Mercidar Fishing Corporation vs. NLRC

Fishing crew members are not "field personnel" under Article 82 of the Labor Code where, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, they have no choice but to remain on board the vessel and are under the effective control and supervision of the employer through the vessel's patron or master, and consequently they are entitled to service incentive leave pay; the factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies on constructive dismissal are binding when supported by substantial evidence and concurred in by both the agency and its subordinate.

Mercidar Fishing Corporation is an employer engaged in the fishing business, operating vessels on which it deploys crew members including "bodegeros" or ship's quartermasters. Private respondent Fermin Agao, Jr. was employed as a bodegero on February 12, 1988. The dispute arose in the context of the Labor Code's Working Conditions and Rest Periods provisions, specifically Article 82, which excludes "field personnel" from coverage and from entitlement to service incentive leave pay. The case also required application of the doctrine on constructive dismissal and abandonment in employer-employee relationships.

Mercidar Fishing Corporation employed Fermin Agao, Jr. as a "bodegero" or ship's quartermaster beginning February 12, 1988. On April 28, 1990, private respondent went on leave without pay for one month due to illness. When he reported back to work on May 28, 1990 at the end of his leave period, he brought a health clearance certificate. Petitioner told him to come back another time, as he could not be reinstated immediately. Thereafter, petitioner refused to give him any work assignments aboard its boats.

On September 6, 1990, private respondent asked petitioner for a certificate of employment. When he returned for the certificate on September 10, petitioner refused to issue it unless he submitted a resignation letter. Private respondent refused to resign unless he was given separation pay, and petitioner thereupon prevented him from entering the premises. On September 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, violation of P.D. No. 851 (13th month pay), and non-payment of five days service incentive leave for 1990.

Petitioner, for its part, claimed that private respondent had abandoned his work. It alleged that he failed to report for work after his leave expired and was absent without leave for three months until August 28, 1990. Petitioner further claimed that it nonetheless assigned private respondent to another vessel, but the latter was left behind on September 1, 1990. According to petitioner, private respondent asked for a certificate of employment on September 6 on the pretext of applying to another fishing company, and on September 10 refused to get the certificate and resign unless given separation pay.

The Labor Arbiter found private respondent's version credible, noting the medical certificate of fitness he had presented upon reporting to work on May 28, 1990, and ruled that he had been constructively dismissed. The NLRC affirmed this factual finding, and both tribunals agreed on the facts.

• Classification as Field Personnel: Petitioner contended that fishing crew members like private respondent should be classified as "field personnel" under Article 82 of the Labor Code, arguing that since their work is performed away from the principal place of business, the employer has no way of verifying their actual hours of work on the vessel, and thus they have no statutory right to service incentive leave pay.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by NLRC: Petitioner argued that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it upheld the Labor Arbiter's finding that petitioner had constructively dismissed private respondent, maintaining that private respondent had actually abandoned his work.

• Field Personnel Classification: Whether fishing crew members like private respondent can be classified as "field personnel" under Article 82 of the Labor Code, thereby exempting them from service incentive leave pay.
• Constructive Dismissal: Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Labor Arbiter's finding that petitioner had constructively dismissed private respondent.

• Field Personnel Classification: No. Fishing crew members are not field personnel under Article 82 because, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, they remain on board the vessel under the effective control and supervision of the employer through the vessel's patron or master.
• Constructive Dismissal: No. The NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on constructive dismissal are binding, being supported by substantial evidence including the medical certificate of fitness, and the elements of abandonment were not established.

• Field Personnel Classification: Article 82 of the Labor Code defines "field personnel" as non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. In Union of Pilipro Employees (UFE) vs. Vicar, the Court clarified that the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules, which exempts "field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer." The Court held that the Implementing Rule did not add a new element but merely interpreted the statutory clause; the inquiry is whether the employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer. In that case, salesmen of Nestle Philippines were held to be field personnel because the company had no way of determining whether they actually spent their field hours working. In contrast, fishermen employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on board the vessel throughout the fishing voyage. Although they perform non-agricultural work away from the business office, they are under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel's patron or master during the entire duration of their work. Their actual hours of work can therefore be determined with reasonable certainty, and they are not field personnel.

