Mercado vs. Ongpin

Malice or bad faith must be proved to sustain an action for damages based on Article 19 of the Civil Code; the mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is not, by itself, a ground for damages under Article 19 in relation to Articles 20 or 21, absent a showing that the bigamous spouse acted with deliberate intent or conscious design to do a wrongful act.

Rene V. Ongpin first married Alma D. Mantaring in Quezon City on February 5, 1972. Mantaring later obtained a divorce decree from a Nevada court. Believing the divorce validly dissolved his first marriage, Ongpin married Mary Elizabeth Mercado in Princeton, New Jersey on April 21, 1989. The couple separated on March 16, 2000. Ongpin subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Mantaring on November 25, 2003, and thereafter filed a petition to declare his marriage to Mercado void under Article 35(4) of the Family Code on the ground that it was bigamous. Mercado, for her part, had earlier filed a separate civil case for separation of property over properties acquired during the marriage.

Rene V. Ongpin married Alma D. Mantaring on February 5, 1972 in Quezon City. Mantaring later obtained a divorce decree from the District Court of Clark County, Nevada. Believing the divorce validly dissolved his first marriage, Ongpin married Mary Elizabeth Mercado in Princeton, New Jersey on April 21, 1989. Mercado was a United States citizen at the time of the marriage. The couple lived together for more than ten years and separated on March 16, 2000.

Within four years of their marriage, both Ongpin and Mercado discovered that the divorce decree between Ongpin and Mantaring might not be valid because of the parties' citizenship. Both consulted a lawyer, who advised them to have the first marriage annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity. Ongpin filed a petition for annulment but later withdrew it; Mercado pleaded with him to continue the case. Ongpin subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Mantaring on November 25, 2003, after it was confirmed that Mantaring was still a Filipino citizen when she obtained the divorce decree, rendering it ineffectual under Philippine law.

On January 8, 2006, Ongpin filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Mercado before the Bacoor, Cavite Regional Trial Court, invoking Article 35(4) of the Family Code on the ground that the marriage was bigamous. Mercado opposed the petition, arguing that the marriage was valid under Article 26 of the Family Code and that the petition was a scheme by Ongpin to evade liability in a separate civil case for separation of property she had filed in 2002 over properties acquired during the marriage that Ongpin was allegedly concealing or disposing with intent to deprive her of her share. She also claimed moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage void and awarded Mercado ₱250,000 as moral damages, ₱100,000 as exemplary damages, and ₱150,000 as attorney's fees, finding that Ongpin's act of contracting a second marriage despite his first marriage not yet being annulled undermined the family as a social institution and went against good morals. Ongpin filed a partial appeal assailing only the award of damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Ongpin believed in good faith that the divorce decree was valid and binding because he thought Mantaring was already a United States citizen at the time, and that Mercado failed to prove bad faith by clear and convincing evidence.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Mercado argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the findings of the Regional Trial Court, ignoring that Ongpin filed two petitions to have his marriage to Mantaring declared void, withdrawing the first one and filing the second only after Mercado filed the case for separation of property.
• Entitlement to Moral Damages: Mercado maintained that she was entitled to moral damages because, unlike Ongpin, she did nothing wrong — she had the capacity to marry, was a United States citizen at the time of the marriage, and lived with Ongpin for more than ten years until she left him in 2000.
• Entitlement to Exemplary Damages: Mercado argued that Ongpin should pay exemplary damages for his blatant disrespect for the institution of marriage, and to serve as an example for the public.
• Entitlement to Attorney's Fees: Mercado claimed she should be awarded attorney's fees for being compelled to litigate after Ongpin initiated the suit against her.
• Ongpin's Prior Knowledge: In her Reply, Mercado claimed that Ongpin had known about the invalidity of the divorce decree even before Mantaring told him, and reiterated that she did not know Ongpin was incapacitated to marry her at the start of their marriage.

• Good Faith in Contracting Second Marriage: Ongpin argued that the Court of Appeals correctly held that Mercado failed to prove he deliberately contracted a second marriage knowing his first was still valid and subsisting. He claimed it was only after he and Mercado separated that Mantaring disclosed her Filipino citizenship at the time she obtained the divorce decree.
• Mercado's Admissions: Ongpin pointed out that Mercado admitted during trial that, at the time she married him, she knew that both he and Mantaring were Filipino citizens, and that it was Mercado who advised him to get a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Mantaring in 1992.

• Reviewability of Factual Questions: Whether the Petition for Review raises questions of fact not reviewable in a Rule 45 petition.
• Entitlement to Moral Damages: Whether Mercado is entitled to moral damages based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
• Entitlement to Exemplary Damages and Attorney's Fees: Whether Mercado is entitled to exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

• Reviewability of Factual Questions: Yes, the factual questions may be reviewed. While questions of fact are generally not reviewable under Rule 45, the conflicting factual findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals on the issue of bad faith justify the Court's examination.
• Entitlement to Moral Damages: No. Bad faith must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and the presumption of good faith was not overcome. The mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is not, by itself, a ground for damages under Article 19 in relation to Articles 20 or 21.
• Entitlement to Exemplary Damages and Attorney's Fees: No. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded absent entitlement to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. Attorney's fees were properly deleted because both parties incurred costs to protect their interests, and the emotional suffering suffered by Mercado was only such as is usually caused to a party hauled into court as a party in litigation.

• Reviewability of Factual Questions: Generally, the Court does not review questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition, and whether a party acted in bad faith is a question of fact. However, when the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, the Court may resolve those issues. Here, the RTC found that Ongpin's act of marrying Mercado despite an existing first marriage constituted bad faith, while the CA found that Ongpin believed in good faith that he was validly divorced. Because of these conflicting conclusions, the Court examined the factual record to determine whether Ongpin acted in bad faith.

