires application of a "national standard" to determine prurient interest and patent offensiveness.
  3. What are the proper constitutional standards for defining obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment?

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  1. The Memoirs test is rejected. The "utterly without redeeming social value" standard is not constitutionally mandated and places an impossible burden on the prosecution.
  2. The First Amendment does not require a "national standard." Juries may apply "contemporary community standards" of the relevant state/locality (California in this case). A national standard is unrealistic given the country's diversity.
  3. The SC established the Miller Test (see Doctrines Invoked). Obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment if it meets this three-part test. States may regulate material depicting sexual conduct specifically defined by state law.

• The Miller Test (Three-Part Obscenity Standard): Material is obscene if:
  1. Prurient Interest: "The average person, applying contemporary community standards" finds that the work, as a whole, appeals to prurient interest (a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion).
  2. Patent Offensiveness: The work depicts or describes sexual conduct, in a patently offensive way, as specifically defined by the applicable state law (e.g., ultimate sexual acts, masturbation, lewd exhibition of genitals).
  3. Lack of Serious Value: The work, as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. (This replaced the stricter "utterly without redeeming social value" test).
  4. Community Standards: The "community" for applying the prurient interest and patent offensiveness prongs is the relevant state or locality, not the nation as a whole. This reflects the country's diversity and is constitutionally adequate.
  5. Specific Definition Requirement: State laws regulating obscenity must specifically define the sexual conduct being regulated to provide fair notice and avoid vagueness.

• "We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited." (Opinion of the Court)
• "It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City." (Opinion of the Court, on Community Standards)
• "I could never succeed in [defining 'hard-core pornography'] intelligibly," but "I know it when I see it." (Justice Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis, cited in Douglas dissent)
• "To many the Song of Solomon is obscene." (Justice Douglas, dissenting, arguing against judicial definition of obscenity)

• Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): Reaffirmed that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. Provided the foundational "prurient interest" and "utterly without redeeming social importance" tests. Miller modified the latter.
• Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966): The plurality opinion articulated the stricter three-part test (prurient interest, patently offensive, utterly without redeeming social value) that Miller explicitly rejected.
• Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967): Established the practice of summary reversals in obscenity cases due to lack of a majority standard. Miller aimed to end this practice by providing clear guidelines.
• Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972): Cited for the "average person, applying contemporary community standards" language from Roth.
• Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968): Highlighted the "variety of views" on obscenity standards among the Justices prior to Miller.
• Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969): Recognized a right to private possession of obscene material but reaffirmed the state's interest in regulating public dissemination, especially to protect unwilling recipients and juveniles.
• Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968): Upheld state power to regulate distribution of obscene material to minors.

• First Amendment (U.S. Constitution): Protects freedom of speech and press. Miller held obscene material, as defined by the test, falls outside this protection.
• Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. Constitution): Applies First Amendment protections to the states and guarantees due process. Miller found the new standards provided adequate specificity to satisfy due process.
• California Penal Code § 311.2(a): The statute under which Miller was convicted, prohibiting knowing distribution of obscene matter. The SC found it could be constitutionally applied if construed in line with the Miller test.
• California Penal Code § 311(a) (Definitions): Defined "obscene matter" incorporating elements of the Memoirs test. The SC held the trial court's instruction based on this definition was erroneous under the new Miller standard.

• N/A (No separate concurring opinions are detailed in the provided text).

• Justice Douglas (Dissenting): Argued the First Amendment allows no exception for "obscenity." Found the new standards vague and unworkable, creating a criminal trap. Believed criminal prosecution should only follow a prior civil adjudication declaring specific material obscene. Contended the "offensive" standard unconstitutionally empowers censors.
• Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall (Dissenting): Argued that no workable standard could distinguish protected speech from unprotected obscenity without severely jeopardizing First Amendment values. Advocated for a standard focusing only on regulating distribution to juveniles or offensive exposure to unconsenting adults, leaving consenting adults free to obtain material. Found the California statute unconstitutionally overbroad.