• Constructive Dismissal: The factual finding of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that private respondent was constructively dismissed was based not only on the pleadings but also on a medical certificate of fitness which private respondent presented when he reported to work on May 28, 1990, contradicting petitioner's claim. The NLRC correctly applied the rule that when confronted with conflicting factual versions, the Labor Arbiter has the discretion to determine which party deserves credence based on the evidence received. Abandonment was not established because it requires the concurrence of intention to abandon and overt acts showing the employee has no more interest in working, and the filing of a complaint seeking reinstatement and backwages is inconsistent with abandonment. The factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are generally binding when supported by substantial evidence, especially where the agency and its subordinate who heard the case in the first instance are in full agreement as to the facts. The rule that reinstatement may not be ordered if the relation is strained was inapplicable, since petitioner itself continued to reiterate its offer to reinstate private respondent even at the Supreme Court level.

• Definition of Field Personnel — "Field personnel" under Article 82 of the Labor Code refers to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. The requirement that actual hours of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules, which exempts "field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer." The latter clause did not add a new element but merely interpreted the statutory definition. The test is whether the employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that fishing crew members are not field personnel because they remain on board the vessel under the effective control and supervision of the employer through the vessel's patron or master.

• Elements of Abandonment — To constitute abandonment of position, there must be concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt acts from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest in working. The filing of a complaint asking for reinstatement and backwages is inconsistent with the defense of abandonment. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's claim that private respondent had abandoned his work.

• Binding Factual Findings of Quasi-Judicial Bodies — The factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are generally binding as long as they are supported substantially by evidence in the record, especially where the agency and its subordinate who heard the case in the first instance are in full agreement as to the facts. The Court relied on this doctrine to uphold the NLRC's affirmance of the Labor Arbiter's factual findings on constructive dismissal.

• "The clause 'whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer' did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause 'whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.'" — This passage articulates the Court's interpretation of the relationship between Article 82 of the Labor Code and Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules, establishing that the supervision element is inherent in the statutory definition of field personnel.

• "In contrast, in the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, fishermen employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on board its vessel. Although they perform non-agricultural work away from petitioner's business offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work they are under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel's patron or master." — This is the ratio decidendi distinguishing fishermen from field personnel, grounded in the supervision and control test.

• "To constitute abandonment of position, there must be concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt acts from which it may be inferred that the employee concerned has no more interest in working." — This is the canonical formulation of the elements of abandonment, as cited by the NLRC and affirmed by the Court.

• Union of Pilipro Employees (UFE) vs. Vicar, 205 SCRA 200 (1992) — Controlling precedent on the definition of "field personnel" under Article 82 of the Labor Code. The Court relied on its interpretation that the clause on unsupervised time and performance in the Implementing Rules merely interpreted the statutory definition, and applied its reasoning to distinguish fishermen from the sales personnel held to be field personnel in that case.

• Gelmart Industries (Phils.) vs. Leogardo, 155 SCRA 403 (1987) — Cited for the proposition that the Labor Arbiter has discretion to determine which party deserves credence when confronted with conflicting factual versions.

• Dagupan Bus Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 191 SCRA 328 — Cited for the doctrine on the elements of abandonment of position.

• Hua Bee Shirt Factory vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 586 — Cited for the proposition that filing a complaint for reinstatement and backwages is inconsistent with the defense of abandonment.

• International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 256 SCRA 124 (1996) — Cited for the doctrine that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are generally binding when supported by substantial evidence.

• Belaunzaran vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 800 (1996) — Cited for the principle that factual findings are especially binding when the agency and its subordinate who heard the case in the first instance are in full agreement.

• Hernandez vs. NLRC, 176 SCRA 269 (1989) — Cited for the rule that reinstatement may not be ordered if the employer-employee relation is strained, which the Court found inapplicable here.

• Article 82, Labor Code — Defines the coverage of the Title on Working Conditions and Rest Periods, excluding government employees, field personnel, members of the employer's family dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers paid by results. The provision defines "field personnel" as non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. The Court applied this provision to hold that fishing crew members are not field personnel because their hours are supervised through the vessel's master.

• Rule IV, Book III, Implementing Rules of the Labor Code — Provides that the rule on holidays with pay applies to all employees except, among others, "field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer." The Court held that this clause merely interpreted and expounded the statutory definition of field personnel in Article 82, rather than adding a new element.

• Presidential Decree No. 851 — The 13th month pay law, violation of which was one of the claims filed by private respondent. The Labor Arbiter awarded 13th month pay, and the award was affirmed.

Regalado, Melo, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concurred.