Mercado vs. Lopena

The defense of Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) is available only in environmental cases governed by A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC and cannot be applied to cases involving violence against women and children under R.A. No. 9262; furthermore, the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) under R.A. No. 9262 does not divest courts and prosecutors of jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases initiated by the respondent against the protected party, nor does it constitute grave abuse of discretion for judges and prosecutors to take cognizance of such cases.

A domestic dispute between estranged spouses Ma. Sugar M. Mercado and Kristofer Jay I. Go escalated into a barrage of legal actions filed by both parties against each other in various courts in Quezon City. The conflict involved allegations of domestic violence, child custody battles, and various criminal complaints including libel, physical injuries, and violations of special laws. Following the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order in favor of petitioner Mercado, private respondents continued to file cases against petitioners, prompting the latter to seek extraordinary relief from the Supreme Court to declare the subsequent filings as harassment suits amounting to SLAPPs.

• Petitioner Ma. Sugar M. Mercado and her parents, spouses Reynaldo and Yolanda Mercado, are engaged in multiple legal disputes with private respondent Kristofer Jay I. Go (Mercado's estranged husband) and his relatives including parents Peter and Esther Go, Kenneth Roue Go, Casey Lim Jimenez, Cristina Palileo, and Ruel Balino.
• Between September and November 2015, private respondents filed several cases against petitioners including: (1) a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody (Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08943) pending before RTC Quezon City Branch 86; (2) criminal cases for violation of R.A. No. 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Law) against Sugar and Yolanda Mercado; (3) libel cases against Sugar and Yolanda Mercado; and (4) criminal cases for Physical Injuries, Oral Defamation, Slander by Deed, and Unjust Vexation.
• Beginning February 2016, private respondents filed additional cases including Grave Threats, violation of R.A. No. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act), and Indirect Contempt against Sugar Mercado.
• On November 5, 2015, petitioner Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for Temporary and/or Permanent Protection Order (TPO/PPO) under R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act), docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201, also raffled to RTC Branch 86.
• On February 19, 2016, the RTC granted the PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 3, 2017 and subsequently denied review by the Supreme Court on October 2, 2017.
• Petitioners also filed various cases against private respondents including Indirect Contempt and violations of R.A. Nos. 10175 and 9262, some of which were dismissed for lack of probable cause.
• At the time of filing the instant Petition, most of the cases filed by private respondents against petitioners were still pending before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Regional Trial Courts, and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

• The cases filed by private respondents against them constitute Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) intended to harass, intimidate, and silence petitioners, and to pressure them into giving up custody of the minor children.
• The filing of multiple baseless complaints constitutes "abuse" and "violence against women" under R.A. No. 9262.
• Public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject cases despite petitioner Mercado being a "judicially declared victim of domestic violence" and the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) in her favor.
• The Court should declare the subject cases as SLAPP and order their immediate dismissal, and amend A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence Against Women and Children) to include provisions against SLAPP.
• The Court should issue a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing public respondents to desist from conducting further hearings on the subject cases.

• Private respondents argued that the Petition does not satisfy the procedural requisites of judicial review and that petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping.
• Some cases were filed prior to the issuance of the PPO on February 19, 2016, and the PPO did not expressly prohibit the filing of such cases.
• The subject cases had factual and legal bases, and the enforcement of a right or seeking redress through judicial processes does not constitute violence against women.
• Public respondents (Secretary of Justice and Chief City Prosecutor) argued that the petition is premature because plain, speedy, and adequate remedies are available (participation in pending cases and appeal), and there was failure to observe the hierarchy of courts.
• The concept of SLAPP applies specifically to environmental cases only under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC and has no application to domestic violence cases under R.A. No. 9262.
• Public respondents were merely performing their official functions in taking cognizance of the subject cases and did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Petition satisfies the requisites for judicial review.
  • Whether the Petition was filed prematurely given the availability of plain, speedy, and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
  • Whether the Petition should be dismissed for failure to state material dates as required by Rule 46 in relation to Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
  • Whether the direct filing of the Petition with the Supreme Court violates the rule on hierarchy of courts.
  • Whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the concept of Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) may be applied to cases involving violence against women and children under R.A. No. 9262.
  • Whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject cases despite the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) in favor of petitioner Mercado.
  • Whether the Court may exercise its rule-making power through a Rule 65 petition to extend SLAPP protection to domestic violence cases.

