Migrante International vs. Social Security System

Compulsory SSS coverage of land-based OFWs, including their treatment as self-employed persons and the differential treatment from sea-based OFWs, does not violate the equal protection clause because the classification rests on substantial distinctions—foreign employers of land-based OFWs are beyond Philippine jurisdiction, while manning agencies of sea-based OFWs are solidarily liable under existing law—but an IRR provision requiring advance payment of SSS contributions as a precondition for OEC issuance is unconstitutional for being ultra vires, unduly oppressive, and violative of the right to travel, as the restriction is not authorized by any law and does not serve the interests of national security, public safety, or public health.

Petitioners are Migrante International (an association of Filipino migrants with chapters in 24 countries), several individual land-based OFWs, and several partylist representatives from Bayan Muna, Gabriela Women's Party, ACT-Teachers Partylist, and Kabataan Partylist. Respondents are the Social Security System (SSS), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), represented by their respective officials. The dispute centers on Republic Act No. 11199, the Social Security Act of 2018, signed into law on February 7, 2019, which for the first time mandated compulsory SSS coverage of all sea-based and land-based OFWs. The law treats land-based OFWs in the same manner as self-employed persons and tasks the DFA, DOLE, and SSS with ensuring compulsory coverage through bilateral social security and labor agreements and "other measures for enforcement." The Social Security Commission promulgated the IRR, published on June 2, 2019, Rule 14 of which governs OFW coverage.

On February 7, 2019, President Rodrigo Duterte signed into law Republic Act No. 11199, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 2018. One of the significant amendments introduced by the law is the compulsory coverage by the SSS of all sea-based and land-based Overseas Filipino Workers. For this purpose, land-based OFWs are treated in the same manner as self-employed persons. Section 9-B of the law provides that coverage shall be compulsory upon all sea-based and land-based OFWs as defined under RA No. 8042 (the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended), provided they are not over 60 years of age. Land-based OFWs are deemed compulsory members considered in the same manner as self-employed persons under rules the Social Security Commission prescribes. The DFA, DOLE, and SSS are mandated to ensure compulsory coverage of OFWs through bilateral social security and labor agreements and other measures for enforcement.

Pursuant to Section 30 of RA No. 11199, the Social Security Commission promulgated the IRR, which was published in the Philippine Star on June 2, 2019. Rule 14 of the IRR governs the compulsory coverage of OFWs. Among its provisions, Rule 14, Section 5 provides that land-based OFWs are compulsory members treated as self-employed persons until a bilateral labor agreement is entered into, with rules on monthly salary credit, contribution payments, and deadlines. Rule 14, Section 6 mandates the DFA and DOLE to negotiate bilateral labor agreements with host countries to ensure that employers of land-based OFWs pay the required contributions. Rule 14, Section 7(iii) provides that for land-based OFWs in countries without any social security agreement or bilateral labor agreement with the Philippines, enforcement measures shall include the collection of contribution payments by the POEA and/or concerned DOLE agencies through documentation and deployment processes such as the issuance of the Overseas Employment Certificate. Under this provision, new hires, direct/name hires, and government-to-government hires must pay one monthly contribution, while re-hires, returning workers, and Balik-Manggagawa must pay three monthly contributions, as a condition for receiving their OEC.

Petitioners Migrante International, several individual land-based OFWs, and several partylist representatives filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly before the Supreme Court En Banc, seeking to nullify subsections (a), (c), and (e) of Section 9-B of RA No. 11199 and Rule 14, Sections 1, 5, 5.a, 5.b, 6, 7(iii), and 7(iv) of the IRR. They alleged that these provisions violate the equal protection clause, constitute an unjust deprivation of property without due process, and violate the right to travel. They also prayed to prohibit the respondents from enforcing the assailed provisions. The individual OFW petitioners submitted OECs processed years before the assailed law took effect, and did not clearly establish current deployment or employment status. Migrante International submitted its Certificate of Incorporation, Articles of Incorporation, and By-Laws, but did not submit proof of authority to sue on behalf of its members. The legislator-petitioners alleged that the IRR provisions were ultra vires and infringed upon their legislative prerogatives.

