Mijares vs. Custorio

An absolute and unconditional pardon blots out the crime committed and removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, including disqualification from voting and consequent ineligibility for elective municipal office.

Mijares and Custorio were registered candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Province of Samar. Section 94, par. (b), of the Election Code disqualified from voting any person declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property, with voting qualification bearing upon eligibility for the office sought.

Mijares and Custorio were both registered candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Province of Samar, in the general elections held on December 10, 1940. Following the election, Custorio was proclaimed elected by the municipal board of canvassers.

Mijares contested the election on the ground that Custorio was disqualified from voting and therefore ineligible to the office to which he was elected. The basis invoked was Section 94, par. (b), of the Election Code, which disqualifies from voting any person declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property. Prior to his election, Custorio had been convicted of a crime against property. On November 29, 1940, however, he was granted an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to his civil and political rights by the President of the Philippines.

The pertinent facts were the subject of stipulation by the parties. Upon those stipulated facts, the court below rendered judgment declaring Custorio ineligible to the office of mayor and ordering his ouster and exclusion therefrom, precipitating the appeal.

• Disqualification by Conviction: Petitioner maintained that Custorio was disqualified from voting and therefore ineligible to the office of mayor, having been convicted by final judgment of a crime against property within the meaning of Section 94, par. (b), of the Election Code.
• Ineffectiveness of Pardon: Petitioner contended that the pardon was ineffective because there was no delivery and acceptance.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon: Whether the absolute and unconditional pardon granted to Custorio had the effect of removing his disqualification from voting and consequent ineligibility for mayor.
• Delivery and Acceptance of Pardon: Whether the pardon was ineffective for lack of delivery and acceptance.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon: Yes. The pardon removed the disqualification, an absolute pardon blotting out the crime and all disabilities resulting from conviction, so the election was sustained.
• Delivery and Acceptance of Pardon: No. The objection lacked merit, the appellee having no standing to raise a matter concerning only the pardoning authority and the grantee, and delivery and acceptance being sufficiently proved on the stipulated facts.

• Effect of Absolute Pardon: Applied was the doctrine enunciated in Cristobal vs. Labrador that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction, later applied in Pelobello vs. Palatino. Upon the authority of those cases, the pardon granted on November 29, 1940, which was absolute and unconditional and restored Custorio to his civil and political rights, was concluded to have removed the Section 94, par. (b) disqualification arising from conviction of a crime against property. Accordingly, no ineligibility remained to defeat the election proclaimed by the municipal board of canvassers.
• Delivery and Acceptance of Pardon: Rejected was the contention of ineffectiveness for want of delivery and acceptance. First, no right to raise that question belonged to the appellee, as it concerned exclusively the pardoning authority and the party receiving executive clemency. Second, upon the stipulated facts, delivery and acceptance were found sufficiently proved.

• Absolute pardon removes disabilities of conviction — An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. The rule was applied to remove a prior-conviction disqualification from voting under the Election Code and thereby sustain eligibility for the office of municipal mayor, where the pardon was absolute and unconditional and restored civil and political rights.

• "an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction." — States the controlling doctrine taken from Cristobal vs. Labrador and applied to hold the pardon removed Custorio's electoral disqualification.
• "the appellee has no right to raise this question which concern exclusively the pardoning authority and the party receiving executive clemency." — Defines the limited standing to question delivery and acceptance of executive clemency, rejecting Mijares's collateral attack on the pardon.

• Cristobal vs. Labrador, 40 Off. Gaz. Supp. 9, 298 — Controlling precedent establishing that absolute pardon blots out the crime and removes all disabilities of conviction; followed as basis for sustaining Custorio's election.
• Pelobello vs. Palatino, 40 Off. Gaz. 1466 — Subsequent application of the Cristobal vs. Labrador doctrine; invoked as additional authority that the pardon removed disqualification.

• Section 94, par. (b), Election Code — Provides that any person declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property shall not be qualified to vote. Invoked as the source of the alleged disqualification and ineligibility; held inapplicable after removal of the disability by absolute pardon.

Diaz, Moran, and Ozaeta, JJ., concur.

• Horrilleno, M. — Dissented, stating that the questions raised were substantially identical to those discussed in Florencio Pelobello against Gregorio Palatino, R.G. No. 48100, and referring to the dissent written therein.