Mesina vs. Pineda Vda. de Sonza, et al.

A homestead patent and certificate of title issued by the Director of Lands over land that has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property are null and void, and an action to cancel such title is not barred by the statute of limitations. The indefeasibility of a decree of registration cannot be invoked where the property involved is allegedly private in nature and the issuing officer had no jurisdiction over it.

The plaintiff, Ignacio Mesina, claimed ownership in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, which he alleged he had possessed since 1914. The lot was the subject of a registration proceeding pending before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The defendants, Eulalia Pineda Vda. de Sonza and others, were issued a homestead patent and an original certificate of title over the same property by the Director of Lands in 1953. The dispute centers on whether the Director of Lands had jurisdiction to issue a patent over land that the plaintiff claimed was already private property, and whether the plaintiff's action to cancel the title was barred by the statute of limitations.

Ignacio Mesina brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case pending before the same court covering the property described therein be given due course, and that defendants be ordered to pay him P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, arguing that the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958, while the decree of registration or issuance of patent over the property was issued "sometime on September 12, 1953 or thereabout," and the transfer certificate of title covering the same was issued on September 16, 1953. They contended that the action, which called for the cancellation of said decree and title, was filed after the elapse of more than four years, and could not be done because the title had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint.

The plaintiff claimed that he was the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he had been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and up to the present time he was the only one who benefited from the produce thereof; that said lot was at the time the subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238; that sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands, without exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent in their favor as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their name by the register of deeds; that said title was procured by defendants through frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands had no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land because it was a private property of the plaintiff. For these reasons, the plaintiff prayed that said decree and title be cancelled.

• Ownership and Possession: Plaintiff claimed that he was the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, having been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against the whole world, and that he was the only one who benefited from the produce thereof.
• Lack of Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands: Plaintiff argued that the Director of Lands had no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering the land because it was private property of the plaintiff, and that the homestead patent and certificate of title were procured by defendants through frauds, deception and misrepresentation.
• Non-Compliance with Requirements: Plaintiff alleged that the Director of Lands issued the homestead patent without exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not complied with the requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

• Statute of Limitations: Defendants argued that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, as the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958, while the decree of registration or issuance of patent was issued on September 12, 1953, and the transfer certificate of title was issued on September 16, 1953, more than four years prior to the filing of the action.
• Indefeasibility of Title: Defendants contended that the title had already become indefeasible and incontrovertible, and could no longer be cancelled.

• Statute of Limitations: Whether the plaintiff's action to cancel the homestead patent and certificate of title was barred by the statute of limitations.
• Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands: Whether the Director of Lands had jurisdiction to issue a homestead patent over land that had allegedly ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private property.

• Statute of Limitations: No. The action was not barred by the statute of limitations because the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree does not apply where the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain.
• Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands: No. The Director of Lands had no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering the land if it was already private property of the plaintiff, and the homestead patent and certificate of title issued in favor of the defendants would be null and void for having been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

• Statute of Limitations: The Court reasoned that the dismissal by the trial court was predicated on the theory that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree. However, this theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain. The Court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving the plaintiff a chance to prove his claim, and that it would have been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground that its object does not appear to be indubitable.
• Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands: The Court applied the doctrine in Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, which held that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government. If by a legal fiction, the plaintiff had acquired the land by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title covering the lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

• Grant by Operation of Law — Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government. It is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the court; an application therefor is sufficient. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that if the plaintiff had been in possession since 1914, he may have acquired the land by a grant of the State, and the land had ceased to be part of the public domain.
• Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands — The Director of Lands has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent over land that has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property. A homestead patent and certificate of title issued over such land are null and void for having been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.

• "If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right." — This passage, quoted from Susi vs. Razon, states the controlling doctrine that the Director of Lands cannot dispose of land that has already become private property, and any such disposition is void.
• "If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation." — This passage applies the Susi doctrine to the facts of the case, forming the basis for the Court's conclusion that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

• Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the doctrine that a possessor who has complied with all the requirements for a government grant through open, continuous, and public possession is deemed to have acquired a grant by operation of law, and the land ceases to be part of the public domain, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.

• Section 48-b, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 — The provision allows those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, to be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to be entitled to a certificate of title. The Court noted this provision in the context of the plaintiff's claim of possession since 1914.

Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concurred.