• Actual Case or Controversy: Petitioners asserted that an actual case or controversy existed given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, and that RA No. 11199 had already been signed and the IRR published, making the threat of injury real and apparent rather than speculative.
• Legal Standing: Petitioners invoked standing as citizens raising issues of transcendental importance. Migrante International asserted standing as an association of Filipino migrants with chapters in 24 countries. The individual land-based OFW petitioners argued they were in immediate danger of sustaining direct injury from enforcement of the assailed law and IRR. The legislator-petitioners asserted standing based on alleged infringement of their legislative prerogatives by the IRR.
• Propriety of Remedy and Direct Resort: Petitioners maintained that certiorari and prohibition were proper remedies since the Petition raised constitutional issues, and that direct recourse to the Court was justified by transcendental issues involving pure questions of law.
• Equal Protection Violation: Petitioners argued that land-based OFWs are not similarly situated as local employees because their employers are outside Philippine jurisdiction, requiring land-based OFWs to pay both employee and employer shares. They contended that treating land-based OFWs as self-employed persons lacked reasonable justification, since unlike self-employed persons, land-based OFWs have actual employers. They also questioned the distinction between land-based and sea-based OFWs, noting that sea-based OFWs have manning agencies paying for them while land-based OFWs must cover the entire premium until bilateral agreements are secured.
• Deprivation of Property and Ultra Vires IRR: Petitioners challenged the compulsory contribution mechanism under Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR, arguing that requiring land-based OFWs to pay contributions as self-employed before leaving the country as a condition for receiving their OEC deprived them of property without due process and restricted their right to work. They contended it was ultra vires for the SSS to enforce compulsory coverage through OEC issuance, and that the imposition was patently oppressive and discriminatory.
• Right to Travel: Petitioners asserted that conditioning OEC issuance on payment of SSS contributions violated the constitutional right to travel.

• No Legal Standing: Respondents contended that petitioners failed to demonstrate direct and personal injury. The individual land-based OFW petitioners did not prove current deployment or employment, as their OECs were processed years before the assailed law took effect. Migrante failed to submit proof of authority to represent its members. The legislator-petitioners' claim of infringement of legislative prerogatives lacked legal basis.
• No Actual Controversy: Respondents argued that the Petition did not pose an actual and justiciable controversy, as there was no showing of any instance where the POEA denied an OEC to an OFW for failure to pay SSS contributions. The law and IRR would have no real effect unless government instrumentalities promulgated rules or performed acts in furtherance of the provisions.
• Wrong Remedy and Violation of Hierarchy of Courts: Respondents argued that certiorari and prohibition were not available to question the wisdom of a declared state policy, and that the manner of OFW coverage was a legislative prerogative. They claimed petitioners erred in directly filing with the Court without exhausting remedies such as an ordinary action before the RTC or a petition for declaratory relief, and without compelling reasons to bypass the hierarchy of courts.
• Impleading of Respondents: Respondents DFA, DOLE, and POEA argued that the Petition failed to specify acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion and that the House of Representatives and Senate were indispensable parties not impleaded.
• Presumption of Constitutionality: Respondent SSS emphasized that RA No. 11199 and its IRR are presumed constitutional.
• Equal Protection Not Violated: Respondents argued that land-based OFWs, like other employees, must be afforded social protection. Due to the jurisdictional impediment regarding foreign employers, a different treatment as to contribution payment was necessary. Land-based OFWs and self-employed persons are similarly situated because no employer may be compelled to pay the employer's share for either class. The distinction between land-based and sea-based OFWs rests on substantial distinction: sea-based OFWs' principals are bound by standard contracts and international conventions, while no similar legal or contractual provision requires foreign employers of land-based OFWs to contribute.
• Valid Exercise of Police Power: Respondents argued that the compulsory collection of SSS contributions does not constitute deprivation of property, as it is reasonably necessary to enforce the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and is an exercise of police power. SSS contributions serve as preparation and protection against unforeseen circumstances.
• No Violation of Right to Travel: Respondents argued that OEC requirements do not curtail the right to travel given the highly regulatory nature of overseas employment, and that the State can validly impose procedures and requirements before OFW deployment.