• Entitlement to Moral Damages: Moral damages require: (1) a physical, mental, or psychological injury clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a wrongful act or omission factually established; (3) the act or omission as proximate cause of the injury; and (4) an award based on cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. The Court has sanctioned the award of moral damages in cases of bigamy based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. However, for a finding of abuse of rights under Article 19, three elements must concur: (1) a legal right or duty; (2) exercise or performance in bad faith; and (3) sole intent to prejudice or injure another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19. Good faith is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the burden to prove it. Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. In Manuel vs. People, moral damages were awarded because the bigamous spouse's continuous and collective acts of fraud before, during, and after the marriage were willful, deliberate, and malicious. Here, the RTC erred in holding that the mere contracting of a second marriage is by itself a ground for damages. Ongpin believed in good faith that the divorce decree was valid because he thought Mantaring was already a United States citizen. Mercado failed to prove that Ongpin knew the divorce was invalid at the time of their marriage or that he concealed this knowledge from her. Moreover, Mercado herself knew of the anomaly as early as 1992, consulted a lawyer, and was advised to seek annulment, yet took no independent action to protect her civil status. The presumption of good faith was not overcome.

• Entitlement to Exemplary Damages and Attorney's Fees: Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a plaintiff must show entitlement to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before exemplary damages may be considered. Because no moral damages were warranted, exemplary damages could not be awarded. As for attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals correctly held that both parties incurred costs to protect their interests, and in the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by Mercado from being made a party in litigation is insufficient to justify an award of attorney's fees.

• Abuse of Rights Doctrine (Article 19, Civil Code) — Every person must, in the exercise of rights and performance of duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. For a finding of abuse of rights under Article 19, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) the right is exercised or the duty is performed in bad faith; and (3) the sole intent of the exercise or performance is to prejudice or injure another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19. Good faith is presumed, and the party alleging bad faith bears the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is not by itself a ground for damages absent proof of bad faith.

• Elements of Moral Damages — Moral damages are awarded when: (1) there is a physical, mental, or psychological injury clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a wrongful act or omission is factually established; (3) the act or omission is the proximate cause of the injury; and (4) the award is based on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. The Court found that Mercado failed to establish the second element — a wrongful act or omission — because Ongpin's contracting of the second marriage was not shown to have been done in bad faith.

• Withdrawal of Appeal After Submission — Once a case has been submitted for a court's decision, the petitioning party cannot, at their election, withdraw their appeal. The grant or denial of the withdrawal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court applied this rule to deny Mercado's December 19, 2019 motion to dismiss, which sought to have her appeal considered withdrawn.

• "Malice or bad faith must be proved to sustain an action for damages based on Article 19 of the Civil Code." — This is the opening line of the decision and encapsulates the controlling principle: that the mere act of contracting a second marriage, without proof of bad faith, does not give rise to liability for damages under the abuse of rights doctrine.

• "Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same." — This passage, quoted from Dart Philippines, Inc. vs. Spouses Calogcog, defines the canonical formulation of bad faith under Article 19 and establishes the presumption of good faith and the corresponding burden of proof.

• "the Regional Trial Court was in error when it held that the mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is, by itself, a ground for damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 or Article 21." — This statement clarifies the boundary between a void marriage and civil liability for damages: the former does not automatically entail the latter, absent proof of malice or bad faith.

• Dart Philippines, Inc. vs. Spouses Calogcog, 613 Phil. 224 (2009) — Followed. Cited for the canonical definition of malice and bad faith under Article 19 of the Civil Code, including the presumption of good faith and the burden on the party alleging bad faith to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

• Manuel vs. People, 512 Phil. 818 (2005) — Distinguished. Cited for the proposition that moral damages may be awarded in bigamy cases where the bigamous spouse acted deceitfully and fraudulently. The Court distinguished the present case because Ongpin's acts were not shown to be willful, deliberate, or malicious, unlike in Manuel where the petitioner actively concealed his existing marriage and maintained a continuous series of fraudulent acts.

• GF Equity Inc. vs. Valenzona, 501 Phil. 153 (2005) — Cited for the principle that Article 19 recognizes that even the exercise of a right may be the source of an illegal act when done in a manner contrary to the standards it sets.

• Spouses Fernando vs. Fernando, 656 Phil. 205 (2011) — Cited for the exception allowing the Court to resolve questions of fact when the factual findings of the RTC and CA are conflicting.

• Article 35(4), Family Code — Declares void from the beginning those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41. Applied as the basis for declaring Ongpin and Mercado's marriage void, since Ongpin's first marriage was still subsisting when he married Mercado.

• Article 26, Family Code — Invoked by Mercado to argue the marriage was valid; the Court did not sustain this argument in the context of the damages issue, as the nullity of the marriage was not the subject of the appeal.

• Article 19, Civil Code — Sets the standard that every person must, in the exercise of rights and performance of duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Central to the Court's analysis; the Court held that malice or bad faith is at the core of this provision and must be proved to sustain an action for damages.

• Article 20, Civil Code — Provides that every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter. Cited in relation to Article 19 as providing the legal remedy for its violation.

• Article 21, Civil Code — Provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Cited in relation to Article 19 as providing the legal remedy for its violation.

• Article 2219, Civil Code — Enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered, including acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. Applied as the statutory basis for the award of moral damages, subject to the requisites established by jurisprudence.

• Article 2234, Civil Code — Provides that a plaintiff must show entitlement to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before exemplary damages may be awarded. Applied to deny exemplary damages because no moral damages were warranted.

Gesmundo, Carandang, Hernando, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred.