Merdegia vs. Veloso

An administrative complaint against a justice cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. A lawyer who files a frivolous administrative complaint against a member of the Judiciary, after the alleged bias has already been resolved through a motion for inhibition, commits indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

The case arose from an administrative complaint filed by Thomas S. Merdegia, represented by counsel Atty. Homobono Adaza II, against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, relative to CA G.R. SP No. 119461. The complaint alleged partiality by Justice Veloso during oral arguments. The Court of Appeals' 2009 Internal Rules permit a justice to act on a motion for inhibition directed against him or her. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies.

Atty. Homobono Adaza II served as counsel for Thomas S. Merdegia in a case before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 119461, where Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso was a member of the division hearing the appeal. During the oral arguments, Atty. Adaza and his client observed what they believed to be Justice Veloso's partiality. Instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint, Atty. Adaza counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case.

Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself and denied the motion, acting on it himself as permitted under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. After the denial, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative complaint, which was based on the same main cause as the motion for inhibition: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments.

The Court noted Atty. Adaza's pattern of filing motions for inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments. These indicators, taken together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverse to Atty. Adaza's client, disclosed that there was more to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.

• Performance of Duty as Counsel: Atty. Adaza argued that he should not be punished for indirect contempt because he was merely performing his duty as Merdegia's counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso.
• Good Faith Belief in the Merits: Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Veloso's partiality during the oral arguments, and that he acceded to his client's repeated request to file the administrative complaint only after the motion to inhibit was denied. He pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially since he also believed in the merits of his client's case.

N/A — The case text does not recount arguments attributed to Justice Veloso as respondent; the matter before the Court was the contempt charge against Atty. Adaza.

• Propriety of the Administrative Complaint: Whether the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, filed after the denial of the motion for inhibition, was a proper remedy or a substitute for judicial remedies.
• Indirect Contempt: Whether Atty. Adaza's acts in preparing and filing the administrative complaint constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
• Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings: Whether the Court could impose a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza as a member of the bar through the contempt proceeding.

• Propriety of the Administrative Complaint: No. The administrative complaint was improper because the resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso's bias, and the proper remedy would have been a petition for certiorari, not an administrative complaint.
• Indirect Contempt: Yes. Atty. Adaza's acts constitute improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
• Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings: No. Imposing a disciplinary sanction through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process, as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt.

• Propriety of the Administrative Complaint: The Court reasoned that the resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso's bias. While the Court did not discount the fact that Justice Veloso penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.

• Indirect Contempt: The Court found that the totality of the facts, read together with the administrative complaint Atty. Adaza prepared, shows that his complaint was merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. The Court noted Atty. Adaza's penchant for filing motions for inhibition throughout the case—first against Judge Estoesta of the RTC of Manila, and second against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal. These indicators, taken together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverse to Atty. Adaza's client, disclosed that there was more to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate grievances. Citing In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, the Court held that a litigant's predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work, and constitutes indirect contempt of court. The Court also noted that a reading of Merdegia's administrative complaint showed an apparent failure to understand that cases are not always decided in one's favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and developments in the case. The Court attributed to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features of the adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand.

• Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings: The Court explained that contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are different in nature and purpose. Contempt proceedings spring from the Court's implied and inherent power granted to courts in general, essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings. Contempt is penal and summary in nature, so legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply. In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis—neither purely civil nor purely criminal—and is not intended to inflict punishment but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. The two proceedings are governed by different procedures: contempt by Rule 71, and disciplinary actions by Rules 138 and 139 of the Rules of Court. Since the October 8, 2013 Resolution only asked Atty. Adaza to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt, and not why he should not be administratively penalized, imposing a disciplinary sanction through the contempt proceeding would violate his due process rights.

• Administrative complaints cannot substitute for judicial remedies — The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. The Court applied this principle to find that the proper remedy after the denial of the motion for inhibition was a petition for certiorari, not an administrative complaint.

• Indirect contempt through frivolous administrative complaints — A litigant's predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and constitutes indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The Court applied this principle to Atty. Adaza's pattern of filing motions for inhibition and the baseless administrative complaint.

• Contempt proceedings vs. disciplinary proceedings — Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions against lawyers are different in nature and purpose, spring from different powers of the Court, and are governed by different procedures. Contempt is penal and summary in nature, governed by Rule 71; disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, governed by Rules 138 and 139, and are intended to determine fitness to practice law rather than to inflict punishment. A contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding, and vice versa.

• "The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling." — This passage states the controlling principle that administrative complaints are not a proper vehicle for challenging judicial rulings, which was central to the Court's finding of contempt.

• "What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case that, when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his complaint is merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice." — This passage articulates the Court's basis for finding indirect contempt, emphasizing the pattern of conduct rather than a single act.

• "A contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa. There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals." — This passage defines the distinction between contempt and disciplinary proceedings, which was crucial to the Court's refusal to impose disciplinary sanctions without due process.

• In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 465 — Controlling precedent for the principle that a litigant's predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary constitutes indirect contempt of court.
• Maylas, Jr. vs. Judge Sese, 529 Phil. 594, 598 (2006) — Cited for the settled rule that administrative complaints against justices cannot substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies.
• Soriano vs. Angeles, 393 Phil. 769, 779 (2000) — Cited for the principle that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and developments in the case.
• Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 248 Phil. 542 (1988) — Cited for the proposition that contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as a member of the bar, and that the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously.
• People vs. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995) — Cited for the distinction between contempt proceedings and disciplinary proceedings, and that a contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding.
• Espiña vs. Cerujano, et al., 573 Phil. 254 (2008) — Cited for the due process requirement that a person charged of an offense must be informed of the nature of the charge and given ample opportunity to explain his side.
• People vs. Judge Estenzo, 159-A Phil. 483 (1975) — Cited for the proposition that the power of contempt is an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general.
• Masangcay vs. Comelec, 116 Phil. 355 (1962) — Cited for the proposition that the existence of the contempt power is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and the administration of justice.
• Insurance Commissioner vs. Globe Assurance Co., Inc., et al., 197 Phil. 192 (1982) — Cited for the proposition that a judgment dismissing a charge of contempt may no longer be appealed, similar to the prohibition against double jeopardy.
• In re Almacen, 142 Phil. 353 (1970) — Cited for the proposition that a disciplinary proceeding is sui generis in nature, not intended to inflict punishment but to determine fitness to practice law.

• Section 3(d), Rule 71, Rules of Court — The provision defining indirect contempt, which the Court applied to Atty. Adaza's acts of filing a frivolous administrative complaint that tends to degrade the administration of justice.
• Section 1 and Section 3, Rule 71, Rules of Court — The provisions governing contempt of court, cited for the Court's power to institute contempt proceedings against any person guilty of acts constituting contempt.
• Section 3, Rule V, 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals — The provision allowing a justice to act on a motion for inhibition directed against him or her, which the Court cited to show that Justice Veloso was permitted to deny the motion for inhibition.
• Canon 19, Code of Professional Responsibility — The canon providing that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, cited to show that a lawyer's duty to represent a client zealously is limited by legal bounds.
• Canon 1 and Rule 1.02, Code of Professional Responsibility — The canon and rule requiring a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws, and promote respect for the law and legal processes, and prohibiting a lawyer from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
• Rules 138 and 139, Rules of Court — The rules governing disciplinary actions in the practice of law, cited to distinguish disciplinary proceedings from contempt proceedings.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the case text.