• Propriety of Remedy: Whether a petition for certiorari and prohibition is the correct remedy in assailing the provisions of RA No. 11199 and its IRR.
• Direct Resort: Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court is justified.
• Requisites for Judicial Review: Whether the Petition satisfies all the requisites for judicial review, including actual case or controversy, locus standi, earliest possible opportunity, and lis mota.
• Equal Protection: Whether subsections (a), (c), and (e) of Section 9-B of RA No. 11199 and Sections 1, 5, 5-A, 5-B, 6, 7(iii), and 7(iv) of the IRR violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
• Police Power: Whether the compulsory collection of contribution mechanism under Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR is a valid exercise of the State's police power.
• Right to Travel: Whether Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR violates the right to travel.

• Propriety of Remedy: Yes. Certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review, prohibit, or nullify acts of legislative and executive officials, consistent with the Court's expanded power of judicial review under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
• Direct Resort: Yes. Direct resort to the Court is justified because the case presents a genuine issue of constitutionality of first impression involving public welfare and the advancement of public policy, and raises only questions of law.
• Requisites for Judicial Review: Yes, satisfied. An actual case or controversy exists given the clash of legal claims and the law's five-year enforcement. The legislator-petitioners have standing based on alleged infringement of legislative prerogatives by the IRR; the remaining petitioners are granted standing as concerned citizens raising transcendental issues. The constitutional question was raised at the first instance and constitutes the very lis mota of the case.
• Equal Protection: No violation. The classification among local employees, self-employed persons, land-based OFWs, and sea-based OFWs rests on substantial distinctions, is germane to the law's purpose, is not limited to existing conditions, and applies equally to all members of the same class.
• Police Power: Invalid as applied to Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR. While the law's purpose constitutes a lawful subject, the method is unlawful: the use of OECs as a collection mechanism is ultra vires under the principle of ejusdem generis, is not reasonably necessary, and is unduly oppressive.
• Right to Travel: Violated. The restriction on the right to travel is merely provided in an IRR, not a law, and does not serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as required by Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution.

• Propriety of Remedy: The Court's expanded power of judicial review under Article VIII, Section 1 includes the duty to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. As recognized in Francisco vs. The House of Representatives and Tañada vs. Angara, certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review, prohibit, or nullify acts of legislative and executive officials. The Court has consistently allowed these remedies in cases assailing the constitutionality of statutes and executive issuances, including Magallona vs. Ermita, Belgica vs. Ochoa, Araullo vs. Aquino, Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City, Private Hospitals Association of the Philippines vs. Medialdea, ACT Teachers Rep. Tinio vs. Duterte, and Bayyo Association, Inc. vs. Tugade.

• Direct Resort: The doctrine of hierarchy of courts generally requires that petitions for extraordinary writs first be filed with lower-ranked courts. However, exceptions exist, including when genuine issues of constitutionality must be addressed immediately, when issues are of transcendental importance, in cases of first impression, and when questions of public welfare and public policy are involved. In Joint Ship Manning Group, Inc. vs. Social Security System, the Court took cognizance of a similar petition assailing Section 9-B of RA No. 11199, justifying direct resort because the case was of first impression and involved public welfare. The present case involves the same law, albeit as applied to land-based OFWs, and presents a genuine issue of constitutionality involving only questions of law. Direct resort is therefore justified.

• Requisites for Judicial Review: An actual case or controversy exists given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims on whether the assailed provisions violate land-based OFWs' constitutional rights, and because RA No. 11199 has been in force for five years, with the contested provisions already affecting land-based OFWs. As to standing, Migrante International failed to establish who its members are or its authority to sue on their behalf, as its incorporation documents did not identify members or prove authorization. The individual land-based OFW petitioners failed to establish current deployment or imminent injury, as their OECs were processed years before the law took effect. However, the legislator-petitioners have standing because when IRR provisions contradict or add to what Congress has provided, the issuance amounts to an undue exercise of legislative power and an encroachment on Congress's prerogatives. All petitioners also invoke standing as concerned citizens raising transcendental issues; the Court granted this, citing Joint Ship Manning Group for the proposition that RA No. 11199 concerns social protection for OFWs hailed as modern-day heroes, and resolving the constitutional issues ensures that social security protection operates in their favor. The constitutional question was raised at the first instance, satisfying the earliest-opportunity requirement, and constitutes the very lis mota of the case.