• Procedural:
  • The Petition is dismissed for being premature. For a petition for certiorari or prohibition to prosper, there must be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Here, petitioners could still participate in the pending cases and await judgment, with the right to appeal unfavorable decisions. For cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor, remedies include petition for review before the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the President.
  • The Petition is dismissible for failure to include a statement of material dates (when notice of judgment was received, when motion for reconsideration was filed, and when notice of denial was received) in violation of Rule 46, Section 3, in relation to Rule 56. This omission prevents the Court from determining the timeliness of the petition, which must be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment or resolution.
  • The direct filing with the Supreme Court violates the hierarchy of courts. While exceptions exist (genuine constitutional issues, transcendental importance, cases of first impression), novelty alone cannot cure the petition's inherent procedural defects. The Court will only relax rules for compelling and exceptional reasons, none of which exist here.
  • The Court noted petitioners' failure to comply with procedural requirements but found it unnecessary to rule on the allegation of forum-shopping after finding other grounds for dismissal.
• Substantive:
  • The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against women and children under R.A. No. 9262. SLAPP was introduced under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) and is strictly limited to actions involving "the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights." R.A. No. 9262 is not included in the enumerated laws covered by A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.
  • SLAPP as a defense is a procedural privilege that may only be exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body. It can only be invoked in the same action and before the same court where the alleged SLAPP was filed, not through an original action before a separate forum.
  • The Court's rule-making power cannot be invoked through a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari or prohibition is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction, not to request the Court to exercise its rule-making power in a particular manner or to grant collateral relief not comprehended under Rule 65.
  • Public respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The issuance of a PPO does not preclude public respondents from exercising jurisdiction over complaints filed before them; anything less would be tantamount to abdication of their public offices. The PPO does not insulate petitioner Mercado from prosecution for acts committed in violation of the law, nor does it prevent private respondents from seeking redress based on legitimate grounds.

• Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) — Defined as an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights. The Court strictly limited its application to environmental cases under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, rejecting its extension to domestic violence cases under R.A. No. 9262.
• Exhaustion of Plain, Speedy, and Adequate Remedies — A prerequisite for the issuance of extraordinary writs under Rule 65. The existence of ordinary remedies such as appeal or motion for reconsideration bars the invocation of certiorari or prohibition. The Court emphasized that petitioners could still participate in pending proceedings and appeal adverse judgments.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court held that taking cognizance of cases within one's jurisdiction, even against a party protected by a PPO, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
• Hierarchy of Courts — Direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons, such as genuine issues of constitutionality, transcendental importance, or cases of first impression. Novelty alone cannot justify bypassing lower courts.
• Rule-Making Power of the Court — Vested by Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this power is plenary and cannot be invoked by private citizens through a petition for certiorari or prohibition to compel the Court to promulgate specific rules.

• "The Court is a court of last resort. This policy must be strictly observed so as not to unduly burden the Court with cases that may be resolved by the lower courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction."
• "Those who seek relief from the Court must comply with its rules. Procedural rules are in place for the orderly administration of justice. Litigation may not be a mere contest of technicalities, but this does not excuse strict compliance with the Rules of Court."
• "There is absolutely nothing that precludes public respondents from exercising their respective jurisdictions over the complaints or cases filed before them; anything less would be tantamount to an abdication of their public offices."
• "SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body."
• "The Court will only relax the application of the rules for the most compelling and exceptional reasons, none of which are existent in this case."

• Asian Trading Corp. v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the rule that certiorari or prohibition requires the absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies.
• Lapid, et al. v. Laurea — Cited for the 60-day reglementary period for filing petitions for certiorari.
• Tolentino v. People — Cited for the rule that direct invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons.
• Rama v. Moises — Cited for the exceptions to the strict application of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
• Bibiana Farms & Mills, Inc. v. NLRC — Cited for the principle that litigation is not a mere contest of technicalities but strict compliance with rules is required.
• Manila Electric Co. v. N.E. Magno Construction, Inc. — Cited for the principle that SLAPP as a defense is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules.
• Spouses Mendiola v. CA — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• Biñan Rural Bank v. Carlos — Cited for the principle that certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.

• Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5(5) — Vests the Supreme Court with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
• Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 1 — Governs the remedies of certiorari and prohibition against tribunals exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Rules of Court, Rule 46, Section 3 — Requires the statement of material dates in petitions for certiorari to determine timeliness.
• Rules of Court, Rule 56 — Governs the procedure for original cases filed with the Supreme Court.
• R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004), Section 21 — Provides that violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO shall constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule 71, without prejudice to other criminal or civil actions.
• A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases), Rule 1, Section 4(g) — Defines SLAPP as limited to actions involving enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights.
• A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 1, Section 2 — Enumerates the environmental laws covered by the Rules, excluding R.A. No. 9262.
• A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 6, Section 2 — Provides the procedure for alleging SLAPP as a defense in civil cases.
• A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 19, Sections 1 and 2 — Provide the procedure for alleging SLAPP as a defense in criminal cases.