• Equal Protection: The rational basis test applies because RA No. 11199 is social welfare legislation. Under this test, a legislative classification must rationally further a legitimate state interest, and the burden is on the challenger to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the classification is without rational basis. The declared policy of RA No. 11199 is to extend social security protection to all Filipino workers, local or overseas. The right to social security is anchored in the UDHR and ICESCR, to which the Philippines is a signatory. The Court found reasonable basis for differential treatment: land-based OFWs occupy a unique position because the absence of social security or bilateral labor agreements leaves the Philippine government without means to compel foreign employers to contribute the employer's share, compelling land-based OFWs to bear the full contribution like self-employed individuals—not from discrimination but from practical necessity. As to the distinction between land-based and sea-based OFWs, the Court relied on Joint Ship Manning Group and Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA, which recognized substantial distinctions in work environment, safety, dangers, and risks. The solidary liability of manning agencies for sea-based OFWs is established by law (RA No. 8042, as amended) and the 2016 POEA Rules, while no singular or uniform employment contract applies to land-based OFWs that would justify imposing the same liability on their recruitment agencies. The classification therefore rests on substantial distinctions, is germane to the law's purpose, is not limited to existing conditions, and applies equally to all members of the same class.

• Police Power: While RA No. 11199 constitutes a lawful subject for the exercise of police power—promoting social justice and protecting workers against hazards—the method employed in Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR is unlawful. Section 9-B(e) of RA No. 11199 provides that the DFA, DOLE, and SSS shall ensure compulsory coverage "through bilateral social security and labor agreements and other measures for enforcement." Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the general phrase "other measures for enforcement" follows the enumeration of "bilateral social security and labor agreements" and should be construed to include only measures of a similar nature—not deployment processes such as OEC issuance. The legislative history confirms this: Senator Gordon's sponsorship speech emphasized that the DFA and DOLE would negotiate with host countries and enhance Philippine embassy functions to collect SSS contributions, placing the primary burden on these agencies rather than on the OFWs. The POEA and concerned DOLE agencies are not authorized by RA No. 11199 to collect SSS contributions, nor is the SSS allowed to delegate collection to these agencies. Administrative regulations must conform to and be consistent with the enabling statute. Furthermore, requiring land-based OFWs who have not yet commenced employment to advance SSS contributions is not reasonably necessary and is unduly oppressive. Prior to OEC issuance, a worker is technically not yet an OFW, yet is compelled to prepay contributions or cannot leave the country. This places an undue burden on OFWs who often borrow money to cover deployment expenses. The measure also undermines the constitutional mandate to protect overseas workers under Article XIII, Section 3 and Article II, Section 18, as it imposes on land-based OFWs an onus—the employer's contribution—not placed on any other class of employee under SSS coverage.

• Right to Travel: The right to travel is part of the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution and may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as provided by law (Article III, Section 6). The assailed IRR provision effectively restricts land-based OFWs' right to travel because without the OEC, they cannot be deployed, and since the primary purpose of their travel is to work, conditioning OEC issuance on advance SSS payment deprives them of their right to travel and their livelihood. This impairment does not serve national security, public safety, or public health but primarily aims to enforce collection of SSS contributions. Moreover, the restriction is provided only in an IRR, not in a law. As held in Genuino vs. De Lima, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law providing for the impairment of the right to travel. An IRR is not a law but an administrative issuance. Nothing in Sections 9-B or 30 of RA No. 11199 authorizes the restriction of the right to travel to enforce compulsory SSS coverage. The constitutional requirement that any impairment of the right to travel must be explicitly provided in a law is therefore not met.

• Rational Basis Test in Equal Protection Challenges — When the challenged legislation is social or economic welfare in nature, the rational basis test applies: the classification must rationally further a legitimate state interest, must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, and the burden is on the challenger to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the classification is without rational basis. The Court applied this test to RA No. 11199, a social welfare law, and found the differential treatment of land-based OFWs, sea-based OFWs, self-employed persons, and local employees to be grounded on substantial distinctions.

• Requisites of Valid Classification Under Equal Protection — A classification is valid if: (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class. The Court found all four requisites satisfied in the classification between land-based and sea-based OFWs under Section 9-B of RA No. 11199.

• Police Power: Lawful Subject and Lawful Method — The proper exercise of police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The interests of the public generally require the interference of the State, and the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The Court found that while RA No. 11199's purpose of providing social security protection constitutes a lawful subject, the method of conditioning OEC issuance on advance SSS payment was not a lawful method—it was ultra vires, not reasonably necessary, and unduly oppressive.

• Ejusdem Generis — A general term following an enumeration of specific words of the same class is construed to include or be restricted to things akin to or resembling those specifically mentioned. The Court applied this principle to hold that "other measures for enforcement" in Section 9-B(e) of RA No. 11199, following the enumeration of "bilateral social security and labor agreements," should be of a similar nature and cannot encompass deployment processes such as OEC issuance.

• Limitations on Administrative Rule-Making — Administrative regulations must be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature, germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by law. The Court struck down Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR for being inconsistent with the provisions of RA No. 11199, as the POEA was not authorized by the law to collect SSS contributions and the SSS could not delegate collection to agencies not designated by the statute.

• Right to Travel — The right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as provided by law. Any impairment must be explicitly provided in a statutory enactment, not merely in an administrative issuance. The Court held that the restriction on land-based OFWs' right to travel through the IRR was unconstitutional because it was not authorized by law, did not serve the enumerated constitutional interests, and was contained only in an administrative issuance.

• Locus Standi — Exceptions for Non-Traditional Suitors — While the general rule requires a personal and substantial interest, exceptions exist for taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators. The Court found that the legislator-petitioners had standing because the IRR allegedly contravened RA No. 11199, constituting an encroachment on legislative power. For concerned citizens, the issues must be of transcendental importance; the Court granted standing to all petitioners on this basis, citing the significance of OFW welfare.

• Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts — Exceptions — Direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed immediately, when issues are of transcendental importance, in cases of first impression, when constitutional issues are better decided by the Supreme Court, and when questions of public welfare and public policy are involved. The Court found direct resort justified because the case was of first impression and involved public welfare.

• "Applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the 'other measures of enforcement' should be of a similar nature to bilateral social security and labor agreements. Notably, the use of OECs does not fall within the same category as bilateral social security and labor agreements." — This passage applies the ejusdem generis principle to hold that the IRR's use of OEC issuance as an enforcement mechanism exceeded the authority granted by Section 9-B(e) of RA No. 11199, forming a key basis for striking down Rule 14, Section 7(iii).

• "Requiring OFWs to pay their SSS contributions before they can secure their OECs does not meet the criteria for a valid police power measure." — This statement crystallizes the Court's conclusion that while the law's objective was legitimate, the enforcement method was unlawful, failing both the "reasonably necessary" and "not unduly oppressive" prongs of the police power test.

• "Certainly, there is nothing in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act No. 11199 which authorizes the restriction of the right to travel to enforce the land-based OFWs compulsory coverage in the SSS." — This passage establishes the ratio decidendi for the right-to-travel ruling: the constitutional requirement that impairment of the right to travel must be explicitly provided by law was not met, as the restriction existed only in an IRR, not in the statute itself.

• "To truly honor the sacrifices of our OFWs, often hailed as modern-day heroes, it is crucial to refrain from oppressive policies that unfairly burden them." — This closing passage frames the decision's normative thrust, emphasizing that while social security protection for OFWs is a valid state objective, the State must not unduly burden OFWs in enforcing collection of contributions.

• Joint Ship Manning Group, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 876 Phil. 596 (2020) — Controlling precedent on the constitutionality of Section 9-B of RA No. 11199 as applied to sea-based OFWs. The Court relied on it for the substantial distinction between land-based and sea-based OFWs, the justification for direct resort to the Court, and the grant of standing on grounds of transcendental importance.

• Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. vs. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration — Followed for the established principle that substantial distinctions exist between sea-based and land-based OFWs in terms of work environment, safety, dangers, and risks, justifying differential treatment under the equal protection clause.

• Francisco vs. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003) — Followed for the proposition that the Court's expanded power of judicial review was meant to ensure the potency of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentality of government.

• Tañada vs. Angara, 338 Phil. 546 (1997) — Followed for the principle that certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review, prohibit, or nullify acts of legislative and executive officials.

• Belgica vs. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416 (2013) — Followed for the propriety of certiorari and prohibition to test the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System, and for the existence of actual controversy based on contrariety of legal rights.

• Genuino vs. De Lima, 829 Phil. 691 (2018) — Followed for the requirement that impairment of the right to travel must be provided by explicit statutory law, not merely by administrative issuance.

• Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan vs. Quezon City, 815 Phil. 1067 (2017) — Followed for the three-tier scrutiny framework (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis) and for the principle that curfew ordinances restrict the right to travel even when primarily imposed for public safety.

• British American Tobacco vs. Camacho, 584 Phil. 489 (2008) — Followed for the formulation of the rational basis test: a legislative classification must rationally further a legitimate state interest, with the burden on the challenger to prove the absence of rational basis.

• Funa vs. Villar, 686 Phil. 571 (2012) — Followed for the summary of requirements for granting legal standing to non-traditional suitors (taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators).

• The Executive Secretary vs. The Court of Appeals, 473 Phil. 27 (2004) — Followed for the principle that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members, provided it establishes who its members are and its authority to sue on their behalf.

• Bayyo Association, Inc. vs. Tugade, G.R. No. 254001, July 11, 2023 — Distinguished on standing; the Court found Bayyo Association's SEC Certificate alone insufficient to establish membership and authority to sue, a principle applied to find Migrante International likewise lacked standing as an association.

• Olarte vs. Nayona, 461 Phil. 429 (2003) — Cited for the characterization of overseas workers as a disadvantaged class deserving of state protection, reinforcing the finding that the OEC precondition was unduly oppressive.

• Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Defines judicial power as including the duty to settle actual controversies and to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Applied to uphold the propriety of certiorari and prohibition as remedies for constitutional challenges.

• Article III, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — The due process clause: no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Applied to strike down Rule 14, Section 7(iii) of the IRR for unjustly depriving land-based OFWs of property (right to work) without due process.

• Article III, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — The right to travel shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Applied to hold that the IRR's restriction on travel was unconstitutional because it was not provided by law and did not serve the enumerated interests.

• Article XIII, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Mandates the State to afford full protection to overseas labor, promote full employment, and guarantee workers' rights to security of tenure, humane conditions, and a living wage. Cited to emphasize that the OEC precondition undermined the State's mandate to protect OFWs.

• Article II, Section 18, 1987 Constitution — The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force and shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. Cited in support of the ruling that the assailed IRR provision unduly burdened land-based OFWs.

• Section 9-B, Republic Act No. 11199 (Social Security Act of 2018) — Provides for compulsory SSS coverage of all sea-based and land-based OFWs, treating land-based OFWs as self-employed persons, and mandating the DFA, DOLE, and SSS to ensure coverage through bilateral social security and labor agreements and other measures for enforcement. Upheld as constitutional; the phrase "other measures for enforcement" was construed under ejusdem generis not to include OEC-based collection.

• Section 30, Republic Act No. 11199 — Authorizes the Social Security Commission to promulgate the IRR within 90 days of the law's effectivity. Cited as the source of the SSC's rule-making authority, which the Court found was exceeded by Rule 14, Section 7(iii).

• Rule 14, Section 7(iii), IRR of RA No. 11199 — Provides for collection of SSS contributions through POEA documentation and deployment processes including OEC issuance for land-based OFWs in countries without SSAs or BLAs. Declared unconstitutional for being ultra vires, unduly oppressive, and violative of due process and the right to travel.

• Articles 22 and 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) — Establish the right of everyone to social security and to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being. Cited to anchor the right to social security in international human rights law.

• Article 9, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) — Establishes a legal obligation for countries to progressively implement the right to social security. Cited to affirm the Philippines' commitment to progressive realization of social security protection.

Gesmundo, C.J., Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred. Hernando, J., was on official business. Gaerlan, J., was on official leave. Leonen, SAJ, and Caguioa, J., filed separate concurring and dissenting opinions, the contents of which are not provided in the source text.

• Lazaro-Javier, J. — Filed a dissenting opinion. The source text does not provide the content or reasoning of the dissent.